VOLUME 20
NUMBER 3
FALL 1976

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ORBIS

A Journal of World Affairs

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A POST-ELECTION VIEW

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
TUFTS UNIVERSITY

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ORBIS, A Journal of World Affairs

Published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
in association with
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

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ORBIS is published four times a year by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. **Editorial and business offices:** 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, is located in Medford, Massachusetts 02155. **Subscription rates,** per year: $12.00 for individuals, $16.00 for institutions. (Plus $2.00 per year, overseas.) Single copy, $4.00. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa., and at additional mailing offices.

Books, monographs and pamphlets for review or listing should be sent to the Managing Editors. Address correspondence relating to subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager (please include ZIP).

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reflections
ON THE QUARTER

ORBIS takes this opportunity to welcome the reaffirmation of American democracy, as celebrated every four years in the election of a president of the United States. The choice of former Governor Jimmy Carter to lead the planet's most powerful nation reflects the considered judgment of the American people.

Rarely have the challenges to U.S. security been so great—not simply on a military level, but also in terms of the global economy, political relations with allies, and popular American attitudes toward international commitments. The mandate provided in this election is ambiguous. One of the most difficult tasks for the new administration will be to understand the public's desires, shape these desires into a reasonable consensus, and translate that consensus into an effective foreign policy.

The role of the foreign policy community will be crucial to such a task. It is our belief that the fierce polarization of recent years among foreign policy specialists should now be muted in favor of an effort to create the bipartisan consensus essential to the survival of American society. To this end, ORBIS is proud to offer in this issue a review of some of the critical issues.

The proper orientation of American foreign policy toward "allies" and "adversaries" is the most debatable and crucial foreign policy issue confronting our new president. Should the United States serve as a mediating force between its allies and its adversaries? Thus, articles in this issue address two major questions: to what extent should the United States remain responsible for the defense of its allies in the face of threats from the Soviet Union, and to what degree can the United States pursue functional cooperation with adversaries without jeopardizing the security interests of its allies? We trust that the following articles will at least stimulate thought on the course to be taken by our newly mandated administration.

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THOUGHTS ON A NEW FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

by Paul Seabury

It is presumptuous to draw up a foreign policy agenda for a hypothetical new administration. Any new administration, certainly a second one under Ford, will face the same general international problems that existed before the election. A wholly new administration will gain momentary uplift from looking at a *tabula rasa* on which it can write its own agenda, but that mood will not last long. No eraser can rub out the old problems. Finally, it ought to be borne in mind that campaign issues often turn out to be factitious. In 1960, for example, the missile-gap issue dominated the Kennedy-Nixon debate on foreign policy; only later did it turn out that the issue was a false one.

It should be added that whichever candidate wins, he will have a clear mandate to start afresh. This holds true because Ford's role until now has been that of caretaker; Kissinger's policies since August 1974 have been extrapolations of those that Nixon commenced. For this reason 1977 will bear comparison with previous watersheds, such as that of 1961. The structure of Kissinger's policies may not be abandoned or repudiated, but a new spirit is certain to inform the contours of policy.

The circumstances of transition in 1977 can be instructively compared with those of 1969. Eight years ago, a new administration found a nation virtually at war with itself, torn apart by Vietnam and by profoundly divisive domestic issues. We must remember that the 1960s were a special kind of tragedy for America, in the sense that high and unrealistic expectations at home — the "war on poverty," for one — clashed with extraordinary issues of lifestyle. The two combined to unleash widespread resentment at continuation of the war. In his last months in office, Johnson, fighting a two-front war at home and in Southeast Asia, found this combination beyond the leadership resources of his administration.

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Many war critics accused the administration of conducting a crusade in Vietnam, but this was not the case; the real crusade was being fought domestically, and Johnson proved to be one of its many surprised victims.

It is understandable that, at the time, the chief policy priority was to cool down the nation, and this meant tuning down both public and foreign policy. "Benign neglect" and the Nixon Doctrine were of the same cloth. The "era of confrontation" was to be followed by the "era of negotiation." A heavy international price was paid to accomplish this, but it was an unintended consequence — hardly an intention — of those who devised the strategy. And the nation did cool down.

Thus, 1977 will not be 1969. This is a time of transition in which we have the chance to look with care at drifts, tendencies and movements swirling around, rather than within, the nation. It is also a time in which there are no "doctrines" by which national action in world affairs can proceed and be understood. The Nixon Doctrine, like so many others, is dead. So, for that matter, is detente. The problems persist and multiply; what is missing is the framework for understanding them and coping purposefully with them.

II

Some of the confusion about America's international position stems from the existence of two contrary yet essentially correct depictions of that position, each of which inspires quite opposite moods and attitudes. The dilemma that they pose may be the starting point for some positive conjecturing about what to think and what ought to be done.

Let us first look at the pessimistic view. Only a Pollyanna could now insist that the Whig theory of history is faring well in the world. The evidence on this is not wholly clear, but the fact remains that, in the world of states and governments, liberalism and free societies are having a hard time of it. America and a few other nations — Japan, Canada, the West European states, and a handful of others — constitute a small island on which constitutional democracy works. Current worries over "Eurocommunism" have legitimate bases in fact. Freedom under law — long a principle of American foreign policy — is no longer the promising goal it once was. During the Cold War, this problem was not adequately comprehended by Americans; the global contest was seen as one between communism and political freedom. That certainly remains true, but it was not and

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is not the whole story. The whole story, as we now see it, is that a great many noncommunist states — notably, the non-Western ones — do not by any stretch of the imagination base their authority on democratic principles. In this respect, civic freedom today seems almost an anomaly.

A second aspect of our malaise is the fact that the balance sheet of detente with the Soviet Union does not balance. While detente has always meant a relaxation of tensions, to the Soviets it evidently does not mean a relaxation in their development of military capabilities, or in their ideological campaign against the Western democracies, or in their target-of-opportunity mode of expansion. All this is an old story, yet one that deserves retelling, for it is particularly odd that most Americans have come to accept this increasingly asymmetrical detente relationship. That it is certainly an unpopular issue to bring up is reflected by the fact that during both primaries only Reagan took it to the voters.[1]

It now seems clear that the central assumption of Kissinger's detente policy is the one that most needs questioning. In the abstract, there is nothing particularly objectionable about his strategy of "taming the bear." Any reasonable person would wish the Soviets to behave more responsibly in the international arena. But in practice the strategy has not worked well. Essentially, it was a policy of inducement: give the Soviets a stake in the existing order, and they will behave more nicely. By encouraging Western investment, capital and technology transfers, and trade (so the argument went), the USSR could be drawn into a system of interdependence, and the bear would be tamed.

We cannot rerun history to see how things would have worked had this inducement policy not been tried, but it is clear that the strategy has had few payoffs. The extraordinary behavior of the Soviets during the October 1973 war, their subsequent adventures in Portugal and Angola, and their continued encroachments in southern Africa — to mention only the most conspicuous cases — occurred at the height of detente. It should also be borne in mind that interdependence works both ways: American farmers, now captivated by the Soviet grain market, will have nothing to do with politically inspired grain embargoes, and President Ford has gone out of his way to tell them that he will not either. In all events, the Soviet Union continues to be what it was a decade ago, but now it

[1] So anxious were the Democrats in 1976 to avoid a recurrence of the foreign policy donnybrooks of 1968 and 1972 that the national committee, in scheduling platform committee hearings across the country this spring, originally planned to include no foreign policy items.

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is able to exercise political and military influence on a truly global scale.

Perhaps the most unsettling change in the international political structure is the new *de facto* alliance of convenience, on a variety of questions, between the great communist states and militant, anti-Western forces in the Third World. Soviet animosity toward the West has different roots than that of the so-called nonaligned states, but both share a view that the Western world, America in particular, is responsible for the woes and plights of the poor, and even the not-so-poor, nations of the world.[2]

Some assert that this new power contest between the West and important forces in the Third World has replaced and superseded that between East and West, but this is not so. Since, like the East-West confrontation, the North-South one concerns power rather than simply economics, it adds another dimension to the strategic difficulties of the United States. It enhances the picture of an America potentially isolated from vast portions of the globe. That this struggle focused mainly on questions of economics (the "new international order," for instance) should not blind us to its political features. The proposed redistribution of the world's wealth has profound political implications. Lasswell's definition of politics — "who gets what, where, when, why and how" — is now being demonstrated on a global scale. Furthermore, that most of the new states calling for this redistribution are also hostile to market-economy principles should alert us to the fact that advocates of a global system of redistributive justice mean to accomplish this through statist and bureaucratic means; and they have many supporters in the West. As the Western and Western-oriented world shrinks in size, its economic principles will be challenged by combinations of states and multistate cartels.

One aspect of the present North-South problem, which distinguishes it from the situation that obtained a decade or more ago, is that today the redistributive solution to disparity of wealth takes precedence over the developmental one. So long as the gap between North and South was perceived to stem from relative pro-

[2] This tendency to compare the impoverishment of the Third World only with the affluence of the West is shared and even propagated by many Westerners. Some months ago, for instance, a *New York Times* chart, purporting to rank the world's nations in terms of GNP and per-capita income, listed all the sovereign, independent states of the world — except for the communist ones. Consequently, the reader was not able to compare, for example, living standards in the Soviet Union with those in, say, Ethiopia, or those in East Germany with those in Bangladesh. The communist states thus become neither part of the problem nor its solution, a role they happily accept.

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ductive capacity, development aid and technical assistance were seen as the chief means by which developed countries could act constructively. Two immediate factors, however, conspired to shift attention to the principle of distributive justice. First, there was growing evidence that the development effort of the 1960s had failed — that where production increases had occurred (e.g., in food), they were canceled out by extraordinary population increases; that systems of state mobilization and control of economic development by and large had not worked. Second, OPEC's 1973 coup showed that something could be gotten for nothing — that rigged monopolistic pricing systems could be created and used with impunity by underdeveloped states. Subsequent attempts by states to apply the OPEC model to other commodities are not to be sneezed at.

It is to ideology, as related to power, that we must now turn to see the implications of this turn of events. Once the emphasis has been shifted from how to increase productivity to how one should distribute what has been produced, one has moved onto terrain fraught with potential conflict, which is bound to have powerful domestic ramifications for the United States. Paradoxically, this new definition of the North-South relationship is bound to rekindle flames of doctrinal discord over the labor theory of value.

Although thoroughly discredited by economists who know how the world operates, the labor theory of value retains a powerful hold on the minds of those concerned with social justice. Marx used it as a moral weapon, and it continues to be used by Marxist economists today. The notion that value is created by those who contribute their labor, skills and intelligence to a product has been repeatedly challenged and refuted by free-market economists. In a supply-and-demand system, they argue, the price of any commodity is determined by the intersection of the curves; if an object or product requires vast amounts of labor, yet has no takers, in a strict economic sense it has no value.

Now, a concern for redistributive justice in the Third World, inspired by an egalitarian creed and imitating OPEC, seeks to alter the relationship between North and South. To the extent that this is accomplished, the North will pay to redistribute wealth to the underdeveloped countries. As the OPEC price hike of 1971-1974 raised oil prices tenfold (and in a decade could well transfer $1 trillion from the developed countries to the OPEC states), so might other schemes follow. The rampaging inflation of the early 1970s might resume, and producers and consumers in developed countries

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might pay, in reduced income levels, to the new state cartels of the South. Suffice it to say, such a state of affairs will at some point cause many to ask in anger why the most productive nations should have to pay tribute to the least productive. In odd fashion, Marx's labor theory of value could become reversed, for now it would be the rich (and productive) against the poor (and least productive). It could also be, as some have pointed out, that the poor in rich countries will pay more into the pockets of the rich in poor countries — already the case in the Persian Gulf states. This brutal scenario may not be consummated, but there are many who imprudently intend that it come to pass.

In the Third World today, the Western democracies are depicted officially as clothed in wealth rather than in freedoms; envy being what it is, one can expect that the righteousness of the poor might be cause for uneasiness among the rich. For America and other technologically advanced societies, one problem lies in the fact that any attempt to justify our good fortune on the grounds that we have won the right to consume by virtue of our extraordinary productivity, would fan the flames of envy still higher. Thus it is that official Third World accusations regarding exploitation and colonialism have, for the most part, been met in the West by silence, acquiescence or hearty agreement.

From all this conjecturing, we can discern a new militant aggregation of poor states, supposedly nonaligned, directing their animus not against all developed states but exclusively against those of the democratic West. In reaction, a freeze of America's classic and traditional humanitarianism might well occur; generosity, as a basis for voluntary transfer of wealth, is to be distinguished from the compulsions of affirmed obligation, necessity or blackmail. Another wall might arise between America and the vast majority of the world's peoples.

III

The foregoing sketch has an opposite and brighter side. Common sense tells us there is a set of positive and dynamic relations between America and the world. As Alastair Buchan put it, the United States is still the "great experimental society." One would be hard put to find another major nation in the past decade that has expended so much human, material and spiritual energy to cure its own social ills. This is particularly true of civil rights and racial equality, and while many may find fault with the wisdom, fairness or realism of some programs, still the evidence of improvement in

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America's race relations contrasts sharply with conditions in many other countries — in the Third World especially.

It is also clear that America's positive connections with the world around us are increasing, not diminishing. The free outward and inward flow of capital and capital investment makes it clear that the United States is not (as critics of U.S. "imperialism" are wont to say) an octopus in the world economy. The open door is a revolving one, admitting and issuing new economic influences. The logic of interdependence works two ways. Those who fear that heavy U.S. capital investment abroad may enfeeble domestic economic growth and increase unemployment should note the extraordinary influx of European, Canadian and Japanese capital into the United States, the establishment of new foreign-owned plants, and the active role of foreign investors in many sectors of American life. These recent developments testify to high confidence in the U.S. economy and reflect a preference by foreign (as well as domestic) capital investors for environments that are stable, not subject to the whimsies of expropriating governments, and free of the political upheavals endemic to many Third World countries.

Furthermore, what we know of current migration patterns tells us that America is still what it was in the nineteenth century — a mecca for people seeking a better life. New patterns of immigration — from Latin America, from the Philippines and other parts of Asia — make it almost inevitable that in the not-too-distant future the United States will be a truly multiethnic society, cosmopolitan in a way that no great nation except perhaps Rome has ever been. The flow of migrants out of the totalitarian states continues, despite the minefields, barbed wire and walls. Those who vote with their feet have shown which way they want to run.

Finally, American culture, with all its fascinating quirks, and its steadfast refusal to be captive to government policy and controls, still works its ways on the outside world, particularly on the world's youth. The threat to the Japanese clothing industry today comes not from U.S. embargoes on Japanese imports (as was the case in the 1930s) but from Levi Strauss's jeans, and young leftist radicals in Italy are more at home with American-style films and tapes than with the somber trappings of socialism.

IV

These two views of the world may seem to contradict each other, but each is an incomplete expression of the same reality. In

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the words of a distinguished economist, "if everything is getting so much worse why is everything getting so much better?" The point should be made that the worst thing that could happen would be to accept one view and reject the other. To adopt the pessimistic representation would be to encourage stultifying fear, despair and harshness of attitude, and to stir up latent xenophobic strains in our culture. To accept without qualification the bright side, would be to bask on a dangerous beach, innocent to forces at work in the world that do not act in our interests. Those who accept the first view — and there are many among our opinion elite who do — may choose to turn in hatred against their own civilization, joining many non-Western intellectuals to condemn it as the chief cause of the generally sad condition of the world's peoples. Those who accept the second view, also perversely, may conclude that they have no serious obligation to support the security requirements of an open society, since there is no serious problem.

Reflections such as these form the backdrop to questions of policy. It is quite clear that in response to a combination of pernicious international developments and popular reactions to them, the United States could lapse into a posture of sullen and aggrieved hostility in its foreign policies. It is also possible that the American public might — as in the past — come to understand and accept that there is truth in both the positive and the negative diagnoses. But if the latter possibility is one that the next administration wishes to encourage, then it is necessary that the government level with the American people. We are talking about a restoration of confidence, which can come about only by discarding slogans and by speaking candidly on the emerging issues of our time.

It is probably true, to put the best light on the matter, that since 1970 those in the highest circles of our government have acted on the assumption that the dominant elements of America's elite suffered a major loss of nerve as consequence of the Vietnam war, and that the policies they designed were a holding action to provide time for something to turn up. Mr. Micawber would surely nod in approval.

The abdication of the elite, however, encourages the extemporizing of policymakers. As the assault on the presidency neared flood level during Watergate, President Nixon quickened in his desire to paint an ever more misleading picture of his great international accomplishments. Seeking to be known as the author of peace, he bore a heavy responsibility for distorting what these accomplishments were. While he probably correctly estimated the

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extent to which important opposition leadership had shackled his administration's freedom of movement, he misrepresented policies of prudent passivity as displays of diplomatic triumph.[3] It is one thing to accept a necessity in public matters; quite another to embrace it.

Now that recent wounds are healing, the first foreign policy priority of any administration is to speak candidly to the American people on the nature of the world we live in. The public should be neither damned nor flattered. We have seen that men who honestly embark on a course of necessary if unpleasant action can ironically come to accept their own pleasant public version of it as a triumph. The people need to be told the truth.

V

If the first agenda-item, then, is to level with the American public, the second is to strengthen America's ties with its allies. There is a very practical reason for regarding this as the most important substantive policy item: the new administration must, in the most realistic way, assess who our friends are in order to form policies that make neat distinctions in this regard. Such a reassessment may be opposed by some Americans who, either for clever reasons of *Realpolitik* or out of undifferentiated humanitarianism, seem to have forgotten the first requirement of a useful foreign policy — to strengthen ties of friendship with states that share interests with one's own.[4] This will also be a difficult and controversial business, for some moralizers discern the mote in the eye of a friend more clearly than they do hatred in the gaze of an enemy. But there are no perfect nations, and because some quite imperfect ones have long announced their enmity to us, some discrimination is needed; corrupt and weak authoritarian regimes that display no desire to align (or nonalign!) themselves with our powerful adversaries may be unpleasant to have around, but they pose no threat to our vital interests. In deciding whether to establish or maintain relations with these states, practical interests ought to apply, just as

[3] One instance of the odd manner in which Nixon diplomacy accidentally succeeded — foreign adversaries rescuing the administration from domestic disaster — occurred in 1972 when Brezhnev, assenting to the proposal for MBFR talks, thereby saved the administration from the Mansfield-McGovern attempt to bring about unilateral and drastic U.S. troop cuts in Europe.

[4] During his stewardship with the U.S. mission to the United Nations, Daniel Moynihan discovered to his surprise that the mission had never troubled to keep roll-call counts in the General Assembly, and thus was quite unable to determine the extent to which other nations' votes corresponded with those of the American delegation.

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practical considerations are taken into account in dealings with our major communist opponents.[5]

A nation's reputation consists partly in what Nietzsche said characterizes a civilized man — the ability to make promises. A too-clever *Realpolitik,* which would sacrifice allies and friends to reap momentary benefit from adversaries, may be a game that small and weak nations must often play, but it is not a wise policy for the leader of an alliance. While many considerations prompted the United States to abandon its allies in Southeast Asia (it is not necessary to rehearse them here), it can hardly be said that the final decision was prompted by a desire to gratify our enemies.

Far different is the issue of Taiwan, taken in the broad context of our Asian policies and the triangular relationship we have with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. There is today a certain irony in the fact that some Americans would abandon Taiwan in order to gratify or strengthen elements in Peking who press for a closer relationship with the United States. This is an overly cunning way to conduct diplomacy. As many have pointed out, Peking has recently looked with alarm and disdain at the global retreat of American power; in such circumstances it hardly can be expected that an American betrayal of Taiwan in the interests of *Realpolitik* would encourage the Chinese to respect us any more than they do now. More likely, it would enhance their contempt. Even more, an act of expediential abandonment would have grave consequences for America's general alliance posture and would create further alarm among America's Asian friends.

The most distasteful aspect of an American abandonment, however, would be its flagrant disregard of the wishes of the inhabitants themselves — Formosans and Chinese alike. To forget the clear contrast between conditions prevailing on the island and those on the Chinese mainland would be an extreme display of crude *Realpolitik*. Taiwan is no democracy, but it has both prospered and escaped the savage stamp of the New Man which reduced the population of the mainland to a dumb silence and imprisonment. It was said of Maria Theresa, when she joined with Prussia and Russia to carve up Poland, "She wept, but she took." It could be fairly said of a hypothetical American abandonment of Taiwan, "She wept, but

[5] It ought to be remembered that almost by definition a corrupt regime is rarely a real threat to anyone save its own people, except when its weakness imperils its friends. Yet regimes posing as quintessentially the most efficient are usually the most ruthless. The brutalities committed by Chile's *junta* are exposed mercilessly, but those of Castro's Cuba are often ignored.

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she gave" — hardly a proud comment on a nation that for two centuries has stood for freedom and self-determination.

VI

The central alliance issue, beyond that of maintaining credible promises, has to do with the future of NATO and of America's broader relations with its European friends. This topic has by now been discussed so often that the mere mention of it evokes yawns. A few Americans, who have convinced themselves that the Cold War is over, see NATO as a vestige of past problems. But probably most of us regard the Alliance as necessary; the old Soviet problem that gave rise to it is still with us, and the peace of Europe depends on known and credible commitments.

Three chief questions need to be stressed here: NATO's strategic efficacy, the insufficiency of NATO's circumscribed role in world politics, and domestic trends in European politics that threaten continental integrity. As for the first, I might single out one problem that the new administration should face. It has been clear to close observers of the NATO force structure for some time that the national forces from which NATO's units are derived pose serious doubts as to war-fighting ability. NATO forces — while capable of operating under unified command — are a melange of national units, nationally supplied. They are not, however, interchangeable parts. The force components are now such that in combat, wholly apart from the question of each component's efficiency, extraordinary logistical problems of coordination and mutual support would quickly arise. It is therefore essential that standardization in arms development, procurement and development be seen as a prime imperative.

While formidable obstacles to standardization exist (as seen in attempts by some U.S. firms to thwart approval of the joint U.S.-German tank), common sense would suggest that these must be overcome. Acceptance of a doctrine of comparative advantage, now that procurement costs have skyrocketed, would also mean that economies of scale could be introduced, resulting in great savings. The achievement of this sort of standardization would also bear new witness to the solidarity of the Alliance and demonstrate that NATO forces are not simply token trip-wire forces. Arms have become every year more costly and complex, and Europe becomes more and more dependent on the United States for advanced weapons technology. This has not been the case in the past, and it should not be so in the future.

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If we take notice of changes in Europe's relationship with the rest of the world, a more fundamental political-strategic issue emerges. President Nixon, in 1972, spoke of a global structure of peace comprising five power centers: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and Europe. The fallacy of this concept lies in the fact that Europe has neither a foreign policy nor a unified strategic force. In a sense, NATO obscures this strategic defect: while it is an alliance, its *raison d'être* has been to counterbalance Soviet power. When NATO was conceived Britain and France were still global powers, and Europe could be said to have strategic interests outside the NATO region. This is no longer the case. While West European nations continue to foster economic ties with other parts of the world, in point of fact Europe — in trade, aid and development — is a parochial region. In a strategic sense, it is more dependent on the United States than it was twenty years ago. Europe's dependency is illustrated vividly by its need for Middle Eastern oil, the threats on access to that oil, and the fact that Europe now has no collective means other than diplomacy to guarantee access. Europe remains vulnerable to Arab blackmail.

If the Western democracies are (as I have said before) a small and beleaguered minority in world politics, one priority of policy should be to strengthen the cohesion that was weakened by Nixonian neglect. The year 1973, when Kissinger began to repair the damage, was to be known as the "Year of Europe"; it turned out to be the year of Watergate and OPEC.

America and Europe need to resurrect their commonality of purpose in a vastly changed world. In monetary and trade matters, President Ford has taken important steps in this direction, but the new administration should enlarge these gains. It would do well to give alliance renewal priority over superpower summitry. Kissinger's ill-disguised contempt for European importance has some basis in fact, but contempt is a poor ingredient of leadership.

One concern, shared in recent years by thoughtful American and European leaders, has been the possibility of Europe's "Finlandization" — a process whereby Western Europe, were the American NATO guarantee to melt away, could become dependent on Soviet good will and thus be effectively neutralized. The fear of American abandonment reached its height in 1972, when U.S. domestic pressures to reduce the U.S. presence in Europe were brought to bear on the Nixon administration. Pressures to cut defense expenditures operated in Europe as well, and they arose from the same general causes — inflation and escalation of the costs

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of social welfare and of high-technology defense items. But over and above these, there was a detente-induced complacency. It was the view of Senator Mansfield that the time had come for Europeans to pay their own way and that the shock treatment of U.S. withdrawal would suffice to awaken them to this fact. How such an American decision would serve as a trumpet blast to Europe, when justified on the grounds that the Cold War was over, was only one of the odd features of this notion.

Fear of American abandonment and ensuing Finlandization has disappeared. In fact, the American presence and will to remain in Europe are as strong today as they ever were. Replacing that fear today is the somber prospect of Eurocommunism. What stance should the new administration take toward the very real possibility that one or more NATO countries may admit communists into the highest levels of government? There are many nuances to this dangerous problem, not the least of which is the question whether loud expressions of U.S. official concern would have positive or negative effect. Ultimately, the problem must be resolved by the Europeans themselves; public lectures from Washington could well backfire.

In one sense, preoccupation with Eurocommunism — serious and legitimate as it is — may be the wrong way to help nurture and sustain the European democracies. A concern for the future of humane and free societies necessitates dealing with forces that, though reputed for their efficiency, are not known for their respect of human freedoms and constitutional rights. But in free societies, it is the vigor of the forces of freedom in charting positive courses of action that is the test of their positive strength; thus, in concrete matters where this vigor is put to a test, the partisans of freedom will be respected more for their conviction and commitment than for their fears. That this is so may be seen in the positive help given by European Community democratic parties to their Portuguese counterparts, which played no small role in the recent triumph of the nontotalitarian parties in their time of peril. The new administration can make clear, as all recent ones have, what our fundamental convictions are in such matters and who our friends are. Silence here could be fatal, and American voices need to be positive, not Spenglerian. Again, the responsibility for guarding European freedom ultimately falls on the Europeans themselves.

At all times, the most difficult problem facing foreign-policymakers is not simply to make choices, but to establish priorities as well. Neglect of Europe during the recent years of East-West

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summitry was not evidence that we were abandoning our allies, but rather that we were seeking to establish firmer ground rules and a better understanding of coexistence. Similarly, to advocate as an urgent priority the renewal of cohesion with our allies must not be seen as abandonment of the diplomacy of coexistence. In fact, in the long run coexistence must necessarily be based on such cohesion and common purpose.

VII

Let us return to the question of Cassandra versus Pollyanna. The optimistic view of America's current situation in the world is really a valid one only if Americans can be made to recognize the truths in the pessimistic view. There is an urgent need to impress on Americans that we are part of a small island of immensely talented and productive people living in a quite poor and populous world, and that the ratio is daily changing against us. We must not be misled into thinking that this contrast of wealth and poverty is our doing and responsibility, and we cannot be deceived into thinking that it lies within our power to erase or significantly ease the disparity. If, as the pessimists say, our condition is steadily worsening, then we must solidify ties with our friends before entering the fray with our adversaries. In so doing, however, we cannot afford to let either harshness or feigned, innocuous innocence become our demeanor in international dealings. Much of our present difficulty in the world is a consequence of our success. We should have a sovereign's pride in this success and cherish it. The world will respect us more for doing so.

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WILL THE SOVIET UNION SOON HAVE A FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY?*

by R. J. Rummel

Since the necessary condition for the pursuit of any national priority is the continued survival and independence of the United States, national security is our highest priority. And the central question for those concerned with the security of the United States is this: does the USSR now possess, or will it soon possess, a first-strike capability? If the anwer is yes, then swift military victory over the United States will lie in Soviet hands.

An answer requires extreme care. We must work our way through a thicket of technical considerations; the essential information is secret and manipulated; and there are two sides to the question — one political, the other technical. The technical side concerns whether in fact it is or might soon be physically possible for the Soviets to attack our strategic forces and destroy our retaliatory capability; that is, do they or will they shortly have a *preclusive first-strike capability?* The political side concerns the Soviet ability to eliminate a significant portion of our strategic offensive forces while deterring us from retaliating with what is left; that is, do they have a *dominant first-strike capability?*

The difference between the two should be clear. A preclusive capability is a matter of relative forces and their objective characteristics: warhead yield, accuracy, hardening of silos, antiballistic missile protection, and so on. It is a matter of probabilities, reliabilities, and a mathematical model putting all the variables and parameters together. The existence of a preclusive first-strike capability thus becomes a physical problem subject to technical solution.

A dominant capability is also a question of weapons characteristics, probabilities and equations. But it is not wholly subject to technical analysis, for man's psychology, perceptions and values are also at issue. It is partly a question of what constitutes a sufficient military threat to deter American leaders from retaliation and to

* This article is based on the author's *Peace Endangered: The Reality of Détente* (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1976).

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invoke surrender. How we answer this depends on our political wisdom.

The weapons requirements for a preclusive strike are not the same as those for a dominant first-strike; hence the basic reason for the distinction. The Soviets might not possess or might not be able to attain a preclusive first-strike capability, but at the same time they might be quite capable of obtaining a dominant one. Since a preclusive first-strike capability requires more offensive and defensive strategic power, its existence would assume a dominant capability as well.

With these considerations in mind, let us take the more demanding case first. Does the Soviet Union now have or will it soon have a preclusive first-strike capability? A full answer necessitates a technical discussion and elaboration of the factors involved, which include the characteristics of the Soviet and American offensive weapons (ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers), hardening of American missile silos, strategic defenses on both sides, missile reliability, number of warheads and yield, missile accuracy, defensive radars, and so on.

To begin the discussion, consider that the United States maintains a strategic force composed of three systems: ICBMs, bombers, and Polaris and Poseidon nuclear submarines. Nuclear deterrence rests on the ability of any one of these systems to survive an attack. I will consider each in turn, beginning with our land-based ICBMs.

The "Invulnerability" of American ICBMs

Several factors are involved in the ability of our ICBMs to survive a surprise attack, among them the number, accuracy and yield of the warheads attacking them, the protection given the ICBMs, and the electronic interference ("fratricide") effects. In order to determine the survivability of our ICBM force, Kosta Tsipis, a senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, assessed the relationships among a number of these factors.[1] Tsipis tends to underestimate the capability of the Soviet missile force, so his study provides a conservative first-approximation of the Soviet Union's first-strike ability.

In his assessment, we have 1,054 ICBMs: 54 Titans, each with a warhead greater than 5 megatons; 450 Minuteman II missiles, with a 1-megaton warhead apiece; and 550 Minuteman IIIs, each with three 160-kiloton MIRV warheads. The Minuteman III ICBMs

[1] Kosta Tsipis, "Physics and Calculus of Countercity and Counterforce Attacks," *Science*, February 7, 1975, pp. 393-397.

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are housed underground in silos hardened to withstand an overpressure of 1,000 pounds per square inch (psi); the rest are in silos built to withstand 300 psi. Is this ICBM force invulnerable?

According to Tsipis, the USSR has available for a sudden attack the following ICBMs: 209 SS-7s, 8 of which have 5-megaton warheads; 288 of the heavy SS-9s, each with a 20-megaton warhead; and 970 SS-11s, with a 1-megaton warhead apiece. There are also the submarine-launched missiles: 528 SS-N-6s (with 1-megaton warheads) and 80 SS-N-8s (also with 1-megaton warheads). These data are for 1974 and are considerably below the current size and power of Soviet missiles. By the end of 1975 four new types of missiles were operational, including the following: the SS-18, which is a larger successor to the SS-9 and is capable of carrying a 50-megaton warhead or eight MIRVs; the SS-17, which can carry four 2-megaton MIRV warheads; and the SS-19, which can carry five 2-megaton MIRV warheads. Nonetheless, let us see where Tsipis's optimistic data lead him.

He first determined a coefficient (K), which is a function of a warhead's accuracy and yield, in order to measure, with a specific probability, how lethal a warhead must be to destroy a missile in a silo.[2] If there is S number of silos, then KS measures the lethality of opposing warheads required to destroy S silos. If there is N number of warheads, then KN measures the overall lethality of the warheads available. When KS equals KN, the number of warheads is just sufficient to destroy the number of silos.

Tsipis tabulated the number of warheads, yields, and accuracies of American and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs together with their KS and KN values. Table I summarizes his relevant data. Note that the Soviets seemed to have nowhere near the ability to destroy a high percentage of American missile silos as of 1974. Even if we were to focus on the Soviets' 288 SS-9s, the most powerful of their missiles at the time and the one provoking first-strike fears in the hearts of analysts, and even if it is assumed that 50 per cent of the USSR's warheads will fall within 1 nautical mile (i.e., CEP=1) of the silo, these SS-9s could destroy only 45 of the 504 silos hardened to withstand 300 psi, or 19 of those 550 hardened to survive 1,000 psi. And all this assumes a 100 per cent availability and launch reliability for the missiles; it also overlooks fratricide by nearby nuclear explosions.

In sum, this optimistic analysis shows a very large gap between Soviet capabilities in 1974 and what is required for a first-

[2] $K = Y^{\frac{2}{3}} \div CEP^2$, where Y is the yield of a warhead and the CEP (circular error probable) is its accuracy in nautical miles.

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TABLE I

LETHALITY REQUIRED AND LETHALITY AVAILABLE TO DESTROY ENEMY SILOS*

Attacker	*Lethality Required (KS)*		*Lethality Available (KN)*
	P = 0.97	*P = 0.90*	
United States	40,000	26,300	18,648
Soviet Union	82,080	54,170	3,864

* All data are for 1974.

strike. However, this assumes a very poor accuracy for their missiles, an accuracy that may be greatly underestimated. Some, for example, have estimated the powerful SS-9 to be almost twice as accurate as Tsipis assumes.[3] Such a change in estimate can increase Tsipis's lethality coefficient for this missile from 7 to 29, or by *more than four times* the silo-killing capacity that he gives it. If the accuracy is four times that which Tsipis assumes, his lethality coefficient explodes from 7 to 116 — an order-of-magnitude jump.

That this higher accuracy is not unlikely, consider the following information supplied to Congress by the Department of Defense: "We have some information that the Soviets have achieved or will soon achieve, accuracies of 500-700 meters with their ICBMs."[4] This would be about a fourth to a third of a nautical mile, or accuracies four and three times that assumed by Tsipis. If the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs were four times greater than that which Tsipis estimates, the lethality available to the Soviets (Table I) would jump from 3,864 to 64,032 — enough to destroy probably 90 per cent of our ICBMs.

As a consequence, the probability values in Table I are subject to sharp increase for the Soviets if in fact their accuracies approach anything like our own, which are estimated at a CEP of 0.5 for the Titan, 0.3 for the Minuteman II, and 0.2 for the Minuteman III. But working within Tsipis's optimistic assumptions, the answer is clear: the Soviets did not have a preclusive first-strike capability as of 1974. Will they soon have one? In another analysis, Tsipis has extended his KN values for the Soviet Union into the future as "possible Russian responses" to announced U.S. progress.[5]

[3] See Harry Gelber, *Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], Adelphi Paper 99, 1973).

[4] James R. Schlesinger, briefing on counterforce attacks before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 11, 1974.

[5] Kosta Tsipis, "The Accuracy of Strategic Missiles," *Scientific American*, July 1975, pp. 14-23.

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We can take these values as representing the future Soviet kill capability.

Judging from Tsipis's plotted projections,[6] the Soviet Union will have (as a worst case estimate; i.e., the top of a range of possible capabilities) KNs of about 80,000 in 1980, 200,000 in 1981, and 800,000 in 1985. According to Table I, a KS of 54,170 could destroy about 90 per cent of our silos; a KS of 82,080 could destroy about 97 per cent. Thus, by 1981, the Soviets would have a possible 200,000 KN to a needed 82,080 KS. This disparity should compensate for the possible unreliability of some of their missiles and the fratricide effects on warheads aimed at the same or nearby targets. Moreover, we must remember that all this may be based on an estimate of Soviet warhead accuracy that is off by a factor of two, which would quadruple the KN of 200,000, or even by a factor of four, which would raise the KN to more than 3 million!

Tsipis does not indicate what Soviet responses he is plotting. We do not know whether he has taken into account their new (MIRVed and more accurate) missiles now operational: e.g., the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19. The SS-18 and SS-19 have been estimated to have a CEP of 0.25,[7] which, if true, according to his way of calculating missile lethality, would give the Soviets an assured ability to obliterate our land-based missiles by 1980. In any case, his optimistic assumptions lead to the pessimistic conclusion that, at least by 1981, the USSR could destroy all but about a dozen of our ICBMs (i.e., 99% effectiveness).

What happens if our assumptions are pessimistic to begin with? Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward have presented data and analyses bearing on this question,[8] arguing that around 1977 the Soviet Union will be able to destroy our ICBMs. They assume that Soviet missile accuracy (CEP) will be within 1,000 feet and that the Soviets can launch 300 SS-9s, 100 SS-18s, and 20 SS-17 or SS-19 ICBMs for a total of 2,634 warheads (mainly 2 megatons apiece) in two equal waves. The second wave could be launched at the same targets after a delay of 6 minutes. The number and power of these warheads should destroy all but 6 of our ICBMs (even if the 150 ICBMs were protected by 100 ABMs at Grand Forks, North Dakota). Moreover, before the warheads impact, some 30 Yankee-class sub-

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[7] William R. Van Cleave, "Soviet Doctrine and Strategy: A Developing American View," paper presented at the Conference on the Future Role of Soviet Military Power Within the East-West Political Context, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Germany, May 1-2, 1975.

[8] Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, *Kissinger on the Couch* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1975), p. 64 ff. *et passim*.

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marines could explode SLBM warheads over our silos at the moment we receive warning of an ICBM attack; through interference effect, this would pin down our ICBMs until the Soviet ICBM warheads arrive.

Another way of looking at the survivability of our ICBMs is in terms of the total throw-weight available to the Soviet Union.[9] Within the limits of the Vladivostok accord, 10 to 12 million pounds of throw-weight "can be expected" to be available to the Soviets. Compare this with a net throw-weight of only about 4 million pounds necessary to threaten the destruction of 92 per cent of our ICBMs. This assumes silos hardened to withstand 1,000 psi, a CEP of 0.125 nautical mile, and two warheads targeted on a silo; it also takes into account reliability. Clearly, the Soviet Union will have enough throw-weight to destroy all but a handful of our ICBMs, and will have enough left over to threaten our cities and deal with our allies.[10]

In short, considering the data offered by Tsipis, Schlafly and Ward, and Nitze, *pessimistic assumptions lead to a possible destruction of our ICBMs by 1977; optimistic assumptions postpone this possibility only for a few years.*

The Retaliatory Capability of America's Strategic Bombers

The destruction of our ICBMs is only part of the preclusive first-strike equation. What about our long-range bombers? We can assume that the Soviets will attack without warning and that, even with 30 per cent of our bombers on 15-minute alert, most would still be caught on the ground. Our SAC bases can be attacked with fractional orbital (FOB) missiles that would give no more than 3 minutes' warning to the bombers. This means that our bases would be hit more than 15 minutes earlier than our ICBMs (an ICBM warhead from the Soviet Union would take about 30 min-

[9] See Paul Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, p. 230 (note 19).

[10] The April 1976 issue of *Foreign Affairs* contained an article by Jan M. Lodal entitled "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternate View," which was critical of Nitze's conclusions about the future destructive capability of Soviet ICBMs. Lodal argues that if "by 1985 the Soviets were able to increase this yield to 1.5 megatons and improve accuracy to 0.15 nautical miles, this could increase the probability of destroying a silo with two warheads to about 85 percent." (p. 465.)

Lodal gives no formula for these calculations, but they appear overly optimistic. According to the Institute for Strategic Studies' *Strategic Survey: 1969* (p. 32), the accuracy and yield assumed by Lodal would lead to a 99 per cent probability of destroying a 300-psi silo with *one* warhead. Using Formula 12b given by Tsipis ("Physics and Calculus . . .," p. 396) and employing Lodal's assumptions with regard to yield, number of warheads and accuracy, we arrive at a 98 per cent probability of destroying a silo hardened to withstand 1,000 psi. These results favor Nitze rather than Lodal.

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utes from launch to impact), but pin-down nuclear explosions could be set off above our ICBM fields by FOBs and SLBMs to prevent launching of our Minuteman force. Only 92 to 138 warheads with relatively low accuracy would be needed to destroy our 46 SAC bases.

In the best case, 20 per cent of our bombers might survive.[11] (In July 1975 we had 463 long-range B-52s.) If we also optimistically assume that 300 B-52s are available and reliably on-line in the 1977-1980 period, then about 60 might survive. On flight toward the Soviet Union and as they attempt to penetrate to target, these bombers would face a swarm of 2,700 interceptors — including the latest and fastest MiG-25 Foxbat and 9,500 surface-to-air (SAM) launchers (not counting reloads). About half these SAMs are SA-2s with a slant-range of 25 miles, and many have more than double this range. Moreover, the Soviets have about 5,000 defensive radars to guide their planes and SAMs to our 60 bombers. Finally, our bombers will try to penetrate at very low altitude and may confront a Soviet AWACS/fighter air-defense system with a look-down, shoot-down capability. The United States has demonstrated that such a system is possible.[12]

Thus, on the average there are 45 interceptors and hundreds of SAMs to attack each U.S. bomber (remember, the Soviets planned the surprise attack and will be ready for our bombers): it would be remarkable if any survive. However, again to be optimistic, assume that 20 per cent make it to target or are able to fire stand-off air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) with 1-megaton warheads. Of these 12 bombers surviving, assume 4 would be of the old B-52 D type, carrying perhaps four 1- to 5-megaton bombs and one ASM; the remainder would be of the G-H type and possibly would carry, in addition to the four bombs, twelve to twenty 200-kiloton SRAMs (short-range attack missiles) and two ASMs apiece.

Therefore, we could expect the following to arrive on target if all went well: 48 bombs totaling 48 to 240 megatons, 20 ASMs with 20 total megatons, and 96 to 160 SRAMs with 19.2 to 32 total megatons. If the megatonnages per weapon are converted to equivalent megatons (EMT) through the formula $EMT = NY^{2/3}$, where N equals the number of warheads (or bombs) and Y their yield, then we get 101 to 215 EMT for this surviving bomber force. This is the total optimistic retaliatory power of our surviving long-

[11] Edward Luttwak, *The Strategic Balance: 1972* (New York: The Library Press, 1972), pp. 32-34.

[12] James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report FY 1976 and FY 1977*, February 5, 1975, p. II-34.

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range bomber force. Evaluation of the significance of this power is a problem to which we shall return after considering the U.S. submarine force.

The Retaliatory Capability of the American Submarine Force

Many feel that none of our bombers and few of our ICBMs could survive a nuclear attack, but that our invulnerable submarines constitute the heart of our deterrent force. In considering the deterrent effect of our Polaris, Poseidon and future Trident missiles, we must take into account the number of submarines on station, the number vulnerable to antisubmarine warfare (ASW), the number of warheads and their yield, and the possible antiballistic missile defenses of Soviet cities. This is quite an order.

Perhaps the best study of all the factors involved in an effective submarine deterrent is that provided by Geoffrey Kemp, who has developed a series of models interrelating several assumptions about these factors.[13] Before going any further, let us first define three damage levels that range up to what the Soviets might consider unacceptable. These are presented in Table II and are based on those discussed by Kemp.[14]

A basic question concerns the psi overpressure needed to achieve these damage levels; Kemp assumes 5 psi is sufficient.[15] Civil defense, however, has been a serious concern in the Soviet Union. For more than a decade urban populations have been prepared for possible nuclear attack; shelters and evacuation plans have been arranged. The Soviets have even boasted that their civil defense can limit the mortality from a total U.S. attack on their cities to around 6 per cent.[16] Since we are talking about a retaliatory attack, surely the Soviet people will be ready. For these reasons, we must consider at least a partial implementation of the USSR's civil defense resources.

The problem, then, centers on what overpressure to use in order to determine damage levels L-1 to L-3, taking civil defense into account. To severely damage a reinforced-concrete building above ground, 11 to 15 psi are required; underground shelters, available to half the urban population, can protect people from overpressures

[13] Geoffrey Kemp, *Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers: Part I — Targets and Weapons Systems* and *Parts II and III — Strategic Requirements and Options* (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers 106 and 107, 1974).

[14] Parts II and III, p. 5. As does Kemp, I am taking 50 per cent of the population at risk as fatalities.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Donald G. Brennan, "When SALT Hit the Fan," *National Review*, July 23, 1972.

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TABLE II

LEVELS OF DAMAGE TO SOVIET POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

Damage Level	*No. of Largest Cities Hit*	*Immediate Fatalities (in millions)*[a]	*Percentage of Population Killed*[b]	*Percentage of Industrial Capacity at Risk*
L-1	10	10.5	4.3	25
L-2	50	23.0	9.4	50
L-3	200	37.0	15.0	62

[a] Does not include fatalities from delayed fallout effects.
[b] Total population assumed to be 244.7 million.

of 25 psi. Thus, taking 5 psi and 25 psi as the lower and upper bounds, 15 psi will be considered the appropriate overpressure from which to compute the number of warheads with a given yield needed to cause a specific level of damage.

Kemp provides a table[17] of the number of warheads needed to cover an area with 5, 10 and 20 psi. On the average, the warheads required to produce 10 and 20 psi are about 2.5 and 5.7 times the number necessary to produce 5 psi. Let us therefore estimate that Kemp's results should be multiplied by 4 to bring them up to a psi of about 15; that is, to compensate for a partially prepared and protected Soviet urban population.

Applying this conversion value of 4, we can then use Kemp's results to assess the retaliatory damage our missile submarines could inflict on the Soviet Union. The results (after conversion) for Poseidon submarines are shown in Table III, which indicates how many submarines would be necessary to penetrate Soviet defenses and cause specific levels of damage under various conditions. In 1980 the American strategic nuclear submarine fleet should consist of 31 Poseidon, 7 Polaris (A-3) and 3 Trident submarines. The first Trident is scheduled to enter the force in mid-1979, and thereafter 2 may be produced per year to replace the Polaris until there are 11 Tridents and 30 Poseidons in all.

Table III gives us a basic matrix for determining the American retaliatory capability under various Soviet strategic defense levels. It is obvious that in most cases our potential fleet would be inadequate to retaliate at any of these levels. If the Soviets are given an unrealistically limited ASW and only 100 ABMs around Moscow,

[17] Part I, p. 18.

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TABLE III

POSEIDON SUBMARINES REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE SPECIFIC LEVELS OF DAMAGE UNDER VARIOUS DEFENSE CONDITIONS*

Damage Level[b]	Limited ASW with ABM for Moscow Area[a]		Improved ASW: With ABM for Moscow Area[a]		Improved ASW: With Upgraded ABM for Major Cities		Improved ASW: With Upgraded ABM for All Areas	
	$P = 0.8$	$P = 0.4$	$P = 0.8$	$P = 0.4$	$P = 0.8$	$P = 0.4$	$P = 0.8$	$P = 0.4$
L-1	24[c] (521)	20[c] (434)	32[c] (695)	28[c] (608)	56 (1,216)	28[c] (608)	176 (3,823)	108 (2,346)
L-2	44[c] (956)	40[c] (869)	64 (1,390)	60 (1,303)	96 (2,085)	72 (1,564)	252 (5,473)	136 (2,954)
L-3	76 (1,651)	72 (1,564)	88 (1,911)	88 (1,911)	124 (2,693)	104 (2,259)	320 (6,950)	184 (3,996)

* The figures in parentheses are the EMTs equivalent to the number of Poseidons shown, where EMT is calculated taking yield to the two-thirds power. The number of Poseidons is computed assuming that half are on station, that the overall reliability of SLBMs is 0.8, and that there are 16 SLBMs per submarine with 10 50-kiloton MIRVs per SLBM. P=single-shot probability.

[a] Consists of 100 missiles.

[b] Defined in Table II.

[c] Falls within U.S. planned submarine capability for 1980: 31 Poseidon (16 SLBMs with 50-kiloton MIRVs), 3 Trident (24 SLBMs with 50-kiloton MIRVs), and 7 Polaris (16 SLBMs with 6 40-kiloton MIRVs each), for a total EMT of 850-1,158, depending on whether one assumes 10 MIRVs or 14 MIRVs per Poseidon and Trident SLBM.

we could achieve L-1 damage; if we have 14 MIRVs per Poseidon and Trident SLBM, then we can just reach the L-2 level. However, if the Soviets improve only their ASW, we could achieve only L-1 damage; L-2 would no longer be possible. If ASW is improved and the ABMs are upgraded to cover other major cities but P is only 0.4, we can still reach L-1; in all other cases, even L-1 is improbable.

Table III reflects an optimistic assessment from a U.S. deterrent-and-retaliatory point of view. The reliability of 0.8 for our SLBMs is much higher than we have been able to achieve thus far. Moreover, for those warheads that penetrate Soviet defenses, it is assumed that they are spread out evenly over an urban area to maximize damage. Duplicate hits or urban misses are not considered. This is an especially important assumption in view of the need for a great many 50-kiloton warheads to blanket a sprawling urban area; for example, in order to produce a 5 psi overpressure against all of Moscow (causing 50 per cent mortality of those unprotected), 43 evenly distributed, 50-kiloton warheads are required.[18]

[18] Kemp, Parts II and III, p. 24.

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With regard to the Soviet ABM capability, which columns in Table III are most realistic? More than likely, the USSR will have an extensive ABM system awaiting our missiles. The Soviets are defended not only by the Galosh system around Moscow, but also by the Tallinn system of radars and SAMs. They have more than 1,000 SA-5 SAMs (high ABM capability and a 100-mile range) as well as thousands of SA-2s (ABM capability, 30-mile slant range, and 100,000-foot altitude). The sophisticated SA-6, a mobile SAM, also has ABM possibilities. Moreover, the Henhouse long-range radars — up to a half-mile in length and 100 feet high — can track warheads thousands of miles away. The Soviet Doghouse network, with ranges surpassing 1,000 miles, and numerous other radars can be hooked into an ABM defense network. Thus, the rightmost columns in Table III are probably the most realistic, and these columns would require an American missile-submarine fleet much larger than the one now planned — even to achieve L-1 damage.

Total Retaliatory Capability

If we put together America's three strategic offensive systems — i.e., its ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers — does the United States have an effective (i.e., deterring) retaliatory capability? For McNamara this would require the ability to destroy from one-fifth to one-fourth of the Soviet population, and at least one-half of its industrial capacity.[19] Level-3 in Table II comes closest to McNamara's criteria, so let us take L-3 as the damage required for deterrence. The essential technical data and the criteria for determining effective deterrence thus at hand, we can return to the question of whether the Soviets will soon have a preclusive first-strike capability.

Toward answering that question, consider the following:

(1) In the early 1980s the Soviets, with their improved missile systems, will probably be able to eliminate virtually all our ICBMs in a sudden strike.

(2) The Soviets will be able to destroy most of our bombers, but those that can penetrate Soviet defenses will still carry tremendous power (calculated at an EMT of 101 to 215). Using Kemp's calculations[20] on the number of 50-kiloton warheads required for given damage levels at 5 psi, we can determine the necessary EMTs (remembering to multiply by 4 to convert to 15 psi), where yield is taken to the two-thirds power. For damage levels L-1

[19] Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 76.

[20] See Parts II and III, Table 2 (based on warhead requirement for the Poseidon).

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to L-3, these EMTs are 123, 303 and 523, respectively (a 50-kiloton warhead has an EMT of 0.14).[21] Thus, a surviving EMT of 101 to 215 can achieve L-1 damage, barely; that is, it is possible to kill around 4.3 per cent of the population and put at risk 25 per cent of the industrial capacity (assuming evenly distributed warheads or bombs).

(3) There may still be some surviving American ICBMs to launch, though probably fewer than a dozen. Let us assume that there are four Minuteman IIs, each with a 2-megaton warhead, and six Minuteman IIIs, each with three 200-kiloton MIRVs. Let us also assume that all these warheads will make it through the Soviet defense network to target. Their total EMT would be 25; this, added to the 101 to 215 for surviving bombers, does not change the picture. Level-1 damage is the best that can be achieved.

In 1980, then, a Soviet first-strike would risk, at most, 4.3 per cent of the USSR's population and 25 per cent of its industrial capacity. Our submarines alone (making the most optimistic assumptions about reliability, distribution of warheads, and so on) might also achieve L-1 damage, but in light of the Soviet ABM potential, this is unlikely.

Table IV illustrates all the above calculations and conclusions. When the retaliatory power of all remaining U.S. ICBMs, bombers and submarines is considered, L-1 destruction is probable, and L-2 is possible but unlikely. There is no way that these figures enable us, realistically, to expect L-3 damage.

In sum, America's total retaliation would probably kill about 4 per cent of the Soviet population, or 10 million people. This is half the cost of World War II to the USSR, and about one-sixth the estimated minimum of 25 million Soviet citizens who have died from communist terror and repression. Recall that McNamara's lower limit of assured destruction was 20 per cent of the population (49 million people), or about twelve times more than the probable capability of our retaliatory force; even if we assume an improbable level of 10 million people killed (L-2), McNamara's minimum requirement would still be five times greater.

The conclusion is inescapable. After a surprise attack, the United States could not retaliate effectively. *Our ability to deter a Soviet first-strike is deteriorating rapidly. Around 1980, perhaps as early as 1977, the Soviets will have a preclusive first-strike capability.*

[21] These EMTs for L-1 to L-3 should not be confused with those in Table III, which are for the total fleet and are not on-target EMTs.

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TABLE IV

U.S. RETALIATORY CAPABILITY AFTER A SOVIET FIRST-STRIKE

Damage Level[a]	*Required EMT*[b]	*Retaliatory Capability (EMT)*		*Probability of Damage with SLBMs*[e]	*Probability of Damage with ICBMs, SAC & SLBMs*
		ICBMs[c]	*SAC*[d]		
Less than L-1	. . .	25	. . .	High	Very high
L-1	123	. . .	101-215	Low	High
L-2	303	. . .	. . .	Very low	Low
L-3	523	. . .	. . .	Impossible	Impossible

[a] See Table II.
[b] Assuming that 15 psi overpressure is necessary for 50 per cent mortality.
[c] Assuming that 4 Minuteman IIs and 8 Minuteman IIIs survive and that all warheads make it to target.
[d] Assuming that 60 SAC bombers survive and that 4 B-52 Ds and 8 B-52 G-Hs penetrate to target.
[e] See Table III.

The Danger Facing the United States

What would the Soviets gain by a first-strike? It is believed almost universally that an all-out attack on our ICBMs and bombers would kill tens of millions of Americans and obliterate our industrial capacity. But this belief confuses an attack on our cities with one on our strategic forces.

An attack on our cities would kill some 100 million Americans from the immediate explosion and from fallout.[22] Our ICBMs, however, are removed from urban areas, as are most of our 46 SAC bases. There are exceptions, such as Whiteman Air Force Base, which is near St. Louis, but clearly an attack on our strategic forces would result in much fewer casualties than would a strike against our population centers.

What would these casualties be? Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger provided the following data on the estimated impact of an attack on our forces. If each of our 1,054 ICBMs were hit with two warheads, if each of our SAC and missile-submarine support bases were struck with one, if each warhead were detonated at optimum height to maximize lethal radius, and if the attack were to occur during March (worst winds for fallout), then from these "2,158 warheads" we would suffer 6.7 million killed and 5.1 million injured. This assumes maximum use of civil defense facilities. Almost

[22] Schlesinger counterforce briefing.

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99 per cent of our manufacturing capacity would survive, and the effects on our agriculture and livestock would be negligible.[23] In other words, the United States would survive such an attack as a viable society. Our cities would remain largely intact, as would our industrial might. America would still be a handsome prize.

A preclusive first-strike would thus be not only possible but profitable. This conclusion is based on a pyramid of assumptions about Soviet weapons, and since we are dealing here with top-secret weapons, Soviet offensive and defensive strategic capabilities may well have been underestimated. Even within this framework of assumptions, it is predicted that the Soviets will have a preclusive first-strike capability in the near future. Given the need for one very large margin of error — on which the survival of the United States, and ultimately of liberty, are at stake — prudence demands that we act *as if* the Soviets will soon have a preclusive first-strike capability.

To make an even stronger case that the danger we face is real, let us turn the above argument around. Suppose that because of the number of assumptions involved in the foregoing analysis and the possibility that I have overestimated Soviet capabilities and underestimated those of the United States, the USSR is unlikely to have a preclusive first-strike capability in the forseeable future. This has been the official American position. Moreover, it can be argued, because of the enormous risk of taking action on the basis of assumption added on assumption, that even if the Soviets felt that they had a preclusive first-strike capability, they could not trust *their* equations sufficiently to take action. Even a small risk in the nuclear age is a strong deterrent, in Kissinger's view.

Let us therefore assume, contrary to my results, that the Soviets will not have a preclusive first-strike capability — that we will be able to retaliate effectively. Would the Soviets have a *dominant* first-strike capability? In the world of politics, the game hinges not on objective capabilities alone, but on the bargaining equations in which national interest and will play a role along with capabilities. These equations invoke the whole matrix of subjective factors that we call the political process — the balancing of power. The question, then, is reduced to whether the United States would exercise an objective capability to devastate Soviet cities.

Consider again a Soviet surprise attack on American ICBMs and SAC bases. Let survive a retaliatory force that can eliminate, say, 25 per cent of the Soviet population; this is within McNamara's level of assured destruction. Also let the USSR possess

[23] *Ibid.*

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in reserve thousands of warheads (of which it is quite capable) and several hundred bombers able to hit the United States and fly on to neutral territory. Furthermore, let this attack be accompanied by the following threat: if we retaliate on Soviet cities, the USSR will immediately unleash a full-scale attack on our cities (remember, we have no ABM or significant fighter protection); if we attack Soviet military installations, the USSR will take out Chicago and New York; and if we try to attack one or two Soviet cities in a tit-for-tat manner, the USSR will unhesitatingly retaliate on every major U.S. city.

No matter what the United States might do, the Soviets would have *escalation dominance*. Because of our weaker strategic and conventional forces, the USSR could easily counter anything we might try (if we attempt to respond through NATO, Warsaw Pact forces could overrun Europe). Having been struck first, we would also have few missiles and bombers left for counterthreats, or for an attack on Soviet reserve missiles or bombers. Even if we knew the location of the Soviet reserves and tried to destroy them, our counterforce attack would be ineffectual, since the accuracy and yield of our warheads have been kept low in order to avoid a provocative, and thus destabilizing, first-strike capability.

Under these circumstances — arguments for "flexible response" notwithstanding — surrender is the only option. This option would be reinforced if the Soviets shrewdly make it a question not of unconditional surrender but of "keeping our hands off," say, the Middle East, and of dismantling our remaining strategic forces. Although America would keep its national integrity and apparent sovereignty for a while, the eventual consequence would be the same — a totalitarian world.

Would the president of the United States order a retaliatory blow in response to such an attack and threat? Would he destroy Soviet cities and bear responsibility for the additional annihilation of some 90 million Americans and most of our industrial capacity? Our weapons are intended to deter aggression; if deterrence fails, will a U.S. president press the button? The Soviet threat would be credible, especially after an attack, and the USSR's treatment of its own people is evidence of Soviet morality.

The button would not be pressed. Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, whose concern it was to maintain the credibility of deterrence, was shockingly candid on this score. The strategy of mutual assured destruction, remember, rests on the premise that each side would retaliate against an attack on the other's cities.

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The mutuality of this presumption supposedly provides a stable deterrence. Now along came James Schlesinger to say:

> For better or for worse, the scientist in the lecture hall who announces that, in response to a Soviet attack on our nuclear forces, we should destroy a hundred Soviet cities and their populations, *is unlikely to implement that threat should the situation arise*. . . .
>
> [T]he reaction of the policymaker in the face of such an attack cannot be foretold. But he and his advisors will have been exposed to a number of paper wars — i.e., hypothetical cases in which deterrence has collapsed and our opponent has launched some kind of a nuclear attack. They will know from these exercises that in many circumstances *the most suicidal course for the United States — and hence the least credible course — would be to strike the population of the opponent's cities*. . . .
>
> While the exercises may be hypothetical, the problem is not. The Soviet Union, for example, *now deploys a strategic nuclear capability that goes far beyond anything required by the theories of minimum or finite deterrence*. Her peripheral attack forces are such as to be able to take under attack every significant target in Western Europe. Her central strategic systems are sufficiently large in numbers so that she could strike at a substantial number of military targets in the United States, and elsewhere in the world, *and still withhold a very large force whose future use we would have to consider in responding*.[24]

Thus did Schlesinger bury MAD, although its skeleton still props up detente. And thus did he also bury his idea of flexible targeting; given the Soviet Union's large reserve force, escalation dominance, and demonstration of political will (since we would already have been attacked), a Soviet threat to hit our cities if we retaliate would simply have to be believed.

The Soviets will have this dominant first-strike capability soon, if they do not have it already. We have already seen that by 1981 the USSR will have a preclusive capability. The Soviets' desire for a first-strike capability explains their intense drive toward military, especially strategic, superiority. Coupled with their zeal to bring about the final defeat of capitalism, it explains why they do not follow the action-reaction theory: as we have engaged in unilateral disarmament, they have continued a massive buildup. Also the drive for a first-strike capability explains why the Soviets have not been restrained by detente, as Kissinger would have it.

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[24] Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report* . . ., pp. II-1–II-2. (Emphasis added.)

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LIBERAL COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE?

by Richard Pipes

The prospect of Italian, French, or perhaps even other communists entering the legitimate governments of their countries has caused considerable bewilderment among Western public-opinion leaders. Opinion is sharply divided over whether one should accept at face value the repeated assertion by these communist parties' leaders that they are fully committed both to democratic processes and independence from Moscow. Are they sincere? it is asked. Will they indeed be willing, having joined their countries' administrations, to step down should the electorate change its mind? Will they be both able and willing to conduct a foreign policy that does not simply execute Moscow's instructions?

To begin with, the issue of "sincerity" is a somewhat spurious one. It is inconceivable that the entire leadership of the Italian and French communist parties (PCI and PCF) should be engaged in a massive fraud. Such deception can be ruled out for a variety of reasons. Not the least weighty of these is the grave risk that dissimulation on basic issues would hopelessly confuse the mass constituencies of the two largest communist parties and sow the seeds of dissent within the ranks, thus robbing the parties, in the long run, of the very fruits they seek. Deceiving the enemy is one thing; deceiving one's own rank and file, another. Anyone acquainted with communist history and with the manner in which communist leaders manipulate their followers and subjects realizes that such deception is not, and cannot be, practiced.

This said, one can turn to more pertinent questions. What are the reasons for the switch in communist strategy? And what are the possibilities that the communists would be able to conduct (or support) a democratic internal policy together with an independent (national) external policy? In other words, assuming that the leaders of the PCF and PCI mean what they say, will they be able to act accordingly?

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II

The thirty years that have elapsed since the end of World War II have been a period of unremitting frustration for the communist parties of Western Europe. In most of northern Europe, including Germany, they have not been able to rise above the status of contemptible also-rans — able to cause mischief now and then, but unable to influence the conduct of politics. In southern Europe, notably in France and Italy, they did manage to obtain a solid hold on one-fourth or so of the electorate — theoretically a powerful lever, but one that, owing to the political ostracism to which these parties have been subjected since 1948, they have not been able to translate into political power. The difficulties experienced by the West European communist parties, whether in attracting voters in the north or influencing policy in the south, ultimately stem from the perception that most voters have of them — namely, that these parties are fundamentally undemocratic and would never yield once in power, and that their main concern is to promote the interests of the Soviet Union. Both beliefs rest on valid historical experience during the past sixty years. So long as the communist parties are perceived by West European voters and politicians in this manner, moreover, they cannot hope to break out of their isolation. Even a 49.9 per cent popular vote does not promise access to the levers of power. This consideration called for a general reappraisal of communist strategy in Western Europe.

Two additional factors may have induced West European communist parties to reappraise their political strategy. One is the progressive decline in the role that private capital plays in the West European economies, and the corresponding expansion of the public sector. As the state takes over the economy and gains control of the nation's capital, the traditional confrontation pitting "communism" against "capitalism" loses relevance. The road to power under such conditions lies not through the overthrow of existing political institutions, but through access to them. In any capitalist country where, for economic or social reasons, the capitalist government were to nationalize all the major industries and large business enterprises, the local communist party would have no choice but to seek to penetrate the governing apparatus. Adaptation to this fact of modern economic life is particularly apparent in the program of the PCI, which expects to attain full power by a series of steps that would gradually lead to control of the national economy within an overall capitalist framework. Thus, a strategy of broad "democratic" fronts,

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designed to advance assimilation of the communist parties into the governing machinery, is perfectly sensible. The alternative — a strategy of doctrinaire, Marxist anti-capitalism — would make these parties totally dependent on the emergence of "revolutionary situations" and/or Soviet military conquest; neither is a likely contingency, and the latter is quite undesirable, to boot.

Another factor influencing the new political strategy of the Western communist parties is the information about conditions inside the Soviet Union that has poured out of that country since Khrushchev's so-called secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress. Before 1956 it had been possible, with a bit of effort, to dismiss reports of Soviet mass exterminations and concentration camps as capitalist falsehoods. Since 1956 this has not been possible. Given the better insight into such conditions on the part of the voters, it has become imperative for the Western communist parties to avoid too close an identification with the USSR. One must also consider that the younger adherents of the Western communist parties have been revolted by these revelations, and have no taste for Soviet policy of the mailed fist, as practiced, for example, in Czechoslovakia some eight years ago.

For all these reasons, a major strategic reappraisal was called for. As is well known, the Italian Communists initiated the process, but for a long time their plea for a more flexible and more liberal political strategy has fallen on deaf ears; this is partly because of Moscow's understandable hesitation and partly because of the older Western communist leaders, whose opposition reinforced this hesitation. The factor that seems finally to have overcome the qualms of both was the failure of the hard-line strategy in Portugal. The inability of the most Stalinist of the European communist parties to take advantage of a golden opportunity to seize power, because of its irreconcilable line toward all noncommunist groups, fatally weakened the cause of the hard-liners in Western Europe and in Moscow. There is almost certainly a direct causal relationship between the humiliation of the Portuguese Communists and the willingness of Moscow at the East Berlin meeting of communist parties in summer 1976 to accept, at long last, the principle of a polycentric communist realm, in which the national communist parties can pursue their own path to power as dictated by local conditions.

So much for the motives behind the change in political strategy. Next arises the question of the consequences. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the leaders of the communist movements of Europe (notably in Italy, France and Spain) do indeed wish

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to follow a democratic, evolutionary path in their internal policies, together with a foreign policy independent of Moscow, can they succeed? Once they have struggled out of their isolation and have assumed some measure of political responsibility, will the Western communist parties be in a position to carry out their new programs?

On this, there are serious doubts. For one, there is something odd and disquieting about the way in which the new strategy has been adopted. One can perceive cross-currents in the PCI and even pale shadows of factions; given the slow evolution toward the new strategy in Italy, we might concede that time has done its job and that most Italian Communists have indeed come to believe in liberal communism. But how is one to explain that the PCF, until recently the most doctrinaire Stalinist party of them all and the great opponent of the Italian strategy, has adopted this very strategy without a major dissident movement being mounted from within party ranks? How is it that a party that only yesterday was 100 per cent anti-democratic has overnight become 100 per cent pro-democratic? The same applies to the minuscule English Communist Party, whose change of heart has occurred just as suddenly and also without the dissent that one might have expected, given its past record. In general, one would feel much more comfortable about the democratic professions of the Western communist parties if they were more tolerant and willing to accept dissent within their own ranks. A democratic strategy adopted unanimously strikes a false note.

Secondly, as one reads the discussions of the PCI, PCF and other West European communist parties on the subject of democracy, one gains the impression that their leaders and theorists consider it something that one can enjoy by a mere act of will: democracy comes into being when one decides to have it. In fact, however, democracy is something infinitely more complicated. The majority of Russian politicians in 1917 also desperately wanted democracy, and yet they did not get it. Nearly all the member states of the United Nations profess democratic ideals, and still most of them live under dictatorships of one sort or another. The reason for this is that democracy is not merely an act of faith but also, and above all, a set of legal, political, and especially economic institutions, so arranged as to place in the hands of the citizenry effective safeguards against the power of the state.

Of these institutions, the historically most effective one has been private property. The ability of citizens to dispose of the material wealth that they create has proved to be a prerequisite of personal freedom. Where the state owns the productive wealth —

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and such a condition is invariably the goal of all communist movements, even the most liberal — all gainfully employed citizens become employees of the state and enter into a condition of dependence on it. An economically centralized (fully socialist) state is, by definition, a state that both owns and manages the economy, including its labor force. In such a state all political dissent inevitably becomes "sabotage," and the dissenters, "enemies of the people." Underlying communism, of course, is the notion that one can run a society and its economy "scientifically," and that by eliminating dissent one can enjoy both economic centralism and democracy; but nothing in the human experience encourages us to think that this proposition is a realistic one. It is worth noting in this connection that the Czech reformers of 1967-1968, in their attempt to raise productivity from the low levels to which it had fallen, found it necessary to broaden the range of political discussion and to move willy-nilly toward political democracy; this process, once begun, could not be stopped halfway. The reverse is equally true: centralization of the economy requires a relentless restriction of democratic freedoms. In other words, it is difficult to see how, even with the best of intentions, the communists could find it possible to combine the centralization (nationalization) of the economy with democratic practices.

In fact, should the communists of Italy or France enter government and exert meaningful influence on the conduct of national policy, one of two things is likely to ensue, neither of which is conducive to professed democratic and nationalist goals:

(1) Should national economies become increasingly centralized, productivity will almost certainly decline (such has been the long-term experience of all countries with centralized, state-run economies), and a secondary or "black" market will arise. To raise productivity and wipe out this secondary market, coercion will have to be applied. Under these conditions the hard-line, Stalinist elements in the Western communist parties are likely to gain the upper hand, and the "liberal" communists — deemed too soft, too "humanitarian," too "democratic" — will be purged. If this happens, there can be little doubt that the Soviet leadership would encourage the hard-liners, who would be more subservient to Moscow. The consequence would be both internal repression and dependence on the USSR.

(2) Should the Western communists miraculously succeed in constructing "socialism with a human face," i.e., a combination of a centralized economy with high living standards and democratic liberties, then the USSR will feel itself extremely threatened. Democratic communism — like democratic socialism — is the *bête noire* of Soviet leadership because it undermines the argument (on which its power and privileges rest) that

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dictatorship and a low standard of living are necessary for the triumph of communism. It is difficult to see how the Soviet Union would tolerate this kind of liberal communism in Western Europe any more than it did in Czechoslovakia. Most likely, it would conspire with hard-line, Moscow-oriented elements in the Western communist parties to remove their rivals; it might even invoke the Brezhnev Doctrine to wipe out this kind of threat should it become serious enough.[1]

III

In sum, the prospects are not very encouraging. There are good reasons to doubt whether the West European communists understand what democracy is or whether they would be able to practice it, given the opportunity. A Western Europe in which communists play a significant or dominant administrative role would find itself either dependent on Soviet support (if unsuccessful) or facing a Soviet threat (if successful). In either event, it is the least democratic, most staunchly pro-Moscow elements in the Western communist parties that would then rise to the top, replacing the more liberal elements in command today.

The result would be a destabilization of Western Europe and the creation of conditions in which the strictly military deterrent would become progressively less effective. With the blurring of the lines between friendly and unfriendly governments, and with Soviet political and economic interference in Western Europe, it would become increasingly necessary to rely on other-than-military means of defense, among them political and economic weapons of all sorts. The military strategy of deterrence will have to yield to a more broadly conceived "grand strategy," or else the United States might prove powerless to stem the tide.

[1] One must bear in mind that from the Soviet point of view any country with a communist government (or even a coalition government in which the communist party plays a prominent part) may come within the purview of the Brezhnev Doctrine. This may be one reason why Moscow is not overly worried about a triumph in the West of communist parties whose spirit and program are not to the Soviet taste. They may merely help legitimize Soviet claims to a "protective" role.

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CHINA REVISITED

by G. W. Choudhury

Will there be chaos and confusion in China after Mao? What is the significance of the so-called power struggle in China, or rather, what is the true meaning of the debate between the two schools of Chinese thought that led many China experts in this country and elsewhere to make gloomy forecasts about what might happen after Mao's death? What are the strains and stresses in the emerging Sino-American relationship; the risks if U.S. policymakers take the Chinese connection for granted? What are the prospects for a rapprochement between Peking and Moscow; and in what ways may U.S. policy influence the future, the Sino-Soviet rift or reconciliation?

Let me describe the Chinese political scene I witnessed in July — before Mao's death. Some groups in the United States and elsewhere believe China is on the verge of a great political upheaval. The death of Chou En-lai, the subsequent dismissal of Teng Hsiao-ping, riots at Tien An Men Square on April 5, 1976, and finally the death of Chairman Mao are responsible for such forecasts. The Cultural Revolution of 1966-1968 evoked other pessimistic forecasts about China. But from my vantage point as Director-General in the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, I gained a different impression. In spite of the alleged "widespread dislocation" and "destruction" resulting from the Cultural Revolution, Pakistan got regular shipments of arms from China, strictly according to schedule. During the same period the Chinese set up a new ordnance factory at Dacca (then capital of East Pakistan, now capital of Bangladesh).

When I arrived in Hong Kong from China on August 1, 1976, journalists attempted to confirm the "great panic, confusion and chaos in Peking" caused by the severe earthquake that had taken place on July 26. My impression was that the Chinese people

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in Peking and the surrounding area showed a strong sense of discipline and displayed no sign of panic.

These incidents suggest that the "China experts" who are predicting China's impending political upheaval may be premature; their suggestions that the United States should "wait and watch" before making any further step toward improving Sino-American relations may be doing a great disservice to America's vital global interests. Always, in this connection, one must keep in mind that the Soviet leaders would like to destroy the emerging Sino-American relationship.

The future of China after Chairman Mao's death is a crucial question about which no one can make absolutely correct predictions. Yet one can make some projections of the likely trends in China's domestic and external behavior in the post-Mao period. The Chinese themselves conclude that "class contradictions, the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and struggle between the socialist road and capitalist road exist throughout the transitional period. We shall go astray if we forget this fundamental theory and practice of our party over the last dozen years or so."[1] The new Chinese constitution, as adopted at the Fourth National People's Congress on January 17, 1975, clearly states: "Socialist society covers a considerably long historical period. Throughout this historical period there are class contradictions and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, there is the danger of capitalist restoration and there is the danger of subversion and aggression by imperialism and socialist imperialism."[2] It is therefore no wonder that the world will hear about "political instability" in China at periodic intervals. The Chinese take pride in these movements toward the path of "true socialism." They also point out the progress China achieved as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

In the course of providing for leadership after Chou En-lai and Chairman Mao, the PRC seems to have developed a collective decision-making process in which three pillars of the Chinese society — peasants, workers and army — are well represented.[3] There will, no doubt, be some shifts here and there, but one thing seems clear: China is a nation united and dedicated to uphold the country's basic national security interests. Its people are determined "to build China

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[1] *Peking Review*, January 2, 1976.

[2] *Documents of the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1975).

[3] Based on my talks with Chinese leaders and with diplomats in Peking.

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into a modern and strong socialist state."[4] Mao's teaching inspired the new generation with an urge to continue their "march forward." His educational policy led millions of educated young Chinese to apply themselves to the development of their country. We met many such young men and women who are working with an ardent revolutionary spirit. A nation so conscious of its past humiliation and suffering due to colonial exploitation, so fully aware of the dangers from external forces, and so proud of its present achievements and future possibilities, runs no risk of being torn by civil strife after Mao's death. As a Chinese friend told me, "Mao, the individual human being will die, but Mao, the great teacher will remain immortal."

Those engaged in working out U.S. policy alternatives toward the Asian/Pacific region, and toward China in particular, must consider certain obvious facts. China is the central power in the Asian region. No important issues in that area can be decided by ignoring her. The expansionist designs of the Soviet Union in the Third World can only be met by meaningful cooperation between Washington and Peking. China has the potential to become a superpower with tremendous appeal to Afro-Asian countries.

Sino-American Relations

After two decades of hostile and frozen relations with China, President Nixon took a big decision to normalize relations in 1969. The Sino-Soviet rift turned dangerous in March of that year when serious border clashes erupted between the two communist giants. The U.S. secretary of state, William Rogers, told Pakistan President Yahya Khan that the USSR appeared to have become "the first of China's enemies."[5] In his dispatches during June and July 1969, Pakistan's ambassador in Moscow reported that Kremlin leaders had consulted with their East European allies about contingency plans to destroy China's nuclear capabilities, while Pakistan's diplomatic sources in Peking indicated China's grave concern over such a pre-emptive strike by the Russians.[6] The Sino-Soviet relationship seemed to be moving toward the brink of war.[7] Nixon's China initiatives could not have been made at a more appropriate

[4] *Peking Review*, January 9, 1976.

[5] See G. W. Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 203.

[6] Based on my reading of Pakistani government documents and unpublished papers.

[7] For details see my *Brezhnev's Collective Security Plan for Asia* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1976).

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time. On the U.S. side, the President seemed to have concluded that the best chance for an understanding with the USSR was to keep diplomatic options toward Peking open. His dramatic announcement in August 1971, after Dr. Kissinger's first secret trip to Peking via Pakistan, that he would be visiting the PRC for talks with the Chinese leaders, set in motion a chain reaction that greatly altered international politics based on the bipolarity of power between the United States and the USSR.[8] Nixon's visit did not result in an "instant detente"; neither side expected such a miracle. But the Sino-American talks covered a wide-ranging discussion of issues of mutual concern such as Taiwan, Indochina, and the alleged revival of Japanese militarism. An "eight-point plan" was presented by Chou En-lai to Washington before Nixon arrived in Peking in February 1972.

In the wake of the 1972 Shanghai communique, a fragile triangular relationship has developed among the United States, the USSR and the PRC. While the talks have never been triangular — there have been either U.S.-USSR or U.S.-PRC talks — the absentee third party has been of crucial importance in Washington's negotiations with both the Soviet and Chinese leaders. As Winston Lord of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State remarked during House hearings on future foreign policy research and development, "Our relations with the world's largest country and the world's most populous country are cardinal elements in our pursuit of a more secure and moderate international system."[9] After his visit to China in December 1975, President Ford said, "Our relationship with China is becoming a permanent feature of the international political landscape. It benefits not only our two peoples but all peoples of the region and the entire world."[10] Secretary of State Kissinger, in his speech to the UN General Assembly of 1975, said "There is no relationship to which the United States assigns greater significance than its new ties with the People's Republic of China."[11]

Twice an American president has paid a visit to China. The secretary of state has held high-level talks with Chinese leaders in both Peking and New York. Members of Congress, scholars, and people from various other spheres of life have visited China. The

[8] See William R. Kintner, *The Impact of President Nixon's Visit to Peking on International Politics* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, Research Monograph Series, no. 13, 1972).

[9] Department of State News Release, *The United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China*, March 23, 1976.

[10] *New York Times*, December 8, 1975.

[11] *Ibid.*, September 23, 1975.

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Chinese have also come to the United States, but no Chinese head of state has yet paid a return visit. The Chinese made it clear that their leaders would not visit the United States as long as the ambassador of the Republic of China has his office in Washington. Both sides freely concede the advantages and benefits of the new Sino-American relationship. From the U.S. side, new ties with Peking offered "improved prospects for preserving global equilibrium; [and] reduced dangers of conflict in Asia, an area where the interests of all the world's major powers intersect."[12] Chinese leaders and their senior diplomats in Washington and at the United Nations acknowledge that the new relationship has reduced the Soviet threat to China and other smaller Afro-Asian countries; Soviet expansionist designs would have been much more dangerous without it.

How the Chinese Assess the Relationship

The Chinese, like American policymakers, attach great importance to their relationship with the United States.[13] The favorable responses Peking made to Nixon's gestures in 1969 came only after thorough and careful analysis of China's national interest and the global balance of power. They were not merely the "brain-product" of one individual, such as the late Premier Chou En-lai, but were made under the guidance of Chairman Mao, who took the leading members of the Chinese Communist Party and the generals of the People's Liberation Army into full confidence before making this big decision. It is wrong to assume that Chinese leaders take any major course of action without an adequate assessment of the internal and external factors involved. They may not have an American or British style of democracy, where issues like this are debated in Congress or in Parliament, but one must not forget Aristotle's saying that there is no universal form of constitution or of government. The Chinese have their own form of proletarian dictatorship, whether or not it is denounced in the Western world as authoritarian. It is futile to expect that the decision-making process in a communist state will be the same as in a Western democratic country. Thus I doubt that the death of Chou, and now Mao, will change

[12] Department of State News Release, March 23, 1976.

[13] This discussion is based on conversations with the Chinese ambassadors in Washington (Liaison Office), London, Cairo, and at the United Nations. The Chinese ambassador in Cairo was Chinese ambassador in Pakistan in 1969-1972, when Pakistan was acting as courier between Peking and Washington, and was therefore actively involved in the secret Sino-American negotiations. Conversations were also held on this topic in Peking in 1976 with officials and foreign diplomats.

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China's policy toward the United States. Such a turn of events could happen, but I am confident that China's basic foreign policy tenets will not change just because of these two leaders' disappearance. If the prospect alters it will be the result of external factors, not because of the so-called power struggle in Peking. China's present policy toward the United States enjoys the approval of the major groups in her leadership.[14]

The Chinese consider the present phase of the Sino-American relationship with anguish rather than anger. They refer to the United States' informal but clear promises and assurances regarding the Taiwan issue and the consequent establishment of full diplomatic relations. As one who had access to these promises and pledges made during 1969-1971, I am inclined to sympathize with the Chinese sense of frustration. Under the 1972 joint communique issued at the close of Nixon's visit the United States acknowledged "that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." What has this meant? The Chinese made it clear from the beginning that under no circumstances would they accept the concept of "two Chinas." This may sound irrational to some, but no one can deny that the point was made as clearly as possible. "One China" is an article of faith with the Chinese. They have not established diplomatic ties with any country unless that country's ambassador was removed from Taiwan. When the United States began to talk of normalizing relations in 1969-1971, the Chinese made their views on the Taiwan issue known to Washington in unambiguous terms. They also told me that when they agreed to establish a liaison office in 1973, they did so on the understanding that it would soon be upgraded to full diplomatic status. U.S. procrastination in establishing full diplomatic relations between the two countries has been a disillusionment to them.

They were happy with the good beginning when Nixon visited China in February 1972. From 1972 through 1973 the process of normalization, according to their interpretation, moved satisfactorily. Then came Watergate, the subsequent decline of Nixon's prestige and power, and finally, with Nixon's exit a stalemate seemed to develop in the Sino-American relationship. They attribute this stalemate to two factors. (1) Nixon could see clearly the dangers from the Soviet Union and he was therefore anxious to promote

[14] Based on talks and interviews in the PRC and with senior Chinese diplomats abroad as well as on information gathered through friendly countries' diplomatic sources.

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better relations with Peking as a counterbalance in the global balance of power. (2) With his departure from office, U.S. foreign policy initiatives seemed to move from the U.S. president to the U.S. secretary of state — an assessment in which many Americans would agree.

Chinese officials feel that since Kissinger has become not only executor but also initiator of America's foreign policy, he has gone back on his past assurances to the Chinese. They were quick to add, however, that what Washington might do or not do in its relations with Moscow "is not their concern." At the same time they gave clear and unqualified warnings that the United States would be sadly mistaken if the present or the next U.S. administration took Chinese friendship "for granted," or worse, if the Chinese found that the Americans were using their new China links as bargaining leverages with the Kremlin.

This is a matter of great significance to Americans. The rationale for detente with the Soviet Union has been widely questioned: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Vladimir Petrov, Eugene Rostow, George Ball, Senator Henry Jackson, Barry Goldwater, among others, have expressed grave concerns about Kissinger's "one-way traffic" to Moscow. Despite detente, the Soviet Union is increasing its military forces faster than the United States. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated, "the future is clouded with uncertainty but there can be no doubt about the larger and growing capabilities at the disposal of the U.S.S.R."[15]

William Kintner has related this problem to the Asian region:

> The Soviet armed forces have acquired global reach and can be deployed in any strategic theatre. . . . There is considerable evidence that the Soviet leaders believe that the global "correlation of forces" has already shifted fundamentally against the U.S.-led alliance systems. This may induce Moscow to work for a rapid change in regional balances of power to its advantage. In this context China is the most important regional power, whose very existence — even before she acquires super-power status — exercises tremendous influence on evolving U.S.-Soviet relations.[16]

Brzezinski, about whom the Chinese asked me many questions, said: "It is important for the United States to move toward normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China." He feels that the rapprochement between Washington and Peking launched by Nixon in 1971-1972 "has been somewhat

[15] *New York Times*, September 12, 1975.
[16] William R. Kintner, *The Soviet Quest for Hegemony in Asia* (unpublished).

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impaired by the Chinese belief that the United States' weakness constitutes appeasement of the Soviet Union designed to deflect Soviet hostility from the West on to China."[17] Brzezinski, who is favorably regarded by the Chinese, seems to have assessed Chinese thinking in a much better way than Kissinger, who appears to be in no hurry to upgrade the existing Sino-American relationship. According to the Chinese, Kissinger seems to have taken China's friendship "for granted." Brzezinski favors taking steps to avoid a cooling of U.S.-Chinese relations, since "such a cooling would free the Soviet Union to pursue tougher policies in Europe, the Middle East and Africa."[18]

China may not be an ally of the United States, but a strong China, unfriendly to Moscow, is as vital to U.S. global interests as a stronger NATO, a stronger ANZUS and a stronger Japan. One should also remember that China is not opposed to a stronger NATO or ANZUS or a stronger Japan. There are many common objectives, if not an identity of interests, between Washington and Peking — much more so than between Moscow and Washington.

The Chinese have expressed their disapproval of Kissinger's handling of U.S. foreign policy since 1974 in a subtle way. They feel that, as Marxists and former allies of the Russians, they know the "socialist imperialists" in Moscow better than the former Harvard professor does. They told the Pakistanis in 1964-1965, when Pakistan made serious bids to woo the Soviets, "We know the Russians in a better way, just as you know the Indians better. You warned us against the Indians and we made a mistake by not listening to you properly."[19] Pakistanis remembered the Chinese warning in 1971, rather too late, when India, backed by the Soviets, dismembered Pakistan. It cannot be denied that the Chinese have a closer historical experience of Soviet aims and methods than Kissinger has, and that their warnings about the Russians deserve serious attention.[20]

The Chinese preferred not to make direct comments on U.S. internal politics in the election year, but they left me with no doubt that they are unhappy with Kissinger's never-ending search for detente with Moscow, which they consider bound to be a failure, even as Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement toward Hitler

[17] See Stephen Barber, "Foreign Relations: Peking a Matter of Time," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 2, 1976.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] Based on my reading of the unpublished documents and papers of the Government of Pakistan.

[20] David Bonana, "The Wizard That Was," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 2, 1976.

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proved disastrous. They seem to favor Brzezinski's views on the Soviet Union and her expansionist designs. The importance of U.S.-Chinese ties has recently been emphasized by Admiral Thomas Moorer, former chairman of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, who is certainly not among those Americans who treat China as an "ally." He observes: "The P.R.C. is not on a par with the United States or the Soviet Union in the overall power equation . . . yet China in effect balances Soviet power in Eurasia — at least to the extent of blocking Soviet expansionist ambitions eastward."[21]

American policymakers need to pause at this juncture in time and consider the consequences of a possible thaw in Sino-Soviet relations — perhaps as a result of taking China's friendship "for granted." The Chinese do not concede that their attitude toward Moscow would be changed by a third party's policy of detente with the Soviet Union. But when I questioned them about their reaction if there should be a real change of the global balance of power as a result of U.S.-USSR detente, their reply was not ambiguous. Like any other big power, China will now begin a process of reappraisal and rethinking about world affairs; in that process Peking's attitude toward Moscow will figure prominently, and who can say whether the two Marxist states may come to some closer understanding? There is no inherent risk of a "pro-Moscow" group emerging as a result of Mao's death; that risk exists only if U.S. policy pushes China into a highly unfavorable global balance of power.

In spite of all the talk about detente, the Soviet Union has not missed a single opportunity to undermine U.S. interests in the Third World — in South and Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas, the Middle East, Africa and even Latin America. Moscow discerns a steady erosion of the position and role of the United States in the Third World as a result of such factors as —

the emergence of a Communist Cuba;

the deterioration of the United States' influence and political-economic control over its "strategic rear," i.e., Latin America;

the collapse of the U.S. venture in Vietnam;

the retrenchment of the U.S. global containment policy as reflected in the Nixon Doctrine;

the loss by the United States of its assured majority in the United Nations;

[21] Stephen Barber, "The New Balance of Power," *ibid.*

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the growing number of developing countries which have established close relations with the Soviet Union; and

the pressure for a new world economic order.[22]

As for the PRC, one perspective of the Chinese attitude regarding the U.S. role in world affairs was summed up by Elliot Richardson:

China's leaders want the United States to play a major role in Asia indefinitely, to head off Soviet domination of the region. I don't think the Chinese would want to see any shifts in Asia for the foreseeable future. The Chinese have an interest in the preservation of a major U.S. role toward the rest of the world, if only because Chinese security to a degree depends on a continuing American countervailing role against the Soviet Union.[23]

The Problem of Taiwan

The debate in the United States over future relations with Taiwan is causing much concern in Chinese official circles. They are wondering whether this is a deliberate attempt to postpone the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking, and whether it means a reversal of the 1972 communique or of the promises made during the 1969-1971 secret negotiations between the two countries.

The Taiwan debate has raised a number of questions. The foremost one is, should the United States unilaterally abrogate a security pact with an ally?[24] In referring to this question, Chinese officials asked, "What happened to the U.S. security pacts with Pakistan?" There were four security pacts with Pakistan — two bilateral and two multilateral (SEATO and CENTO). In the 1950s and early 1960s Pakistan used to be described as "the most allied ally of the U.S.A. in Asia." Yet when India attacked Pakistan by crossing her international boundary on September 6, 1965, the United States did not come to her rescue; this apart from formal security pacts and an unqualified statement issued by the U.S. ambassador as follows: "Under instructions from the White House and Department of State [it is acknowledged] positively and without equivocation that our formal agreement to assist Pakistan in the event of aggression, even with our armies, was not limited to com-

[22] See Michael J. Deane's "The Soviet Assessment of the 'Correlation of World Forces': Implications for American Foreign Policy," in this issue of ORBIS.

[23] *Durham* (North Carolina) *Morning Herald*, May 22, 1975.

[24] See Michael Reisman, "The Danger of Abandoning Taiwan," *New York Times*, August 28, 1976.

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munist countries but indeed specifically included India."[25] Then in 1971, under Moscow's direct supervision and guidance, Pakistan was dismembered by Indian troops.

"Why," the Chinese ask, "is so much sanctity attached to the security pact with Taiwan?" Most of the countries of the world that have diplomatic ties with China agree with the 1972 communique that there are not "two Chinas." Taiwan is not just an island or a piece of territory the Chinese can be expected to forget. It represents to the PRC a rebel or rival government which still pretends to represent the Chinese people and which was unjustly allowed to do so at the United Nations for more than two decades. The Canadian prime minister's recent decision not to allow the Taiwan team to participate in the Olympics with the designation of "Republic of China" was greatly appreciated by the Chinese, who consider that the Canadian government's decision accurately reflects Chinese feelings on Taiwan.

I am not, however, suggesting that the United States should do nothing to prevent the use of force in settling the issue. The Chinese have indicated more than once that they are prepared to "take long-term views" of it, and Senator Hugh Scott during his visit to China in July 1976 obtained their assurances to this effect again. Since the Sino-American rapprochement came to pass, China has done nothing to cause embarrassment to the United States. Given a fair opportunity, she should continue to show restraint and do nothing to damage U.S. prestige and the U.S. image in Asia.

The Taiwan debate has also given rise to suggestions for a UN-supervised plebiscite in Taiwan. In response to this, the Chinese ask why the United States and the other Western powers did not bother to ask for a plebiscite in any of the East European countries before signing the Helsinki document which Solzhenitsyn termed a "moral sellout of those countries and people under Kremlin rule."[26]

Chinese officials are further dismayed by Japan's opposition to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC. They resented the Japanese foreign minister's statement during Senator Mike Mansfield's visit to Tokyo in July 1976. Accusing Miyazawa of violating the 1972 China-Japan normalization agreement, which declared that "Taiwan was a part of China," Ch'iao Kuan-hua said in reply to his Japanese counter-

[25] See Ambassador B. H. Oehlert, Jr., "How to Lose Allies," an unpublished paper dated May 19, 1970.

[26] *Impact International* (London), September 12-25, 1975.

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part that Japan "has interfered with China's domestic affairs by proposing a two-China policy."[27] Peking has raised no objections to the presence of U.S. troops or bases in Japan. It approves the special relationship between Washington and Tokyo. It is, however, worried about Soviet expansionist designs in Northeast Asia — whose prevention should be regarded as a common objective of both the United States and China.

The Chinese friendship is worthy of American trust. China has no hegemonic aspirations in the Asian/Pacific area. Recalling the proverb, "A stitch in time saves nine," the United States should avail itself of China's goodwill and friendship before China's patience is taxed too far. That would be a tragic ending for a great diplomatic feat of the United States begun in 1970-1972.

[27] Shahmn Awanohara, "Miyazawa Strains the Peking Link," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 30, 1976.

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THE NEW EQUATION OF WORLD POWER AND ITS IMPACT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

by Thanat Khoman

Conversation with prominent Americans, whether diplomats, businessmen or politicians, almost invariably begins with them asking, "What do you want the United States to do in this part of the world?" No one in Thailand can reply intelligently until he receives an answer to the question all Asians are asking today: "What do you think the United States can and *will* do in Southeast Asia?" The latter rarely elicits a satisfactory response.

There is no intention here of dodging the issue by throwing the ball back to the Americans. Rather, this discussion is prompted by the political reality that whatever the U.S. Administration or the American President does or says may come to naught if it fails to secure the approval and consent of an assertive Congress under the control of the opposition party. Too many recent instances — the U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement, the question of arms shipments to Turkey, military assistance to Cambodia and South Vietnam, Angola — clearly show that Congress can "pull the rug out" from under the Administration's feet. The American legislators have served notice to the world that foreign policy is not conducted by the Executive Branch alone, but also, and perhaps primarily so, by the Congress.

This point has been recognized by both friendly and enemy governments. Israel's insistence that its recent agreement with Egypt, particularly the involvement of American personnel in manning the electronic monitoring system in the Sinai, be first endorsed by the U.S. Congress, illustrates the reaction of a friend. Earlier, Hanoi recognized the significance of Congress's decisions which shaped American policy in Cambodia and Vietnam. Despite the presence in Southeast Asia of significant U.S. airpower that could easily have launched heavy retaliatory attacks against the North, when legislative restrictions confirmed nonintervention by the

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United States General Giap's forces were ordered to move in on South Vietnam for the kill.

Perhaps some day Congress will realize that its efforts to score a domestic political victory over the Administration with respect to the Vietnamese war did not enhance America's international stature or its credibility. If anything, the April capitulations of Phnom Penh and Saigon, by dealing a heavy blow to the U.S. position in the whole of Asia, raised doubts about how effectively it will play its future role as a great power. By contrast, the communist "victory of the peoples of Indochina" gave an added aura to the USSR and the People's Republic of China as both stood unflinchingly by their allies and ideological brothers to the end of the long struggle.

It is tempting to think that detente and the about-turn in U.S. foreign policy with respect to the PRC and the USSR represent the end of Cold War, the termination of the dichotomy of the world, and the beginning of a restructuring of international alignments into a larger number of power centers which owe their world status less to military capability than to their impressive economic and industrial performance. It would be a welcome trend indeed if the confrontation between the two rival camps were to recede into the background, if the international atmosphere were to clear up and allow coexistence gradually to replace the system of studied hostility. This would permit the barricades separating the two sides to be pulled down, enabling the countries behind them to move, however timidly at first, across the line and come into contact with one another. Like molecules gliding to form new groupings, nations that were once separated by a sharp political dividing line could then search for new affinities and look for unexplored fields of mutual interest and cooperation. Hopefully such a phenomenon might prosper and spread worldwide.

While all this has yet to come to pass, there is the beginning of movement among the molecules. A small nation like Thailand must, therefore, try to look into the future and by a process of deduction foresee the various ways in which existing international elements will interact among themselves, creating new situations and relationships.

Naturally, among the many factors coming into our consideration, the two great powers figure prominently. They are expected to continue to dominate events in the area. The United States, which has had less than a satisfactory experience in Vietnam, professes an intention to seek disengagement and to lessen its involve-

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ment in Southeast Asia. The USSR, emboldened by the resounding victories of its protege, Hanoi, is moving rapidly to widen its role and increase its presence in the region.

It is too soon to say whether a global power like the United States can afford to efface itself and leave the field free to its rival. Even the so-called peripheral strategy, recently revived in U.S. circles, raises grave doubts about its validity and practicability in this age of intercontinental missiles and global interdependence. Certainly if such a policy were ever fully implemented, the Soviet Union for one would feel greatly obliged. After all, its objective has been, and still is, to push the Americans into the sea while it develops its position firmly on the mainland, at strategic coastal bases like Berbera or Camranh Bay, where it can control sea communications and the flow of strategic materials such as oil. If the United States can be forced back to its pre-Korean War frontier — the offshore island chain — the USSR would be the major beneficiary.

As such a development would hardly safeguard America's global interests, even today's nationalistic Congress should not object to the Administration waging a bold competition with the Soviet rival, provided it is satisfied that the contest will not end in an armed conflict. To Asian observers it appears that this competition inevitably will continue in the economic and political fields. In any event, this is probably the only justification acceptable to U.S. legislators for maintaining any kind of presence in Southeast Asia.

It is this indirect though continuing competition that brings the United States closer to the Chinese position, although Peking's policies stem from a far more urgent and entirely different motivation, namely, the present feud between the PRC and the USSR. Presumably, therefore, neither Peking nor Washington can accept with equanimity the expansion of Soviet influence in the area. For that, if for no other reason, China tends to become a natural partner for the United States. It stands on the same side of the world power equation and shares the common objective of preventing Soviet hegemony in this part of the world.

Fortunately for the smaller nations, the global interests of these two external powers are not permanently rooted in Southeast Asia; they have, rather, a negative aspect, that of opposing the area's domination by any single state. However, we must assume that in pursuit of that common objective, both China and the United States will observe due caution. At the present time they

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are not likely to become involved in large-scale military operations merely to bar the way to the expansion of Soviet influence.

As to the latter, Moscow's representatives in Bangkok and elsewhere have not been idle. They have expressed pride and satisfaction for having supported North Vietnam. Hanoi's victory over the Soviets' major rival gives them a clear opportunity to implement their strategic policies. Already Laos has become an appendage of their client, North Vietnam. By the Laotian government's own admission, more than 2,000 Soviet experts have poured into the country. Allegedly they are there to help the Laotians build oil storage facilities for an economy that has hardly any automobiles or usable roads and no railroad. This raises doubts about the explanation, but even if it were true, what would be the real use of such petroleum reserves? Will it be to support external military operations? Across the border in Thailand, for example?

More likely these Soviet technicians, who are mostly engineers, have the mission of improving the road system from Laos to Haiphong and Danang so that this landlocked country will no longer have to depend on Thailand for its only outlet to the sea. As Hanoi's master plan seems to call for the complete integration of Indochina under its authority, it is only logical that the North Vietnamese should give priority to ending Laos' economic dependence on Thailand. They will seek, as quickly as possible, to reduce all trade and commerce with the "capitalist neighbor" to a minimum, shifting it entirely to the new, unified Vietnam. Here modern, deep-water ports are already available to handle Laos' exports and imports.

There are also strategic considerations to be taken into account. From Moscow's point of view, the question is "How can we transform this poor, landlocked country of only three million people from an economic liability to a military asset?" When one thinks about it, one cannot help but give some credence to reports reaching Bangkok that at least half of the Soviet engineers are there to install ballistic missile emplacements in the mountainous jungle and limestone caves of northern Laos. These installations, which would be difficult to monitor by satellite photography, would complete the Soviet Union's nuclear encirclement of China, bringing its vulnerable southern targets within reach of intermediate-range missiles. Whether the Soviets are prepared to move their nuclear pieces forward in this deadly chess game remains to be seen. They tried the gambit once in Cuba. They may feel that they are in a far stronger position to try it again today.

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Judging by the intensity of the Sino-Soviet exchanges at the United Nations — not to mention the intensity and pace of their separate political activities in Southeast Asia — it seems safe to say that Moscow's efforts will not be reduced. They may rather increase. Whatever the result of this bilateral power game and regardless of the possibility that it may lead to actual warfare, the Soviet Union appears to have served notice that it intends to prevent any expansion of Chinese influence in Indochina and on the mainland of Southeast Asia. While the Chinese are clearly thinking along the same line, they recognize that at least for the present the Soviets are stronger and have the initiative. They make frequent reference to the seriousness of the Soviet threat. They constantly remind their own people "to dig shelters deep; store grain everywhere."

II

In this heightened Sino-Soviet rivalry, what role might the United States play? Since the signing of the Paris cease-fire agreement, Washington seems determined to follow a course of disengagement and low profile in Southeast Asia. The short and sudden outburst of power displayed in the *Mayaguez* affair appears not to have been a reversal of policy, but rather a low-risk enterprise intended to recoup national prestige, which had been gravely affected both domestically and internationally by the Vietnamese debacle. Certainly the Asians do not read this incident as indicating a change of heart or policy toward Southeast Asia. They think America will probably seek a reduced presence merely sufficient to keep watch on Soviet movements on land and in the oceans.

Meanwhile, indications are that the United States will try to strengthen itself in Northeast Asia, anchoring the northern end of its defense line in and around South Korea and Japan. Accordingly, it will endeavor to coordinate its actions with China, with which it sees eye to eye concerning the Soviet problem. Any future cooperation and collaboration between the two countries will be marked, as in the past, by utmost discretion. This discretion is understandable, for neither country wishes to exacerbate its relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, keen observers are now brooding over the implications of possible future American arms sales to strengthen China's defense capability, thereby reducing the Soviet temptation to initiate armed conflict. It is too early to evaluate the probability of such strategic options or to predict the future course of policy of these three powers. For example, it should not be

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ruled out that if the Middle East situation is stabilized, at least for the next two or three years, the United States may be able to pay more attention to the Far East, including Southeast Asia.

For now, it is all too apparent that the power equation in Southeast Asia is out of balance. The U.S.-China component is weakened to the point of atrophy. This is not because of a lack of intrinsic strength: it is owing to the United States' lack of interest and determination and to China's preoccupation with internal problems as well as the threat to its northern borders. The Hanoi-Moscow component, on the contrary, is ebullient over its recent military and political successes. In its view these seem to open the way for further extension of Vietnamese and Soviet control and dominance.

The key to the future situation lies with the new Vietnamese regime, acting in consultation with its Soviet partners. Will the Vietnamese in the years to come concentrate on rehabilitation and the task of rebuilding their countries, as they and their Soviet friends like to affirm? Or, having been on the warpath for so long, will they find it impossible to return to a life of peace and tranquillity? Like the Mongol warlords of old, they may be compelled by some inner drive to continue further depredations and conquests. If so, how far and how long will the Soviet Union be willing to support its socialist ally in Hanoi by providing the logistic wherewithal for further military enterprises? If the answers to these disturbing questions confirm an aggressive intent, the balance of power will be upset even further, with disastrous results for Southeast Asia and for the whole Asian continent. The next few months and years will be fraught with grave uncertainties for this part of the world. Small nations like Thailand will require utmost caution and circumspection in charting the course of their national policies.

It may be noted that Japan was left out of the power equation. The reason is not difficult to understand. By its own constitutional limitations, Japan is debarred from making any military contribution to the security of the region. Politically, it is not expected to play a significant role. However, because of its considerable economic resources and potential, Japan has had an increasingly important impact on economic activities in Southeast Asia. Already, reportedly, it has offered North Vietnam substantial economic assistance. It remains to be seen whether such a move is designed merely to secure commercial outlets for Japanese products or whether cooperation with the new communist regimes will enable Japan to exert

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a moderating influence that may contribute to the greater stability of the region. This would, of course, be all to the good.

Looking ahead, it would appear that Southeast Asia is likely to become a contested zone as the two sides of the equation prepare to confront each other. This means that the small nations in the area will be compelled to play the role of unwilling second-fiddle actors, standing on tightropes stretched over a precipitous gorge. They will have to learn to maintain an appropriate equilibrium and avoid showing excessive enthusiasm for either of the main performers. Otherwise they will face many risks with few, if any, advantages. Even without war, rival campaigns of propaganda and subversion will cause internal unrest and disturbances. The economy of the region may also be adversely affected and entire national societies may be upset by unwarranted external interferences.

Nowadays aggressive wars tend to become rather unwieldy instruments of policy. The preference seems to be to gain or maintain power by assisting regimes sympathetic or even subservient to one's cause. The cases of Laos and Angola are clearly illustrative. This results in political manipulations, instigations of internal disorder, coups d'etat or revolutions. According to impartial reports and assessments, this is what both the Soviets and the Chinese are already trying to set in motion here in Thailand.

While the new communist regimes, and North Vietnam in particular, are busy with the task of consolidating their gains in South Vietnam and Laos, early signs point to their intention to build a case against the northeastern part of Thailand, whose inhabitants, they claim, are of Laotian stock. Plans are probably not yet finalized, but it cannot be ruled out that a so-called Laotian nationalist movement may be started in that part of Thailand and that "liberated areas" may be set up contiguous with Laos. Yet this would be an ethnological and historical anomaly, for there is no such thing as a Lao or Laotian race. In Southeast Asia, only five major races — the Thai, Malay, Mon, Khmer and Burmese — have been identified by scholars. Laotians represent the northern branch of the Thai race. The language they speak is nothing but ancient Thai, which, like Low Latin, has yet to go through the process of evolution and refinement.

After the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon, the Thai government of Prime Minister Kukrit, apparently seized by panic, rushed to Peking to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. This could and should have been done almost five years ago, through the good offices of friendly countries. Unfortunately

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it was opposed by the military government in power at the time, on the grounds that it might compromise U.S.-Thai relations and encourage the growth of communist insurgency within the country.

Also out of the blue sky, the Kukrit government issued a declaration, without prior discussions with either the U.S. government or that of North Vietnam, requiring the United States to pull out all its military personnel by the end of March 1976. In acting so precipitantly, Thailand failed to derive any advantage or *quid pro quo* from the communist side, while hurting the feelings of an ally and receiving no gratitude from its hostile neighbors. Similarly, the Thai government's handling of the *Mayaguez* affair succeeded in further poisoning friendly relations which had extended over a century. Thus, with new relations hardly consolidated, ancient relations have been shaken to the roots.

III

As students of international affairs and thinking human beings, we have to take cognizance of realities. The options left open to the countries in this part of the world are few, and the inescapable fact is that the power equation in Southeast Asia is unevenly balanced, with the U.S.-PRC side distinctly weaker than the Soviet-Vietnamese combination. Any gesture on Thailand's part favoring the former would inevitably draw harassment and pressure from the latter. This is actually what happened following the agreement to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. If Thailand is to survive the impact of this new equation it would seem that it must adopt a policy of "equidistance," to the best of its ability avoiding any deep commitment of a political or military nature with the major outside powers. While this will be difficult to do, it is necessary because the national interests of the big powers do not always coincide with ours. More often than not, they are related to strategic considerations that extend far beyond the confines of Southeast Asia.

What exactly does an equidistance policy mean? What are the countries that seek to practice this kind of diplomacy expected to do? Effectively, it enjoins those observing it to live on as good terms as possible with all the major powers, without letting any of them "hug you too profusely." It is also essential to bear in mind that a favor or concession granted to one party will provoke the other to ask for similar treatment. If this is not forthcoming, pressure will be applied either in communist or Western style. To escape these inconveniences, this country and others in the area

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will have to learn to walk the diplomatic tightrope with as much grace and aplomb as possible.

This seems to be the gloomy prospect looming on the horizon. It may not be too long before the great-power struggle begins in earnest — and, sadly, the nations on the spot can do little, if anything, to prevent such a contest from taking place on their homelands. The only course left is to try to keep as aloof as possible, avoiding any enticement or entanglement and remaining at a safe distance from political or military involvement with either side. Obviously we must recognize that the outsiders are not likely to respect our wishes and will surely pressure us for our support and services. As the proverb says, "When the elephants fight, the grass gets trampled."

Not only does the situation call for building national strength and reinforcing internal unity; it is time to close ranks among countries sharing the same stake in freedom and independence. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represents a somewhat belated effort to move in this direction. True, conflicting national interests have delayed progress. The argument has sometimes come down to the cynical question, "Is there any advantage in hanging together, when by hanging separately we might be last in line?" But considering the realities of power, the fact is that ASEAN, even if it becomes a coherent, effective grouping of nations, can have little impact on the security of the region unless it receives tangible guarantees from the United States, the USSR and the PRC. The prospect for such a convergence of interests among the external powers today is remote. To take a recent example, while China endorsed the ASEAN proposal to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, progress and neutrality, the other antagonist, the Soviet Union, through its official organ, *Pravda,* deprecated the proposal, accusing it of being the first step in turning the association into a military alliance. Such a charge is completely unfounded. Everyone knows that the ASEAN members are small nations with hardly any military potential compared with the major powers, or even with a country like the new Vietnam, which already boasts of having the fifth largest military establishment in the world.

IV

The picture of Southeast Asia, as described above, should not be taken out of context, for it must be expected that future developments in this part of the world will be integrated in geopolitical movements around the globe. It follows that as long as

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international peace is still predicated on the balance between the two major forces, the United States and the Soviet Union, any attempt to upset that balance will ultimately face certain resistance wherever it may occur. For that reason also, the policy of equidistance and the necessity to maintain an impartial posture vis-a-vis these two powers, as well as those closely allied with them, becomes a *sine qua non* for the safeguarding of our nation's peace and freedom.

From Thailand's point of view, the shape of things to come will probably be determined by the validity of certain assumptions and the answers to several related questions, namely:

(1) As matters now stand, the United States, despite assertions that it will honor its commitments, is most unlikely to engage in military operations for the defense of any country in Southeast Asia. The Congressional resolution barring such an engagement forecloses any action on the part of the Executive Branch.

(2) Both the United States and the PRC may be willing to do what they can, short of entering into an armed conflict, to prevent Soviet hegemony over Southeast Asia.

(3) Although the USSR may or may not wish to secure control over all of Southeast Asia, it probably finds North Vietnamese dominance over South Vietnam and Laos conveniently serving its purpose of confronting the PRC from its southern flank. For this service, it may extend many favors to North Vietnam. The important question for Thailand to know is how far the Soviet Union is prepared to go to fulfill its strategic aims, and to what extent it will help its North Vietnamese friends to fulfill theirs.

(4) What will be North Vietnam's or unified Indochina's future disposition and ambitions? Will Hanoi be content with consolidating its position in Southeast Asia or will it seek to extend its influence and overlordship, either on its own or with the help and support of the Soviet Union? And what will be the reaction of the PRC and the United States in such a contingency? For the latter this question will be transposed from the level of helping to defend a country against overt or covert aggression to that of preventing a significant shift in the world balance of power through any single state's establishment of regional hegemony.

(5) Should Vietnam elect to push its expansion farther, will it opt for overt action or will it, as seems more likely, follow past patterns of subversion and insurgency, expanding gradually into full-scale military action for the final phase? Continuing re-

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ports of arms smuggling across the Mekong River for the purpose of building arms caches in Thai territory may indicate the nature of the problems ahead.

(6) Should the attempt to spread Soviet-Vietnamese control over the whole of Southeast Asia materialize, Thailand and the countries of the region must work together to counter such an offensive. In addition to strengthening their own national defense posture, they will have a deep interest in concerting their collective defensive actions. They will also wish to present a united front diplomatically. As in the Middle East, the United Nations should be called upon to send observers to be stationed in sensitive areas. By so doing, there is a possibility that peace and stability may still be preserved in this part of the world.

These are the stark realities as seen from Bangkok. They emphasize both the disturbing implications of the imbalance of power in Southeast Asia, and the rapidity with which events are moving. The future is characterized by great time compression; things no longer move at the leisurely pace we Buddhists are accustomed to. Clearly the Soviet-Vietnamese team has the initiative. They probably estimate that America will be immobilized throughout 1976 by its elections and that China will be similarly inhibited by internal problems of succession. If so, they may wish to move as quickly as possible to exploit the situation. Thus our small country finds itself suddenly buffeted by conflicting external forces over which it has no control. What were once treated as possible "future shocks" are already upon us. What little time Thailand has left is fast running out.

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THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF THE "CORRELATION OF WORLD FORCES": IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY*

by Michael J. Deane

The summit conferences of May 1972 and June 1973 evoked in many Americans the optimistic expectation that detente signified a new stage in Soviet-American relations. Despite caution engendered by the bitter years of the Cold War, Americans sincerely hoped that the "era of confrontation" could be superseded by the "era of negotiations." On the U.S. side, it was envisioned that our profound expressions of good will would — perhaps not immediately, but certainly with time — put an end to the conflict characterizing past relations and institute a friendlier environment in which the United States and the USSR would work together to find common solutions to our differences.

Soviet spokesmen have likewise expressed the view that the summits of 1972 and 1973 were part of a new stage in Soviet-American relations. Similarly, they have agreed that detente has opened up significant possibilities for the negotiation of Soviet-American differences. However, at this point they diverge sharply from their American counterparts. Soviet leaders adamantly deny that detente implies an eventual reconciliation between the two systems or an end to the intersystemic struggle underlying the Soviet view of the U.S.-USSR relationship. According to the Soviet position, "peaceful coexistence" between communism and capitalism requires only the avoidance of direct Soviet-American military confrontation while presupposing total conflict in every other area. As stated in the authoritative party journal, *Kommunist:*

> Peaceful coexistence represents a specific form of class struggle in the international arena and a dialectically complex form of struggle in which

* This paper was prepared for the Strategic Studies Center of the Stanford Research Institute, as part of a project being directed by Richard Pipes on the "correlation of forces."

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> the superiority of this or that social system is tested and determined not by a clash of weapons and not by the tempo of preparation for armed conflict, but by the interaction of the sum total of the elements constituting the actual power of the state: economic, political, social, and spiritual.[1]

Thus, the Soviet view posits that detente is not a substitute for conflict, but rather a specific type of conflict which will lead to the victory of communism over capitalism.

Two general reasons buttress the USSR's present approach to peaceful coexistence. First, a fundamental feature of detente is avoidance of direct, total war. Since the Russo-Polish war of the 1920s, when the Soviet Union for all practical purposes gave up the goal of world revolution through war, the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy has been to avoid armed conflict with militarily superior Western enemies. Total war has been viewed as an unacceptable and undesirable course of action.[2]

Second, the Soviet leadership contends that communism can attain its "inevitable victory" even without war, because the correlation of world forces is shifting in its favor. Indeed, it maintains that the shift of forces in communism's favor has made war incompatible with the attainment of world communism. As one political officer of the Soviet armed forces noted, Marxist-Leninists

> take into account the character of the correlation of world forces and the trends of their development. On consideration of these changes and trends is based their assurance of the inevitability of the victory of socialism on a worldwide scale, as well as the possibility of preventing a new world war.[3]

The same officer further explains that an assessment of the correlation of forces is important not only because it points out the general direction of history, but also because actions are determined in accordance with this analysis.

Given the importance attached to the "correlation of world forces" by the Soviet leadership, the purpose of this article is (1) to define the concept as the Soviets understand it, (2) to illustrate the current Soviet assessment of the correlation of world forces, and (3) to demonstrate the impact of the Soviet assessment on Soviet foreign policy.

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[1] N. Lebedev, "On the Class Character of Peaceful Coexistence," *Kommunist*, March 1975, p. 57.

[2] Obviously total intersystemic conflict is here distinguished from limited probes of the type characterized by Soviet blockades of West Berlin in the 1940s, the Soviet-sponsored Cuban "missile crisis" in the early 1960s, or Soviet-supported use of proxy Cuban troops in Angola in the 1970s.

[3] Colonel S. Tyushkevich, "The Correlation of Forces in the World and Factors of War Prevention," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, May 1974, p. 13.

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The "Correlation of World Forces": Definition and Disaggregation

Historically, the general concept of a "correlation of forces" (*sootnosheniye sil* in Russian) has been used since pre-revolutionary days to denote the relative alignment of two opposing forces or groups of forces. It variously has reference to forces or groups of forces in the domestic arena (that is, the internal correlation of forces), on the international scene (the international correlation of forces or the correlation of world forces), and to particular types of forces (for example, the correlation of class forces, of political forces, of economic forces, and of military forces).

With the widest extension, the concept of the "correlation of world forces" subsumes all of the other individual elements. Generally, Soviet descriptions of specific factors are vague. However, in one of the most detailed disaggregations so far given in Soviet literature, G. Shakhnazarov listed four main categories, as well as specific elements within each category, which, he claimed, are given the greatest attention in calculating the correlation of world forces. They are:

Economic—per capita GNP, labor productivity, the dynamics of economic growth, the level of industrial production, especially in the leading branches, the technical equipping of labor, resources and degree of labor qualifications, the number of specialists, and the level of development of theoretical and applied science.

Military—quantity and quality of armaments, the firepower of armies, the combat and moral qualities of soldiers, the training of the command staff, the forms of troop organization and their combat experience, the character of military doctrine and methods of strategic, operational and technical thinking.

Political—breadth of the social base of the state authority and its organization, the constitutional procedure of relations between the government and legislative organs, the possibility of making operative decisions, and the degree and character of popular support of domestic and foreign policy.

International Movements—quantitative composition, influence among the masses, position in the political life of individual countries, principles and norms of relations among the component parts, and the degree of their cohesion.[4]

A review of Soviet sources indicates that calculation of the correlation of world forces is made, and has historically been made, on two levels. In a broad sense it is used to adjudge the global relationship between the capitalist and communist camps. In a

[4] G. Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of the Correlation of Forces," *Kommunist*, February 1974, p. 86.

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narrower sense it has been applied to situations in specific regions of the world.

The global "correlation of world forces" is apparently only a rough approximation derived from the analysis of individual elements. As Shakhnazarov conceded in his article:

> Incomparably more complex is the overall correlation of forces in the world. It is difficult to give a calculation of the number of factors partaking in its formation. Some of them have changing significance and are capable of behaving in an unpredictable manner.[5]

Thus, the global correlation seems to constitute an intuitive calculation of forces based on the Soviet leadership's "feel" for the direction of world events.

On the regional level, a different situation appears to exist. Evidence indicates that in dealing with regional or specific short-term situations, the Soviet leadership develops careful assessments of the alignment of forces insofar as it involves both local contestants and the superpowers that may be involved. This is feasible because the number of factors to be assessed under such circumstances are fewer and more easily ascertainable. Thus, the regional "correlation of forces" appears to possess operational meaning for the formulation of foreign policy actions.

Soviet literature on the correlation of world forces discusses two major problems, which make precision of analysis a complicated attainment. First, some elements are quantifiable only to a limited degree. While material — i.e., economic and military — factors can to a large extent be quantified, equally significant sociopolitical factors are less quantifiable and therefore can ultimately be estimated only qualitatively.[6] Often cited in this category are: (1) the general crisis of capitalism, (2) the struggle for national liberation, (3) the mobilization of international mass anti-Western movements, and (4) the stratification of Western leaders on the issue of cooperation with the communist community.

Second, there exist independent forces or "wandering values," which act unpredictably. These forces lack strict adherence to either the communist or the capitalist cause but may have a significant or even determining effect on a particular situation. Shakhnazarov explains:

> Finally, there are forces which have not "defined their position," have not taken clearcut positions, and to a certain extent vacillate between

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Sh. Sanakoyev, "The Problem of the Correlation of Forces in the Contemporary World," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, October 1974, p. 46.

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the main participants of the class conflict. Therefore, when calculating the correlation of forces, it must be taken into consideration that the international arena has its own type of "wandering" values, which in each concrete case can significantly influence the outcome of events.[7]

Prominent examples of vacillating independent forces include: (1) Egypt in the Middle East situation, (2) the Vietnamese Communist Party in the Sino-Soviet conflict, (3) social democrats in Western Europe, and (4) religious and pacifist groups in the West.

In complicating the analysis process, these factors inject a degree of uncertainty into the overall assessment of the correlation of world forces. Obviously, a global calculation increasingly suffers the impact of these uncertainties. In terms of international behavior, it would seem to follow that the more the Western countries can maximize the range of such uncertainties, the less assured the Soviets will be in the outcome of a particular action against, or probe into, the Western sphere of influence.

But as Soviet commentators repeatedly stress, "correlation of forces" in this sense is more than "balance of power." "Balance of power" in Western usage tends to be confined to the strictly military aspects of the equation, in accordance with military tradition. Western armies customarily operated in a familiar and relatively stable socio-economic situation in which wars were decided first and foremost by military power and skill. (In non-Western colonial areas, where the situation was quite different, the sheer military might of the West, until recent times, also made it relatively unimportant to calculate other factors.) The communists, however, being heirs of a revolutionary tradition, have for a long time had to wage war with all sorts of weapons except military ones and have developed a more comprehensive concept of what constitutes "force." They incorporate in it such factors as the social and political cohesion of the adversary, his economic power (especially as it bears on the military effort), and such imponderables as morale and will. They also consider the international implications of a given situation. In other words, they take a more inclusive view of the factors that enter into the calculation of forces than does the Western side.

The Current Soviet Assessment

According to the Soviet historical view, the correlation of world forces has since 1917 experienced three radical shifts, each of

[7] Shakhnazarov, p. 87.

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which has resulted in a new relative alignment even more favorable for the communist side. The first shift occurred in 1917 with the emergence of the first communist state. Allegedly, the correlation of forces at that time was demonstrated by the inability of either Imperial Germany or the Western Allied interventionists to overthrow the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and restore Russia to tsarist rule. The second shift took place in 1945 with the defeat of Nazi Germany and the emergence of new communist states in Eastern Europe. Claiming the major role in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union asserted that its military victory was proof of further change in the correlation of world forces.

The third and most recent shift is said to have transpired about 1969-1970 and is closely connected with the attainment of strategic military parity. While they reject any suggestion that military might is the foundation or even the dominant element of their "correlation of forces" assessment, Soviet spokesmen argue that the attainment of strategic parity allowed the main competition between the two systems to be shifted away from the military confrontation toward the economic, political and ideological spheres.[8] As a result of the new shift, the capitalist states, especially the United States, were supposedly compelled to reappraise their policy of acting "from a position of strength" and to enter into "an era of negotiations." Thus, one Soviet writer observed:

> To sum it up, the balance of world forces had further shifted in socialism's favour by the early 1970s as evidenced, for example, by the attainment of Soviet-American nuclear and missile parity and the awareness by the USA of its limited possibilities to influence diverse events in the world by means of military forces. This made the U.S. ruling class start a "reappraisal of values" and acknowledge the need "to reconcile the reality of competition between the two systems with the imperative of coexistence."
>
> As a result of this reappraisal, the United States switched over from the policy of confrontation to a policy of negotiation with the USSR and other socialist countries.[9]

Moreover, owing to the new correlation of forces, Soviet spokesmen maintain, the capitalist states were forced to accept peaceful coexistence as the guiding principle of international relations and to enter into detente as a "relaxation of tensions" with

[8] N. Inozemtsev, "Unity of Theory and Practice in the Leninist Peace Policy," *Kommunist*, December 1975, pp. 46-47. According to this framework, one would include under political activity such undertakings as Soviet weapons modernization programs, military construction efforts, and military aid and support to the United States' opponents. Quite plainly, the Soviet definition of the avoidance of military confrontation does not imply an end to military competition.

[9] G. Trofimenko, "From Confrontation to Coexistence," *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1975, p. 38.

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the communist states.[10] Since peaceful coexistence in the Soviet view does not preclude intersystemic conflicts, but only transfers the struggle to areas other than direct Soviet-American military confrontation, it is a deliberate offensive policy aimed at destruction of the West. "Peaceful coexistence," stated one Soviet writer accordingly,

> is essentially a class policy conducive to the strengthening of the position and prestige of the socialist countries, while undermining the aggressive imperialist forces and narrowing their opportunities for plotting against the cause of peace and social progress.[11]

Likewise, at the Twenty-fifth CPSU Congress, General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev conceded that present peaceful relations with the West are designed to attain unilateral Soviet advantage. In Brezhnev's words, "we make no secret of the fact that we see in detente the way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction."[12]

In sum, the Soviets calculate the correlation of forces as a "two-in-one process," in which the communist side continuously wins and progresses and the capitalist side decays and disintegrates. As Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU's Central Committee, has stated, "if the influence of socialism on the course of events grows, this means that the resources of the imperialist and reactionary forces will diminish correspondingly, and the resources of the forces of peace, national independence, and social progress will increase."[13] While some internal economic problems (such as recent agricultural deficiencies) and social difficulties (such as alcoholism and "hooliganism"), as well as foreign policy setbacks (such as the ouster of the Soviet-supported Allende regime in Chile) are acknowledged, the general trend is described as constantly shifting in communism's favor.

Impact of the Shift on Soviet Conduct of Foreign Policy

It must be emphasized that Soviet calculation of the correlation of world forces is not a mere scholarly exercise solely

[10] See, for example, speech by M. A. Suslov, member of the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat, commemorating the 105th anniversary of Lenin's birth, in *Pravda*, April 23, 1975. The Nixon Doctrine and the SALT agreements are generally cited as two instances when the United States was forced to modify its policies to accord with the new correlation of world forces.

[11] N. Kapchenko, "Socialist Foreign Policy and the Restructuring of International Relations," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1975, p. 8.

[12] *Pravda*, February 25, 1976.

[13] Boris Ponomarev, "The Role of Socialism in Contemporary World Development," *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, January 1975, p. 11.

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intended to justify and rationalize current behavior. While it undoubtedly may fulfill this function under a particular set of circumstances, historical example and contemporary writings indicate that the calculation has pertinent application in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. According to the deputy head of the International Department of the CC/CPSU, calculation of the prevailing correlation of world forces is extremely important because in accordance with it "the Communist Parties set themselves their immediate tasks and determine the current policy or tactics," and a change in the correlation of forces "can lead to a change in the general line, in the entire strategy of the world communist movement."[14] In another place, the same high-ranking party official asserted that the new alignment of forces must be utilized to attain even more concrete gains in foreign policy. Interpreting the significance of the 1969-1970 shift in communism's favor, V. V. Zagladin maintained: "It signifies that the possibilities of the socialist world to influence actively the policy of imperialism are growing. And it follows that the responsibility of socialism to utilize these possibilities is also growing."[15]

The differing perception of the correlation of world forces highlights the differences between the approaches of the present regime and its predecessor to the conduct of foreign policy. Broadly speaking, Khrushchev had envisioned the intersystemic conflict as a peaceful competition in which the inherent superiority of the communist system would gradually gain world prestige and influence. This belief was reflected in the declaration issued by the conference of twelve communist parties meeting in Moscow in 1957:

> In connection with the profound historic changes and fundamental shifts in the correlation of forces in the international arena in favor of socialism and as a result of the increasing power of attraction of the ideas of socialism among the working class, working peasantry, and working intelligentsia, more favorable conditions are being created for the victory of socialism.[16]

Specifically, Khrushchev viewed economics to be the dominant element in an assessment of the correlation of forces. He asserted that the attainment of economic superiority over capitalism would propel all other forces to favor communism. For example, he

[14] V. V. Zagladin, editor, *The World Communist Movement: Outline of Strategy and Tactics* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), pp. 41 and 36, respectively.
[15] V. V. Zagladin, "The Revolutionary Process and International CPSU Policy," *Kommunist*, September 1972, p. 22.
[16] *Pravda*, November 22, 1957.

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declared to the Twenty-first CPSU Congress that fulfillment of the new seven-year plan

> will increase the economic potential of the USSR to such an extent that, coupled with the growth of the economic potential of all socialist countries, it will secure a decisive preponderance in the correlation of forces in the international arena in favor of peace, and thus will come into existence new and still more favorable conditions for averting world war and preserving peace on earth.[17]

Thus, while Khrushchev was not averse to limited military adventures or "harebrain schemes," he made significant efforts to redirect a portion of Soviet budgetary allocations away from military expenditures toward greater consumer and agricultural investments.

In comparison, the Brezhnev regime has sought to broaden the front of systemic confrontation. While economics retains its former importance, relatively greater significance is now attached to other arenas of competition. According to the Soviets there are no "neutral" areas of cooperation; all are considered to be elements of struggle. An article in *Kommunist,* for example, points out that:

> . . . peaceful coexistence does not remove the contradiction between socialism and capitalism — the main contradiction of the contemporary epoch. The class struggle of the two world systems continues; it is developing in three basic forms: political, economic, and ideological.[18]

The Soviets do not uniformly and consistently pursue the competition of the two systems in all these forms, however. At a particular time or under a certain set of circumstances, greater emphasis may be given to one or another form.

This is not to deny the significance of East-West agreements in the economic and military fields. Insofar as they produce mutually beneficial results, such agreements are desirable from the Western viewpoint. A problem arises, however, when some Westerners mistakenly conclude that these individual agreements will, over time, point the way to an accommodation of interests between capitalism and communism. Soviet leaders totally reject any suggestion of converging interests. Indeed, while the latest shift in the correlation of world forces has resulted in some cooperative agree-

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[17] N. S. Khrushchev, "On the Planned Figures for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1959-1965," *Vneocherednoy XXI s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stenographic Record), Vol. 1 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1959), p. 72.

[18] "International Relations and the Ideological Struggle," *Kommunist,* September 1973, p. 4.

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ments, this has been balanced by stepped-up Soviet activity in the Third World.

The Soviets consider the Third World to be a legitimate arena for superpower competition, because conflict there can be managed within acceptable limits. Traditionally fluid and unstable, the Third World with its relatively low potential for direct superpower military confrontation, as opposed to that of Europe, is viewed as a target of opportunity. Material and political support for national liberation movements is not construed by the Soviets to contradict the principle of peaceful coexistence. On the contrary, national liberation movements in the Third World are specifically excluded from the principle of peaceful coexistence and are described as allies of "world socialism" in the "joint offensive against imperialism and capitalism" for the victory of socialism.[19] Moreover, Soviet spokesmen frequently reason that the growth of Soviet influence and power, especially military power, vis-a-vis the United States, in conjunction with the present detente relationship, effectively deters Western responses to national liberation movements.[20]

Apparently, proceeding from its general assessment of the correlation of world forces since the 1969-1970 shift in communism's favor, the Moscow leadership has undertaken to increase its activity in the Third World. One manifestation of this growing involvement is the tremendous increase in Soviet economic aid extended to Third World countries in the past five years. During the period 1971-1975, Soviet economic aid increased to 1.7 times the level of the previous five-year period (1966-1970). Thus, while the earlier period represents 37 per cent of all Soviet economic aid to the Third World over the past ten years, the more recent period represents 63 per cent. (See Table I.)

A similar sharp rise in Soviet military agreements with Third World countries can also be dated in correspondence to the shift in the correlation of world forces. Military agreements in 1971-1975 were 2.62 times greater than in 1966-1970, so that the more recent time period represents 72 per cent of all Soviet military agreements with the Third World over the past ten years. (See Table II.)

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[19] V. Tyagunenko, "World Socialism and the National Liberation Revolution," *ibid.*, May 1973, p. 52.

[20] See, for example, L. I. Brezhnev, speech at banquet for President Tito of Yugoslavia, *Pravda*, June 6, 1972; and L. I. Brezhnev, speech in Havana, *ibid.*, January 31, 1974.

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TABLE I

SOVIET ECONOMIC AID EXTENDED TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES
(millions U.S. $)

1966	1,241	
1967	291	
1968	379	
1969	494	
1970	198	
1971	1,125	
1972	802	
1973	657	
1974	575	
1975	1,264	
Total 1966-1970		2,603
Total 1971-1975		4,423
Total 1966-1975		7,026

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975," ER 76-10372U, July 1976, p. 5.

Implications for American Foreign Policy

The concept of the correlation of world forces is without doubt a fundamental part of the Soviet approach to international affairs. Its main message is that competition proceeds along a wide front of intersystemic conflict, manifested in many spheres. This is important because until now the United States has tended to view

TABLE II

SOVIET MILITARY AGREEMENTS WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES
(millions U.S. $)

1966	450	
1967	525	
1968	500	
1969	350	
1970	1,025	
1971	1,450	
1972	925	
1973	1,900	
1974	2,475	
1975	725	
Total 1966-1970		2,850
Total 1971-1975		7,475
Total 1966-1975		10,325

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975," ER 76-10372U, July 1976, p. 1.

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the East-West conflict as occurring primarily in the political-military arena. Limited in this perspective, U.S. foreign policy has reacted best to military and political challenges with military and diplomatic responses.

Hence, U.S. foreign policy is ill-equipped to meet the Soviets' multidimensional, global challenge and to deal with the complexity of change as a global phenomenon — that is, as a dynamic global correlation of forces. This problem renders U.S. policymakers insensitive to the magnitude of the conflict and unprepared to cope with innovative Soviet nonmilitary actions against Western spheres of influence which pass unrecognized.

It is misleading to ask "What will happen if detente fails?" or "What alternative is there to detente?" The implication in such questions is that detente in essence is characterized by peaceful cooperation and businesslike competition and that the only alternative is total nuclear confrontation. The reality of the situation, however, is that only one side, the United States and its Western allies, looks upon detente from this perspective. As a consequence, U.S. foreign policy is self-restrained in its utilization of economic, political and political-military leverages against the Soviet Union. Indeed, U.S. policymakers appear almost embarrassed to pursue whatever advantages detente may presently possess in order to gain further mutually beneficial agreements from the Soviet Union. The Soviets, conversely, have made no such reciprocal concession to the relaxation of conflict; they continue to wage political, economic and ideological warfare on the West.

Since it appears to be impossible for the USSR to give up its systemic competition, it is necessary for the United States to find an alternative to "detente" on Moscow's terms. In our own self-interest it behooves U.S. policymakers to recognize the nature of the challenge posed by contemporary Soviet national strategy and foreign policy. This demands a broad, macropolitical perspective. The nation-state paradigm, which has for so long constituted the basis of American foreign policy formulation, is incapable of grappling with the multidimensional and truly global threat from communism. It is vital that Western policymakers develop an organizing concept that permits a holistic perspective on world politics. Such a perspective would assist them in discerning the broad scope of Soviet intersystemic conflict. It would also make more visible to them the heretofore unmobilized and unconventional, yet substantial, assets of the West, and the means to employ them effectively in the competition with world communism.

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THE AFRICAN DIMENSION OF INDIAN OCEAN POLICY

by Chester A. Crocker

African dependence on external powers preceded direct European rule, was systematized in the colonial period, and has continued in various forms since the grant of formal independence. In the strategic sphere — defense postures, military aid ties, external military roles, and foreign bases and access rights — decolonization has been a gradual process.[1] Events of the past five years, however, indicate that strategic decolonization has accelerated. African opposition to continuing military dependence on the former European metropoles has grown while European nostalgia for the symbols and substance of postimperial defense roles has declined. The April 1974 coup d'etat in Lisbon, it can be argued, marked the last time that Africa's political and strategic context will be decisively shaped by "European" events. Portugal's evolution, in the meantime, bears witness to Africa's influence on Europe.

This essay analyzes the evolution of European and superpower strategic roles in Africa and the western Indian Ocean since the early 1960s. It first traces the gradual recognition in London and Paris that their African strategic presence was inescapably limited by the nature of the colonial legacy and by a growing divergence of interest between Africa and Europe. By the 1970s, both European powers found themselves obliged to accommodate resource constraints as well as the constraint posed by a changing African political context. European military roles and relationships were adjusted or terminated, thereby dissolving a security buffer that had long shaped Africa's international affairs. It next demonstrates that the Soviet Union has been the more willing of the two superpowers to pay the price and take the risks of fostering military client relationships in Africa.[2] This is explained in terms of Moscow's

[1] This argument is developed in the author's "Military Dependence: The Colonial Legacy in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, June 1974.

[2] Borderline cases from the 1960s would include the U.S. role in ferrying Belgian paratroops to Stanleyville in 1964 and later missions flown by Soviet military advisers on behalf of the Sudanese government in the dissident southern provinces.

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Indian Ocean strategic aims, the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and Soviet perceptions of potential gains to be derived from support of various African causes. The United States, it is maintained, has perceived fewer advantages and greater liabilities in African military ties, and has until recently given the impression of seeking to disengage militarily from Africa's principal conflict zones — the Horn and Southern Africa. Washington's caution has reduced its potential liabilities while also reducing its influence with littoral states by creating both the fact and the image of ambivalence. The essay concludes that the Angolan civil war of 1975-1976 has set in motion the most profound rethinking of America's Africa policy since the outset of the 1960s.

Europe in Africa: The 1960s

For over 100 years, British and French self-images have been shaped by Africa, and Africa has been an adjunct of these nations' global power positions. Africa's location and manpower, its potential for defense in depth against "eastern" threats, its resources, have been an element in the European position. France, facing a threatening balance in Europe, looked to its African-centered empire to help right that balance by providing strategic facilities and a "reservoir" of manpower available for use in Europe and throughout the empire. Britain regarded African manpower as subsidiary to the Indian army, and its African naval stations at Freetown, Simonstown, Mauritius and Mombasa were lesser links in an imperial structure centered around Suez, India and Singapore. After 1945, as the two powers were thrown on the defensive by nationalism in North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa came to be seen as a haven of strategic continuity. Ironically, at a time when decolonization elsewhere had paved the way for rapid and largely peaceful progress toward political independence in Africa, the two European powers envisaged continuing defense roles there.

For France, strategic continuity after independence paralleled relations in most other spheres, and was specifically provided for in the elaborate series of cooperation accords signed with its ex-colonies and Madagascar in 1960-1961.[3] Military cooperation included a continuing French military presence in most of the new states; French base, staging and overflight rights; joint planning for

[3] One of the fullest descriptions of these agreements is contained in Maurice Ligot, *Les accords de coopération entre la France et les états africains et malgache d'expression française* (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1964).

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the establishment of new national armed forces from elements of the French African army; military assistance and training agreements; and provision for consultation and joint action in the event of threats to external security and, in some agreements, internal order. Britain did not seek (and English-speaking Africans did not permit) this degree of strategic cooperation. But Britain retained and was actually improving its defense infrastructure in Nigeria and Kenya during the years 1957-1962 when African decolonization reached its crescendo. Initially, London's rationale had less to do with Africa than with the need to circumvent the Arab "air barrier" to the north by prepositioning ground and air forces in an East of Suez "theatre reserve." By the early 1960s, however, British policy statements began to make explicit reference to a continuing presence "in support of the civil power" in eastern and southern Africa, a scenario best illustrated by the June 1963 British army deployment into Swaziland during a labor dispute and by the more heralded British intervention to suppress mutinous soldiers paralyzing the independent governments of Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda in January 1964.[4]

Political and strategic decolonization were thus remarkably out of phase in the early 1960s. In part this was because of a demonstrable security vacuum in a number of African states, but it also derived from a European perception that independence need not disrupt strategic communications or terminate European "responsibilities." The rash of instability and external intervention in Africa led leaders in both European capitals to exaggerate the durability of postcolonial missions. Self-delusion was hard to resist when French leaders could read the new Malagasy Chief of Staff's declaration in a French military journal in 1963 that his country was "a spring board of the free world in the Indian Ocean facing the still troubled states of Africa and Asia. . . ."[5] A year later, after French forces had suppressed a Gabonese army putsch and restored President Leon Mba to power, French spokesmen observed that the Franco-African defense accords had been aimed at "precisely this threat" and had been the grounds for French internal security as-

[4] See, for example, Cmnd. 1639 (Command Papers), *Statement on Defense 1962: The Next Five Years*, pp. 4-12. On the Swaziland operation, see Ian Raitt, "Operation 'Green Belt' in Swaziland," *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, February 1964; on the Tanganyika intervention, see Keith Kyle, "Mutinies and After," *The Spectator* (London), January 31, 1964, and T. M. P. Stevens, "A Joint Operation in Tanganyika," *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, February 1965.

[5] General Gabriel Ramanantsoa, "Madagascar: son armée," *Frères d'Armes*, December 1963, p. 12.

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sistance on ten previous occasions since 1960.[6] Drawing similar conclusions in London, shadow defense spokesman Denis Healey argued that Britain possessed unique defense capacities and responsibilities for dealing with local instability in parts of Africa and Asia, and that these were unlikely to diminish much, "at least in the next decade."[7]

However, the mid-1960s marked the high point of European fascination with African defense roles, and of African tolerance of them. On the European side, it soon became apparent that African armies could not be prevented from taking power unless London and Paris were prepared to offer open-ended life insurance policies to literally dozens of civilian regimes (as the rash of coups d'etat in 1965-1966 made clear). Moreover, there were larger constraints. Britain's "correct" response to Nigeria's defense requirements during the Biafran secession indicated that it was prepared to be overshadowed by Moscow's more dramatic aid contribution rather than become overinvolved itself. Rhodesia's UDI in December 1965 posed the issue in still sharper fashion: postimperial policing would be avoided if it called for the application of major forces and generated significant domestic opposition at home.[8] In lieu of effective military action, London opted for more symbolic measures: the dispatch of a fighter aircraft squadron to Zambia (which was not in a position to defend its own airspace), the deployment of a small army force to guard Botswana's BBC facility, and the establishment of a naval screen in the Mozambique Channel to help enforce the economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

Limited British willingness to take decisive action on issues of central importance to the black states reduced their willingness to countenance continuing, overt dependence on London. Britain's potential role was also hindered by African reluctance to grant it defense facilities. Nigeria, which had abrogated a limited defense agreement with the UK in 1962, could not be counted on for cooperation. The East African governments, so recently bolstered by British troops in 1964, rapidly terminated their presence; Kenya pressed the closure of Britain's almost new base facilities just months later, leaving Britain with limited Kenyan staging, overflight and port

[6] Press conference of French cabinet member Alain Peyrefitte, cited in *Combat* (Paris), February 27, 1964.

[7] Quoted in *The Financial Times* (Defense Supplement), March 23, 1964.

[8] The issue could have threatened Labour's paper-thin majority in Parliament. On the military aspects, see Neville Brown, "Military Sanctions Against Rhodesia," *Venture* (London), January 1966; Brown, who supported strong military measures, concluded that Britain would require some 35,000 men plus air and naval support to assure an effective military operation.

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rights but no base facility between Libya (El Adem) and Simonstown.

Thus, Britain faced a curious paradox: if it remained responsive to security issues as perceived by Africans, the potential demand on its limited resources was open-ended; if it stuck to more modest, symbolic roles that were not internally divisive, African states would have less interest in strategic continuity. The dilemma in Africa was but a microcosm of its larger dilemmas of overseas defense policy. Between 1964 and 1968, there were calls on British forces in South Arabia, Oman, Cyprus, Guyana and Indonesia — as as well as the African cases. Far from being an inexpensive and glamorous route to prestige, Britain's overseas roles resulted in seriously overstretched military and economic resources. Internal debate over the "East of Suez" role grew dramatically,[9] culminating in the withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and the February 1968 decision to retrench in the Persian Gulf and throughout the Indian Ocean region.

The 1967-1968 British defense reviews provided for a rapidly phased withdrawal of forces whose presence and availability could support direct, unilateral and timely British action in the internal security affairs of littoral states. What remained was the token "presence" created by British officers serving in local forces; small detachments where Britain had a responsibility as the protecting power (the Persian Gulf until 1971 as well as Hong Kong and Brunei); a modest force commitment in Singapore and Malaysia to the ANZUK pact (the Five-Power Defense Agreement, after April 1971); and a skeletal air and naval presence scattered among Simonstown, the Mozambique Channel, Mauritius, Bahrein, Sharjah, Masirah and Gan in the Maldives.

Yet, despite this reversal, underlying British attitudes remained sympathetic to the concept of a unique British contribution to stability in Afro-Asia; the very suddenness of the 1968 shift caused misgivings in some quarters, especially in reference to the Persian Gulf.[10] Rather than tailoring commitments and responsibilities to defense resources, London remained ambivalent about the nature of the threat against which its token presence was aimed. In the Persian Gulf and Kenya — where Britain had limited base rights[11]

[9] See, for example, Christopher Mayhew, *Britain's Role Tomorrow* (London: Hutchinson, 1967); Neville Brown, "What Kind of East of Suez Force and Why?," *Venture*, February 1966; and Alastair Buchan, "Britain East of Suez: Part I — The Problem of Power," *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, August 1967.

[10] D. C. Watt, "The Decision to Withdraw from the Gulf," *The Political Quarterly*, July-September 1968.

[11] Provided for in an unpublished "memorandum of understanding" negotiated shortly after Kenya's independence.

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and conducted periodic joint exercises with the UK-trained Kenyans as a signal to Mogadishu — the threat was local (rather than communist) aggression. But British thinking reflected a lingering concern as well over Chinese pressures in Asia and over the arrival of the Soviet navy in Indian Ocean waters in 1968, which London's retrenchment had, ironically, encouraged. As was demonstrated when the Tories returned to office in 1970, London resisted the policy implications of its decline in power and will, and rejected the notion that African states should control the methods by which Britain pursued its overseas interests.

Paris found it simpler than London to retain strategic continuity. Describing France as an African power — rather than an East of Suez power in the British sense — its sphere included states with a more substantial and more uniform degree of dependency on the ex-metropole. The postcolonial role was less demanding militarily than Britain's, and there were no troublesome colonial hangovers such as Rhodesia to impede smooth relations with independent African states. France's East African interests — the Djibouti enclave, independent Madagascar, and the island dependencies of Reunion and the Comores — formed an integral part of this Africa-centered, politico-strategic system.[12]

But France also faced constraints. Its success in restoring the *status quo ante* in Gabon in 1964 could not become a binding precedent: if Paris were to avoid the costly burden of continually propping up African regimes threatened by their own security forces, it would be necessary to (a) deter military coups against the more "important" (to France) African leaders, while (b) distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable coups and (c) making clear that Paris would make the decisions. On the other hand, certain senior African civilian leaders stressed their preference for a meaningful French military presence that could deter such threats — as well as perceived dangers posed by potentially hostile neighbors — without exacerbating local sentiment by creating the impression that Francophone Africa was still under colonial rule.

To deal with such dilemmas, France took action to reduce its military presence. In 1964-1965, the French army in independent Africa and Madagascar was cut from some 28,000 to just under 7,000 men; the demobilization of 10,000 Africans serving within the French army would also help to reduce a potential point of fric-

[12] French defense policy in Africa during the 1960s is discussed in detail in the author's "France's Changing Military Interests," *Africa Report*, June 1968.

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tion.[13] Forces and bases were streamlined around facilities in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Chad and Madagascar, and small contingents remained on station in Niger, Mauritania and Gabon. When coups d'etat occurred in the Central African Republic, Dahomey and Upper Volta in December 1965-January 1966, a stern warning about the need for stability emanated from Paris — but there was no military action. On the other hand, official statements repeatedly emphasized the strength of France's capability for intervention in Africa, consisting of forward-based units supported by a 25,000-man "intervention division" based in the metropole (*couverture à distance*). The point was driven home by periodic joint war games aimed at thinly disguised "hostile forces" and "infiltrators."[14] The readjustment appeared to be successful; there were no military coups in the four core states of Franco-African defense cooperation until 1972 (Madagascar), and no "protected" states were the victims of overt external aggression.

Underlying the smooth readjustment, however, strategic coherence was strained. In 1968 the Chad government called for direct French support to help it deal with festering rebellions in the central and northern provinces. The resulting commitment of some 2,000 French troops in combat roles lasted four years, provoking significant domestic debate about the wisdom of French involvement. Though reasonably successful in military terms, French intervention failed to resolve basic political cleavages or relieve Chadian administrative incompetence. Dependence on a France it could not control annoyed the Chad leadership and helped to politicize the military.[15] Dissent within France over the Chad commitment only betokened a broader malaise over the cost of African involvements symbolized by the *cartieriste* slogan, "Garonne not Gabon." By 1968 French technical assistance to Africa was declining, and strains in franc-zone monetary cooperation began appearing as well.[16]

Meanwhile, tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia in the

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[13] *Le Monde*, October 1 and November 25, 1964; July 18 and October 16, 1965.

[14] A more comprehensive official description can be found in (Lieutenant Colonel) Bernard L. Pujo, "Defense Problems in French-Speaking Africa," *Military Review*, February 1966. Defense Minister Pierre Messmer reconfirmed these doctrines in a speech in January 1969; see Agence France-Presse, *Bulletin D'Afrique*, January 10, 1969. A typical joint military exercise is described in *Frères d'Armes*, December 1966-January 1967, p. 56.

[15] An excellent discussion of the Chad war is in J. F. Froelich, "Tensions in Chad," *Conflicts in Africa* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], Adelphi Paper No. 93, December 1972). The military seized power in 1975.

[16] Kaye Whiteman, "Parlent-ils toujours français? Francophone Black Africa Today," *Interplay*, December 1968, pp. 12-13.

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Horn were increasingly mirrored within colonial Djibouti, producing periodic outbreaks of communal and anti-French violence and requiring France to reinforce its normal garrison of 3,500. Though Paris preferred to retain Djibouti, the efficacy of its presence there depended on internal tranquillity and on French ability to withstand the competing pressures and interests of Somalis, Arabs and Ethiopians.[17] Djibouti's importance to France, in turn, depended on how Paris viewed its Indian Ocean mission. If the goal of French deployments along the African littoral was simply to maintain influence in traditionally French-oriented territories, specific missions would be quite limited: (a) securing order in dependent territories (Djibouti, Reunion, the Comores), (b) providing way stations for air and naval units en route to French nuclear testing facilities in the Pacific, and (c) meeting the defense commitment to Madagascar. But, as in London, broader conceptions based on changes in the Indian Ocean balance were also possible.[18]

Europe Adapts to African Decolonization: 1970-1975

By 1970, the bases of European-African strategic cooperation were eroding rapidly. That they lasted through the 1960s can be explained largely by the lack of any serious *external* challenge to residual British and French influence and the absence of alternatives affording an acceptable framework for the security of the African littoral and its hinterland. Standing behind the legal and institutional supports offered by membership in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the new African state system rested essentially on the assumptions that (a) Europe would remain a source of support for the existing territorial and political order and (b) that the superpowers would not directly challenge that order or support local actors who tried to do so. The further premise — not without reason — was that African diplomacy shared these assumptions, recognizing Africa's vast vulnerability to local disorders and regional instability.

But the assumptions were valid only for a transitional period. Residual European influence was projected through the local economic apparatus and through de facto alliances with the first generation of nationalist elites: sooner or later the strength of the

[17] Mordechai Abir, "Red Sea Politics," in *Conflicts in Africa*, Adelphi Paper No. 93, pp. 31-37.

[18] For an early effort to broaden the scope of France's Indian Ocean perspectives, see the anonymous but authoritative "Vers un nouvel equilibre des forces dans l'ocean indien," *Revue de Défense Nationale*, July 1965.

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European connection would produce its own reaction. The modest European military presence was declining in parallel with the willingness of metropolitan electorates to vote funds for the maintenance of ex-imperial burdens in Africa. Direct European influence was limited to places of former (or continuing) sovereignty, and was thus tied, no matter how disguised, to a history of domination. The inevitable pressure of Africans to Africanize the colonial legacy was only delayed by the presence of remarkably cooperative leadership groups and the absence of alternatives.

As we have seen, the former metropoles were not consistently responsive to African demands for some forms of security assistance — political life insurance, for example — with the result that a diminishing number of African states actively supported a continuation of European roles. The continent's diplomacy had become increasingly fragmented into regional and subregional sets of relationships, paralleling circumstances along the Asian littoral of the Indian Ocean.[19] External policies aimed at Africa in general foundered on these cleavages, while external efforts aimed at selected states faced the traditional costs and pitfalls of client-patron relations in a competitive environment. Some African states joined their Arab and Asian colleagues in opposing the principle of foreign bases and foreign naval presence in the Indian Ocean; those prepared to facilitate such activity tended to do so from a desire to obtain political support and military or economic aid. In the early 1970s, Africans demonstrated little interest in Europe-originated strategic conceptions — whether defined by the dated formula of defending Europe's "southern flank" or in contemporary terminology emphasizing the security of trade routes and the rise of Soviet naval power. Moreover, the argument that Europe could "shelter" Africa from competitive superpower intrusions wore thin over time when dependence on Europe also implied being ignored in superpower aid programs and being subject to continued, tight-fisted influence by local European expatriates.

In the Horn of Africa, for example, Britain's Kenyan and France's Djiboutian interests could no longer be pursued or defended in isolation from those of the United States in Ethiopia and the Soviet Union in Somalia. Cross-cutting conflicts within and

[19] On the lack of a single integrative focus along the Asian littoral, see John Badgley, "An American Policy to Accommodate Asian Interests in the Indian Ocean," *SAIS Review*, Fall 1971. An excellent discussion of the subregionalization of African politics is in I. William Zartman, "African Regional and Subregional Systems," paper presented at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association (Chicago, October 1974), pp. 2-9.

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between these states served to engage each of the external powers as participants in a closely related set of subregional issues: insurgency and possible balkanization in Ethiopia, regime succession problems in Kenya and Ethiopia, the problem of Djibouti's future status should France withdraw, and Somalia's irredentist territorial claims against the others. The potential for a costly escalation of these issues sharply limited the scope for autonomous European initiative.[20]

In Southern Africa, as the basic cleavage over white minority rule has deepened, the European powers have remained torn between competing sets of political, economic and strategic interests. The acceleration of events since Portugal's withdrawal in 1974-1975 has only served to dramatize Europe's ambivalence. British and French efforts to pursue an independent course during 1970-1975 could not avert the threat of upheaval and competitive superpower intervention once the fabric of domestic authority and regional order was broken, as in Angola.

Comparable pressures have limited the reach of British and French power elsewhere along the African littoral. The governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda alternate between involvement in the Horn and the Southern African arenas and immersion in their own disputes. This has foreclosed the possibility that external powers could treat them as a regional entity, while also narrowing the benefits that might flow from close association with any single state among them. The western Indian Ocean islands, Madagascar, Reunion, Mauritius, the Seychelles and the Comores, offer little as a durable, integrative focus for European policy apart from their extreme dependence on outside aid and the political complexity of their polyglot social systems.[21]

Though the record illustrates the inexorable process by which Africa's European security buffer has been stripped away, Britain and France nonetheless improvised new means of retaining a measure of presence and influence in the area's security affairs. Both European powers perceived important interests to be at stake as the Soviet naval presence expanded in the western Indian Ocean in the early 1970s, and both made an explicit connection between their own presence and a policy of defense cooperation with South Africa. In 1970, Britain's new Tory government generally accepted

[20] J. Bowyer Bell discusses conditions for the internationalization of insurgency in "Endemic Insurgency and International Order: The Eritrean Experience," ORBIS, Summer 1974, pp. 447-450.

[21] An excellent discussion of the islands' prospects is by Philip M. Allen, "New Round for the Western Islands," in Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, editors, *The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Strategic Importance* (New York: Praeger, 1972).

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its predecessor's retrenchment policies in the Persian Gulf but focused attention on the Soviet "threat" to Western trade routes around Africa. With the Suez Canal closed since 1967, the Simonstown base facility acquired new importance in British eyes and formed the rationale for London's decision, announced in 1971, to resume sales of naval arms to Pretoria (terminated by the Labour government since 1964) to meet Britain's presumed "obligation" under the 1955 Simonstown agreement. Despite domestic and Commonwealth criticism that such a move would only enhance Soviet influence in black Africa, London went ahead to supply a modest package of naval helicopters, expand joint naval exercises with South Africa, and increase marginally its own naval presence East of Suez.[22] In addition, Britain's allies were urged to consider the implications of the new Soviet presence in western Indian Ocean waters.

By the late 1960s, France was chastened by heavy involvement in the internal problems of its generally weak ex-colonies, but it also perceived opportunities for a broader role in African regional affairs. The new approach included initiatives to strengthen French influence outside the former colonial domain, as in Biafra during the Nigerian civil war, Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) and Libya. But the most striking example occurred in Southern Africa, where Paris decided to use its influence to soften the black-white cleavage while continuing to expand security relationships with South Africa. In the mid-1960s France had moved aggressively to fill the gap left by U.S. and UK observance of the South African arms embargo, and by 1973 Pretoria had acquired some $200 million worth of French military and naval equipment (with more in the pipeline);[23] Franco-South African licensing and joint production agreements offered Pretoria continuing access to sophisticated aircraft and air-defense technology. Meanwhile, the new significance of the Cape route around Africa upgraded the value of France's positions in the western Indian Ocean. Its modest naval presence at Diego Suarez (Madagascar) and Djibouti was periodically augmented by visiting task forces, and

[22] Ironically, Royal Navy use of Simonstown began to increase sharply just as the East of Suez retrenchment was announced. See D. C. Watt, "The Continuing Strategic Importance of Simonstown," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1969, pp. 53-54. The debate over arms for South Africa is in J. E. Spence, "South Africa and the Defense of the West," *Survival*, March 1971; Geoffrey Rippon, "South Africa and Naval Strategy," *The Round Table*, July 1970; and D. C. Watt, "Britain and the Indian Ocean: Diplomacy Before Defense," *The Political Quarterly*, July-September 1971. Data on British military and military-related transactions with South Africa are in *Strategic Survey 1972* (London: IISS, 1972), pp. 60-61.

[23] *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-73* (Washington: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1974), p. 68.

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Paris promoted joint naval exercises with South Africa and the Malagasy Republic.[24] Working quietly through business and intelligence channels, it provided Pretoria an entree through which to break out of its diplomatic-political isolation in such French-influenced places as the Ivory Coast, Gabon and Madagascar, and it discreetly supported the South African "dialogue" policy with its African proteges.[25]

French action in this arena has seldom been discussed officially. Though Paris failed to shift the majority OAU position on dealings with South Africa, Franco-South African collaboration reduced the extent of Pretoria's isolation, at least temporarily, and assured it a steadily expanding margin of regional military superiority. At the same time, Paris had the satisfaction of retaining an independent mission — independent, that is, of the Anglo-Saxons and the communist powers — in an increasingly contested zone, while helping its own balance of payments and arms industries.

But British and French initiatives of the early 1970s were soon overtaken by events. Despite some sentiment in Europe favoring a joint European naval role in the Indian Ocean,[26] there was little tangible result apart from *ad hoc* Anglo-Dutch exercises and CENTO maneuvers. France operated on its own outside the NATO framework, and few NATO members were prepared to commit resources to the Indian Ocean or to associate with the British and French openings to Pretoria. Washington's growing Indian Ocean concerns centered on the non-African littoral states. The Western powers, operating according to divergent premises, failed either to develop a joint Southern African strategy hinged on South Africa or to devise an alternative approach that might have been less offensive to African sentiment.

In 1972-1973, a series of violent disturbances in Madagascar ousted the pro-French elite that had proved so cooperative since 1960, obliging France to agree to pull its military and naval units out of the country by June 1975.[27] The loss of its extensive Madagascar facilities, and the decision to grant independence to the Comores in October 1975, reduced its ability to support a

[24] *Le Monde*, February 3, 1972, discusses the purposes of such naval endeavors.
[25] These extensive Franco-South African intelligence contacts are largely unrecorded in unclassified sources, but see Stanley Uys, "France Promotes Dialogue in Africa," *Washington Post*, August 19, 1971 and Allen, "New Round for the Western Islands."
[26] *The Economist* (London), December 16, 1972.
[27] David B. Ottaway, "French Ouster Puts Malagasy Port in Limbo," *Washington Post*, June 2, 1975.

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strategic presence along the African littoral.[28] During that same month, France completed the withdrawal of its forces from Chad, thus ending an embarrassing entanglement in that country's festering rebellion and, in the process, forfeiting air staging and communications facilities which had previously linked French military assets throughout Africa. Plans were announced in December 1975 to grant self-determination and independence to Djibouti, further confirming a loss of interest in a policy of grandeur.

The metropole now faces enormously complex diplomatic and security problems in designing a graceful exit from Djibouti during the coming year; however, recent concessions to the territory's opposition leadership suggest that top priority has been placed on establishing a workable successor regime. Ultimate military withdrawal will depend in large measure on the actions taken in other capitals. To the south, French naval units have continued port visits and naval exercises with South Africa, but Paris has apparently seen an advantage in bowing (or appearing to bow) to African pressure by announcing in August 1975 a partial embargo on new arms supplies to Pretoria.[29] Yet it continues, to the extent possible, to pursue its interests on both sides of African conflicts. Thus, it was willing to pick up the lucrative but controversial contract to supply nuclear reactors to South Africa when opposition to American participation in the deal developed within the U.S. Senate in May 1976. One suspects that French participation has less to do with grandeur than with commercial considerations.

Similarly, London failed to follow through on its initial enthusiasm for countering Soviet naval policy with South African collaboration. By 1972 the United Kingdom was once again mired in the intractable problems of negotiating a Rhodesian settlement, an effort requiring a delicate balancing of its interests in both black and white Africa. When the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement effort of 1971-1972 failed, Britain saw little advantage in provoking domestic and African opinion by any further initiatives to strengthen Anglo-South African defense ties. Pretoria's tendency to flaunt its Western naval associations as a badge of political standing made London's position increasingly uncomfortable. After a heated wrangle within the new Labour government in October 1974, the Simonstown agreement was canceled, ending 170 years of continuous British presence at the Cape. In March 1975 an economy-minded Treasury announced further withdrawals from UK facilities at Mauritius and

[28] *Washington Star*, October 17, 1975.
[29] *The Economist*, August 16, 1975.

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Gan (Maldives).[30] Another phase in the many oscillations of postwar British defense policy was complete.

The Development of Soviet Strategic Interests

Soviet military relationships with Africa can be traced back to the 1955 arms deal with Egypt and subsequent military ties with the governments of Algeria, Sudan, Somalia, Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, and the liberation movements of Southern Africa during the 1960s.[31] But a new phase of Soviet policy became visible in connection with the beginning of Moscow's Indian Ocean naval diplomacy. It seems clear that the first regular Soviet deployments into the Indian Ocean in 1968 were related to naval arms deliveries to India and to Soviet space activities.[32] But it is agreed also that they related more generally to the "opportunity" inherent in the UK's East of Suez reductions of 1967-1968, and to the "threat" posed by the potential U.S. capability to reach Soviet targets with submarine and carrier-borne strategic weapons deployed in the western Indian Ocean. The extent of such deployments is debated, but the growing U.S. capability to deploy there, especially if support facilities were available at Diego Garcia, is not.[33]

The argument that Soviet units entered the region to support a "commercial maritime offensive" and to protect Soviet merchant shipping appears less plausible, though Soviet interest in the lucrative fisheries off Africa's eastern and southern coasts offers at least one explanation for Moscow's active "fisheries diplomacy" among the littoral and island states.[34] Western attention to the possibility that the USSR planned to "threaten" the West's crucial remaining trade routes around Africa[35] would seem to ignore (a) the nearly

[30] *The Guardian* (London), January 4, 1973; *Washington Post*, November 3, 1974; *Survival*, May-June 1975, p. 145.

[31] The history is treated in Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), pp. 45-51.

[32] This material draws on Geoffrey Jukes, *The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy* (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper No. 87, May 1972); B. Thomas Trout, "Naval Strategy and Naval Politics: Peacetime Uses of a Wartime Naval Force," paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis, March 1974; Barry M. Blechman, *The Control of Naval Armaments: Prospects and Possibilities* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1975); and Robert G. Weinland, Robert W. Herrick, Michael McGwire and James M. McConnell, "Admiral Gorshkov's 'Navies in War and Peace'," *Survival*, March/April 1975.

[33] Jukes, pp. 7-10. See also Earl C. Ravenal's testimony, "Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean," *Hearings* before the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974, p. 127. (Hereafter cited as "Proposed Expansion Hearings, 1974.")

[34] Jukes, pp. 18-19.

[35] For examples, see Rippon, "South Africa and Naval Strategy"; various articles in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, April-May 1972; and *International Defense Review*, 3 (1969).

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unlimited ramifications of any direct action against Western shipping, (b) the vulnerability of Soviet shipping to Western retaliation elsewhere, and (c) the availability of other, more convenient, places for the Soviets to prey on Western trade. This is not to say, however, that more subtle uses of Soviet naval power against Western economic and other interests can be dismissed: for example, Soviet possession of an unchallenged military capacity to interfere with shipping — or to provide direct support to those that might interfere — could create a political climate encouraging such actions.[36]

Thus, apart from the nuclear strategic rationale and interest in the area's ocean resources, the major thrust of Soviet naval policy is political and diplomatic. The naval leadership has produced extensive commentary about the peacetime uses of naval power and presence: to "protect" one's interests by being "represented" in the local strategic environment; to project support for foreign policy by symbolizing interest in local issues, clients or crises; and, in general, to assure recognition of great-power status and "rights" by other states. Since the political use of naval power "involves beliefs, and beliefs about beliefs, it is a highly subjective undertaking once or twice removed from actual military capabilities."[37] As Barry Blechman has observed:

> The mere presence of a naval force in a region serves a political function, regardless of its composition, its missions, or its activity, and even in the absence of any diplomatic activity directed towards similar ends. The existence of the force automatically causes the states of the region to weigh a new factor in their calculations of the balance of power and in their expectations of the probable behavior of other states in various contingencies. As such, a state that establishes a peacetime naval presence in a specific region is apt to gain influence in the affairs of that region.[38]

Soviet foreign policy goals that could be advanced by the peacetime presence of naval forces include: (1) countering Chinese influence among littoral nations by using an instrument that underlines China's vast inferiority;[39] (2) reducing Western influence among littoral states by offering things the West will not offer (e.g., arms to Somalia and Uganda) and providing support for causes the West will not support (e.g., African liberation groups or the Lusaka Manifesto

[36] This scenario was raised in the testimony of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., in "Proposed Expansion Hearings, 1974."

[37] Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, quoted in Trout, p. 3.

[38] Barry M. Blechman, *The Changing Soviet Navy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 20.

[39] For a brief discussion of the limits on Chinese military capacity vis-a-vis the African littoral, see Bruce D. Larkin, "China and Africa: A Prospective on the 1970's," *Africa Today*, July 1971, pp. 9-10.

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on denuclearization of the Indian Ocean); and (3) increasing Soviet access to local elites as well as littoral resources and strategic facilities.

One additional aspect of Soviet naval diplomacy warrants emphasis. Whereas, as yet, China has no requirement for naval facilities in the area, the Soviets do have; and whereas France, Britain and the United States (through Britain at Diego Garcia) have possessed "sovereign" naval facilities for communications, refueling, shore support and minor maintenance, the Soviets have not. The direct consequences have been threefold. First, much of the Soviet presence has taken the form of oilers and support ships (roughly 60 per cent according to one estimate)[40] needed to service combatants, while the latter have spent considerable time idle in high seas anchorages. Second, this factor has increased Moscow's incentive to acquire secure and protected shore facilities from littoral states, thereby creating the impression of an ambitious naval expansion program in the region. Third, the Soviets seek to diversify their dependence on shore facilities as a form of insurance against the risks of unstable littoral politics. This syndrome has obliged them to pay the price (in military aid and political support) normally paid by an external power dependent on the local sovereign state's strategic facilities. It is a price no longer being paid by the other maritime powers along the African littoral of the Indian Ocean, and it suggests a somewhat greater Soviet propensity for involvement in littoral affairs.

In sum, the USSR's military interest in the African littoral stems from its proximity to "sensitive" maritime routes (both around the Cape and through the Red Sea and Suez), to Southern African liberation conflicts, and to possible U.S. deployment areas for strategic naval forces. Over 60 per cent of Soviet ship visits in the Indian Ocean have been concentrated in ports in the Horn of Africa/Aden area, and the proportion is growing.[41] Another source of Soviet attraction is the presence of some of the world's poorest and most economically fragile states, offering opportunities to an external power that is prepared to provide support in exchange for strategic access.

These factors help to explain the Soviet entanglement with Somalia, a nation whose foreign relations have been shaped by its

[40] Blechman, *The Control of Naval Armaments . . .*, p. 95.

[41] "Proposed Expansion Hearings, 1974," p. 159. For further data on the composition and location of the Soviet presence see *Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraphs 6 and 7 of G.A. Resolution 3080 (XXVIII)*, UNGA Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, A/AC 159/1, May 3, 1974, pp. 8-10.

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strategic location and profound sense of irredentist grievance against its neighbors since independence in 1960. Until the military coup d'etat in 1969, Somalia's awesome dependence (85 per cent of its development finance came from outside sources in the late 1960s) was diversified among nine external powers headed by the Soviet Union. But Moscow established its primacy in the military aid field in 1963 by outbidding a group of Western nations (the United States, West Germany and Italy) with an offer of some $30 million of aid aimed at developing armed forces of 20,000 men. A key incentive for the arms buildup, apart from internal security needs, was Somalia's desire to support its border diplomacy in the periodically violent conflict with Ethiopia, whose U.S.-supported forces are larger.

In the 1970s, under the fervently nationalist government of General Siad Barre, dependence on the USSR has been aggravated by the loss of alternative aid sources and by severe economic dislocations caused by years of drought. In addition to substantial amounts of Soviet economic aid, Somalia had by 1974 received several squadrons of combat aircraft, over 500 armored vehicles (including over 200 tanks that give it regional numerical superiority), and a variety of field and anti-aircraft artillery. Moscow showed its interest in obtaining Somali facilities as early as the mid-1960s when it undertook to make improvements in the port at Berbera. This interest increased sharply after it lost facilities previously available in Egypt and Sudan in 1972. Soviet-Somali military links were apparently formalized in the July 1974 Friendship Treaty, details of which have not been published. When U.S. observers received Somalia's surprise invitation to see for themselves the "absence" of Soviet bases there in June 1975, it had already been confirmed by Western intelligence that Berbera had become Moscow's largest naval facility outside of Russia. The Berbera complex reportedly includes a 15,000-foot airstrip capable of handling all types of Soviet aircraft, oil storage and ship repair facilities, naval communications, ashore housing, and a storage and handling site for naval cruise missiles.[42]

[42] Somali boundary disputes are well documented. The Somali perspective is available in Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), and Al Castagno, "Somalia Goes Military," *Africa Report*, February 1970. Aid data are derived from Ozay Mehmet, "Effectiveness of Foreign Aid — The Case of Somalia," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1971, and *The Military Balance 1974-75* (London: IISS, 1974), pp. 43-44. For more recent developments, see the *New York Times*, July 6 and 7, 1975; Malcolm Rutherford, "The Powers Fill a Vacuum," *The Financial Times*, July 18, 1975; Dusko Doder, "Somalia's Scientific Socialism: A Bit Soviet but Still African," *Washington Post*, July 18, 1975. A more alarmist account is by Dennis Chaplin, "Somalia and the Development of Soviet Activity in the Indian Ocean," *Military Review*, July 1975.

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The scale of the Soviet Union's military cooperation with Somalia has promoted another round of competitive armament in the Horn, while its strategic presence has heightened Western perception of Soviet naval expansion in the region. The 1974 Friendship Treaty, patterned after Soviet treaties with Iraq and India, has led to speculation that it may be the blueprint for a "Soviet sponsored system of collective security for Africa" paralleling Moscow's efforts in Asia.[43] This presupposes an anti-Chinese focus of policy that is more distinct in East and Southern Africa than in Somalia, whose principal attractions are its strategic location and desperate dependence.

A substantial supply of Soviet arms began flowing into Uganda in early 1972, including the first MiG-21s in sub-Saharan Africa and growing amounts of armored vehicles and artillery. The size and scale of these deliveries suggest Moscow's willingness to undergo the rigors of involvement with the mercurial General Amin as the price necessary for gaining a counterpoise to Chinese influence in neighboring Tanzania. The prestige of Chinese aid programs in Tanzania and Zambia gains importance in Soviet eyes because of the former's role as the principal training base and sanctuary for FRELIMO forces until Mozambique's independence. As the liberation struggle moves to Rhodesia and Namibia, African states and outside powers will continue to contend for influence within it — a mission Amin has claimed for Uganda.[44] The Uganda arms buildup must also be interpreted in the context of intermittent border clashes with Tanzania and recent threats directed toward Kenya. It is noteworthy that both of the Soviet Union's East African military clients (Somalia and Uganda) have been at odds with their neighbors and that both had ambitious arms plans rebuffed by Western powers shortly before Soviet arms agreements were signed.

FRELIMO profited directly from intense Sino-Soviet rivalry during the long war against Portugal. But an independent Mozambique government may find it more difficult to continue to enjoy this neat, if unwitting, division of labor in communist arms supplies.[45]

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[43] Alexander O. Ghebhardt, "Soviet and U.S. Interests in the Indian Ocean," *Asian Survey*, August 1975, p. 677.

[44] Recent reports of Uganda-Soviet arms cooperation are in Stanley Uys, "Soviet Union's Role in Uganda — A Result of Big Power Politics," *Washington Post*, July 6, 1975, and Colin Legum, "Amin Gets MiGs," *The Observer* (London), September 21, 1975.

[45] For details, see Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 283; (Brigadier) Michael Calvert, "Counter-Insurgency in Mozambique," *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, March 1973.

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Soviet strategic interest in the new state was made clear even before independence in June 1975, with reports of an offer of naval training and equipment in exchange for access to Mozambique's well-developed port facilities — presumably unavailable to Western navies because of U.S. and European support for Portugal during the liberation war.[46] Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet rivalry was starkly reflected during the Angolan civil war of 1975-1976 and is noted in current reports of splits among Rhodesian guerrilla groups based in Mozambique and Tanzania.[47] (The implications of the Soviet and Cuban role in Angola are discussed in the concluding section of this study.)

By the end of 1975, Africa had assumed a major place in Soviet aid diplomacy. Aid deliveries and training programs were increasingly concentrated in a handful of countries — Somalia, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville and Uganda — whose common denominator is their willingness to provide various facilities for Soviet forces cum their high level of internal difficulties. Angola and Mozambique must now be added to the list: their continuing dependence on external assistance and their role as bases and sanctuaries for Rhodesian and Namibian liberation forces offer attractive openings for Soviet military diplomacy. When the Angolan conflict reached its height at the beginning of 1976, Moscow was already firmly established as Africa's leading source of arms supplies. Africa accounted for some two-thirds (over 2,300) of total Third World military personnel being trained in the USSR, and there were over 2,600 Soviet and East European military advisers in African countries, including 1,000 in Somalia.[48]

Not surprisingly, the prominent military component of Soviet African policy — to say nothing of Moscow's decisive efforts in Angola — has stimulated concern in a number of African and Western capitals. U.S. Defense Department data on Moscow's military aid programs in eleven African countries were given attention in various African media in early 1976. Kenya's *Daily Nation*, for example, cited the data as evidence of "perverted priorities," and argued that "there is plenty of reason for suspicion" about Moscow's intentions. By way of response, the Soviet Embassy in Nairobi issued

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[46] Such reports, quoting U.S. intelligence sources, appeared in the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 13, 1975, and the *Washington Star*, June 12, 1975.

[47] See, for example, David B. Ottaway, "Rhodesian Accuses China Aides," *Washington Post*, August 23, 1976.

[48] Data are from *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1965-74* (Washington: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976), p. 75; *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975* (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, July 1976), pp. 2-4, 31-32.

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a bulletin associating its aid programs with the rising prestige and influence of "revolutionary-democratic parties" in Africa and with the toppling of "reactionary-imperialist regimes"; it further declared that Soviet aid would "continue to be an important factor in strengthening solidarity between the Soviet and African peoples, between world socialism and the national-liberation movement."[49] This exchange offers little insight into the relative weight to be attached to various Soviet objectives, including the goal of countering Chinese influence, but it does reflect that, within a decade, a more activist Soviet policy has altered African perceptions about the continent's strategic environment, now no longer under predominant European influence.

U.S. Interests in the African Littoral

Apart from its brief venture into African grand strategy in conjunction with the British during World War II, the United States has never considered itself an African power in military or strategic terms. Throughout the period of African strategic decolonization, Washington has been at pains to point out that the region was of primary interest (and responsibility) to the European ex-metropoles; its sole direct military involvement during the 1960s occurred within the framework of the international effort to support the territorial integrity of Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire). Principal exceptions to this pattern have been the U.S. military facilities maintained in the Mediterranean states of Morocco and Libya (until the overthrow of King Idriss), and in Ethiopia, where major communications and intelligence related facilities have been based. In Liberia, air staging and communications are available to the United States under agreements dating back to the 1940s.

The fact that its NATO allies enjoyed access to extensive African facilities no doubt played a part in reducing Washington's incentives to seek its own strategic presence: U.S. Navy vessels in transit made regular use of Portuguese African ports until quite recently; use of the British-South African naval base at Simonstown by Vietnam-bound vessels was terminated in 1967 following strong domestic protest over the exposure of U.S. servicemen to South African race policy. U.S. arms sales, grant aid, and training to African countries have typically been less than 5 per cent of the worldwide total. The great majority of such military support has been provided, in descending order, to Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, Zaire, Tunisia,

[49] *Africa Research Bulletin* (Political/Social Series), February 1976, pp. 3944-3945.

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South Africa (sales), Liberia, Kenya and Nigeria. During the two years prior to June 1975 only four African countries (Ethiopia, Zaire, Liberia and Kenya) received annual U.S. military aid in excess of $100,000.[50]

Africa, in short, has played a minor role in postwar American strategic thinking and in the development of U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean over the past seven years. Unlike Britain and France, which have had reasons for deployments in Africa and for means of getting to specific African states, the United States has taken the position since 1970 that the "problem" in the Indian Ocean was how to respond to the increased Soviet presence following so closely on the announcement of UK strategic withdrawals.[51] Whatever strategic coherence the Indian Ocean region is seen to possess, apart from the colonial heritage of most littoral states, derives from the fact that the dominant means of access to it, and of transport within it, are naval. The "threat" to U.S. interests has been perceived not in naval (conventional war) terms, but in terms of possible littoral state behavior, which an exclusive Soviet naval presence would tend to encourage, if not actively foster. The rationale for "doing something" about the Soviet expansion centers on the desirability of "being there, and being seen to be there" in a region whose political climate has for so long been shaped by external naval presence.

U.S. officials have avoided specificity in discussing hypothetical combat or intervention scenarios. They have downgraded consideration of direct Soviet threats to the Indian Ocean trade routes, including the Cape route, and have denied that the United States should become a regional policeman. At the same time, they have on occasion spoken of the "deterrent effect" of the "policeman on the beat" and of a "vital national interest" in preserving friendly

[50] Data on U.S. military aid, sales and training are from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-73;* annual issues of Department of Defense, *Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts* (Washington: GPO, various); and *Fiscal Year 1976 Submission to the Congress — Summary* (Washington: Agency for International Development, May 1975).

[51] As an official on the National Security Council Staff, the writer participated in a series of three Indian Ocean policy studies carried out between 1970 and 1972. Published official views can be found in "U.S. National Security Policy and the Indian Ocean," *General Foreign Policy Series* No. 258, Department of State (Washington: GPO, 1971), and in prepared testimony before House and Senate committees considering funding for facilities at Diego Garcia from 1971 through 1975. See also Howard Wriggins, "United States Interests in the Indian Ocean," in Cottrell and Burrell, *The Indian Ocean. . . .* Updated alternative views on U.S. interests are in Blechman, *The Control of Naval Armaments. . . ,* Chapter 5, and Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, "Soviet-U.S. Naval Competition in the Indian Ocean," ORBIS, Winter 1975.

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governments through "encouraging them by our presence."[52] Whatever one makes of such analogies, the point is that African base facilities and African contingencies have played a minor role in U.S. strategic thinking about the region.

A significant exception has been U.S. interest in Ethiopia, which accounts for a high percentage of total U.S. military aid to Africa since the 1950s. Agreements signed in 1953 provided for use of extensive military and naval communications and intelligence facilities in Asmara, and for military aid as a form of tacit "rent" obligation. Although no U.S. defense commitments exist, the Ethiopians have pointed to the Soviet-supported arms buildup in Somalia (itself stimulated in part by the growth of Ethiopia's forces) and to Arab support of the insurgent Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) as evidence of the need for continuing or increased levels of U.S. assistance. In 1970-1972, Washington reached the decision to phase out its dependence on Kagnew Station in Asmara; from some 1,750 men, U.S. military personnel have been reduced to a small transitional element preparing for closure of the facility in 1977. Factors behind the decision included (a) concern about the United States becoming a target and hostage of the insurgency (a concern that has proved to be justified); (b) the availability of alternative communications sites and technology; (c) a willingness to accept some deterioration in intelligence capability targeted regionally and vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; and (d) a desire to get out from under the "rent" obligation at a time of growing uncertainty about Ethiopia's political future.

With the demise of Emperor Haile Selassie's government in 1974-1975, the traditional rationale for U.S. military aid to Ethiopia disappeared, since Ethiopia's moderate leadership in African affairs could no longer be assumed. However, the political turmoil in Addis Ababa has coincided with growing ELF strength and the growth of Soviet involvement in Somalia, leading to sharply increased military aid requests by the new military government. To date, Washington has been generally responsive: military aid and sales rose from around $12 million annually in the late 1960s and early 1970s to $24 million in fiscal year 1974 and around $40 million annually in fiscal 1975 and 1976. In the wake of Angola, it appears likely that U.S. responsiveness to Addis Ababa will be determined in light of the broader context of Moscow's arms deliveries to its African clients. This was confirmed in May 1976 when the Administration outlined

[52] Testimony of Admiral Zumwalt, in "Proposed Expansion Hearings, 1974," pp. 145-158.

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a $175 million Ethiopian program (mostly credit sales) for the twenty-seven-month period ending September 1977.[53]

The Ethiopian case provides evidence of a desire in Washington to forestall potential arms imbalances favoring Soviet-supported states — a perspective that could have implications elsewhere on the continent. In August 1975 it was announced that the United States would provide flight training and one squadron of combat aircraft to Kenya, whose armed forces have been supported primarily by a modest UK aid program.[54] Total cost of the U.S. program is estimated at $70 to $75 million over several years. Though such aid need not imply U.S. involvement in future succession crises in Kenya or in regional East African disputes, it may be noted that Kenya is the sole African littoral state between South Africa and Ethiopia which might be favorably disposed toward American military access in future contingencies.

The fact remains, however, that in Ethiopia the United States is terminating its sole land-based military presence on the African littoral of the Indian Ocean. In part this reflects the substantial U.S. Navy capability in afloat support, which permits it to operate at far greater distances for longer periods without shore support than the Soviet counterpart. Further, it reflects an indefinite security of tenure at Diego Garcia that is not subject to potential denial by a littoral state. Both factors have until recently permitted the United States to avoid, or disengage from, military involvements along the African littoral. Space tracking, communications, and potential air staging facilities arranged through the British on Mauritius and the Seychelles could be difficult to replace but are not central to the maintenance of a U.S. naval presence.

The years 1970-1975 witnessed an apparent "shift" in U.S. policy toward greater "communication" with, and tolerance of, Portuguese colonialism and the white minority governments of Rhodesia and South Africa. Evidence of the shift was seen in Washington's willingness to "go along with" continued Portuguese rule in Africa in exchange for renewed Azores base rights; in the supply of limited numbers of civilian aircraft with dual civilian-military use to both Portugal and South Africa; in the United States' violation of UN sanctions obligations by importing Rhodesian chrome ore; in the use of U.S. vetoes in the Security Council to forestall stronger measures against white rule; and in continued expansion,

[53] Military aid data are in AID's *Fiscal Year 1976 Submission to the Congress*, pp. 14 and 18. See also David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Becoming Involved in African Arms Race," *Washington Post*, July 6, 1976.

[54] *Los Angeles Times*, August 20, 1975.

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with some official support, of economic relations with South Africa.[55] Moreover, there have been repeated warnings suggesting that American "communications" with South Africa, in parallel with British moves, could result in closer strategic links premised on the Soviet naval threat to the Cape sea routes. The possibility of a Western embrace of South Africa, it was thought, would jeopardize the entire Western position in black-ruled Africa.[56]

However, the "softening" of the U.S. official stance toward Southern Africa in the period up to 1975 did not include an identifiable strategic aspect. In late 1970, the Nixon Administration was responsive to British suggestions that greater attention should be paid to the changing naval picture in the Indian Ocean; but the resulting policy reviews included almost no references to the Southern African littoral, and the existence of the South African navy was hardly acknowledged. Washington did not support or join the British in arguing that the Soviet naval expansion required Western arms shipments to Pretoria. The Navy's position, effectively argued within government councils, centered on the need to modernize the three-ship MIDEASTFOR based at Bahrein, to provide for periodic maritime patrol flights over Indian Ocean waters, and in general to increase the amount of Western presence through allied exercises and task force cruises. After the Indo-Pakistani war, the U.S. carrier task force was identified as an appropriate instrument for showing the flag in the area. Given the insecurity of tenure at Bahrein and the risks of having a principal shore facility become hostage to Persian Gulf politics, the United States has focused on upgrading Diego Garcia as the center for logistic naval support, air staging and communications.[57]

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[55] See, for example, Jim Hoagland, "U.S. Shifts Africa Policy," *Washington Post*, November 8, 1970; Bruce Oudes, "The U.S. Deal with Portugal," *Newsday*, January 1, 1972; Terence Smith, "U.S. Is Quietly Tightening Its Ties to White-Ruled Southern Africa," *New York Times*, April 2, 1972. American academic opinion can be seen in John Marcum, "The Politics of Indifference: Portugal and Africa, A Case Study in American Foreign Policy," *Issue* (African Studies Association), Fall 1972. Details of exceptions and "grey areas" in U.S. arms embargoes are in "Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa and Related Issues)," *Hearings* before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, March-April, 1973 (hereafter cited as "Embargo Hearings, 1973"), pp. 47, 50, 52, 96, 98, 102, 117; and testimony of Bruce J. Oudes, pp. 4-15. Publication of classified policy studies (NSSM 39) in October 1974 lent apparent credence to the suspected "tilt" in U.S. policy; see Jack Anderson, "Henry Kissinger's First Big Tilt," *Washington Post*, October 11, 1974, and Murrey Marder, "Nixon 'Tilt' in Africa Bared," *ibid.*, October 13, 1974.

[56] Larry Bowman, "Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean," in Cottrell and Burrell, *The Indian Ocean. . . .*; see also George W. Shepherd, "The United Nations' Arms Embargo on South Africa and the Cape Route," paper presented to the Sixteenth Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 1975.

[57] The central importance of Diego Garcia to Navy planners is reflected in their

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In the six years before the Portuguese coup d'etat, the MIDEASTFOR units made some sixty refueling visits in Angola and Mozambique.[58] Without the use of these ports, individual U.S. naval officers have drawn the conclusion that access to South African ports is now required,[59] not only for refueling, but because they have the only repair and drydocking facilities in sub-Saharan Africa capable of handling major vessels. However, official policy in the 1970s has recognized that political constraints (in the United States and Africa) against use of South African ports override considerations of convenience and incremental cost: South African port visits continue to be ruled out except in cases of medical emergency on board a U.S. ship in those waters.[60] (The closing down of the U.S. space tracking facility in South Africa in 1974, following Congressional criticism, reflects the same concerns.) The "political threat" posed by an expanded Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean has created the ideal rationale for pressing ahead with Diego Garcia's development, and there has been little official interest in jeopardizing those plans by associating them in any way with military ties to South Africa.

This is not to say that Washington was adequately prepared for the burgeoning conflicts in Southern Africa in the mid-1970s or that it favored disengagement from South Africa. Rather, the Administration's approach tended to downgrade the significance of the region's conflict potential and exaggerated the durability of the Portuguese position. As a result, the United States demonstrated little except rhetorical sympathy or support for African aspirations. At the same time, it cannot be maintained that Washington opted to pursue its interests through security cooperation with Pretoria: American policy simply enjoyed the convenience of the then-prevailing balance of regional power favoring the white regimes, but saw no justification for paying the political price of a coherent and close strategic relationship with the dominant regional power. In denying itself the routine use of South African ports as an aspect of

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persistence in devising rationales to gain Congressional and White House support for its development. See the Ravenal testimony in "Proposed Expansion Hearings, 1974," pp. 81-128.

[58] "Embargo Hearings, 1973," p. 106.

[59] Admiral John McCain, former Pacific Fleet commander, is quoted as saying: "What has happened in Mozambique and Angola makes our possession of Diego Garcia more important than ever. But it also means that we absolutely need access to the South African naval facilities at Simonstown and Durban." *Washington Post*, October 21, 1974.

[60] "Embargo Hearings, 1973"; see also the statement and testimony of Edward W. Mulcahy, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 29, 1975.

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peacetime naval presence in the Indian Ocean, it sacrificed day-to-day operating convenience in the knowledge that these facilities would be available to the United States if it asked for them. It now remains to explore the impact of Angola on these perceptions.

The Impact of Angola

The Angolan civil conflict of July 1975-March 1976 brought these trends to a crossroads, testing their durability while also setting new precedents for the area. In one sense, the Angolan conflict was simply the natural outgrowth of the power vacuum created by Portugal's sudden withdrawal following the April 1974 coup d'etat in Lisbon. Competitive external intervention could only have been prevented by reciprocal superpower restraint or by unified African nationalist leadership, as in Mozambique. Since both factors were absent, the competition for power within Angola became internationalized and militarized before independence. The time had passed when European states, individually or collectively, could forestall this outcome.

Because this sequence of events is unique in Africa's decolonization history, it may be inappropriate to draw conclusions from the Angolan experience concerning the maritime powers' future behavior in Africa, including Southern Africa. Similarly, it can be argued that the victory achieved by the Soviet- and Cuban-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is an isolated event not replicable elsewhere in the region unless the United States and other Western powers provide fresh opportunities for Soviet/Cuban exploitation by a misguided policy of aligning themselves with Salisbury and Pretoria. The implication of this view is that the United States must now dissociate itself from minority rule in Southern Africa as the best means of coping with the problem of external intervention.[61]

But before rendering judgments or predictions about the impact of Angola, the conflict can be analyzed against the preceding discussion of Africa's strategic decolonization and the evolving role of external powers. First, it dramatized the extent of Africa's continuing dependence on, and vulnerability to, extracontinental and white South African military power *in the absence of effective buffers against the resort to force*. In the past, such buffers have included an implicit mutual deterrence of direct intervention by the United States and the USSR, acceptance of a "natural" European

[61] See John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976.

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role in African security problems, and the paucity of circumstances featuring *both* a breakdown in order and the possibility of substantial gains for the intervening power flowing from successful support of its local ally. In addition, growing African resistance to external military roles — as reflected in the rhetoric and substance of African diplomacy — constituted a hindrance. With these buffers stripped away, the Angolan civil war was decisively affected by non-African power and interests. African nationalist forces and black-ruled states played strictly secondary military roles, serving as legitimizers, critics or champions of external force. Apart from the colonial wars of Britain, France and Portugal, joint military campaigns on the Angolan scale have not taken place on the African continent since World War II. After fifteen years of strategic fragmentation, Africa appears to have entered a new phase of external military clientage and polarization.

Second, the Angolan conflict would appear to confirm the asymmetry of strategic interest in Africa on the part of the Soviet Union and the Western powers. At the outset, in early 1975, external intervention was relatively balanced and low-level, with a number of outside powers providing funds, advice and equipment through their respective channels. But by the time open warfare broke out in July 1975, Moscow had called Washington's bluff with a major increase in its commitment to the MPLA. Initially, the United States responded in similar fashion by mounting a covert arms supply and military adviser operation in support of the National Front for Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), while in August South Africa began its own direct military intervention by leading a UNITA advance to the north. But American countermoves and Pretoria's involvement only spurred further Soviet escalation and offered a rationale for the already planned introduction of a sizeable Cuban combat force.

In the months between August 1975 and February 1976, Moscow and Havana demonstrated that they were willing to run the risks and costs of a massive combat intervention in an African civil war (dubbed a war of "national liberation" for cosmetic purposes), and the gamble was successful. By December, domestic U.S. opposition to further military escalation had grown, and Washington belatedly sought to develop a diplomatic option, using the troops of an increasingly reluctant South Africa as a bargaining counter in order to produce a negotiated stalemate. Although the OAU at its January summit split down the middle on the question of con-

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demning Pretoria's intervention, the conflict was soon turned into a rout as South Africa — isolated internationally and overextended militarily in the absence of clear-cut U.S. support — pulled back to Namibia. In sum, Washington attempted to match the Soviet strategy of partisan intervention in an African civil war, but succeeded only in producing a highly visible defeat for its Angolan clients and their collaborators in Pretoria, Kinshasa and Lusaka.[62] One effect of its failure was to cast doubt on the level of American interest in deterring Soviet (and Cuban) military involvement in Africa.

Finally, the Angolan conflict has altered the power relationships of Southern Africa, perhaps permanently, while also shedding new light on the utility of military power in African regional and international affairs. Though the circumstances may be unique, the "demonstration effect" of Angola could affect the overall African strategic context. In this analysis, the significance of the MPLA's victory lies not in any presumption of lasting ideological affinity or political debt between the new government and its external patrons, nor even in the possibility of continuing dependence upon them for economic and physical security. These relationships are reversible. Rather, the importance of the outcome derives from the fact that South Africa's regional preponderance of military power is effectively counterbalanced by the actual or potential presence of the Cuban army, backed by Moscow, and by the way victory was achieved — by overwhelming reliance on an alliance of external powers campaigning with African troops. Now that the South African and Cuban armies are the two most potent and readily available forms of military power in the region, it may be that a new form of mutual deterrence will become established as events unfold within Rhodesia and Namibia. If so, this situation could restrain pressures toward internationalized conflict in those territories. But this assumes an orderly transition to majority rule, without a major breakdown of governmental authority during the interim. In the meantime, African states and African liberation movements are reminded of their ultimate dependence and of the availability of military options that seemed unlikely before 1975.

Seen against this background, Angola may prove to be a turning point in strategic relationships between African states and the maritime powers. The four African states most directly involved in the Rhodesian struggle (Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and

[62] In the Angolan war, some 13,000 Cuban troops and hundreds of Soviet advisers used up to $300 million in Soviet hardware to turn the tide. For a highly critical account of the Administration's policy, see Ken Owen, "Angola's Tragedy," *The Star* (Johannesburg), March 20, 1976.

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Tanzania) have sought to contain Angola precedents by working for unity among the Rhodesian liberation groups, by seeking to channel external military supplies and training through the OAU's Liberation Committee, and by holding to the principle that the war be waged by African guerrillas, not Cuban auxiliaries. This strategy has the effect of protecting China's considerable investment in Rhodesian guerrilla-training and influence with the host governments in Mozambique and Tanzania.[63] However, there is also evidence that Moscow has had some success in seeking to exploit the many cleavages within the political and military leadership of the Rhodesian liberation movement, and to capitalize on Mozambique's dependence by offering economic and military support on a scale that Peking cannot match. During May 1976 Angolan Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento and Mozambique President Samora Machel crossed paths in Moscow, where both men signed a series of bilateral accords providing, *inter alia*, for further Soviet military aid.[64]

The presumed confluence of interest between China and the West in limiting Soviet and Cuban gains in Southern Africa has not been served by their respective failures in Angola; nor is the presumed Western interest in avoiding or minimizing racial conflict in Southern Africa served by an environment in which local preferences for moderation receive so little outside encouragement. These factors explain some elements of the United States' initiatives announced during and after Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Africa trip in April 1976, including: promises of assistance to the black governments surrounding Rhodesia, stronger verbal commitment to majority rule and racial justice in the region, a pledge of "unrelenting opposition" to the Ian Smith regime in Salisbury until a settlement is achieved, and an activist American diplomatic effort to bring the various Rhodesian parties back to the bargaining table.

There are three noteworthy aspects to the new U.S. policy in the broader regional context:

(1) It tacitly leaves open the possibility of a U.S. response in the event of further Soviet/Cuban direct involvement in regional conflicts. In his Lusaka speech on April 27, Kissinger reiterated past warnings about the pursuit of "hegemonial aspirations or bloc policies" by any outside power since "any attempt by one will

[63] See the discussion in Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1976, pp. 753-755.

[64] *Soviet World Outlook* (University of Miami), Vol. 1, No. 6, p. 5. See also Christopher Wren, "Moscow Pledges Angola Arms Aid," *New York Times*, June 1, 1976, and Robin Wright, "Moscow Advances on China in Africa," *Washington Post*, April 16, 1976.

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inevitably be countered by the other." The Rhodesian government was sternly notified that it could expect no U.S. diplomatic or military support "at any stage in its conflict *with African states or African liberation movements*."[65] Although the implied warning has a hollow ring in light of Washington's paralysis over Angola, it can be noted that Angola itself had a significant impact on the domestic U.S. perception of detente with Moscow — a development Moscow appears to have recognized by downplaying any suggestion of an Angolan solution for Rhodesia, and by publishing reports of Cuban plans for phased withdrawals from Angola.

(2) In the wake of Angola, Washington has reversed earlier trends by increasing the number and scale of military assistance efforts with selected African countries. Most significant politically is the provision of $25 to $30 million in security-oriented "supporting assistance" to Zambia and Zaire and the possibility of economic and technical aid to Mozambique. Moreover, the package of grant aid and sales totaling $70 to $75 million for Kenya to acquire a squadron of F-5E fighters (together with training and logistic support assistance) was confirmed during the trip to Africa of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in June 1976; expanded arms supply programs of some $50 million to Zaire and $175 million to Ethiopia are now planned, and Gabon (sales) has been added to the list.[66] While these programs are modest in comparison with the major Soviet military programs, they signal a conviction that security assistance must become an element of any U.S. posture designed to limit the growth of Soviet influence and military presence on the continent.

(3) The new U.S. position draws the sharpest line to date between the circumstances of South Africa and those of Rhodesia and Namibia. Kissinger's reference in Lusaka to white South Africans as "historically an African people" was followed shortly by his late June meeting in Germany with Prime Minister Vorster. The meeting must have been profoundly affected by the immediately preceding worst urban violence in South Africa's history. Moreover, to a degree, the Kissinger-Vorster session can be interpreted as fence-mending following the severe strains in U.S.-South African relations that developed during January-March 1976 over Angola. Nonethe-

[65] "Southern Africa and the United States: An Agenda for Cooperation," text of Kissinger speech in Lusaka, April 27, 1976, published by Department of State Office of Media Services (PR 205). (Emphasis added.)

[66] At the time of writing, the final shape of these security assistance programs remains under Congressional consideration. The information is based on interviews. But see Ottaway, "U.S. Becoming Involved in African Arms Race."

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less, it represents a long-sought recognition of Pretoria's pivotal role in Southern Africa's evolution, and indicates a new readiness in Washington to engage tactically in the search for accommodation of the region's political and military conflicts. To be effective, such a stance would require that the United States and other Western powers develop both carrots and sticks in their relations with Pretoria, without aligning themselves with a defense of minority rule.

All that can be safely predicted as of mid-1976 is that America's emerging Africa policy will be extraordinarily difficult for any Administration to orchestrate. An intense diplomatic effort with the South Africans and selected black states has produced an apparent breakthrough over a framework for the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia, and some progress has been made in the Namibian constitutional talks. A sustained Western engagement in Southern Africa will require sufficient domestic support and diplomatic virtuosity to permit a nuanced straddling of racial nationalisms.

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EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR*

by Charles K. Ebinger

On April 25, 1974, the Portuguese armed forces overthrew the dictatorship that had dominated the Lusitanian world for almost half a century, and the myth of *Lusotropicalismo* was shattered. Although most commentators saw in those initial events hope for a new era in southern African race relations, less sanguine analysts realized that Lusitanian civilization was in a process not of adjustment but of sharp transformation.

Nowhere in the former Portuguese empire was this radical change in the status quo more evident than in Angola and Cabinda, where the coup intensified pre-existing ethnic, racial and ideological animosity into what had by early 1976 become a fratricidal political struggle involving the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Portugal, the Republic of South Africa, Cuba, rival Angolan and Cabindan nationalist groups, almost all the nations of Africa (but particularly Zaire, the People's Republic of the Congo and Zambia), the Organization of African Unity, and varied international financial interests.

In the aftermath of the April 25 coup, it became clear that the political evolution of Angola and Cabinda would be directly affected by the outcome of the political competition unleashed in Lisbon. It is important to note that prior to the coup, U.S. State Department officials had seen no reason to anticipate that the catalyst for change in southern Africa would be released in 1974.

Since the outbreak of the Angolan rebellion in 1961, nationalist resistance to continued Portuguese rule had been emasculated by the intense ethnic, racial and ideological rivalries existing among the three major guerrilla organizations: the Popular Move-

* This article is based primarily on interviews conducted by the author in Portugal and southern Africa in late 1974 and early 1975.

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ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), now directed by Agostinho Neto; the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), led by Holden Roberto; and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), headed by Jonas Savimbi. In addition, there were a few moribund political groups in Cabinda, with varying political aspirations. Of these, the most important was the separatist-inspired Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). Despite its impressive sounding name, however, FLEC posed no military challenge to continued Portuguese rule, remaining enmeshed in leadership quarrels between its Brazzaville- and Kinshasa-backed factions.

Indeed, the continuation of Portuguese rule through the 1970s and beyond seemed so secure that National Security Adviser Kissinger had begun in February 1970 to plan a subtle shift in the United States' policies toward southern Africa. Kissinger prepared for President Nixon a "realistic" set of secret policy options, designed to foster American interests, and presented them in a National Security Council briefing.[1]

Although Kissinger was cognizant that some African states, such as Zambia and Tanzania, might castigate the United States for subordinating its professed belief in the right of self-determination to the protection of its material interests, he assumed that Portuguese rule would continue for the foreseeable future. It was a classic miscalculation. As Marcum notes, by the early 1970s there were many indications that Portugal's days as a Eurafrican power were numbered. The Marcello Caetano regime was beset by demoralization and defection within its African forces; it suffered from rising economic dislocation and inflation; more than 1.5 million job seekers and draft evaders had emigrated to Western Europe; and the Portuguese government was besieged by escalating levels of anti-regime terrorism and sabotage.[2]

Kissinger and high-level State Department officials chose to overlook the vulnerability of the Caetano regime. As a result, although NSSM 39 stated that the United States had no strategic interests in Angola that were vital to U.S. national security, Kissinger believed that continued U.S. access to military facilities in the Azores necessitated that America tilt its policies in favor of the white-ruled southern African regimes.

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[1] National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, *Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa*, AF/NSC-1G69, August 15, 1969. (Usually referred to as NSSM 39.)

[2] John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976, p. 408.

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The importance of the Azores base in the American airlift to Israel during the October 1973 Ramadan War reinforced Kissinger's belief in the need to maintain good relations with Caetano. By 1974 Kissinger, in the wake of the OAPEC embargo and the Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean, had reassessed the geopolitical significance of Portuguese Africa to U.S. security.

The Lisbon coup made the strategy outlined in NSSM 39 irrelevant. But Kissinger, now concerned about the significance of the Soviet naval buildup, decided that the United States' strategic interests were best served by supporting General António de Spínola's plan for a Lusitanian commonwealth, and by enlisting the help of America's old ally President Joseph Mobutu of Zaire to ensure that the Zairois-backed FNLA would play a major role in the ensuing political struggle in Angola. Kissinger believed that Mobutu's influence in African nationalist circles would guarantee an FNLA political triumph over the Marxist-oriented MPLA and UNITA. The fallacy of this policy's tenets will be demonstrated below.

The Angolan Nationalists on the Eve of the Coup

In order to analyze properly the relative geographic and political configurations of nationalism in Angola and Cabinda at the time of the coup, one should begin with the fact that the major guerrilla fighting-force confronting the Portuguese at the time belonged to the FNLA. According to official Portuguese military estimates, the FNLA had about 2,000 armed guerrillas operating in the Dembos Mountains and an additional 10- to 12,000 guerrillas headquartered at the Kinkuzu military base on the Zairois side of the frontier. In addition, the FNLA had scattered units north of Luso. (See map, p. 672.)

Roberto's statements to the contrary notwithstanding, the FNLA's support has been confined almost exclusively to the Bakongo ethnic group, straddling the borders between Zaire, Angola, Cabinda and Congo-Brazzaville (People's Republic of the Congo). This narrow parochial base has precipitated numerous splits among the FNLA leadership and on occasion has led to large-scale rioting in the guerrilla camps along the Zairois-Angolan frontier. In 1972 one such rebellion, in Zaire's Kwango Province, was put down only by the intervention of the Zairois army.

In contrast to the effective fighting strength of the FNLA, the MPLA's military prospects in April 1974 were bleak. Because the MPLA from 1961 to 1974 was consistently denied operational bases

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

ANGOLA April 1974

From Anthony R. Wilkinson, "Angola and Mozambique: The Implications of Local Power," *Survival*, September-October 1974, p. 219; reproduced by permission of the publisher.

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in Zaire, it was never able to develop the military potential of its small partisan force in the interior, north of Luanda. As of April, it had only been able to launch incursions into the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda from its bases in Congo-Brazzaville, and into the unpopulated grasslands of eastern Angola from its operational theater in Zambia.

By the spring of 1974, moreover, the MPLA had fragmented into three contentious wings. Daniel Chipenda, the MPLA's military commander on the Zambian front, had in 1973 led the only effective MPLA fighting force into open dissidence with Neto. In May 1974 Neto was challenged by still another MPLA splinter movement, composed of Brazzaville-based *mestiço* intellectuals under Father Joachim Pinto de Andrade. Thus, by early spring 1974 the MPLA's chances of success in the evolving Angolan military and political struggle appeared marginal.

Finally, the military wing of UNITA, cut off from active external Zambian support in 1967 for meddling in internal Zambian politics, consisted of 800 guerrillas in the Angolan interior. UNITA suffered from inadequate supplies and had to seize weapons during its skirmishes with Portuguese and rival MPLA units.

Zairois External Support: The FNLA

After success at the outset of the Angolan rebellion, in 1961, the FNLA's forces fled from massive Portuguese retaliation into neighboring Zaire, where they regrouped among their Bakongo brethren. With two notable exceptions, the FNLA has always received staunch support from the Zairois government. This was particularly true under the Cyrille Adoula (1961-1964) and Mobutu (1965–) regimes.

In the heyday of Joseph Kasavubu's power (1960-1961), the FNLA was tolerated but was largely circumscribed in its political activity by Kasavubu's Kinshasa-based ABAKO Party, whose pan-Bakongo schemes often directly conflicted with the unified-Angola position of the FNLA.

Similarly, under the Moïse Tshombe regime (1964-1965), the FNLA found its operational capacity severely restricted by (1) Tshombe's pro-white settler sympathies, a holdover from his days as head of the breakaway Katangan regime; (2) his fierce, ethnically motivated hatred of the Bakongo;[3] and (3) the exigencies of Zairois ethnic, regional and international politics during 1964-1965, which

[3] Tshombe was a Lunda and hence an implacable foe of the Bakongo.

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prohibited Tshombe's active support of guerrillas attempting to overthrow a Portuguese regime in Angola that was one of his staunchest supporters.

At the same time, the machinations of Zairois politics precluded Tshombe from eliminating the FNLA from the political scene. The overthrow of President Fulbert Youlou in neighboring Congo-Brazzaville in August 1963, and the subsequent establishment of the radical regime of M. Massemba-Debat, placed the Zairois government in a critical political situation. In October, the new Brazzaville government welcomed the establishment of the Zairois revolutionary front (Comité National de Libération [CNL]), dedicated to the forcible overthrow of the Zairois regime. Likewise, in late 1973, the Massemba-Debat government extended operational facilities to the MPLA.

By the quirks of African international politics, the geographic zone of Zaire in which the FNLA operated made the FNLA a valuable fighting force against both the CNL and MPLA incursions from Brazzaville into Zaire and Angola.[4] Thus, by sustaining the FNLA at a minimal level, Tshombe not only reduced the threat of the CNL to Kinshasa but also won valuable aid from the Portuguese authorities in Angola for reducing the military potential of the MPLA.

The significance of this playing off of the FNLA and the MPLA was not lost on Mobutu. After his November 1965 coup, he used the FNLA as an effective instrument of foreign policy in relation to (1) his growing ideological dispute with the Brazzaville regimes of Massemba-Debat (1963-1968) and Colonel Marien Ngouabi (1968–) and (2) his desire for a wide range of options vis-a-vis Angola and Cabinda. This fact is of critical importance in understanding the dynamics of the Kinshasa-Brazzaville quarrel over an independent Angola or Cabinda.

Zairois-FNLA-Cabindan Relations

The enclave of Cabinda, situated to the north of the Congo River's mouth, is bordered by Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville. Cabinda has approximately 80,000 inhabitants, of whom some 8,000 are Europeans.

The politics of Cabinda is complex and merits detailed discussion. Although inhabited largely by the Bakongo, Cabinda is linked demographically to Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon, and historically to the Loango (Vili-speaking) Kingdom, which was lo-

[4] Interview with Lucio Lara, November 22, 1974.

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cated to the north in what is today Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon.[5] It is important to note that the modern Bavili community of the Pointe Noire region of Congo-Brazzaville extends not only southward across the border into Cabinda but also northward into Gabon. One of the chief factors precipitating this demographic diffusion was that the Portuguese traders who historically dominated much of the commerce in Congo-Brazzaville have traditionally hired Portuguese-speaking Cabindans in preference to French-speaking Congolese.

Even though the beginnings of Cabindan ethno-nationalism are obscure, it appears that the first manifestations occurred in 1956 with the founding of the Associaçao dos Indigenas do Enclave de Cabinda. Citing the provisions of the 1885 Treaty of Simulambuco between the Portuguese government and the "Princes of Cabinda" (Angola is never mentioned), the Association sought to give legal justification to its dual objective of separating Cabinda from Angola and achieving a union with either the Belgian or the French Congo.

Despite many vicissitudes in the Cabindan nationalist movement by 1959, its forward march was assured with the creation of an emigre group in Congo-Brazzaville known as the Association des Ressortissants de l'Enclave de Cabinda (AREC), led by Luis Ranque Franque. During 1960 AREC was converted from a mutual aid association into an overtly political movement, the Mouvement de Liberation de L'Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC). Before 1960 there were several other Cabindan ethno-associations: the União Social dos Maiombes de Luali (a local branch of Zaire's ABAKO Party), the Alliance du Mayombe (Alliama — an association largely hostile to Kasavubu's ethnic subgroup of the Mayombe), and the Comunidade Cabindenes (Comcabi). All of these last three groups lacked effective leadership and played only a peripheral role in the evolving Cabindan political scene.

The membership of MLEC within Cabinda consisted mainly of coastal people — Bavili, Baoio, Cacongo (Bakongo), and mulattos living in and around the economic and administrative infrastructure of Cabinda City. In contrast, the Mayombe peasantry of the northwest was little influenced by the impact of modernization. This coastal-urban versus interior-peasant dichotomy has had important ramifications for Angolan politics.

During 1958-1959 Franque made several overtures to Kasavubu in order to obtain his support for the absorption of Cabinda

[5] The Loango Kingdom reached its apogee at the end of the seventeenth century, after which its Vili-speaking inhabitants were pushed south under the impact of Fang migrants from what is now Gabon. For this reason, the Bavili community is a minority one in Gabon—a fact of crucial importance.

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into a future independent Zaire. As part of the plan, however, Franque demanded a top position in the future Zairois government. Since the current exigencies of evolving ABAKO and Zairois politics necessitated against any such merger, Kasavubu rebuffed Franque.[6]

The situation in Cabinda was further complicated by the fact that the Mayombe, because they were resentful of the dominant position of the coastal population, remained aloof from MLEC and tended to ally with the rural-oriented FNLA. The fact that Kasavubu himself was a Mayombe made this relationship even more complex. As the policies of the UPA (União das Populações de Angola) and ABAKO clashed head on, the Mayombe community found itself in a terrible position, and since the community was ethnically located within both Cabinda and the border area around Tshela, Zaire, the groups vacillated between alliances with the ABAKO Party and the FNLA. Kasavubu, because of his hostility to both MLEC and the FNLA, which were in turn opposed to each other, enthusiastically supported the Comité de Acção da União Nacional de Cabinda (CAUNC), which split off from MLEC in December 1961.

Thus, until 1963 the political milieu in Cabinda remained divided among three major groups: (1) MLEC, led by Luis Ranque Franque and supported by Brazzaville; (2) CAUNC, led by Henrique Tiango Nzita and supported alternately by Kinshasa, Brazzaville and Gabon; and (3) Alliama, led by António Eduardo Sozinho, which alternated among demands for annexation into Zaire, an independent Angola-Cabinda, and an independent Cabinda free of all foreign domination.[7]

Cabindan politics were further fractured since most of the non-Bakongo peoples in Cabinda were related to the Vili-speaking peoples of Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon. Although these coastal groups have generally followed Brazzaville's support of CAUNC, at times they have supported a trans-Bavili movement whose aim was to create an independent Bavili state among group members living in Zaire, Angola-Cabinda, Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon. The fluctuating strength of this movement, centered in Gabon, runs parallel to deteriorations in interstate relations between Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville, such as occurred between 1964 and 1968 when Brazza-

[6] Interview with Henrique Tiango Nzita, vice president of FLEC, November 21, 1974. As of October 1976 Franque appears to continue to be collaborating openly with Zaire despite Mobutu's disclaimers.

[7] Interview with Bruce Porter, American consul general in Angola, November 17, 1974. By the time of the Portuguese coup of April 1974, Alliama followers gathered around the personality of the Cabindan mulatto Alexander Taty. Since 1964 Taty had held several key positions in the FNLA and MPLA and ran a private guerrilla army.

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ville's sponsorship of Chinese-led guerrilla activity severely threatened the continued hegemony of Fang ethnic domination in Libreville.[8] Gabonese support of the Bavili movement seems also to have fluctuated in direct proportion to the degree of Bakongo (Lari) machinations to suppress Bavili rights in the mineral-rich southern regions of Kouilou and Niari in Congo-Brazzaville.

In 1963 CAUNC, MLEC and Alliama merged under the auspices of Abbé Youlou in Brazzaville to form a single political organization — FLEC.[9] Youlou supported FLEC as part of his design to eventually annex Cabinda onto Congo-Brazzaville.

Politics in Cabinda took a new turn in December 1964 when the MPLA, desperate to open a new front after its near disastrous split of 1963, began to make military forays into Cabinda from Congo-Brazzaville. Although they have been little publicized, skirmishes between the MPLA and FLEC for control of the Cabindan hinterland occurred frequently between 1964 and 1968.

In 1968 a new international actor emerged when the Cabindan subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation began pumping oil. By 1972 new oil production from the giant Malango deposits (accounting for seven-eighths of Cabinda's total production of 160 million barrels per day) ensured that Gulf would remain a major protagonist in any future struggle for Angola-Cabinda.

The Brazzaville Connection: External MPLA Support

Unlike the FNLA on the eve of the Portuguese coup, the *mestiço*-led MPLA had suffered severe political reverses since 1971. To understand the workings of MPLA external politics it is necessary to divide the post-1960 period into four distinctive time periods: (1) 1960-1963, (2) 1963-1966, (3) 1966-1971, and (4) 1971-present.

From 1960 to 1963 the MPLA, blocked by the conservative regimes in Brazzaville and Kinshasa from effectively penetrating the Angolan frontier, conducted a diplomatic-political offensive in order to gain increased international support and thus force the FNLA to acquiesce in a common-front strategy that would give the MPLA access to Angola. As part of this effort, the MPLA leadership strength-

[8] Interview at Consulate of the Republic of South Africa, Luanda, November 29, 1974. Interviews with officials of Gulf Oil Company, Cabinda, November 20, 1974; Johannesburg, December 7, 1974. Interview with Henrique Tiango Nzita, Cabinda, November 21, 1974.

[9] Since 1963 the same factions have vied for control of Cabinda under the umbrella of a unified FLEC.

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ened its diplomatic relations with the USSR, the communist states of Eastern Europe, and the socialist countries of Scandinavia.[10]

By 1963, however, the failure of these common-front policies provoked a leadership crisis in the MPLA. The radical ideologues grouped behind Viriato da Cruz, while those who favored increased efforts at penetrating the fragmented Bakongo community gathered around Agostinho Neto. A third faction, under Mario de Andrade, was caught in the middle. The dispute was exacerbated by the growing Sino-Soviet ideological rift, with da Cruz supporting the Chinese and Neto backing the Soviets.

This was a bad time for the MPLA. In November 1963 Zairois Prime Minister Adoula closed the MPLA liaison office in Kinshasa, while in July 1964 the OAU recognized the FNLA as the sole Angolan liberation movement. These factors would have emasculated the MPLA if the Neto faction had not already moved MPLA headquarters to Brazzaville in 1963.

The motives behind the conservative Youlou regime's invitation of the MPLA to Brazzaville are complex indeed. By 1963 Brazzaville's support for MLEC in Cabinda had waned as MLEC, abandoning its Brazzaville alliance, adopted a program for Cabindan independence. This fact, combined with Youlou's expanding relations with the politically isolated government of Tshombe in Zaire's Katanga Province, made an alliance with the Adoula-supported FNLA in Cabinda an unacceptable political option vis-a-vis the Cabindan separatists. As a result, Youlou invited the MPLA to Brazzaville in exchange for a de facto agreement that the MPLA would oppose both Cabindan independence and the annexation of Cabinda by Zaire.[11] (This agreement appears to provide a plausible explanation of why Youlou would denounce the radicalism of the FNLA while supporting the far more radical MPLA.)

After Abbé Youlou's overthrow in August 1963, the new radical regime of Massemba-Debat launched a major diplomatic offensive aimed at obtaining support from Cuba and the communist countries of Europe and East Asia. In 1964 both Peking and Moscow were recognized, and extensive commercial ties were established. By 1968 Peking had lent to Brazzaville more than twice what Moscow had provided. The massive financial and technical aid provided by the communist states, while giving a substantial boost to the stagnant Brazzaville economy, was not without political cost.

[10] For a thorough discussion of early communist support for the MPLA, see John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Volume 1, 1950-1962* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1969), pp. 27-46.

[11] Interview with Lucio Lara, member of the MPLA Politburo, November 16, 1974.

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Among China's first envoys to Brazzaville were Colonel Kam Mai, an expert in guerrilla warfare, and Colonel Kao Liang, head of the New China News Agency in Dar es Salaam, which served as conduit for Chinese subversive activities.

By 1965 Massemba-Debat had become alarmed by the Chinese-trained guerrillas' growing ability to determine the direction of Brazzaville's foreign relations. Indeed, by 1966 the Chinese were training and equipping guerrillas for military action in Zaire, Gabon, Cameroun and Angola-Cabinda.[12] Peking apparently believed that the Congo provided a unique strategic base for Chinese revolutionary activity in central Africa. In order to counter the growing entanglement of his country in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Massemba-Debat began wooing smaller communist nations, particularly Cuba. By the end of 1965 the Cubans had taken over training of the Congolese paramilitary units as well as of most foreign guerrilla groups, including the MPLA.[13]

Under the administration of Massemba-Debat, the MPLA no longer needed to play down its links with other socialist countries. But from 1964 to 1966 the MPLA, while enjoying enhanced diplomatic support, did not make major military gains. As the MPLA expanded the war into Cabinda in 1964, it began to suffer from the active hostility of both FLEC and a splinter, pro-FNLA Mayombe group (Kasavubu's ethnics), which advocated independence within a unified Angola-Cabinda matrix under the FNLA. The Mayombe were a great obstacle to the MPLA because they inhabited the Cabinda-Brazzaville frontier region, which the MPLA had to traverse to reach those areas of Cabinda more sympathetic to the MPLA cause.

The international dynamics of the Angolan conflict during 1964-1968 became more complex as the pro-Chinese da Cruz of the MPLA joined the FNLA, thus forming a curious alliance between Chinese- and Western-backed Angolan nationalists. The United States had always tacitly supported FNLA leader Holden Roberto, because of his links with the pro-Western regimes of Adoula, Tshombe and Mobutu in neighboring Zaire. Likewise, by

[12] It should be noted that in 1963 three talented Marxist Zaireans—Mulele, Gbenye and Loubaya—went into exile in Brazzaville where they established the CNL, whose *raison d'être* was the overthrow of the conservative governments of Tshombe (1964-1965) and Mobutu (1965-1968). This, more than anything else, has been responsible for the deterioration of interstate relations between Brazzaville and Zaire, and for their ensuing polarization in the Angolan civil war.

[13] It should be noted that after the June 1965 ouster of Ben Bella in Algiers, Cuba shifted the headquarters of its African subversive activities from Algiers to Brazzaville. See "Brazzaville Cuba's New Base," *African Review*, August 1966.

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1964 the Angolan conflict assumed a new dimension with the defection of FNLA Foreign Minister Savimbi, a member of the Ovimbundu ethnic group of central Angola. Savimbi cited Roberto's "tribalism" as the main reason for his defection.

From 1964 to 1968 all went well for the MPLA in Brazzaville, as Massemba-Debat, increasingly fearful of Sino-Soviet–backed forces in his state, put to use a paramilitary corps (after 1966 composed largely of Cubans and MPLA recruits) as his personal bodyguard. Although all scholars note that the MPLA began preparations in 1966 to open a new front in western Zambia, none of them has made the observation that the MPLA had acquired many enemies in Brazzaville as a result of its support of the Massemba-Debat government during the attempted June 1966 coup. In 1968 Captain Ngouabi made one of his first moves as president to curtail the influence of all revolutionary groups, particularly the MPLA, in domestic Brazzaville politics. It was at this time that the MPLA moved its headquarters to Lusaka.[14]

Although the MPLA from 1968 to 1972 continued to enjoy the use of Brazzaville as a base, its domestic influence in the country was greatly reduced. The timing of the MPLA move to Lusaka had more than just strategic significance, as evidenced by Ange Diawara's attempted coup against the Ngouabi regime in February 1972.[15] The failed coup had important ramifications for the future pattern of external support for the various Angolan guerrilla factions. After Massemba-Debat's overthrow in 1968, China had emerged as the dominant external political force within the new Ngouabi regime. Nonetheless, it appears that the Chinese were disturbed by Ngouabi's severe curtailment of guerrilla activity directed at Angola, Zaire and Cameroun. As a result, the Chinese at least tacitly approved Diawara's attempt to overthrow Ngouabi.

To complete the Byzantine cycle of Brazzaville politics, the MPLA, eager to regain Ngouabi's favor, apparently double-crossed Lissouba and helped the Ngouabi regime pursue Diawara's guerrilla forces. The irony is completed when one realizes that Diawara received arms from Zaire not only because of his opposition to the

[14] Interview with Daniel Chipenda, December 12, 1974.

[15] See Siradiou Diallo, "Le Complot de Brazzaville," *Jeune Afrique*, March 10, 1973, pp. 12-15. In the wake of the coup's failure, Diawara — a hero of the Brazzaville revolution — conducted a Mao Tse-tung-style guerrilla campaign in the forest areas of the Zaire-Congo frontier, until his death in early 1973. Diawara was a radical member of the Brazzaville leadership and was backed by Pascal Lissouba, who it appears tried to gain MPLA support for Diawara. Lissouba had been head of the Maoist-oriented Jeunesse, and had been instrumental in creating from the MPLA a paramilitary guard for Massemba-Debat.

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Brazzaville government, but also owing to his Bakongo ethnicity.[16] The problem was made still more complex by the fact that Diawara tried to mobilize support among radical Bakongo groups hostile to the FNLA, a policy that led to severe clashes between the FNLA's forces and Diawara's guerrillas.[17]

Diawara's death and the ensuing reduction of Chinese influence in Brazzaville, the termination of the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent re-emergence of Chinese diplomatic initiatives, President Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972 and the attendant Sino-American rapprochement — all these seem to have precipitated a major reassessment of China's southern Africa policy. As a visible manifestation of this new policy, General Mobutu, an implacable foe of hostile Chinese propaganda for more than a decade, visited Peking in January 1973. The evidence available suggests that the PRC was encouraged toward reconciliation with Mobutu by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia; by 1973 the Chinese were deeply involved in financing the $400-million Zambia-to-Tanzania railway project.[18]

Chinese diplomatic initiatives after the Cultural Revolution increasingly emphasized government-to-government relations, and support of liberation movements was confined to those groups opposing continued white rule. The Chinese apparently believed that this policy would allow the PRC to maintain its revolutionary ideology without jeopardizing its relations with black and North African governments. Clearly, in light of the diplomatic setback in Brazzaville after Diawara's death, a rapprochement with Zaire provided new opportunities.

Mobutu's visit to Peking occurred against the backdrop of an attempt by Mobutu, Ngouabi, Julius Nyerere and Kaunda (in December 1972) to reconcile the differences between the MPLA and FNLA. Although the resultant accord set up a theoretical union of the two movements under a Conseil Suprême de Libération de L'Angola, this agreement was quickly shattered in May 1974, when the FNLA wiped out a large contingent of MPLA troops attempting to infiltrate Angola. It should be noted that by June 1974, advance units of a 112-man contingent from China, led by a major general,

[16] The flow of Zairois arms to Diawara was increased after the Zairois-Chinese rapprochement, stemming from Mobutu's visit to Peking in January 1973.

[17] Interview with a member of the MPLA Politburo, December 6, 1974. Interview with Henrique Vaal Neto, FNLA representative in Luanda, December 4, 1974. Also see Diallo.

[18] It is interesting to note that the Chinese decision to build the Tanzam Railway was made prior to the Cultural Revolution and that the surveys were ordered and carried out during the height of that period of diplomatic isolation.

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had arrived in Zaire to train FNLA guerrillas at the Kinkuzu military base.[19]

The Zambian Sector

The year 1964 witnessed the emergence of a new element in the international politics of the Angolan civil war. After his resignation as FNLA foreign minister in that year, Savimbi launched a major recruitment campaign. By 1966, with a nucleus of fellow Ovimbundu, as well as with members of the Ngangela (Luena, Luchazi, Mbunda) and Chokwe ethnic groups, Savimbi's UNITA launched a series of actions against the Portuguese — including, to all accounts, the blowing up of a section of the Benguela-Lobito Railway that fed Zambia. This action led to Savimbi's expulsion from Zambia.

But it was the FNLA and not UNITA that most probably destroyed the railway. This fact can be documented in two ways. First, the FNLA claimed credit for the action; UNITA never did. Second, the Portuguese later stated that original reports implicating UNITA were false, and that the FNLA was responsible.[20] The real reason for Savimbi's expulsion, though never mentioned by the Zambian government, is that he was fostering the rise of occult politics in western Zambia. To make matters worse, he seems to have allied himself for ethnic reasons with the ANC (African National Congress) Zambian opposition in Zambia's northwestern (Luchazi and Luena) and western (Lozi) provinces.[21]

After Savimbi's clandestine return to Zambia in 1968, the politics of the western Barotse Province became crucial to the Angolan liberation movement.[22] The development of Barotseland was so neglected under colonial rule that those in search of employment had to migrate to South Africa and Rhodesia. In 1966 Zambia banned the recruitment of African labor on the grounds that Zambians were being subjected to the inhuman policy of apartheid in South Africa. However, at the same time, little alternative employment was available in Zambia. The result was massive economic discontent; in the 1968 general elections, candidates of Kaunda's United National In-

[19] *International Herald Tribune*, June 3, 1974.

[20] Lisbon ANI in Portuguese, 14:57 GMT, December 29, 1966.

[21] Although this has been noted by other African scholars, they have tended to overlook the fact that the Zambian government was extremely sensitive to any new manifestations of occultism, owing to continued political activity by the followers of High Priestess Alice Lenshina after her capture by MPLA guerrillas.

[22] Gerald L. Caplan, "Zambia, Barotseland, and the Liberation of Southern Africa," *Africa Today*, August-September, 1969, pp. 13-17.

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dependence Party (UNIP), including cabinet ministers from Barotse Province, suffered a major defeat. Related to the economic factor as a cause of ethnic tension in Barotse Province is the security element. Barotseland's strategic position is obvious: it forms a portion of Zambia's western boundary with Angola, and it touches the Caprivi Strip of Namibia (South-West Africa).

The Portuguese authorities had not been unaware of the possible implications of Zambian independence on the Angolan revolution. Throughout the 1960s the Portuguese and the South Africans wooed the *litunga* (traditional ruler) of the Lozi with promises of military assistance if he would secede from Zambia.[23] As part of these initiatives, South Africa established a military depot in the Caprivi Strip in 1964 which has since significantly expanded.

In 1968, as UNITA began to work effectively with the Zambian opposition, the Zambian government cracked down on UNITA's allies. The banning of the Pan African Congress (PAC) of South Africa on August 24 ought to be seen in this setting. In December 1968 the Portuguese foolishly retaliated against the Lozi-backed UNITA — sponsoring raids by Lunda tribesmen into Barotseland. The Lunda were all too eager to manifest their traditional hostility against the Ngangela, Ovimbundu, Lozi and Chokwe.[24] Kaunda gained political capital out of these incursions by claiming that they were jointly sponsored by the African National Congress and the Portuguese.[25]

From 1968 to 1971, the MPLA was able to mobilize support within the Ngangela community, and the situation in Barotseland became even more complex. Basil Davidson has attributed the MPLA's success in this regard to UNITA's failure to produce promised ammunition; it appears, however, that the real reason lay in the MPLA's clever playing-off of traditional Mbunda-Luchazi hatred of the Ovimbundu.[26]

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[23] Gerald L. Caplan, "Barotseland: The Secessionist Challenge to Zambia," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, October 1968, pp. 354-355.

[24] *New York Times*, December 2, 1968. It should be noted that mutual ethnic hatred of the Lunda temporarily united the Ngangela with their other traditional enemies, the Ovimbundu and the Chokwe. After the 1974 Portuguese coup, many of the Lunda who had sided with the Portuguese against the Angolan guerrillas joined the MPLA because of their hatred of the Ovimbundu, Chokwe and Ngangela peoples. The Lunda were supporters of the Bemba-dominated Kaunda government. Moreover, they had actively supported Tshombe's secessionist Katangan regime in 1960-1963. This Katangan gendarmerie continues in its attempts to dislodge Katanga (Shaba) Province from the rest of Zaire.

[25] *New York Times*, November 29, 1968. Kaunda capitalized on the hatred of his Lunda allies to attack his domestic enemies. This led to further polarization of the Zambian domestic political scene.

[26] Interview with Daniel Chipenda, December 12, 1974. Wilson Santos, UNITA's spokesman in Luanda, although he acknowledged problems among these ethnic groups, refused to discuss the issue during an interview on November 19, 1974.

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The MPLA's drive into eastern Angola from its Zambian bases during 1966-1971 generated severe setbacks for UNITA. In a score of clashes with the aggressive MPLA units, UNITA lost many men and had to cede considerable territory, falling back to the center and south of the country. After 1971, however, major offensive operations by the Portuguese combined with an improved fighting capacity on the part of UNITA (owing to an influx of Chinese arms, and the MPLA was pushed back to the Zambian frontier.

The War in the South

By early 1974 the MPLA tried to open a new front around the Cuando River, west of Chiume in southeastern Angola. In the south UNITA maintained hot-and-cold relations with SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization), whose guerrillas since 1966 had often transited southern Angola on the way to Ovamboland in Namibia, where they were trying to create a guerrilla *foco*. Even though SWAPO at times also collaborated with MPLA forces en route to Namibia, relations among the three groups have often led to bitter ethnic warfare.[27]

The SWAPO-UNITA alliance has been troubled by the fact that UNITA, for ideological reasons, was allied to SWAPO's rival organization — the South-West Africa National Union (SWANU). SWANU was a Herero-backed organization that, although it lacked a military organization, included some members from the small Herero community in Angola. The Herero and the Ovambo (with SWAPO) are traditional enemies that, since April 1974, have fought each other in the Angolan-Namibian frontier area.[28] To complicate matters further, SWANU was supported ideologically by the Chinese, since SWAPO was aided by the Soviet Union.

In 1972, as the MPLA expanded its activities into Huila and Cuando Cubango provinces, South Africa began to be seriously alarmed by the events in Angola. The South African government had important political, economic and military interests that were directly linked to the struggle for power in Angola.

In January 1969 South Africa had signed an agreement with the Caetano regime which involved considerable South African

[27] Interview with a member of the SWAPO Committee, Harvard University, October 1973. Interview with a UNITA representative, Boston University, May 5, 1973.

[28] Interview with a SWANU Politburo spokesman, December 2, 1974. Note that many Herero and Bushmen fought on the side of the Portuguese against the Angolan guerrillas. In the case of the Bushmen, their historical hatred of all Bantu tribes seems to have been the chief motivating factor. The Bushmen, native to the remote, barren areas of southern Angola, were among some of the best counterinsurgency soldiers ever to serve the Portuguese.

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participation in the Cunene River development project. Under the accord, Portugal was to undertake all work on the section of the river from the Gove Dam downstream to Calueque, while South Africa was responsible for the remaining thirteen dams and associated projects. South Africa agreed to finance most of the cost of the major portion of the project: namely, the construction of the Gove and Calueque dams. The purpose of the Calueque complex, forty miles from the Ruacana Falls on the Angolan-Namibian border, is to supply water and power to Ovamboland, Grootfontein, the Tsumeb iron-ore facility, Windhoek, Walvis Bay, and Rio Tinto Zinc's mines at Rossing, which hold one of the world's largest deposits of uranium.

Since approximately 40 per cent of Namibian contract labor consisted of Ovambo from Angola, the South African authorities were quite concerned when the general strike in Namibia, which began at the end of 1971, extended into March 1972. In the aftermath of the strike, some 15,000 Ovambo were repatriated to Angola in order to defuse the political situation.

The strike was followed in early 1972 by an episode in which Ovambo "guerrillas" invaded Angola from Namibia, destroying fences and claiming territory up to the huge hydroelectric complex on the Cunene River. The incident precipitated the intervention of both the South African police and the Portuguese army. Pretoria feared that the rise of radical Ovambo nationalism would seriously jeopardize its Namibian Bantustan policy and might unleash political forces that would prove impossible to control.[29]

As the MPLA was pushed back to the Zambian border after 1971, it began a systematic assassination campaign against ethnic leaders sympathetic to UNITA. The MPLA was so bold as to attack Chokwe, Luchazi, Mbunda and Lozi leaders within the territorial confines of Zambia. These actions were denounced by the Zambian government and greatly aided UNITA in its recruitment efforts.[30] They also helped UNITA to rally support among the Chokwe, Cuanhama (who are related to the Ovambo), Luimbi and Herero groups.[31] Despite these successes, UNITA forces, as noted above, are nevertheless said to have clashed with SWAPO forces.[32]

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[29] Interviews at the South African Defense Ministry, Pretoria, December 1974.

[30] Interview with a UNITA representative, Boston University, May 5, 1973. *Times of Zambia*, September 13, 1972.

[31] *Washington Post*, December 25, 1973.

[32] Interview with a member of the SWAPO Central Committee, Harvard University, October 1973. See also *The Guardian* (Manchester), January 24, 1972; *Financial Times* (London), February 8, 1972; and *Jeune Afrique*, April 15, 1972.

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The Portuguese Coup

The Portuguese coup of April 25, 1974, caught all three Angolan nationalist groups unprepared. Although they all rejected the Spínola government's offer of local autonomy under a Lusitanian federation, they did express interest in future negotiations.

But by summer 1974 new events had again wreaked havoc on the Angolan political scene. In June the MPLA was rocked by another leadership crisis as Chipenda, MPLA military commander in Zambia, again contested Neto for leadership. Chipenda (like Savimbi, an Ovimbundu) expressed dissatisfaction with (1) mulatto domination of the MPLA leadership (seven of the top ten were mulattos); (2) Neto's growing personality cult; (3) Neto's ideological affiliation with the USSR and the socialist nations of Eastern and Western Europe to the detriment of relations with Peking; (4) the assassination tactics in Zambia that had backfired to UNITA's advantage; and (5) Neto's discussions with officials of Cabinda Gulf which contravened official MPLA policy.[33]

By August the MPLA split widened still farther, and most MPLA ideologues rallied behind Pinto Andrade's Revolte Active faction in a vain attempt to unify the party. However, because the Andrade faction lacked any effective military organization, it failed in its unification efforts. Capitalizing on the battle for leadership, the Chinese by mid-1974 had sent hundreds of tons of arms, as well as military instructors, to the FNLA via Zaire. China apparently saw a unique opportunity to score a major diplomatic triumph over the Soviet Union and to extend its influence in central Africa, through Mobutu. By autumn Kaunda was discreetly backing the Chipenda faction, which had begun to receive arms from Peking.[34]

Throughout the summer and fall of 1974 the situation became ever more complex as the growth of radicalism in the Armed Forces Movement increasingly led Portuguese policymakers to tilt toward the Neto wing of the MPLA. It appears that, by September, Admiral Coutinho's pro-MPLA policies in Luanda forced General Spínola's move to assume personal control over all the Angolan negotiations.

In late September, Spínola, anxious to reverse the growing pro-MPLA orientation of the Portuguese government, signed an accord with Mobutu designed to eliminate the Neto faction from the Angolan political scene. Under the terms of the agreement, both

[33] Interview with Daniel Chipenda, December 12, 1974.
[34] *Ibid.*

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Spínola and Mobutu were to recognize Chipenda's dissident wing as the "legitimate" MPLA. As part of the plan both the Revolte Active (Andrade) and the Revolte de l'Est (Chipenda) were to set up offices in Kinshasa;[35] however, with Spínola's removal on September 28, the plan was shelved as the new government under Costa Gomes became increasingly polarized. Gomes was disturbed that increased Lisbon support for the MPLA might intensify FNLA and Zairois machinations to woo the Chipenda and Andrade factions as well as FLEC into an effective anti-MPLA alliance.

Despite serious clashes in Luanda between the MPLA and UNITA (in November), the attempted takeover of Cabinda by FLEC and the expulsion of Chipenda from the MPLA (in November and December), UNITA, the FNLA and Neto's MPLA came together at Mombasa, Kenya, on January 4, 1975, and agreed to a common front in their negotiations with the Portuguese. Although Chipenda and FLEC both appealed to be included in these negotiations, the Alvor Agreement of January 31, 1975, which called for independence for Angola on November 11, 1975, effectively excluded them.

External Intervention: The Breakdown of Alvor

The collapse of the Alvor Agreement in February 1975 led to an ever-widening internationalization of the Angolan conflict. After his expulsion from the MPLA, Chipenda joined forces with the FNLA, taking with him some 1,500 seasoned guerrillas. For ideological reasons and because of his growing FNLA links, the Chinese provided him with increased support. The massive support the Soviet Union began to provide the MPLA in the spring of 1975 must be explained by events in Lisbon and by the string of Chinese diplomatic successes in southern Africa since 1972.

By spring 1975 the pro-Soviet and pro-MPLA orientation of the Gonçalves government seemed to provide the MPLA with a real trump card for eventual victory. In brief, increased Soviet support, including sizable numbers of Cuban troops, provided the opportunity for a major diplomatic victory at very little cost. Although much has been written about the Soviet intervention as a test of American will in the wake of the Vietnam and Watergate debacles and as growing evidence of Soviet expansion, such an explanation is far too simplistic.

The USSR was deeply disturbed by the level of material support that the Chinese began to send the FNLA and Chipenda

[35] The Andrade and Chipenda factions established offices in Kinshasa in October 1974.

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forces during the summer of 1974. To counteract this aid, the Soviets began small-arms shipments to the MPLA (Neto) in October-November 1974. In 1973 the Soviets had suspended aid to Neto, believing that, without an active military wing, he would not be able to counter growing Chinese support for the FNLA and, to a lesser extent, for UNITA. As part of this policy shift, the USSR began to ship small amounts of material to Chipenda. In the aftermath of the April coup, however, the Soviet Union performed a diplomatic *volte-face*, apparently on the advice of the Portuguese Communist Party.[36]

Since 1972 the Chinese had scored many diplomatic coups at Soviet expense. In early 1975 China's influence in Zambia and Tanzania was at an all-time high as a result of its financing of the Tanzam Railroad; the PRC was making steady headway in Zaire and exerted considerable control over the FNLA; after April 1974 Chinese influence had eclipsed that of the Soviets among the leaders of the new revolutionary government in Mozambique (despite years of active Soviet support, the FRELIMO government in 1974-1975 declined to grant port facilities to the USSR); Chinese prestige with the Namibian and Rhodesian guerrilla movements was never higher;[37] despite evidence of Chinese complicity in the 1972 Brazzaville coup attempt, China continued to have a significant presence there; the PRC established diplomatic relations with the conservative Khama regime in Botswana in January 1975; and finally, China had run roughshod over the Soviets in the struggle for influence in the fledgling Angolan Communist Organization (OCA).

To stem this rising Chinese tide the Soviet Union, after the breakdown of the Alvor Agreement, decided to increase its arms deliveries to the MPLA, hoping to halt the growing military predominance of the FNLA. The Soviets had good cause for concern. In February 1975 Chipenda with his army of 3,000 guerrillas joined up with the FNLA. In April the FNLA sent a motorized column to Luanda in a vain attempt to dislodge the MPLA leadership from the area of its central cadre support. Although there is no clear evidence to link the two events, it should be noted that the Soviets stepped up their aid (March-July) when the Gonçalves government in Lisbon wavered. The Lisbon crisis provoked a major debate in Soviet foreign policy circles, and it appears likely that the "hawks," having lost in Lisbon, pressed for intervention in Angola.

[36] Interview with Alvaro Cunhal, secretary general of the Communist Party of Portugal, Lisbon, November 9, 1974.

[37] Interviews with leading members of Namibian and Rhodesian guerrilla groups between 1972 and 1975.

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By June 1975 the introduction of massive amounts of foreign arms doomed to failure the mediation efforts of President Jomo Kenyatta at the Nankuru summit, and by July full-scale civil war erupted throughout the country. The three Angolan guerrilla groups were largely confined to geographic areas corresponding to their ethnic-support base. The only exceptions in this general picture were MPLA control of Cabinda, seized in June, and sizable support for the MPLA among mulatto communities in the port towns and cities of southern Angola.

The infusion of Soviet arms tilted the military balance in favor of the MPLA, and in mid-July the MPLA drove the FNLA out of Luanda. The steady MPLA advance frightened Zambia and Zaire, which were concerned about the threat the deteriorating political situation in Angola might pose for their own security. In July Zaire and Zambia "turned to the United States for assistance in preventing the USSR and Cuba from (1) imposing a solution in Angola, (2) becoming a dominant influence in south-central Africa and (3) threatening the stability of the area."[38]

To counteract the MPLA's military advances, Peking in mid-July authorized Zaire to release sizable quantities of Chinese military equipment held by the Zairois army.[39] Although there is no hard supportive evidence, one can hardly resist wondering whether the Chinese move was in any way coordinated with the U.S. covert-assistance program launched at the same time to help UNITA and the FNLA.

Another piece in this puzzle of political maneuvering is Neto's early-July visit to Brazzaville in order to urge the Congolese to speed up transshipment of Soviet weapons to Angola. It appears that Ngouabi — worried by the MPLA's military successes against the Brazzaville-based wing of FLEC in Cabinda — had slowed the shipments. Ngouabi's support of the MPLA placed him on both sides of the evolving Cabindan political situation, and by slowing the MPLA's arms shipments, he hoped to give FLEC time to revitalize its forces in the hinterland.[40]

In late July the OAU, meeting in Kampala, Uganda, decided to prepare a report on the possibility of sending a peacekeeping force to Angola. But, with only one of the principal guerrilla leaders in attendance (Savimbi), the OAU refused to take sides.

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[38] Testimony of Secretary of State Kissinger before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 29, 1976.

[39] Interviews with Zairois embassy officials, July-August 1975.

[40] Interviews at the U.S. Department of State, Africa Bureau, September 1975.

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By August 1975 Angolan politics had become increasingly enmeshed with the politics of Lisbon. Prime Minister Gonçalves and the radicals in the Armed Forces Movement began to support a proposal to declare Angola independent under the banner of the MPLA, while anti-Gonçalves dissidents in Portugal, apparently supported by most of the military units in Angola, wanted the transitional government established by the Alvor Agreement to be reconvened.

The MPLA's seizure of the strategic port of Lobito in August posed new problems for the security of Zaire and Zambia. Lobito handled nearly 40 per cent of Zaire's and Zambia's foreign trade, including more than one-third of each country's copper exports. In 1975 the export of copper accounted for 95 per cent of Zambia's export earnings and 65 per cent of Zaire's. The port closure reduced Zambia's imports by 25 per cent and Zaire's by 15 per cent.

The port seizure presented severe problems for the Kaunda regime. Since the early 1970s Zambia had unofficially supported UNITA; the Benguela Railway ran through territory controlled by UNITA, and Kaunda feared that in the event of a partition of Angola, Zambia would be dependent on UNITA's support. Kaunda realized, however, that if the MPLA won recognition as the sole legitimate government of Angola, and secured access to the towns along the railway, then previous Zambian support for UNITA would give the MPLA a powerful lever (access to Lobito) by which to blackmail Zambia into compliance with MPLA foreign policy goals.

Zambia was under further political pressure because, although she could divert some of her exports to ports in Tanzania and Mozambique (via Malawi), both Mozambique and Tanzania were staunch MPLA supporters. In addition, these ports were heavily congested. Kaunda realized that Zambia's only other outlet to the sea, through Rhodesia and South Africa, would involve Zambia in an intolerable political alliance at a time when Zambia's detente policies toward South Africa were being vigorously assailed throughout black Africa.

The events that followed are well known. In August large contingents of Cuban and Soviet personnel began to arrive in Angola, increasing their numbers to 11,000 soldiers by February 1976; in October the last remaining Portuguese troops were withdrawn; and in mid-October the FNLA and UNITA launched a coordinated counteroffensive on the MPLA, which by late October was joined by an armored South African column composed of regular South African defense forces, black members of the precoup Portuguese

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Angolan army, white Angolans, right-wing followers of Spínola's Portuguese Liberation Army, and white mercenaries. This intervention seriously tipped the military balance against the MPLA.

On November 11, 1975 Angola became formally independent; the MPLA announced the creation of a government in Luanda, and the FNLA-UNITA coalition proclaimed a rival government in Huambo. The MPLA government received immediate recognition from seven African states, the USSR, North Vietnam, the communist nations of Eastern Europe, and Brazil. The Huambo government received no formal recognition.

In late November an attempted invasion of Cabinda by FLEC, supported by Zaire, was repulsed by the MPLA. At the same time the USSR, concerned by the success of the South African advance, airlifted heavy equipment to the besieged MPLA. Also in late November, sizable contingents of Cuban troops landed in Luanda.

The South African Intervention

Although the South African intervention was designed to protect the Cunene River hydroelectric complex in southwestern Angola, to wipe out SWAPO guerrilla bases in southern Angola, and to improve the military position of the FNLA-UNITA forces on the eve of Angolan independence, it turned out to be a serious diplomatic and military miscalculation.[41] Covertly waged by the United States, Zambia and Zaire, the intervention (1) severely damaged South Africa's detente policy, (2) exacerbated the Namibian political situation, owing to the large South African military build-up in the northern part of the territory, and (3) compromised the viability of U.S. and Chinese support for the FNLA-UNITA coalition. MPLA military successes late in 1975 significantly broadened UNITA-South African military cooperation deep inside Angola. South Africa apparently believed that an MPLA victory in Angola would jeopardize both its Namibian policy and its policy of expanding the dialogue with black Africa. South African authorities believed that the radical MPLA government would not only be able to step up aid to SWAPO, but would also be able to press Kaunda vis-a-vis the Benguela Railway to adopt a more militant posture in regard to South Africa's detente policy.

The South African intervention created new problems for the United States. Clearly, the image of American-South African collusion did not aid U.S. policy flexibility. Given Angolan political

[41] Apparently, South African foreign policy officialdom was deeply divided on the question of intervention. Interview at the South African Embassy, Washington, June 1976.

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realities, the fall of the Spínola government in September 1974 had left the United States with no policy. As a result, U.S. policy hinged on the success of a negotiated compromise through the Alvor Agreement. Once the agreement broke down, Kissinger saw no alternative but to support the FNLA, and later the FNLA-UNITA coalition, through increased covert support. The failure of the Kissinger policy lies in the fact that his parochial view, focusing only on U.S.-Soviet great-power rivalry, precluded the United States from seeing the larger regional and international context of the Angolan struggle. Likewise, it was not until early 1975 that State Department officials began to count Savimbi's forces as a serious factor in the Angolan political scene.

In fairness to Kissinger, it must be recognized that the congressional actions of December and January, which placed a ceiling on the level of U.S. funding for FNLA-UNITA, severely restricted Kissinger's options. Nonetheless, he failed to weigh accurately the following: (1) the anti-Chinese component of the Soviets' Angolan policy, (2) the implications of the South African intervention on black African public opinion, (3) the ineffectiveness of the FNLA-UNITA coalition arising from the inveterate hatred of the Bakongo for the Ovimbundu, and (4) the significant divisions within the MPLA leadership on future relations with the West. Taken together, these misperceptions constitute a classic myopic policy-failure.

Similarly, the intervention posed acute problems for Peking. Once South Africa intervened, China withdrew her military advisers to the FNLA, partly because she believed that U.S.-South African support for FNLA-UNITA would ensure the defeat of the Soviet-MPLA-Cuban alliance, but also because she wished to preserve her revolutionary credentials. Behind the scenes, the PRC continued to provide aid that could be channeled through African intermediaries, thus leaving Peking with a plausible case for denying any direct role. China was dismayed by the lack of a strong U.S. response to the Soviet build-up of the MPLA forces, and it is possible that Kissinger's toughened stance in his talks with Brezhnev over SALT and detente was intended to assuage the Chinese.

The OAU Emergency Summit

On the eve of the OAU emergency summit on Angola, held in Addis Ababa from January 10 to 13, 1976, the shipments of Soviet arms and Cuban troops that arrived in late November and early December began to turn the tide in favor of the MPLA. But at

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the conference, the UNITA-FNLA coalition scored a major diplomatic triumph when the pro-MPLA forces failed to obtain enough votes for formal OAU recognition. While twenty-two states recognized the MPLA as the only legitimate Angolan government, twenty-two others supported a resolution calling for a cease-fire and negotiations that would lead to a government of national unity.

After the stalemated OAU summit of July 1975, the South Africans had decided that their intervention was not so much an anathema to black Africa as they had believed. Nonetheless, Pretoria, dismayed by the lack of effective Western support and by growing domestic opposition to its Angolan intervention, had decided by late January to press for a negotiated settlement.

After the Summit: Zaire

By February 1976 the MPLA enjoyed a clear military advantage on all fronts in Angola. In the wake of the FNLA's rout by the MPLA in northern Angola, Zaire began to question its long-standing support of the FNLA. Mobutu was worried that an MPLA regime, firmly entrenched in both Angola and Cabinda, would be in a position to strangle Zaire by cutting off its only outlets to the coast — the Benguela Railway and the Zaire Estuary.

Mobutu was also concerned by the massing of 4,000 of the old Katangan gendarmes (Lunda tribesmen) on the Angolan frontier with Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba (Katanga) Province.[42] In January Antoine Gizenga, an old Lumumbist and archenemy of Mobutu, made contact with the gendarme leaders in an attempt to increase the pressure on Mobutu.[43] Finally, Mobutu was apprehensive about the political ramifications of his inability to prevent the increasing number of Cuban bombings of Zairois villages.

In this political context, Mobutu stated in late January that, although he continued to support an Angolan coalition government, he no longer insisted on the inclusion of the FNLA. In February Mobutu announced that mercenaries attempting to transit Zaire in order to engage MPLA forces in Angola would no longer be tolerated. To bolster his regime, Mobutu concluded a substantial arms-purchase agreement with the United States during the spring visits of Secretaries Kissinger and Rumsfeld.

Despite the enhanced prestige that Mobutu garnered from the Kissinger-Rumsfeld visits, he nevertheless felt threatened enough

[42] The Katangan gendarmes apparently want Shaba Province to secede from Zaire.
[43] Gizenga had been vice premier of Zaire under Lumumba and had headed up the secessionst Stanleyville regime in eastern Zaire during 1964-1965.

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to announce in May 1976 that the Zairois-Angolan frontier was closed to FLEC guerrilla forces. Even with this official policy, however, Mobutu has continued covert aid to the FLEC guerrillas. In June Mobutu, as a prelude to the forthcoming talks with the Angolan regime on mutual security questions (scheduled for July), announced that Zaire would henceforth expel all Angolan "refugees" using its territory as a base against Angola. The subtlety of Mobutu's position was not lost on the MPLA.

After the Summit: Zambia

During the early months of 1976, Zambia's Kaunda had to steer a different political course. South Africa's intervention into Angola had severely compromised Kaunda's policy of dialogue with the white South. This was especially true in Namibia because the United Nations in December 1974 had unanimously demanded that South Africa withdraw its illegal administration before May 30, 1975. When South Africa failed to comply, Kaunda had agreed not to press Pretoria so long as it moved ahead toward a constructive solution.

But by late 1975 the real possibility of an MPLA victory in Angola, and thus the prospect of an Angolan sanctuary and base for SWAPO guerrillas operating against Namibia, so potentially discredited Kaunda's policy that he severely circumscribed the use of Zambian territory for SWAPO raids directed at Namibia. Kaunda's concern was heightened by the internecine struggle raging between SWAPO's party hierarchy and its young recruits, and between rival Chinese and Soviet factions. From the evidence available, the Soviets would seem to have promised the leader of SWAPO's external wing, Sam Nujoma, considerable support if he could reduce the level of Chinese influence in SWAPO.[44]

As the UNITA-FNLA alliance collapsed under the MPLA onslaught in January, open warfare broke out between UNITA's Ovimbundu army and elements of the Ngangela population along the Zambian-Angolan border. Likewise, UNITA's characterization of Chipenda as a common bandit set off fighting between Chipenda's Chokwe army and UNITA's Ovimbundu forces. Chipenda's defection and plundering deprived FNLA-UNITA of an effective fighting force. In the northwest MPLA-backed Lunda warriors clashed with Chokwe, Ovimbundu and Ngangela tribesmen. Although some of this fighting was related to the larger Angolan struggle, much of it was confined to purely local, ethnic considerations. To escape

[44] Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1976, p. 758.

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Ovimbundu and Chokwe depredations, many Ngangela tribesmen fled into western Zambia, thus posing an increased security threat to the Bemba-based Kaunda regime.

By late January Kaunda was sufficiently alarmed by his deteriorating political situation that he declared a state of emergency and suspended constitutional guarantees. Kaunda cited the security situation on Zambia's frontiers and foreign (i.e., Soviet) interference in Zambian affairs as justification for the decree, but this was a smoke screen to conceal his fear that the influx of hostile tribesmen into Zambia's northwestern and western provinces would enhance the political position of his domestic opposition.

Throughout January Kaunda publicly continued to support UNITA out of fear that an MPLA government could strangle Zambia economically, threaten its internal security by supporting dissident frontier populations, and ruin its expanding dialogue policy with the white South. But by February the withdrawal of the bulk of the South African forces from southern Angola, combined with the collapse of the UNITA-FNLA coalition, forced Kaunda to adopt a public posture more favorable to the MPLA. In tune with this policy shift, *The Times of Zambia* on February 13 did a diplomatic about-face and praised the Cuban intervention against the forces of imperialism. The paper called on Cuba to extend the struggle southward to liberate Rhodesia and Namibia.

In April a dramatic upsurge in SWAPO guerrilla activity against Namibia, directed from southern Angola and southwestern Zambia, presented a new challenge to Kaunda.[45] This new vitality disturbed Kaunda because it occurred against the backdrop of an escalation in the conflict between SWAPO's active forces, under Shipanga, and the external leadership, under Nujoma. Although Nujoma, under MPLA pressure, had adopted a more open pro-Soviet position in April,[46] Kaunda was more afraid of the Shipanga wing, based in Zambia's Barotse Province, because it had established cordial relations with anti-Kaunda Zambian dissidents. This, together with the influx of hostile Ngangela and Chokwe tribesmen from eastern Angola, forced Kaunda in April and May to place a large number of SWAPO officials under protective custody.

In order to counteract the African reaction to his detention of high-level SWAPO officials, Kaunda used the pretext of Kissinger's visit in April to travel to Mozambique for consultations. In Maputo Kaunda gave a militant speech on the southern African

[45] Johannesburg International Service in English, 2100 GMT, April 11, 1976.
[46] East Berlin ADN in English, 1800 GMT, April 7, 1976.

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situation, pledging full Zambian support for the liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia, and calling for the end of apartheid in South Africa.[47]

By late April Kaunda found himself on the defensive, even though Zambia had recognized the Angolan government on the fifteenth of that month. The flood of hostile refugees into western Zambia had resulted in open ethnic warfare. To confront his critics, Kaunda took advantage of the Eighth UNIP National Council Meeting to denounce tribalism, witchcraft and all foreign ideologies.

After the Summit: South Africa

Despite the withdrawal of the major portion of the South African Defense Forces in late January 1976, some 4- to 5,000 of these troops initially remained in Angola, up to a distance of thirty miles from the Namibian border, both to protect the Cunene facility and to assure that "terrorists" would not be allowed to establish bases from which they could launch strikes into Namibia.[48] Savimbi seems to have been dismayed by South Africa's decision to withdraw its forces from Angola; he had expected that the OAU failure to condemn South Africa's involvement would encourage Pretoria to increase its support.

In the wake of the South African withdrawal and the collapse of the FNLA forces on Angola's northern front, Savimbi, although vowing to wage guerrilla war indefinitely, asked Kenyatta to serve as an intermediary with the MPLA and to propose a coalition between UNITA and the MPLA. Kenyatta was approached after Mobutu told Savimbi that Zaire could no longer afford to openly support the FNLA-UNITA forces.[49]

By late February Nascimentos, the Angolan foreign minister, opened the way for a complete South African withdrawal by announcing that the Angolan government would be prepared to cooperate with Pretoria provided that South Africa recognize the MPLA's sovereignty in Angola. In March Pretoria, having received assurances that the MPLA would safeguard the Cunene hydroelectric installations, withdrew its remaining forces from Angola. South Africa, however, was still disturbed by Neto's declared backing for SWAPO.

On June 3, 1976, Zambia's continued economic strangulation vis-a-vis the Benguela Railway forced Kaunda to announce that

[47] Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese, 1955 GMT, April 20, 1976.
[48] Press statement by South African Defense Minister Botha, February 4, 1976.
[49] Interview with Zambian and Kenyan embassy officials, February 1976.

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Zambia would allow Rhodesian guerrillas to use its soil for attacks on the Ian Smith regime. Pretoria, angered by Kaunda's new militancy and by his apparent unwillingness to put an end to all SWAPO activity, responded by sponsoring a raid by former members of the Zambian ANC into Barotse Province, from bases in the Caprivi Strip.

Kaunda scored the attack as imperialistic but made no reference to the involvement of Zambian dissidents. The Mushala raid attracted so much popular support among dissident elements in Zambia's western and northwestern provinces that in July Kaunda unleashed the Zambian army in the area. The mass repression was so great that thousands of people fled to eastern Angola.

Also in July, the South African government, worried by increasing SWAPO raids from southern Angola and southwestern Zambia, attacked a major SWAPO guerrilla base. Zambia, making no mention of the SWAPO connection, denounced South Africa's incursion before the UN Security Council as an unprovoked attack on Zambia.

After the Summit: Angola

As events raged in the external arena during the spring and summer of 1976, the mystique of MPLA unity began to evaporate within Angola. Increasingly, MPLA radicals and several key military commanders grouped around Interior Minister Nito Alves in an attempt to keep the Angolan revolution on a leftward course.

In April Alves had the leading members of the Revolte Active and the Angolan Communist Organization placed under arrest and demanded their execution. A staunch supporter of the Soviet Union and a fierce critic of mulatto domination in the MPLA hierarchy, Alves is against the participation of white Angolans in the MPLA. He began his campaign against all opposition to the MPLA following his participation in the Twenty-fifth Soviet Party Congress in February 1976.

The evidence suggests that the Soviets support Alves both because of his criticism of the Chinese-leaning OCA and because they are increasingly concerned by Neto's more neutralist position.[50] To counteract Alves's influence, Neto is conducting speaking tours throughout Angola, emphasizing the need to avoid racial animosity, to adopt a neutralist foreign policy, and to work with defeated comrades.[51] Neto has likewise enlisted the support of the Cubans in his

[50] *Diario de Noticias* (Lisbon), April 21, 1976.

[51] For representative speeches see Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese, 0600 GMT, May 24, 1976; *Afrique-Asie* (Paris), July 12-25, 1976, pp. 15-19. Also, Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese, 0600 GMT, May 26, 1976.

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struggle with Alves. Kissinger, apparently unaware of the subtleties of Angolan politics, has failed to realize the Cubans' vital role in balancing off Soviet influence. Viewed in this context, Kissinger's insistence on Cuban withdrawal borders on the absurd.

La Luta Continua

Divisions within the MPLA continue, and the political situation in Cabinda remains complex. On April 13, 1976, birth of a new independence movement, Molica (Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda), was announced in Paris. Although elements of the Brazzaville wing of FLEC were represented, it is difficult to assess the exact source of foreign support. To judge from the scant information available, Molica appears to be an amalgam of Cabindan political groups unified in their common desire for an independent Cabinda free of Zairois, Angolan or Brazzaville control. It is financed at least in part by French financial interests based in Brazzaville and Cabinda, and is supported by Gabon.

Remnants of the old FLEC continue to be active in the Cabindan back country and, contrary to MPLA assertions, FLEC's forces have confined the MPLA and Cuban forces to Cabinda City and the Gulf Oil installations.[52] Zaire, notwithstanding official disclaimers, continues to finance the Kinshasa-based wing of FLEC. Brazzaville, though officially committed to the MPLA, continues to give Nzita some political support. However, the Ngouabi regime is frightened both by the fierce stand on Cabindan independence taken by Molica and by the recent string of military successes carried off by that organization. Castro's visit to Brazzaville in June should be viewed against these machinations in Cabindan politics.

In the Angolan interior (Moxico and Cuando Cubango), UNITA is still a sizable threat to the MPLA regime. It is significant that during UNITA's reorganization conference in June, considerable praise was reserved for China. The FNLA, though largely moribund, continues to harass MPLA and Cuban forces. In terms of the larger Angolan struggle, the situation is fluid. The Chinese suffered a severe setback when they were unable to stem the Soviet advance in Angola. Peking recognized, however, that an alliance with South Africa would jeopardize its larger African relations and therefore sought to consolidate its position.

Since the January collapse of the FNLA-UNITA coalition, the PRC has moved to strengthen its relations with Africa in a

[52] Interview at the U.S. Department of State (Angola desk), August 1976.

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continuing ideological struggle with Moscow. The Chinese have established firm patterns of influence in Mauritius, Botswana, the Comoroes and the Malagasy Republic. High-level Chinese officials, including Ho Ying, vice minister for foreign affairs, have visited Zambia and Zaire. China has strong influence in the military wing of SWAPO. In this connection it is interesting to note that while the USSR attacked South Africa's July raid on Zambia as an act of aggression, the Chinese denounced the raid as an attack on SWAPO. Meanwhile, in June, the external wing of SWAPO opened an office in Luanda and apparently has received some Soviet support. It should be noted, however, that active MPLA support for Nujoma has not been without cost. In late June 1976 SWAPO guerrillas (Shipanga) blew up a jeep carrying Cuban and MPLA officials.

The Soviet Union enjoys good relations with the MPLA regime, but continued Soviet support for Alves may move Neto into a more nonaligned stance.[53] The United States, because of its myopic view of the nature of the Angolan struggle, intervened (covertly) on the side of the South Africans, thus dooming its policy to failure. In the final analysis, all that can be said for Angola's future course is *La Luta Continua*.

[53] *The Economist*, July 31, 1976, pp. 52-53.

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THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE SOVIET BLOC: RUMANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY RECONSIDERED*

by Vladimir Socor

More than a decade has passed since Communist Rumania embarked on an innovative course in foreign policy, which for some time influenced the West's perception of the evolution of Eastern Europe as a whole, and which continues to be widely acknowledged as a policy of independence. Rumania's apparent endeavors to establish a special position of autonomy within the Soviet bloc (always cautious enough to be tolerated), coupled with her efforts toward diplomatic rapprochement and economic cooperation with the West, led many observers to conclude that the country's Communist leadership had abjured a long-tested adherence to the Soviet Union and its international objectives. The ostensible desatellization in external affairs, correlative as it has been with the regime's revival of nationalism and manifest concern for economic modernization, seemed to indicate that a conception of national interest in the conventional sense, admittedly with communist ideological coloration, had come to underlie and guide foreign policy. Rumania's actions in foreign affairs have thus often been interpreted as being divergent from, and even running counter to, Soviet interests and objectives.

In reconsidering the view, prevalent in the West, of an independent Rumanian foreign policy this essay will attempt a critical re-examination, and suggest alternative interpretations, of the factual evidence usually adduced in support of that view. It will seek to determine how Rumania's foreign policy has materialized in operational rather than rhetorical terms, and how the country's active diplomacy of recent years relates to Soviet political strategy in Europe and elsewhere. To this end we will proceed to a serial examination of each of the areas in which the Rumanian Communist regime has been credited with pursuing a policy of independence, and draw a balance sheet of its results.

* The author is indebted to Professor Charles Gati of Columbia University for his critique of an earlier draft of this article.

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Rumanian-Soviet State Relations

The earliest significant public intimation that the Rumanian Communist leadership was revising its traditional attitude of obedience to the Soviet Union was contained in the well-known April 1964 *Statement* of the RCP Central Committee.[1] This document remains the main theoretical basis and source of vocabulary for Bucharest's discourse in intrabloc politics. Widely regarded at the time as a bold declaration of independence, it did little more than repeat the substance of the November 1960 Moscow Declaration, and as such was an uneven compromise between the then Soviet and Chinese theses, with emphasis on the former. It was on two points, carrying rather minor weight in the document, that Rumania added a nuance of its own to the Soviet formulae: one was the special stress laid on the familiar Soviet-aired "principles of independence and national sovereignty, equal rights, mutual advantage, brotherly understanding, non-interference in internal affairs" in relations among states, in particular among socialist states; the other was opposition to the contemplated supranational planning in COMECON. The *Statement* alluded to the satellite image as a handicap to the "spread of the ideas of Socialism," and recommended replacing it with a new image, of a commonwealth of independent equal parties and states, freely collaborating in their "internationalist solidarity" — one apt to "exert a strong appeal to the peoples throughout the world . . . and represent a mobilizing factor in the struggle waged by the working masses in the capitalist countries and in the newly-independent states."[2]

That the "independence and sovereignty" of a member of the "Socialist camp" is compatible with, and indeed beneficial to, the interests of the camp as a whole, was made clear by General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu at the Ninth RCP Congress:

> The more fully the principles of proletarian internationalism are applied in the relations among the socialist countries, the more forcefully will the superiority of these relations over the relations prevailing in the capitalist world — characterized by inequality and the violation of national sovereignty and independence — be demonstrated, and greater will be the power of attraction of Socialism in the international arena.

Ceausescu went on to stress that cohesion among the socialist countries, based on socialist internationalism, was required *"in the name*

[1] *Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the International Communist and Working-Class Movement* (Bucharest, 1964).
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

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of the fundamental interests of our great cause — the victory of Socialism and peace throughout the world."[3]

This theme, the need for projecting a new image of intra-bloc relationships as supportive of a more effective communist international strategy, has been repeatedly expounded by RCP leaders. As chief ideologist Paul Niculescu-Mizil, regarded as one of the principal architects of what Bucharest has called its *independent* policy, explained, "relations of a new type" among socialist states constitute a "lever which helps increase the forces of Socialism . . . [and] strengthen the positions of Socialism in the world," appealing to noncommunist nations by "enabling them to see that only Socialism is apt to accomplish truly fraternal relations among peoples. This increases the force of attraction of Socialism, the influence of its ideas."[4]

This acute concern with obliterating the satellite image is often evident in Rumanian pronouncements on foreign policy, and has been consonant with a wider effort in the Soviet bloc to do away with that image as a handicap to its international strategies. The early endorsement of the independent policy by the veteran Muscovite group in the Politburo, led by Emil Bodnaras, further suggests that the Rumanian course may not have been as challenging to Moscow as it was assumed to be.

Nor should the de-Russification measures taken in the 1960s be construed as being challenging or offensive to the Soviet Union. As a matter of a more enlightened Soviet policy, de-Russification had become a bloc-wide trend after 1956. Despite Rumania's non-Slavic character, Bucharest was among the last to move in that direction, and it needed explicit prodding from Khrushchev during his last visit in 1962. The de-Russification measures were the same as elsewhere in Eastern Europe with respect to public nomenclature, cultural exchanges, academic scholarship and educational policies (the Russian language lost its status as an obligatory subject in the school curriculum; it was, however, reinstated as obligatory in 1969).

The most serious Rumanian grievance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union has remained a taboo issue: no official reference is ever made to Bessarabia. Undoubtedly the Rumanian leadership correctly assumes that any such hint would exceed the tested limits of Soviet tolerance. Neither has allusion to this subject been permitted in the academic field, with the exception of the publication in 1964 of

[3] *Scînteia*, July 20, 1965. (Emphasis in original.)
[4] Speech to the Grand National Assembly, *ibid.*, July 27, 1967.

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manuscript notes by Marx,[5] in which the founder of scientific socialism approves of comments by a contemporary French scholar to the effect that Tsarist Russia had no rights to Bessarabia. However, the book was withdrawn from circulation shortly after publication — conceivably at Soviet request. Since then, academic as well as official silence on the non-issue has been complete. Moreover, the frontiers established in Europe as a result of World War II have been over and again proclaimed to be immutable and final in Bucharest's official pronouncements and Ceausescu's statements.

This attitude reflects the Communist leadership's awareness of its ultimate reliance on Moscow's support, and an anxiety not to alienate it. It also indicates that the regime deems Soviet support to be more important, in terms of continuation in power, than the vast domestic support an assertive stand might rally. No Rumanian Communist government will unearth the territorial issue until such time as Soviet support for its continuation in power will have become unnecessary or unavailable.

Moscow-Bucharest-Peking: The Triangular Diplomacy

Ever since the Moscow-Peking rift became public, the RCP has scrupulously observed a neutral stance. The contrast between Soviet polemic militancy and Rumanian neutrality, and Rumanian reserve toward Soviet-sponsored communist international meetings, have contributed to creating the assumption that the RCP's attitude runs counter to the policies of the CPSU. The Rumanian party has even been credited with resisting a Soviet-sought symbolic expulsion of the Chinese from the ranks of the world communist movement. Its position has been attributed to a policy of independence: the endeavor to keep the Chinese in the movement is said to aim at avoiding Soviet hegemony, counterbalancing Soviet pressures, and securing for the RCP some room for maneuver between the two communist metropolises.

This view may hold if the Soviet intention to expel or irrevocably ostracize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is accepted as fact. However, Moscow has conspicuously refrained from making use of the majority it could at any time muster to this end in a world communist conclave — with or without Rumanian support. Soviet leaders undoubtedly realize that a formal expulsion of the CCP would entail losses for Moscow rather than gains. It would sanctify

[5] A. Otetea and S. Schwann, editors, *K. Marx — Insemnari despre Romani* (Bucharest, 1964).

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the definitive split of the world communist movement, and would open up schisms in a considerable number of communist parties; Soviet influence in the Third World and with "liberation movements" would be hampered. Moreover, a formal excommunication of the Chinese would amount to burning the bridges to future reconciliation; such a strong display of Soviet hostility would increase the potential for border clashes and might push China into closer rapprochement with the West. Continuation of the present state of limited conflict, without resort to drastic steps, is presumably viewed as the more advantageous course: Moscow has thus been content to await the passing of the aging Chinese leadership while preserving the chance for eventual pro-Soviet elements to succeed in changing Peking's policy.

If the above hypotheses are plausible, it is only reasonable to assume that Moscow, while continuing anti-Chinese polemics and other forms of psychological pressure, is at the same time willing to negotiate and anxious to preserve a channel of communication with Peking through a third, neutral and mutually acceptable party. The RCP is well suited for the role of intermediary, and has indeed been playing this role since 1964.

The ideological commitment underlying its pursuit of reconciliation was stated by Ceausescu at the Ninth Party Congress in 1965, when he appealed to the fraternal parties

> . . . not to permit any extension of the divergencies among Parties to relations between the states. . . . It is our unshakable belief that what unites the Communist Parties — their common ideology, their common aims and interests, their joint struggle, and their unique historic mission — is what is essential, and that it must overcome any differences of view.[6]

Much circumstantial evidence indicates that the Rumanians have continued to perform a discreet go-between function. Thus, when Premier Chou En-lai journeyed to Rumania in June 1966, his visit was preceded by an unannounced visit of CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. In addresses delivered during the Chinese premier's stay, Ceausescu clearly intimated that the international situation imperatively required Sino-Soviet cooperation against worldwide "imperialist aggression." Chou, however, remained un-

[6] *Scînteia*, July 20, 1965. See also *Statement* . . ., pp. 16-17: "Today there are more favorable international conditions than ever for unfolding the struggle for the social and national liberation of the peoples, for peace and socialism. The sharp public polemic in the Communist movement hampers the full utilization of these conditions, diminishes the role and influence of the world socialist system, diverts the Communist-Workers' parties from their major tasks, harms the fighting unity of the international working class and the national liberation movement, and disorients the masses."

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responsive, and the fact that no communique was issued at the conclusion of the visit pointed to a failure of Rumanian efforts to bridge the gap between Moscow and Peking.

In light of the above, it makes sense that Moscow has allowed Bucharest to preserve the apparent nonalignment: the prerequisite for the RCP's diplomatic usefulness is its established dissent from the official Soviet line. This explains Soviet permissiveness in face of Rumanian nonattendance at several preparatory meetings for a world communist conference and of only qualified Rumanian support for this Soviet project between 1965 and 1969. The conference, the RCP maintained, could be assembled only after having been "carefully prepared" — in other words, after the two main contenders had agreed to compromise, lest the meeting result in mutual recriminations and an exacerbation of the conflict.

When the world communist conference was assembled in Moscow in June 1969 — in the absence of five ruling communist parties[7] — Ceausescu led the Rumanian delegation and, although ending by duly signing the Soviet-drafted Statement of the Conference, he cautioned at the outset that polemics and mutual recriminations would "adversely affect" efforts for reconciliation. In his main speech he reverted to the familiar theme that "what unites us is stronger than what separates us," and demanded a cessation of polemics. As for the settling of Soviet-Chinese divergencies, he pointedly reminded that this could be attained "only through discussion and negotiation."[8]

Ceausescu again expressed these views in an article in *Pravda* the following year, pleading for a normalization of Sino-Soviet relations "by means of discussions and conversations among comrades. . . . The RCP proceeds from the conviction that common interests, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the unity of aims, all that which unites the Socialist countries and their Parties, [is] stronger than their differences."[9]

From 1964 to the present, high-level Rumanian delegations have been periodically traveling to Peking, and regularly reporting to Moscow on their inbound and/or outbound way. Ceausescu, Maurer, Niculescu-Mizil and others have made such trips, but a perennial figure on the Bucharest-Peking-via-Moscow route was, remarkably, Bodnaras, until his disabling illness in the last years. While no information has transpired as to the contents of these

[7] The Yugoslav, Chinese, North Korean, North Vietnamese and Albanian.
[8] *Scînteia*, June 10, 1969.
[9] *Pravda*, April 19, 1970.

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visits, and they have usually received minimal publicity, it may be inferred that the RCP leadership has continued to act as go-between.

The Chinese on their part engaged, during the 1960s and early 1970s, in stirring up the potential sources of Rumanian-Soviet tension, and through assurances of support sought to encourage Bucharest to challenge Soviet domination. This policy reflected China's relative isolation within the communist world and on the world scene as well, and her search for associates and supporters.

Notable in this respect were Chinese attempts to associate Rumanian territorial claims against the USSR with their own claims. On July 10, 1964 Mao Tse-tung, in a widely publicized statement, asserted the Chinese claims, and in addition accused the Soviet Union of having "appropriated part of Rumania" as well as Polish, German, Finnish, Mongolian and Japanese territories.[10] To date this remains Peking's strongest statement on the Rumanian-Soviet territorial issue. Chinese propaganda has since occasionally alluded to the subject, but usually with restraint, which is probably the result of Bucharest's continued unresponsiveness to such advances. (For example, Chou En-lai on his 1966 visit was rebuffed by Ceausescu after a gala performance at which Chinese artists had produced a suggestive song about "Moldavia.")

The Chinese have also occasionally uttered public approval of, and after the invasion of Czechoslovakia even commitments to support for, what they termed "Rumania's struggle for independence."[11] Although Rumania has remained unresponsive to Peking's soliciting and has most often refrained from publishing in her media the latter's forceful assurances of support, she has on occasion drawn economic profit from the Chinese connection. A generous Chinese long-term, interest-free loan in 1971 estimated at $250,000,000, preceded by a flood-relief donation in 1970 estimated at $20,000,000, added an economic dimension to Peking's advances.

But since 1972 the Chinese *captatio benevolentiae* policy toward Rumania has changed appreciably. China's emergence from diplomatic isolation, her expanding relations with Western and other nations, have apparently resulted in a decline of interest in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Rumania's importance to China has diminished accordingly. Another factor that in all probability con-

[10] Dennis J. Doolin, *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict. Documents and Analysis* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Studies, 1965), Document XIV, p. 43.

[11] Cf. *Scînteia*, August 24, 1968, and June 9, 1971; also see Robert F. King, "Romania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Winter 1972, pp. 392, 410-412 (docs. X-XI).

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tributed to the change in Peking's attitude toward Bucharest was Rumania's return to a conformist bloc position, evident by 1971.

In sum, the hypothesis of Bucharest looking to Peking as a counterweight to Soviet pressure and support for a policy of independence amounts to examining the Peking-Bucharest relationship from a reverse perspective: such an assumption would ascribe to Rumania what seems to be a one-way Chinese policy, often embarrassing to its intended beneficiary. The Rumanian case has provided Peking with a fertile propaganda theme against Moscow, and with the opportunity of enhancing its anti-imperialistic credentials. Rumanian leaders, however, would be highly unrealistic to count on effective Chinese support of a genuine autonomist policy, particularly since the events of 1968 exposed the limitations of China's role in East European affairs. Rumanian embarrassment with and nonresponsiveness to Chinese offers of support indicate that looking for such support has not been part of a Rumanian policy of independence. The peculiar relationship maintained by Bucharest with Peking is a connection potentially useful to Moscow and a function of Soviet-Chinese relations rather than a component of an independent Rumanian-made policy.

The persistent efforts of the RCP to bring about a settlement, or at least a truce, between Moscow and Peking tend to cast doubt on the idea that a Rumanian policy of independence was made possible by and has taken advantage of the Soviet-Chinese conflict. Should the Rumanian Communist leadership be anxious — as it is assumed to be — to promote independence by exploiting the schism, it should be equally anxious that the gulf between Moscow and Peking be maintained (albeit in a manageable state). It would seek to play up and manipulate their differences, and not endeavor, as Bucharest has been doing, to compose and reconcile them.

Rumania's Position in COMECON

The position taken by Rumania within the COMECON framework has been defined in terms of resistance to Soviet attempts at closer economic integration, implementation of an intensive industrialization at variance with "international Socialist division of labor" schemes, and efforts to expand trade beyond the limits of the bloc. This, too, has been credited to a policy of independence.

It is significant, although not surprising, that Rumanian Communist leaders have defended their forced "Socialist industrialization" in the name of the Soviet-patented blueprint, which

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Bucharest spokesmen have repeatedly professed as the norm to be followed. Indeed, the Soviet economic model continues to be applied in Rumania probably with greater strictness than anywhere else in Eastern Europe. No indications have come to light of Soviet opposition — whether on doctrinal or pragmatic grounds — to the country's industrialization along quasi-autarkic lines. As for Khrushchev's short-lived drive for COMECON integration — one of the Soviet leader's most "subjective" projects — it was frustrated by insuperable economic obstacles quite apart from Rumania's subsequent opposition to the scheme.

In the economic debate of the mid-1960s over the question of COMECON integration, the main thrust of the Rumanian campaign for unlimited industrialization was directed, sometimes explicitly, more often implicitly, at the industrially most advanced bloc members: Czechoslovakia and East Germany were accused of disregarding their and COMECON's alleged obligation to assist the less developed members to industrialize. Bucharest at the time indulged in "anticolonialist" language against the Czechs and the East Germans, complaining of inequitable trade, of attempts to thwart Rumania's industrialization and relegate her to the role of supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs, and even of plans to exploit Rumania's labor force. On one notable occasion, in 1964, a Soviet geographer's suggestion of a Lower Danubian symbiotic economic system was severely criticized.[12]

Similarly, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and occasionally Poland as well, were the main critics — usually by indirection — of Rumania's refusal to participate in multilateral COMECON schemes; they were quick to question the economic justification of Bucharest's tendencies toward autarkic development, which the Rumanians defended as "complex, all-round development."

The circumstances in which the debate took place brought to the surface the discrepancies in development levels among COMECON member states — e.g., between East Germany and Czechoslovakia, optimal producers of advanced equipment and industrial goods, and less developed Rumania, determined to catch up and reach a degree of economic maturation earning it the rank of socialist society. The basic issue under discussion could be defined, schematically speaking, as economic efficiency versus level-

[12] This was the Valev plan, published in an obscure Moscow University departmental journal, suggesting the merger of Southeastern Rumania, Northeastern Bulgaria and Southern Bessarabia into a functionally integrated economic unit. The plan was assailed by *Viata Economica* on June 12, 1964, then disavowed by *Izvestia* on July 5.

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ing within COMECON. Rumania's Communist leaders, however, shrouded this economic issue in nationalistic garb for domestic propaganda purposes, with a view to mobilizing popular support for their extravagant industrial plans (the annual rate of reinvestment has averaged 30 per cent for the last decade, with the most painful consequences for the country's standard of living). They manipulated the issue of industrialization so as to turn it into an issue of national independence, and identified themselves with both, portrayed as inseparable. From a doctrinal viewpoint there was nothing novel in associating the two: the idea of industrialization as a prerequisite for independence constituted official thinking in the Stalin era, and had been programmatically adopted by the RCP since as early as 1945.

In the end Rumanian leaders appear to have concluded that if they joined in supranational economic coordination or production specialization arrangements with industrially more developed partners, the ensuing division of labor among member countries would perpetuate Rumania's inferior posture. Hence their opposition to the notions of supranational planning and institutions, aloofness from multilateral projects and preference for bilateral, country-to-country arrangements apt to preserve intact what the RCP has repeatedly stressed that it regards as an essential prerogative of national sovereignty: the party's economic planning authority.

The development of economic integration within COMECON has since revealed a pragmatic, piecemeal approach to the problem. While the Soviet Union's time-honored bilateral approach to economic relationships with the East European states has continued to prevail, multilateral cooperation has developed selectively around a number of institutions such as the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, the General Directory of Energy Systems, the Joint Rolling Stock, the Ball Bearing Association, Intermetal, Interchim, Intertextilmash, Interelectro, Interatomenergo, the Shipping Association, and the Investment Bank, none of which is supranational.

An original member of the first three organizations, Rumania abstained after 1964 from joining the others, but ended by joining them all in 1970 and 1971. Her realignment with COMECON in the early 1970s came about mainly because the potentialities of trade with and technological borrowing from the West as devices for sustained economic development were already revealing their limitations. The realignment was underscored at the COMECON Council meeting in Bucharest in July 1971, when a new "Comprehensive Program" was adopted, aimed at gradually furthering multilateral

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cooperation and the leveling of the member countries' economic development. While official Rumanian statements and the media coverage were decidedly favorable and sounded an optimistic note at the time, subsequent pronouncements have indicated some dissatisfaction with the implementation of the Comprehensive Program: Bucharest has in recent years — e.g., during COMECON's twenty-fifth-year jubilee and at the June 1975 meeting of the COMECON Council — publicized demands for increased industrial cooperation and specialization, the establishment in Rumania of joint enterprises and organizations (with a continued caveat against supranational projects), and expanded intra-COMECON trade, all in pursuit of the objective of economic leveling. This represents a clear shift from the positions taken in the 1960s.

The earlier stance had not, in any event, significantly affected the basic orientation of Rumania's foreign trade, wherein for more than a decade the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany have occupied first, third and fourth positions,[13] in a pattern set before 1964. A distinct idea publicly advanced by Bucharest of late advocates the increase of agricultural and raw material prices in intra-COMECON trade — an interest Rumania shares to some extent with the Soviet Union.

Rumanian-Soviet bilateral economic relations have expanded considerably during the last five-year plan. Since 1970, when the Soviet Union's share in Rumania's foreign trade was 27 per cent — by far the largest — Rumania has become a co-investor in the ball-bearing industry and in iron-ore extraction in the USSR, the latter supplying the Galati steel works. In 1972 joint exploration of Black Sea offshore oil deposits was decided on, along with a number of joint industrial and mining ventures, and it was announced (a commitment fulfilled and renewed each year since) that the two countries would expand their trade by more than the 32 per cent originally planned for the period 1971-1975. Later that year Rumania delivered to the USSR 500,000 tons of grain, amounting to 10 per cent of her crop, thus being prevented from selling for hard currency at the rapidly rising prices on the international market. The bilateral trade turnover between Rumania and the Soviet Union since 1971 has been growing faster than each country's trade with COMECON as a whole, although the Soviet share in Rumania's total foreign trade declined to 21 per cent in 1973, mainly due to the relative stability

[13] West Germany is in second position.

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of prices in the Soviet bloc as compared to inflation-affected prices in the West.[14]

To sum up, Rumania's refractoriness vis-a-vis COMECON came to an end by 1970. What was presented to the population, often in manipulative nationalistic language, as a striving for economic emancipation, was in fact an attempt on the part of the Bucharest leadership to legitimize its right to reproduce in Rumania the Soviet pattern of industrialization. While studiously advertising to the West its "deviation" from the Soviet line and soliciting credits and privileged tariffs, the Bucharest regime remained, of all COMECON members, the most inaccessible to any idea of economic reform. Finally, it came to seek solutions to the economic problems plaguing it primarily in expanded cooperation with COMECON and the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the posture of independence assumed in the mid-1960s is to be credited for much of Rumania's success in expanding her trade with the Free World. While a certain reorientation of foreign trade and increased economic exchanges with the West have corresponded with a general trend in the Soviet bloc, Rumania was able to proceed more rapidly along this path because her newly-acquired international stature and active diplomacy facilitated access to Western credits. The West's share in Rumania's foreign trade grew from 24.6 per cent in 1963 to a high of 38.1 per cent in 1967, then declined slightly to 35.7 per cent in 1971 and 36.6 per cent in 1973.[15] Her lead of all COMECON members in this respect has been sustained in large measure through credits piled up in the West. West Germany, ranking Western trade partner (8 per cent in 1965, 10 per cent in 1973) is her largest (and by now reluctant) creditor; over three billion marks' worth of debts were pending in 1975.[16] More recently a liberal source of credit has been the World Bank and IMF; from December 1972, when Rumania became the first Soviet-bloc member to join these institutions, until 1976 they have granted her a total of $445 million in loans.

The relative stagnation in the expansion of trade with the West, and its artificial sustenance through credits and heavy deficits, prompted Bucharest to seek acceptance by the European Economic Community (EEC) as a "developing country" and thereby become

[14] *Anuarul Statistic al R.S.R., 1974.* See also *RFE (Radio Free Europe) Research,* May 24, 1975, quoting Ceausescu's statement at press conference with the London *Times, Le Monde, Die Welt* and *La Stampa,* May 7, 1974.

[15] Cf. *Anuarul Statistic al R.S.R., 1974.*

[16] *RFE Research,* October 9 and December 12, 1975; also April 3, 1974 and April 18, 1973.

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eligible for the preferential tariffs to which such countries are entitled. When the answer to the initial demarches was negative, Bucharest took a big step in March 1972 and submitted a formal application to the Ministerial Council of the EEC, thus seeming to grant the West European organization implicit recognition. In July the claim to developing country treatment, with an equivocally-phrased de facto recognition of the Common Market, was again put forward by Ceausescu in his speech at the RCP's national conference.[17] The EEC approved Bucharest's application in principle in June 1973, in acknowledgment of Rumania's semi-recognition; the latter was, however, revoked in January 1974 at the European security negotiations.

For all her financial insolvency which severely limits expansion of trade with the West, Rumania has displayed rather amazing largesse in supplying credits to Third World countries. In recent years courtship through Rumanian credits has been directed primarily at Africa, the main recipients being Algeria ($100,000,000 in 1971), Egypt ($130,000,000 in 1972), Zambia ($50,000,000 in 1972), and Guinea ($80,000,000 in 1974); other African countries have received smaller credits. In October 1975 the military-Communist government of Portugal was given a $100,000,000 Rumanian credit. Meanwhile, Rumania's financial debts to the West have continued to rise, as have her pleas for commercial and tariff privileges.

Rumania's Position in the Warsaw Pact

Still, it is as a member of the Communist military alliance that Rumania has most often been credited with dissenting positions. These include:

(1) *Reported resistance to Soviet plans for restructuring the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), and attempts to limit Soviet control of the organization,* particularly in 1964-1966. These reports, customarily supplied by Rumanian official (albeit anonymous) sources and not documented by actual evidence, failed to elicit manifestations of Soviet irritation. They centered essentially on three issues: objections to Soviet projects to "strengthen" WTO — projects for which no specifics were provided; proposals that command of the Warsaw Pact's joint forces be exercised by rotation — purported to have sprung from information planted by Rumanian diplomats in Moscow as well as by Bucharest,[18] with no independent

[17] *Scînteia*, July 20, 1972.
[18] See, for example, *New York Times*, May 14-22, 1966.

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corroboration available; and suggestions that Warsaw Pact allies share control of Soviet-held nuclear heads for tactical missiles deployed on their territories — an idea seen as a Pact response to NATO's plans for nuclear multilateral forces. The last idea was dropped upon NATO's renunciation of the MLF project, and Rumania continued to provide deployment ground for Soviet missiles aimed at NATO countries, without any longer demanding a share in their control.

(2) *Nonparticipation in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia,* and momentary criticism thereof, won the Bucharest regime wide international acclaim as a gesture of defiance of the Soviet Union and the high point of Rumania's independent policy.

This interpretation would hold had Rumania rebuked Soviet injunctions to take part in the invasion, or at least not to condemn it. But such was not the case. How Bucharest would have reacted had it been summoned — like the Kadar regime, which reluctantly complied — to participate in the Soviet-led action, remains an open question. Rumania was not called upon to join in the Warsaw Pact operation, however; nor had Rumanian leaders been invited to the preceding high-level meetings of Pact members assembled to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia.[19] It is apparent that the Soviet Union did not seek, but on the contrary decided to avoid, Rumania's participation in suppressing the Czechoslovak deviation.

This choice fitted in with, and eventually proved beneficial to, Moscow's European strategy. In the short run it enabled the Soviets to demonstrate at least *some* restraint, and some toleration of diversity, by acquiescing in Rumania's abstention (some punitive action had been widely expected, due not least to rumors spread in the West by Rumanian diplomacy). Allowing Rumania's independent posture to subsist and maintaining a semblance of dissension within the Warsaw Pact helped to mitigate somewhat the political and psychological impact of the intervention on the West. In the longer run, Bucharest's conspicuous dissent from the Warsaw Pact action decisively enhanced its credibility and reputation for independence in the West, thereby fully qualifying the country for its prominent role in the Soviet Union's European security campaign.

As for Ceausescu's criticism of the invasion in his emo-

[19] Meetings took place in Dresden in March, Moscow in May, Warsaw in July, and Bratislava in August 1968. Meanwhile the Rumanian leadership was providing proof of irreproachable orthodoxy by maintaining a reporting blackout on the liberalization process taking place in Czechoslovakia.

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tional speech of August 21, 1968,[20] it added little to the embarrassment being incurred by Moscow. It was based on two main arguments: the absence of a "counter-revolutionary danger" in Czechoslovakia (with the unmistakable implication that, had such a danger existed, the invasion would have been justified, as in the previous case of Hungary); and the damage being inflicted on the image of the Communist camp held by the rest of the world. This much, however, the Soviets were not prepared to take. On August 25 Ceausescu had a reportedly agitated interview with Soviet Ambassador A. V. Basov, which put an end to the communications failure and the apparent dizziness prevailing in Bucharest. The tone of official speeches and the press was promptly subdued, and Ceausescu's address on August 26 in the sensitive, multiethnic Brasov department marked the abandonment of condemnation of the invasion. These events revealed the limits of Soviet tolerance and the margin of maneuver allotted to Bucharest; the limits had been momentarily exceeded, and discipline was promptly restored.

(3) *Verbal opposition to "military maneuvers on the territories of other states," and occasional nonparticipation in Warsaw Pact maneuvers.* Actually it was only in 1965 and 1966 that Rumania was absent from joint maneuvers, while prodding NATO members to follow her example. She has participated, along with the Soviet and Bulgarian armies, in all joint maneuvers of the southern flank of the Communist alliance (including naval maneuvers) from 1967 to date. Whereas most of these maneuvers have taken place in Bulgaria (and in 1969 in the Ukraine), those of March 1969 (partially), February 1973 and January 1974 (staff exercises) were hosted by Rumania herself. Soviet naval squadrons have continued to pay routine visits to Rumanian ports, including inland Danubian ports, and to use the submarine base at Mangalia. In addition, Rumania along with Bulgaria has honored invitations to maneuvers of the Pact's northern flank, held in East Germany in October 1970 and in Czechoslovakia in September 1972.

(4) *Purported delays in the renewal of "friendship treaties" with the Warsaw Pact allies.* The bilateral treaties of alliance tying Rumania to her military partners were all duly renewed in 1970-1972 (except for that with Czechoslovakia, renewed in 1968). The original treaties, concluded in 1948-1949 for a period of twenty years, carried an automatic extension of five more years unless de-

[20] *Scînteia*, August 22, 1968. The promise to set up armed civilian units "to defend the Socialist homeland" was never put in practice.

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nounced. There were no indications of Bucharest's reluctance to renew its military commitments. On the contrary, official comments repetitiously stressed that, in view of the recurrent danger of "imperialist aggression," strengthening of the Communist military alliance was essential for the preservation of the regime ("the people's socialist conquests").

The alliance treaty with the Soviet Union, renewed on July 7, 1970 (two and a half years before expiration) is identical in substance and similar in formulation to the other renewed "friendship treaties" between Moscow and its allies (apart from the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, which endorsed the "Brezhnev Doctrine"). The stipulations bind Rumania "to ensure the inviolability of the frontiers" of all Warsaw Pact members and extend the obligation of military assistance beyond the European theater, to apply "in case of an armed attack by *any* state or group of states" against a contracting party.[21] The twenty-year-long treaty makes specific provisions for joint efforts to bring about "an efficient system of European security" and cooperation among European states, and regional cooperation in the Balkans and the Black Sea area, as well as consultation and coordination on "all important international problems."

Rumania's treaties with Bulgaria and Poland were also renewed in 1970, and those with Hungary and the GDR in 1972. The latter one is particularly onerous, as it commits Rumania to protecting the inviolability of the present borders cutting across Germany.[22] While the imposition of extra-European treaty obligations has evoked some audible grumbles from Bucharest, the military obligations assumed by Rumania in Europe, bearing no relation to the national interest however construed, constitute an expression of the regime's own ideologically motivated commitment.

(5) *Reports of Rumanian resistance to alleged Soviet demands for troop passage to Bulgaria through Rumanian Dobrudja* in the summer of 1974 were once again attributable to Bucharest's want of an issue with which to revitalize its independent reputation. The credibility of these uncorroborated reports furnished to the Western press[23] was undermined by the fact that Dobrudja's sparse communications run mainly West-East rather than North-South, with no practical way for Soviet troops and transports to descend from the Danube mouths to the Bulgarian border in Southern Dobrudja.

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[21] *Scînteia*, July 8, 1970. (Emphasis added.)
[22] *Ibid.*, May 13, 1972.
[23] Associated Press (Bucharest), June 12; *International Herald Tribune*, June 13; *New York Times*, July 8, August 23 (correspondence from Bucharest), July 10, 1974.

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Consequently Soviet troops and materiel have routinely been transported to maneuvers in Bulgaria on the convenient sea route from Sebastopol or Odessa to Varna, without detour through Rumanian territory.

One seldom discussed aspect of Rumania's contribution to Warsaw Pact and Soviet strength has been her maintenance of an intelligence network in the West working for the Soviet services, particularly in France and at NATO and European institutions located in Belgium.[24] Also worth noting is her extraordinary attempt in 1975 to buy Phantom jet fighters and other advanced weaponry from the United States: Washington declined, on grounds that the items in question might end up in Soviet hands.[25]

To conclude, the image elaborately fostered in the West by the Rumanian regime, that it is a recalcitrant and even disruptive factor in the Warsaw Pact, does not withstand closer scrutiny. The trouble undertaken to enhance that image, and the absence of any signs of Soviet displeasure in response, raise the question of the motivations behind such efforts.

Building Bridges to the West

By the mid-1960s, its reputation for independent intra-bloc policies established, Bucharest was eminently qualified to broaden the scope of its diplomatic maneuvers beyond the limits of the Communist world. The establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany in January 1967, widely regarded at the time as contradicting the concerted policy of the Soviet bloc toward the Federal Republic, was actually fully consistent with the substance of that policy as set forth at the Bucharest and Karlovy Vary meetings of July 1966 and April 1967: the Communist states demanded, as prerequisites for a European settlement, the general diplomatic and legal recognition of "both German states" and their present borders; the normalization of West Germany's relations with Eastern Europe; a military detente through denuclearization of divided Germany, creation of denuclearized zones and reduction and withdrawal of foreign bases and troops from the European member countries of the two alliances; and ultimately the dismantling of the alliances, to be replaced by a European security system.

[24] See Pierre Accoce and Daniel Pouget, *Le Réseau Caraman. Treize Roumains ont fait trembler l'OTAN* (Paris: A. Fayard, 1972); Pierre de Villemarest, *L'Espionnage Soviétique en France* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1969), chap. 19; John Barron, *The KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974).
[25] *Time*, August 17, 1975.

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Bonn's *Ostpolitik,* particularly under Brandt-Bahr direction, was conceived along similar lines, suggestive of a convergence of the tactical objectives of both sides, if not of conjunction in planning. In the actual process of implementing the two symmetric scenarios, the first two stages overlapped each other.

Rumania was the first of the five East European states to upgrade its permanent trade mission with the Federal Republic to embassy status, a mere month (January 1967) after the advent of the Grand Coalition government in Bonn. Recommended by her posture of independence, she was the first bloc member to respond to the newly-launched *Ostpolitik,* thereby strengthening the hand of its advocates in Bonn. Bucharest's move harmonized a Rumanian interest — further expansion of business relations with West Germany — with Moscow's interest in removing a major obstacle in the way of its European design: the Hallstein Doctrine, embodiment of the Federal Republic's claim to speak for the entire German nation. The establishment of Rumanian-West German diplomatic relations was the needed breach to that classic Soviet-bloc target. This was promptly underscored when, on February 1, 1967, a declaration of the Bucharest government called upon all states to extend diplomatic recognition to East Germany: the Rumanian case was there to show that West German reprisals were not to be expected.

Rumania's action attracted criticism from the Ulbricht regime, whose perception of *Ostpolitik* impelled it to obstruct, and seek to pre-empt, Soviet direction of bloc diplomacy vis-a-vis West Germany. *Neues Deutschland* ran two critical editorials (one reportedly written by Ulbricht himself), which were answered by *Scinteia* in an unusually offensive vein — as if certain of immunity — chastising East Berlin's meddling in Rumania's affairs. Bucharest's organ then proceeded, as if to persuade Pankow to drop its opposition, to list the benefits of the recent diplomatic agreement for the Soviet bloc as a whole: in the shorter run, operating a breach in the Hallstein Doctrine and laying the foundation for the general recognition of "both German states" and their borders; in the long run, marking a "step toward" the achievement of detente and security in Europe, the dissolution of military alliances, and the "development of European interstate cooperation" and flourishing of "independent national policies" — like that of France, studiously commended by the editorials.[26] The contribution to Soviet strategies of fragmentation and bilateralism in dealing with the West could hardly have been made more explicit.

[26] *Neues Deutschland,* February 3 and 7; *Scînteia,* February 4 and 10, 1967.

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Following the Rumanian precedent, other members of the Soviet bloc extended overtures to Bonn, albeit cautiously. The negotiating process set in motion has thus far resulted in the completion of the first two stages of *Ostpolitik*. Rumania's role, if limited in time and scope, nonetheless proved useful as a vehicle for diplomatic breakthrough and needed precedent. Her diplomatic action in 1967, as a subsequent official statement put it, "encouraged those lucid, realistic-minded groups in the F.R.G. who understand the vital necessity for international cooperation."[27]

Rumania's courtship of France has been of little consequence, notwithstanding Bucharest's invocation of the "traditional friendship" on festive occasions — notably in 1964, when Premier Maurer was the first chief of a Communist government to visit France; in 1968, when President de Gaulle visited Rumania, two years after having toured Poland, and in 1970, when Ceausescu returned the visit to de Gaulle's successor (in one of his meaningful statements on that visit, Ceausescu paid tribute to the Franco-Russian alliance of World War I and Rumania's accession to it).[28] Along with Moscow, Bucharest has persistently engaged in prodding and lauding Gaullist obstructionism toward Atlantic cooperation and West European integration, in the name of national independence and sovereignty.

A special relationship has existed between Rumania and Israel since the Middle East war of 1967. As the sole East European state to have maintained diplomatic relations with Israel (counterbalanced by the establishment of official relations with the PLO in the wake of the 1973 war), Rumania is in a unique position to keep open a channel of communication since Moscow had to close its own, to observe the scene, gather intelligence, offer her good offices to, and convey views from one to the other of all sides involved. Visits to Bucharest by Premier Golda Meir in April 1972 and especially by Foreign Minister Abba Eban in November 1973 were explicitly linked to attempts to bring about an accommodation between Israel and her Arab and Soviet adversaries. Subsequent to both the 1967 and 1973 wars, Rumania unsuccessfully offered to join her own mediation — that of a Warsaw Pact member — to the UN and American mediation efforts, or substitute for them. Also, when Israel in 1974 objected to a Polish peace-keeping force within her cease-fire lines, Bucharest suggested, again without success, that a Rumanian force be given the assignment, which would have resulted

[27] See *RFE Research*, February 2, 1972.
[28] *Le Monde*, June 18, 1970.

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in a Warsaw Pact force — albeit a less "objectionable" one — gaining access behind the Israeli front lines.

The Soviet and Rumanian positions on the Middle East have drawn close since the October 1973 war. Moscow now favors guaranteeing the existence of a territorially reduced Israel, while Bucharest has been moved by economic as well as political considerations to endorse all Soviet-supported essentials of a Middle East settlement: Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and international recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians and as a full participant in peace negotiations, with the eventual settlement to be reached at Geneva by an expanded conference.

Bucharest has devoted its diplomatic efforts to persuading Israel to accept a settlement along these lines. But contacts with Israel have been interspersed with more frequent and higher-level exchanges with the PLO (whose permanent representative in Bucharest, it is interesting to note, is accredited to the RCP Central Committee rather than to the Rumanian government). From 1974 to date Ceausescu has had eight official meetings with PLO delegations, including four meetings with Yasir Arafat. Other high-level RCP-PLO delegation exchanges include the one in January 1976 in which Rumania's deputy minister of the interior and chief of the security police, General Nicolae Doicaru, for undisclosed reasons accompanied RCP secretary Stefan Andrei to meet with Arafat in Damascus. (Doicaru had also accompanied Ceausescu on his 1974 Middle East tour.)

However, Bucharest has stopped short of joining in Soviet-bloc propaganda campaigns against Zionism and in the recent UN General Assembly condemnation of it, thereby helping to preserve some of its acceptability as an interlocutor, if not "mediator," and communication channel to an increasingly isolated Israel.

Rumania's Contribution to the Soviet Campaign for European Security

In recent years pronouncements demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European states, the dismantling of military blocs and their replacement by a European security system, have constantly emanated from Bucharest. Often interpreted by Western observers as manifestations of an independent-minded foreign policy, they have in reality been in line with the USSR's European strategy outlined as early as 1954: Soviet proposals

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for the withdrawal of troops based on foreign territory, for the dissolution of the two blocs and the creation of a European security system to substitute for them, have been persistently advanced for two decades, with particular insistence since 1966. Since 1966, too, the Soviet campaign, aimed at securing perpetual dominion over East-Central Europe, the withdrawal of American forces from Western Europe, and the latter's eventual fragmentation and neutralization through the dismantlement of NATO, has been echoed by a parallel Rumanian propagandistic and diplomatic campaign.

Thus, when in his celebrated speech of May 7, 1966, Ceausescu declared that "the military blocs and the existence of military bases and troops on the territories of other states are barriers in the path of cooperation among peoples . . . and an anachronism incompatible with the independence and national sovereignty of peoples," and urged their dissolution and replacement with a "system of European security,"[29] this was generally regarded as a virtual act of defiance toward Moscow. Actually, it was not to Moscow, but to the West Europeans, especially to the French, that Ceausescu was talking, all but echoing the line laid down by Brezhnev and Gromyko in their speeches at the Twenty-third CPSU Congress in March of that year. Furthermore, within days of Ceausescu's address, a Soviet note to the West German government (on May 17) proposed anew the withdrawal of foreign-based forces, the dissolution of blocs, and the establishment by the states themselves of a system of European security and cooperation.

The declaration of the conference of Warsaw Pact party leaders assembled in Bucharest in July again proposed the dissolution of blocs and their replacement by a European security system based on the principles of national independence and state sovereignty.[30] Similar proposals were advanced by the Karlovy Vary conference of European communist parties in April 1967. While not attending the Karlovy Vary meeting, Rumania endorsed the Soviet formulae and actively assisted in their promotion.

This was done with partial success when President de Gaulle visited Bucharest in May 1968: the final communique, and the more far-reaching suggestions advanced by Ceausescu and De Gaulle in their speeches, stressed European detente, removal of foreign troops and eventual dismantlement of the blocs. In the same vein, the Ceausescu-Pompidou communique of 1970 called for the

[29] *Scînteia*, May 8, 1966. This adheres to the Soviet definition of European security as ultimately incompatible with the existence of blocs.
[30] *Ibid.*, July 6, 1966.

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blocs' replacement with a European security system.[31] Within days of Ceausescu's visit to Paris, Maurer presented similar proposals in Bonn.

Although Rumanian identification with and proselytism on behalf of the Soviet scheme for European security has been unequivocal and generally lacking in sophistication, there are several points on which Bucharest's contribution has been subtle. Thus the Soviet conception of the security conference and the European system resulting from it as a forum of individual nations, not of blocs of states, was actively advanced in the West by Rumanian diplomacy, with the attached implication that such an arrangement would allow the East European states some room for maneuver and magnify the degree of their autonomy. Bucharest's official pronouncements have persistently advocated that any arrangement for security and cooperation could not be the result of an agreement between the existing blocs, but rather of an understanding reached among the *states* of the continent,[32] the blocs being defined as an obstacle to the full exercise of the functions of sovereign nations. In an article for *Le Monde* (May 22, 1971), Deputy Foreign Minister N. Ecobescu and Ceausescu's personal interpreter S. Celac, reiterating the proposal for the speedy convocation of a European security conference and the creation of a permanent "Organization for European Security and Cooperation," maintained that "only the states, as full subjects of international law, and no other entities created by them, would have the right to discuss and decide" the affairs of the continent.

While such statements may conveniently be read as expressing aspirations for independence from Moscow, it is obvious that they concur with, and assist, the fragmentation strategy pursued by Moscow vis-a-vis Western Europe. Adoption by the West of the dialogue rules urged in unison by Moscow and Bucharest would amount to the disintegration of the Western negotiating position, and would leave the Soviet Union in a posture of uncontested superiority over its divided opponents.

Bucharest also contributed actively to promoting the early Soviet idea of institutionalizing the security conference in the form of a permanent organization to preside over the affairs of the continent. The first such proposal came from Ceausescu during his visit to France in 1970, when in addition to urging the convocation of the conference "without any precondition" (i.e., without the prior conclusion of an agreement on Berlin), he advocated establishment of a

[31] *Ibid.*, May 19, 1968; June 20, 1970.
[32] *Ibid.*, July 26, 1971.

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permanent, above-blocs organism to regulate European security and cooperation.[33] The proposal, then thought of as an attempt by the Rumanian leader to create conditions conducive to loosening his country's bonds to the Soviet bloc, was officially put forward a mere five days later by the Warsaw Pact, in a memorandum issued by a conference of its foreign ministers (June 22). As noted above, *Le Monde* subsequently offered its columns to Rumanian-labeled reiterations of this Pact proposal. The proposed European standing body was to have a "democratic character" — i.e., was to function on the basis of voting by individual states, thus dispensing with the blocs and leaving the West at a distinct disadvantage.

Following the Warsaw Pact summit meeting of January 1972, which restated that security on the continent is incompatible with the existence of blocs, and which urged the creation of a permanent body to promote security and cooperation, Bucharest's campaign in support of the scheme reached a peak during the first stage of CSCE: its leitmotif was that the proposed body would constitute a suitable framework for all European countries to exercise their independence and sovereignty and cooperate on a state-to-state basis, freed of bloc constraints. The Rumanian formula providing that the talks "will take place outside the framework of the military alliances" was promptly endorsed by the Soviet bloc[34] and became the basis for a compromise whereby the trade blocs, but not the military alliances, would speak with one voice at the conference.

Rumania also called for the removal of all foreign bases and troops from the territories of European countries — which was tantamount to a demand for unilateral American withdrawal from the continent. Significantly, the Rumanian demand was timed to coincide with the Soviet-American agreement to hold negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions concurrent with the European security conference.

As the MBFR talks opened in April 1973 in Vienna, the Rumanian delegation requested that its observer status be changed to a full participatory one, i.e., that Rumania be included among the countries subjected to force cuts by the two alliances. The demand, in habitual language, advocated the right of all European states to be represented in the negotiations on the basis of their sovereignty and to speak with their own voice rather than let the blocs speak for them. Once again viewed as a gesture of independence, the Rumanian step was taken in pursuit of the decision made at the Warsaw

[33] *Le Monde*, June 18, 1970.
[34] *RFE Research*, December 4 and 7, 1972.

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Pact meeting in Moscow on January 15, 1973, to push for Rumanian and Bulgarian representation at the MBFR negotiations and to demand inclusion in the reduction measures not merely of forces stationed on the "central front," as previously agreed, but of those in other European states as well.

The USSR was especially eager to have the American forces in Italy subjected to reductions — hence the suggested *quid pro quo*. As Italy's strategic importance to NATO by far exceeded that of Rumania to the Warsaw Pact, however, and the dangers of bilateralism in negotiating with the Soviet Union were evident, the Western delegates rejected the Rumanian proposal. The Soviets then made Italy's exclusion from troop reductions conditional upon the exclusion of Hungary, arguing that Soviet forces had to be stationed in Hungary for the defense of the Warsaw Pact's southern flank because Rumania refused to allow them on her territory. Finally, to break the deadlock, the NATO negotiators consented on May 14 to give Hungary observer status instead of that of a full participant, and thereby exempt from reductions Warsaw Pact forces stationed in that country. The Rumanian claims to participatory status were instantly dropped: Moscow had sought Rumania's inclusion only in exchange for Italy's.[35]

Three days later, on May 17, the Rumanian delegation again became the focus of attention, as it urged both negotiating sides not to evade force cut measures by simply shifting forces from the "central front" to other European countries. These representations made in closed-door conferences were "leaked" by Bucharest's delegates, and made new headlines as an assertion of independence. Actually, by this logic, the U.S. forces removed from Germany, Belgium and Holland would have to be withdrawn from Europe altogether, while Soviet troops stationed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland would take a mere step behind the Soviet-Polish and Soviet-Czechoslovak borders, as the West was not slow in pointing out. The proposal was reiterated by Bucharest at the MFR (B for "balanced" was no longer a consideration) talks in December 1975.[36]

The resumption of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations in 1974 set the scene for more Rumanian salesmanship respecting Soviet definitions of detente, wrapped in the language of national independence: Bucharest's delegates demanded the abolition of military blocs as incom-

[35] Cf. *New York Times*, April 13 and May 20, 1973.
[36] *Scînteia*, December 5, 1975.

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patible with the notion of European security, and the creation of a European "institutional mechanism" — which "will not be a supranational body, but rather a framework within which independent, sovereign states . . . will be able to democratically consult each other." They insisted on the prompt establishment of a special working group to examine concrete proposals for the constitution of this body.

At the same time Rumanian representatives in the CSCE Economic Commission demanded total removal of restrictions in international trade, the general application of Most Favored Nation treatment, and the conduct of trade on the basis of indiscriminate agreements among all European states, not trade groups[37] — an approach the Soviet Union is historically on record as favoring. Along these lines, a most recent COMECON proposal to the Common Market, whereby member states of each group should be allowed to negotiate trade agreements directly and bilaterally with members of the other on a state-to-state basis, without reference to their respective organizations, was conveyed by Rumania to Denmark in February 1976.

As the second stage of the CSCE negotiations stalled over the issue of a "free," then "freer," flow of ideas and people, Rumanian diplomacy seconded Soviet efforts to circumvent that issue by campaigning in West European capitals for speedy convocation of the concluding summit at Helsinki without a prior commitment on Basket Three. This came in the aftermath of a Gromyko-Macovescu meeting in Moscow, where functional coordination in the diplomatic field (further development of "useful working contacts between the Foreign Ministries of the two countries" and "broadening of the consultations between the Foreign Ministries of the two countries at various levels") had apparently been among the subjects discussed.[38]

Following the Helsinki summit conference, the scene of East-West negotiations shifted to the MFR talks in Vienna, where the Rumanian delegation continued to advocate that force reductions on the central front be considered as an interim measure toward the removal of all foreign bases and troops from Europe's states and the dismantling of military alliances. As a first step in the latter direction, it suggested that the MFR conference be "democratized"

[37] *Ibid.*, January 31, 1974. This position was incompatible with the de facto recognition previously conceded to the Common Market, but it was in line with earlier Warsaw Pact proposals, advanced in the context of the European security campaign, for arrangements for all-European trade and cooperation to replace the present trade blocs.

[38] TASS, December 9 and 13, 1974, quoted in *RFE Research*, December 19, 1974.

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— i.e., that all participating states should negotiate directly with one another as fully independent and sovereign agents, abandoning the bloc-to-bloc approach.[39]

A distinct note in Rumanian and Soviet discussions of the potentialities for security and cooperation in Europe has been the linking of international detente with increased opportunities for a shift to the left in domestic politics in Western Europe: as *Scinteia* put it, CSCE represents a beginning in a long-term effort at "building a new political and economic order in Europe."[40] Although this theme is muted in addressing external audiences, it has occasionally come to the fore — for example, at the RCP's National Conference of 1972, which endorsed Ceausescu's appeal to extend East-West cooperation to political cooperation between the Western Communist parties and "progressive forces," particularly the Socialist parties; the alliance of the left in France was commended as a worthy example.[41]

In this connection, during the 1975 events in Portugal the RCP endeavored, through its active contacts with both the Communist and Socialist parties (and the radical military as well) to persuade them to overcome their differences and pursue a coalition strategy essential to ensure the development of the revolutionary process. At the end of 1975, the Communist setback in Portugal notwithstanding, Ceausescu was still integrating the international policy of European detente with the domestic political process in Western Europe in terms of cooperation between Communist and Social-Democratic parties.[42] Subsequently, however, he has come to display apprehensions similar to Moscow's regarding the risk of Communist ideological concessions entailed in coalition politics: in a February 1976 speech he refuted the French Communist Party's programmatic renunciation of the tenet of dictatorship of the proletariat.[43]

Throughout the European security campaign Rumania has proffered calls for a Balkan Pact whereby the states of the region would become devoid of nuclear weapons and foreign bases and forces. The proposal — equivalent to demanding the removal of U.S. and NATO installations from Greece, the Aegean Sea and

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[39] *Scînteia*, December 5, 1975.
[40] *Ibid.*, January 22, 1975.
[41] *Ibid.*, July 20 and 22, 1972.
[42] Speech to the Grand National Assembly, *ibid.*, December 19, 1975.
[43] *Scînteia*, February 5 and February 8, 1976. Cf. *Le Monde*, February 6, and *Pravda*, February 8, 1976; *Pravda* cited with approval Ceausescu's remarks on the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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at least parts of Turkey — was first advanced in September 1957 by then Prime Minister Chivu Stoica, on the eve of the launching of the similarly conceived Rapacki Plan for Central Europe; the parallelism bespoke a division of labor among Warsaw Pact members in airing Communist objectives with respect to the two areas. The Rumanian proposal, like the Polish plan, has been officially endorsed by the Warsaw Pact and reiterated as part of the European security scheme.

Bucharest has promoted the Balkan plan (whose formula frequently includes "the Black Sea area" as well) with intensity since June 1970, when an updated proposal was forwarded to all Balkan states and to the UN, calling for turning the Balkans into a "nuclear-free zone of peace and peaceful coexistence" and for assembling a regional conference to promote interstate relations and cooperation. The Rumanian efforts have been seconded by Bulgarian and Soviet appeals to make the Balkans a zone of peace and cooperation,[44] although Rumania remains the more active, because more credible, proponent of the scheme.

A new element was added to the plan in July 1972 when Ceausescu proposed at the RCP national conference that the contemplated Balkan conference, in addition to discussing denuclearization of the area and the removal of foreign bases and forces, should also consider inter-Balkan agreements on economic and political cooperation and set up a permanent organization to regulate such cooperation. In May 1973, as the MBFR negotiations for mutual disengagement on the "central front" were beginning in Vienna, Ceausescu prominently restated his Balkan proposal in an interview with the Italian press.[45] Moreover, Bucharest attempted unsuccessfully to interest the Greek colonels' regime, with which, in contrast to the rest of the Warsaw Pact, it had maintained cordial relations, and whose leader Colonel Papadopoulos had been, shortly before his overthrow, invited to exchange official visits with Ceausescu.

Bucharest's diplomatic efforts in favor of the Balkan security scheme entered another phase with recent developments in the Cyprus situation, as relevant Rumanian pronouncements began to extend the concept of Balkan security and cooperation to apply to the Eastern Mediterranean as well, and proclaimed Rumania to be "vitally interested" in the settlement of the Cyprus

[44] See F. Stephen Larrabee, "Changing Russian Perspectives in the Balkans," *Survey*, Summer 1972.

[45] Cf. *L'Espresso*, May 18, 1973.

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conflict. In February and March 1975, on the heels of a Zhivkov visit to Bucharest, Foreign Minister Macovescu carried to Athens and Ankara a proposal for the Balkan states' participation in a Cyprus settlement. The proposal appears to have been designed to appeal mainly to Greece, as it envisaged as a *sine qua non* the preservation of Cyprus's independence and integrity, thus ruling out a partition of the island — although it was made palatable to Turkey by holding out the prospect of inviting unspecified "Mediterranean" states, presumably Moslem-Arab, to be participants in the discussions. The proposal was again advanced to Greek Premier Caramanlis and Turkish Premier Demirel on their visits to Rumania (and Bulgaria) in 1975, when Ceausescu termed it a test of detente and cooperation in the Balkans. Neither the Greek nor the Turkish government has as yet shown itself responsive to the introduction of Warsaw Pact members as arbitrating parties to an intra-NATO dispute.

Balance Sheet and Conclusions

The idea of an independent Rumanian foreign policy is meaningful to the extent to which it would have diverged from Soviet policies and adversely affected, or at least refrained from supporting, Soviet interests and objectives. This view is not confirmed by the factual evidence, much of which points in the opposite direction.

The main content of the foreign policy conducted by the Rumanian Communist leadership can be succinctly summarized as reflecting an essentially conformist attitude, rooted in ideological commitment as well as domestic power motivations, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact; a temporary *fronde* toward COMECON, terminated by a return to the line; honest brokerage between Moscow and Peking; the building of bridges to the West in the framework of detente, and promotion of security and disengagement schemes on Soviet terms. On balance, while in some areas it has been benign to Soviet interests, in other areas it has proven directly beneficial to Moscow, or has even been integrated in an ancillary relationship with Soviet diplomacy.

The Communist regime in Bucharest has derived substantial benefits from its impersonation of independence. Domestically, this has enabled it to acquire the national coloration indispensable to breaking out of its prolonged political isolation and

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establishing a dialogue with a basically hostile and uncooperative population. By skillful manipulation of the patriotic sentiment in an effort to free itself from the stigma of Soviet dependency, the regime has, for the first time since its installation in power, found a way to secure some measure of consent from its subjects and lay a belated claim to legitimacy.

At the same time the appeal to nationalism has helped the rulers to eschew internal claims for relaxation and reform. Characteristically, any suggestions for measures of liberalization, however modest, are systematically rejected by the party as conducive to "external" (i.e., Soviet) interference and therefore detrimental to the country's independence. To safeguard national sovereignty and the independent foreign policy, Rumanians are told, the RCP has to pursue a course of unabated orthodoxy at home. The latter is relentlessly being done, as the population of "independent Rumania" enjoys the least degree of political liberalization or economic reform and remains subject to the tightest controls in the Soviet bloc. The illusion of self-assertion in foreign policy has been used as a convenient substitute for long-overdue internal reforms the party would not undertake.

The phraseology of independence has also been ingeniously manipulated by Bucharest leaders to modify the image of their regime abroad. The endeavor has proven largely successful, as the pretense has often been accepted at face value. In lieu of substantiation by actual policies, the nationalistic rhetoric, along with leaks and "confidences" elaborately disseminated by Bucharest to the Western press, officials and ranking visitors, have been accepted as evidence of an independent foreign policy. Thus rhetoric and a sustained policy of misinformation have combined to erase the satellite image and build the new image of a "national Communist" regime striving for independence from Moscow. As a result the West has afforded Bucharest, through exchanges of official visits and favorable publicity, an international respectability unprecedented for a communist government. The regime has succeeded in eliciting international and particularly Western acceptance as a substitute for the internal legitimacy eluding it. Its reputation for independence has also attracted a larger flow of Western trade and credits than granted to any other country in the Soviet bloc.

Despite this reputation, the nature of Rumania's political relationship with the Soviet Union has remained fundamentally unchanged. State sovereignty, in the sense of supreme legal (law-

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giving and law-enforcing) authority within national borders and "impenetrability" of territory, had been devolved by Moscow to the matured East European Communist regimes, the Rumanian one included, during the Khrushchev period — though the events of 1968 demonstrated both the limits and the revocable nature of this sovereignty. Independence, in the sense of a state's latitude to manage its internal and external affairs, including its constitutional set-up and the determination of foreign policy as it sees fit, without reference to the authority of another state, has *not* been enjoyed by Rumania to a greater degree than by other member states of the Soviet bloc. What makes all these regimes Soviet satellites is the derivative nature of the Communist monopoly of power as a function of the regime's external politico-military alignment with the Soviet Union.

If, as we have seen, the Rumanian display of independence in foreign policy has brought benefits to vassal and suzerain alike, without altering the fundamentals of their relationship, are we to draw the inference that it has been pursued in agreement between the two? This question has less to do with the locus of decisions than with the overall conception of Rumania's foreign policy and its main directions as they relate to Soviet policies and objectives. The answer must take into account both the mutually beneficial character of, and lack of substance in, Bucharest's "independent course," as well as the nearly discretionary Soviet capacity to terminate it should it gain any concrete content and become detrimental to Soviet interests.

A factor looming large in the background is Rumania's geopolitical situation, which precludes any effective assertion of independence from Moscow: sharing a long and vulnerable land frontier with the Soviet Union, and entirely surrounded by Communist states, Rumania is strategically the safest of all Soviet satellites, and lacks any possibility of desertion from the Communist camp. This recommends her for the role assumed by eliminating the risk — for either the Soviet Union or the Bucharest regime itself — of the process of "de-satellization" getting out of control.

Finally, the absence of mass opposition movements prior to 1964 must have been a reassuring circumstance for both Bucharest and Moscow when the "independent course" was launched.

The utter contrast between the rhetoric and the operational content of Rumania's foreign policy invalidates the argument that domestic relaxation and liberalization have had to be sacrificed

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for the sake of maintaining its independence. The familiar counterposing of Hungary (and to a lesser extent Poland), described as having traded conformity in foreign policy for Soviet acceptance of a degree of domestic liberalization and economic reform, versus Rumania, portrayed as having made the reverse trade, appears to be lopsided: the absence of internal relaxation in Rumania cannot represent the cost of a nonexistent external autonomy. Moreover, it may be argued that a genuine policy of resistance to Soviet pressure is hardly conceivable in the absence of concessions to workers, peasants and intellectuals at least comparable to those once granted by the Gomulka regime in Poland, not to speak of Tito's Yugoslavia.

The degree of external autonomy the Rumanian Communists may seek is stringently limited by the fundamental insecurity still characterizing the regime and its persisting incapacity to generate a base of popular support; by the party's inherent qualitative weaknesses, awareness that continued Soviet backing is necessary to maintain it in power, and caution not to alienate Moscow; and, again, by the liability of the country's strategic position. These factors, which for the most part did not exist in Yugoslavia's case, strictly circumscribe whatever independent course the Bucharest regime may take, no matter how acute its desire for legitimation, no matter how pressing the need for a nationalistic diversion from dogmatic immobilism in domestic policies and economic failures.

There are equally severe limitations on the extent of autonomy that Moscow would be prepared to allow its ally to enjoy. No matter how potent the necessity of making a Communist regime more palatable to the population by "nationalization," and more functional by means of internal reconciliation and acquisition of legitimacy; and no matter how strong the quest for Western recognition of its European sphere of influence, Moscow cannot afford to grant a significant degree of autonomy to any of its satellites. To do so would set a precedent and stir up similar and further claims from other East European nations, a process bearing unpredictable consequences.

With no proof of direct collusion between Bucharest and Moscow, we can conclude that Rumania's semblance of independence in foreign policy, and Soviet permissiveness toward it, have probably been the result of an enlightened comprehension by each side of the advantages to be drawn from such a course.

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This, and the minimal risks involved, have led to the emergence of Communist Rumania in her "independent" posture. To expect that an East European Communist regime would or could, under the international conditions prevailing in the 1960s and 1970s, embark upon a genuine policy of emancipation and independence running counter to Moscow's interests would be as unrealistic as to expect that Moscow would tolerate the challenge.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF "NEW" PAKISTAN

by Shirin Tahir-Kheli

Pakistan's foreign policy orientation has shifted from the one-sided alignment with the West noted in the 1950s to the current phase of "tripartite bilateralism." In the following pages we will analyze Pakistani attempts to operate in the post-1971 era, looking first at moves initiated by Pakistan to improve its capability, and second, at others over which Pakistan had no control but which influence its foreign policy.

The year 1971, like 1947, constituted a new beginning for Pakistan. While the state continued in name, it was a disheartened and truncated state sharing little of the euphoria that had followed independence. In 1971, as in 1947, it found the majority of world opinion unsympathetic, if not unfavorable. In terms of leadership, things had worsened. Unlike the Indian leaders Gandhi and Nehru, who were "world figures admired and respected for their strong and prolonged fight against British imperialism,"[1] Pakistan's Jinnah and Liaquat were relatively unknown at independence. President Yahya Khan became well known internationally in 1971, but for the wrong reasons. His actions against civilian Bengalis in March exposed his regime to vociferous international condemnation. Furthermore, while many in India and the West have referred to the similarities shared by the Muslims and Hindus of the subcontinent, and called the 1947 partition a tragic event, in 1971 the same people dwelt at length on the differences in language, culture, physical bearing and traditions dividing East from West Pakistanis, calling their separation a natural one.

Thus, as 1971 ended and the presence of Indian troops in Dacca ensured the birth of Bangladesh, Pakistanis could contemplate their future with very little satisfaction. With the exception of the United States (in a psychological sense) and the People's Republic of China (in a moral and material sense) they lacked the

[1] S. M. Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), p. 77.

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sympathy of the world's major powers — though the support received from Muslim friends was valued, and since the oil boom good will and material help from them have gone hand in hand. As a nation Pakistan had been halved, the bulk of its population now citizens of an unfriendly new state under Indian domination and Soviet obligation. It thus began its post-1971 phase with essentially the same three priorities it had always pursued: territorial integrity, a search for friends and allies, and economic development.

II

The first task for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as he came to power on December 20, 1971 in what was left of Pakistan was to gain some measure of respectability for the country. He had not only to live down the image of a government committing atrocities against its own population but also to wipe out the lingering suspicion that he had played a critical role in the dismemberment;[2] he had to convince the world that Pakistan had suffered at the hands of foreign aggression and that he was a reasonable man, one who had only the welfare of the nation at heart. The strategy for bringing about such a change was personal diplomacy, and Bhutto set out on extended travels almost immediately after taking office.

Since almost the entire bloc of Muslim (and many non-Muslim) Third World countries had supported Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, Bhutto's first visit abroad as head of state, in January 1972, was a "journey among brothers." He went to thank them for their support rather than to change their opinion regarding Pakistan or his intentions. In typical Bhutto style — i.e., dealing from strength — he thought it best to begin with countries that were solidly behind Pakistan to demonstrate to any who might have doubts (as some did in the United States, the "tilt" notwithstanding) that Pakistan was not entirely without friends. Turning toward the Muslim countries also signified that with the loss of its Eastern half Pakistan no longer considered itself a part of Southeast Asia,[3] but rather of Muslim West Asia.

China: The Reaffirmation of Friendship

Sino-Pakistani relations became firmer after 1971 in keeping with the Chinese reputation for standing by friends in time of

[2] G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1975).
[3] Burke, p. 229.

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need. Professor G. W. Choudhury has provided a detailed account of the role of China's leaders in trying to convince Yahya Khan that "unification of Pakistan and unity of the peoples of East and West Pakistan [were] basic guarantees for Pakistan to attain prosperity and strength."[4] Privately, the Chinese counseled against the use of force in bringing about this unity, and warned against the increasing involvement of India and the USSR in the conflict. As far as a moral commitment to "national liberation" was concerned, Peking believed the Bangladesh movement to be one of Bengali elite interests against Pakistan rather than a genuine grass roots peasant movement.

When Bhutto traveled to China in February 1972, he wished not only to thank Peking for support rendered, but to seek agreement regarding future relations with Moscow, New Delhi and Dacca. In the absence of any alternative source of military aid, Chinese help in this matter was crucial. Premier Chou En-lai reportedly had said: "We are not ammunition merchants. Whatever your defense requirements are, they will be met gratis."[5]

When Bangladesh applied to the United Nations for membership in mid-1972 — its leaders apparently feeling that membership was essential to the legitimate aspirations of the Bengali people and that it would signify their independence not only from Pakistan but from India and the Soviet Union as well — the Chinese veto in the Security Council succeeded in keeping it out. This was crucial to Pakistan's calculation of pressing India and Bangladesh for the release of some 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (among them 15,000 civilians) and Indian withdrawal from occupied lands.

Peking justified its veto on the grounds that Bangladesh appeared to be a tool in the hands of "reactionary" India and the "social imperialist" USSR.[6] For the Pakistani leader, who had already implied the Chinese veto, this action could be construed as boosting his position "by allowing it to be interpreted as strong political pressure brought to bear, at Bhutto's request, on India and Bangladesh to return 90,000 Pakistani P.O.W.'s."[7] The Chinese were unhappy with the role of the Soviet Union and its growing power.[8] It might be said that at the time China's support of Pakistan was

[4] G. W. Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 211.
[5] *New York Times*, February 2, 1972.
[6] Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh . . .*, p. 211.
[7] Zillur R. Khan, "Multi-polar Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh," *Asian Forum*, July-September 1974.
[8] New China News Agency, December 8, 1971.

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more anti-Soviet than pro-Pakistani, for Peking was not pleased with Pakistan's handling of the crisis. In return, Pakistan pledged not to become a party to "any conspiracy against China,"[9] clearly in response to Moscow's attempts to incorporate Pakistan into its collective security schemes.

Thus, Pakistan was able to maintain its friendship with China, obtain China's backing in the Nixon-Chou communique of February 27, 1972,[10] receive vital military aid and retain clear support on Kashmir. This last was affirmed once again at a banquet given for Bhutto in Peking during his May 1974 visit. Offering a toast, then Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping stated that China continued to support the right of the people of Kashmir to self-determination, which prompted a walkout by the Indian charge d'affaires.

Mending Relations with Moscow

Bhutto journeyed to the Soviet Union in March 1972. While his hosts reminded him that they considered their stand in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war to have been a just one, and one they would take again "were history to repeat itself," Bhutto pointed out that he was not a new visitor to their country but had traveled there more than a decade earlier, as Ayub Khan's minister for fuel, power and natural resources, to sign an agreement for oil exploration, the first "tangible step towards the establishment of good cooperation." Thereafter, as foreign minister, he had visited the USSR many times. Said Bhutto: "I have always worked for the development of relations between our two countries on a firm and realistic basis . . . that friendly relations between us should not be constructed at the expense of our relations with other countries."[11] Though the Soviets may not have liked Pakistan, as a small power, to use the same line of reasoning Moscow used whenever Pakistan brought up the subject of Soviet-Indian relations, they seemed to imply that it was mainly the intransigence of the Yahya regime and the villainous role of the Chinese that had taken Pakistan on a ruinous path. They renewed their offer of financial and technical assistance for the Karachi steel mill, and later signed a trade agreement.

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[9] *Pakistan News Digest* (Islamabad), April 7, 1972.
[10] *New York Times*, February 28, 1972.
[11] *Pravda*, March 3, 1972, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter cited as *CDSP*), vol. XXIV, no. 9.

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Despite the direct role played by the Soviet Union in the formation of Bangladesh, Pakistan was careful not to break relations, although it severed diplomatic ties with some small powers. Furthermore, in the attempt not to antagonize the Soviets, Bhutto was pointedly quiet when questioned on Soviet interference in Baluchistan,[12] realizing that Pakistan must, of necessity, maintain reasonable relations with all major powers. Speaking in December 1973 to a session of the National Assembly, he summed up his efforts saying that Pakistan's relations with the USSR had steadily improved and would keep on improving. Referring to his government's refusal to become a party to the Soviet collective security plan for Asia, he stated that it was untrue that Pakistan's relations with the USSR would be determined by its attitude toward the plan, since the foreign policy of a country cannot be influenced by a single factor but, rather, "the totality of relations counted."[13] Here Bhutto seemed to be replying to pro-Moscow critics at home, who criticized the government's rejection of the Soviet plan as directly contributing to the coolness between Islamabad and Moscow.

The new realism in foreign policy called for awareness that the imbalance of power on the subcontinent in India's favor necessitated a balance (with strong preference toward one or both of the superpowers but with antagonism toward none) among the three major powers. Consequently, the Pakistan government did not whip up anti-Soviet feelings (as it certainly would have done earlier) when, on February 10, 1973, a cache of Soviet arms was discovered in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad, destined for anti-Pakistan elements in troubled Baluchistan. Iraqi involvement rather than Soviet collusion was emphasized.

"Bilateralism" with India

The trickiest foreign policy problem Bhutto had to face was to mold Indo-Pakistani relations in the light of changed circumstances, with India holding all the trump cards. It was ironic that the very man who had declared "a thousand years of war against India," was the one who talked now of a "just peace." "Peace," said Bhutto,

certainly cannot be imposed and yet remain durable. It must be equitable and acceptable to both India and Pakistan. It is an inherent contradiction to

[12] *New York Times*, February 13, 1972.
[13] *Pakistan Times*, December 23, 1973.

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think that a one-sided settlement can lead to a durable peace. It can never be lasting; it can only lead to continued instability and war. This is the lesson of history.[14]

The new relationship rested on both Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi recognizing that as a first step the withdrawal of Indian troops from 5,000 square miles of Pakistani territory (and of Pakistani troops from a much smaller area of India) was essential. The issue of Pakistani prisoners of war was complicated by Bangladesh's insistence that their release be tied to its recognition by Pakistan and the trial of some prisoners for war crimes.

The Simla Agreement signed in July 1972 states that the governments of India and Pakistan will work toward a policy of peace rather than confrontation "so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples." Pursuant to this objective, they agreed to the following: (a) that relations between them shall be governed by the Charter of the United Nations (in Pakistan this was assumed to mean that India had renounced the use of force in the solution of Indo-Pakistani problems); (b) that both countries would settle their differences through bilateral negotiations or other peaceful means as mutually agreed upon and would not seek to alter the status quo (Pakistanis generally took this as guaranteeing the status quo in West Pakistan and Kashmir); and (c) both countries subscribed to the principles of peaceful coexistence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and respect for each other's national unity, political independence and sovereign equality. Pakistanis regarded this as India's public admission that it would henceforth have no designs on the territorial integrity and/or the political independence of West Pakistan, as well as a pledge that it would not interfere in Pakistan's internal problems — the Pakhtoonistan issue and language problems in Sind, to mention only two.

Pakistan and India further agreed to take "all steps within their power" to prevent hostile propaganda against each other. This was aimed at mitigating the past legacy of hostility and mistrust. They would also, under the Simla Agreement, take steps to restore and normalize relations: to resume communications through postal, telegraphic, sea, land and air links; to promote travel facilities, encourage trade and economic cooperation, and

[14] Address to the nation, *ibid.*, June 28, 1972.

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foster an exchange in the fields of science and culture. Delegations from the two countries would meet periodically to work out the necessary details.

Then came two specific clauses with an immediate bearing on Indo-Pakistani relations: (1) that Indian and Pakistani forces would be withdrawn to their own sides of the international border; and (2) that the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 would be respected "without prejudice to the recognized position of either side." Neither country would seek to alter it unilaterally.

Finally, the governments agreed that their respective heads would meet again at a mutually convenient time and that, in the meantime, representatives of the two sides would meet to discuss the establishment of a durable peace, notably including the questions of repatriating prisoners of war and civilian internees, reaching a settlement on Jammu and Kashmir, and resuming diplomatic relations.

Upon his return to Pakistan President Bhutto stressed in his public speeches, as well as in his lengthy address to the National Assembly session convened to discuss the Simla Agreement, first, that he had kept his promise not to discuss the issue of Bangladesh on Indian soil — this despite repeated Indian attempts to introduce it; second, that the agreement had succeeded in clearing Indian troops from some 5,000 square miles of Pakistani territory; and third, that "Kashmir was not sold down the river," as had apparently been the case at Tashkent.[15] The agreement held to the cease-fire line of December 17, 1971, without prejudice to "the position of either side." Pakistan's "position" demanded a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir as promised by India and confirmed in the 1948 resolution of the Security Council. The Indian "position" denied a referendum in Kashmir and stated that Kashmir was an integral part of India.

There were some obvious and clear-cut advantages accruing to Pakistan, not least of which was the withdrawal of Indian troops from Pakistani territory, enabling one million refugees to return to their homes. For India, the agreement offered the chance

[15] Speaking to the National Assembly, Bhutto compared Simla with the Tashkent Agreement in these words: "What is the difference between Tashkent and Simla? At Simla we had lost 93 thousand prisoners of war, we had given two or three Tehsils [geographic administrative areas, each equaling approximately 1,700 square miles] of ours into Indian hands, we had threats of war trials. Pakistan was demolished and demoralized physically and ideologically. At Tashkent we went with a very high head. If we had not won the war, there was at least a draw. East Pakistan was with us . . . Shastri was in a weak position. . . ." *Ibid.*, July 19, 1972.

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for a new beginning in Indo-Pakistani relations, and, as Bhutto said, "a just and honorable peace."

The Simla Agreement was the first major agreement reached between India and Pakistan without the help of outside powers.[16] The meeting between Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi had the backing of several countries and the conclusion of an agreement was lauded by most,[17] but basically it was reached by the two leaders themselves and came at the very end of Bhutto's visit after reports of failure had already begun to circulate. Compounding the talks and adding to the many years of mistrust was Indian insistence that the agreement must be a package deal addressing itself to all outstanding Indo-Pakistani problems, while Pakistan wished to deal with each problem individually. The eventual outcome was closer to the Pakistani position.

India and Pakistan both have treaties with major powers to guarantee their security, and relations in the subcontinent cannot remain entirely apart from events occurring outside, yet the Simla accord offers both countries the alternative of a solution worked out by themselves without outside interference. But what will be the effect of this new attempt at bilateralism on major Indo-Pakistani problems, and what are the chances for its success? Will the Simla Agreement really end the twenty-eight-year period of confrontation and conflict and usher in a new era of peace on the subcontinent?

The answer is not clear. If the Simla Agreement is implemented, both in letter and in spirit, the chances for the success of future bilateral negotiations are considerable. Underlying this agreement is the assumption that India and Pakistan can be reasonable in dealing with each other; that they can solve their outstanding problems in a civilized manner; that they can cease hostile propaganda against each other and in effect forget the past twenty-eight years. These things could happen if events within each country provided no temptations to the other. For example, if "Pakhtoonistan" becomes a major problem for Pakistan and if Wali Khan (head of the National Awami Party [NAP], who has good relations with India) leads any such movement, India could be tempted to

[16] Even though Bhutto had stated in 1966 that "bilateralism is the only form of foreign policy that Pakistan should adopt," and though this policy had been followed vis-a-vis the major powers in the early 1960s while Ayub was president and Bhutto foreign minister, it had not, prior to 1972, been applied to Pakistan's relations with India.

[17] Generally the right-wing parties in both India and Pakistan opposed the agreement.

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act in ways contrary to the agreement signed in Simla. Should there be an uprising in Indian Kashmir, Pakistan could be sorely tempted to interfere although, given its current military weakness vis-a-vis India, its interference could only be minimal. So long as obvious and tempting opportunities connected with Kashmir, Pakhtoonistan, language disturbances and autonomy moves do not come up, the Simla Agreement could survive. Once these opportunities arose, it would be hard to say whether the leaders of India and Pakistan could restrain themselves and not interfere.

The Simla Agreement did not really set up a model for solving some of the subcontinent's major problems. Even though withdrawal of Indian forces from Pakistan has taken place,[18] and the POWs were released, the Kashmir issue remains unresolved. Neither India nor Pakistan has abandoned its position.[19] President Bhutto stated that he told the Indians: "As for Kashmir, we are prepared to hold talks with you. For the present, you remain where you are, and we stay where we are."[20] Thus, the Simla Agreement merely by-passed the Kashmir problem and prospects for a settlement remain dim. In the long run it is unlikely to have much bearing on the dispute. The Indians now appear interested in establishing the cease-fire line in Kashmir as an international boundary and have, in fact, incorporated Kashmir more closely into India. While there are many in Pakistan who feel that the country should not suffer a third war over Kashmir, it would be political suicide for any leader to state this publicly, even though Pakistan today is in no position to undertake military action against India.[21]

"Killing Bangladesh with Kindness?"

When one recalls how difficult it was for Pakistan to let go of its Eastern province, it is remarkable how quickly the "new" reality was adjusted to. The fact that Bangladesh's independence was gained with direct Indian and Soviet help has consoled most

[18] The withdrawal, scheduled for September 15, 1972, did not take place until December 1972. The delay was chiefly the result of Indian insistence that withdrawal of Indian forces from 5,193 square miles of Pakistani territory and Pakistani forces from 69 square miles of Indian territory should await demarcation of what India called the "line of control" in Kashmir.

[19] He referred repeatedly to the Pakistani stand as one of "principle" (self-determination for the Kashmirs) but to that of India as a "position" claiming that Kashmir was an integral part of India. See, for example, his speech at Lahore Airport, *Pakistan Times*, July 4, 1972.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Bilateralism in South Asia," *World Affairs*, Summer 1973, pp. 81-85.

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Pakistanis and continues to aid them in developing more positive feelings toward relations with the new state. Although most of them would agree that Bangladesh was a political and economic liability, the government would be quite happy to draw it out of the Indian orbit. Hence, the manner in which recognition was granted to Bangladesh, i.e., under the aegis of the Muslim Summit Conference in February 1974, was a sign that Pakistan considered its relations with Bangladesh a separate affair from Indo-Pakistani relations.

Pakistan was able to gain the release of its prisoners of war without the threatened war crimes trials taking place when the government argued that such trials would affect the security of some 400,000 Bengalis then living in Pakistan. The final agreement of April 9, 1974 did not resolve all of the basic issues, but it did open the way for normalization of relations. Bhutto received a tremendous welcome from the Bengali population when he went to Dacca in August 1974. This surprising event was viewed by the Pakistani delegation as an indication of growing disenchantment with post-independence conditions as well as resentment of India. When Mujib's government produced a counter-demonstration the next day, however, attitudes had already hardened, with Mujib (perhaps on a signal from New Delhi) demanding a division of assets without a concurrent division of the more than $5 billion in liabilities that is Pakistan's foreign debt. The abrupt departure of the Pakistani entourage marked a failure of the mission to improve relations.

The August 1975 coup d'etat in which Mujib was killed and Khundkar Mushtaq Ahmed was installed as president of Bangladesh came as a surprise in Pakistan. The author was in a Bengali shop in Islamabad, early in the morning of August 15, 1975, when this news was telephoned to the shopkeeper by a member of the National Assembly. While it is understandable that any Bengali who had opted to remain in Pakistan would be less than sorry at Mujib's downfall, the surprising fact that it was taken as an occasion calling for celebration was perhaps reflective of the growing alienation from the "Banga-Bandhu." Bangladesh officials have stressed in private conversations that Mujib lost out partly because the situation in their country is so desperate, and primarily because he failed to translate popular support into an effective governmental machine. The inefficiency and corruption with which his regime had been identified had not left him untainted.

Pakistan was the first country to recognize the new

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government. It also persuaded certain friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia to extend their support, so as to strengthen pro-Muslim and anti-Indian elements among the Bengalis. New Delhi watched the direction of events in Dacca with concern. In Pakistan there was some confusion about whether Bangladesh had actually declared itself to be an "Islamic Republic," as had first been announced by Radio Dacca. In Islamabad this was interpreted as a move away from India, and perhaps for that reason the word "Islamic" was dropped by the new authorities in Bangladesh at India's insistence.

The young officers who had spearheaded the August 15, 1975 coup were themselves overthrown in a countercoup in November; in Bangkok, whence they fled, they stated that they had to kill Mujib because he was corrupt and threatened Bangladesh's sovereignty. They also feared that he was asking for assistance from a "foreign power."[22] Meanwhile, the new president of Bangladesh declared that his government would "strengthen friendly relations with our close neighbors" — an obvious reference to India.[23] For the present, the Pakistan government has accepted that fact. Bhutto commented in an interview recently that no nation, India or any other, can prevent good relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh if the people of the two countries want them. However, "to what extent the relationship is to develop is really for the people of Bangladesh to determine. It was they who wanted separation. It is now up to them to tell us how close they want to come to us. We don't want to kill Bangladesh with kindness."[24]

Neutralization of Elites

The role of elites, particularly the military and bureaucratic elites, in the formulation of Pakistani foreign policy is undisputed.[25] Bhutto has attempted to limit the power of the various elites, not only with respect to foreign affairs but also in their domestic power base.

Pakistan's political history clearly demonstrates that after 1950 the power of the political elite declined in proportion to the increase in power of members of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the military and the economic elite — the "22 families."[26]

[22] *The Times* (London), November 7, 1975.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Time*, December 29, 1975.
[25] Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh . . .*, pp. 13-14, 85, 183-185.
[26] Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Pakistani Elites and Foreign Policy," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1972.

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While the relative power of each has varied at different times, a combination of two or more elites managed over the years to exclude the political leaders. Bhutto has seemed determined to prevent the formation of such an alliance in the future by reducing the power of each of these elites and thereby neutralizing their capability to offer a viable alternative to the political system.

In 1972 it was possible for Bhutto to carry out this policy. He had come to power, not at the whim of any general, but as an elected leader, a representative of "the people." He could therefore initiate reforms that no leader before him could, especially since the 1971 war and the events preceding it had left both the military and the CSP largely disheartened and discredited.

The economic elite headed the list to be neutralized, and there were two ways of dealing with it. First, nationalization of certain "key" industries not only diluted the economic power of the "22 families" but also demonstrated their vulnerability to governmental action. Second, labor laws were enacted ensuring minimum wages and certain benefits for the workers. Members of the "22 families" were threatened, sometimes imprisoned, and their passports were temporarily revoked to prevent their flight from the country along with capital. Some of these policies had to be toned down when the government found that it was creating an unfavorable climate for economic growth, but by and large the regime has succeeded in preventing business from exerting a controlling influence over politics.

After 1971 the aura of patriotism and invincibility that had surrounded the military from 1947 onward was to a large extent diminished. The misdeeds of military leaders, the immoral behavior of Yahya Khan, the surrender of Dacca to the Indians without effective resistance, and other offenses had, as one Pakistani put it, "got the Army off its high horse!" There were some who implied that Bhutto kept this issue alive by leaving the 90,000 POWs in India for two years while consolidating his power. But while it is true that their absence diminished the ranks of the military and dramatized the "embarrassment" of surrender to India (after all, death in battle is held in high regard), it must be stated in all fairness that the return of Pakistani prisoners was a complicated affair where the Indians, not Bhutto, had the final word.

Yet the prime minister was no doubt aware that to downgrade the Indian threat even in a small way, on the basis of the Simla accord, was to deny the *raison d'être* of a strong military establishment. This coupled with the limited military aid to be

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counted on in these times in a sense has neutralized the military, which had hitherto played a crucial role in foreign as well as domestic policy. Furthermore, the Federal Security Force (FSF), a paramilitary organization under direct government control and equipped with modern weapons, was set up to act as a counter-force to the military in domestic situations, giving the government access to means of coercion against any challengers that might arise.

However, if for domestic political reasons (i.e., a continued ban of NAP and the imprisonment of Wali Khan) Bhutto raises the specter of "foreign" designs on Pakistani territory — and Afghanistan's menacing attitude can be cited here — he cannot turn around and deny the military the resources and power it may demand to shield Pakistan from such designs.

Again, while a senior corps of administrative officers still exists, the CSP as an elite branch of that corps with tightly controlled recruitment has been substantially altered. By abolishing the Civil Service as a distinct institution, even if more in name than in fact, the magic of untouchability that surrounded the service has vanished. Its politicization is one of the special characteristics of the current situation in Pakistan. In the first phase (1967-1971)[27] the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) may have been interested in turning itself into a popular movement to oust Ayub and achieve victory at the polls. Since coming to power in 1971, however (the second phase), it has been converting that popular support into a viable party organization with absolute loyalty to Bhutto. Even though splits have occurred in the party leadership of late, Bhutto remains firmly in charge. Party membership — with priority given to early membership — has almost become a prerequisite for office, high and low. One immediate effect has been to illustrate the gains that accrue to people who owe their loyalty to the PPP rather than to the landlord, the military, or any other elite.

III

Pakistan is classified as a "small power" in international politics, one influenced by events beyond its control; it can therefore mainly react to external determinants of its foreign policy. Several such key events are discussed below to show their impact on Pakistan and how it has handled them.

[27] See Anwar Syed, *The Pakistan People's Party: Phase One and Two*, paper read at the Wayne Wilcox Memorial Seminar, Duke University, 1974; and H. A. Rizvi, *Pakistan People's Party: The First Phase, 1967-1971* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1973).

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The Afghan Coup d'Etat

In July 1973 King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan was deposed while on a visit to Italy and his first cousin and brother-in-law, Daud Khan, took over as the new Afghan leader. Daud had served as prime minister from 1953 to 1963, and his return (as had his earlier tenure) had an immediate effect on Pakistan-Afghan relations.

While Daud was prime minister foreign policy was his domain, and the pillar of his policy was support for Pakhtoonistan. He severed relations when Pakistan amalgamated the provinces of West Pakistan into "one unit" in October 1955, stating that since Pakistan had no jurisdiction over the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, these provinces could not be incorporated with the others and must be maintained as separate entities. Daud was close to both Moscow and New Delhi, either because he was an ally in anti-Pakistan policies, which were no doubt welcomed in these capitals, or because he needed to cultivate both the Soviet Union and India as logical sources of help against Pakistan. In any case, throughout the 1950s Pakistan was faced by a Moscow/New Delhi/Kabul axis. Only when Moscow decided for its own reasons to abandon its hostility to Pakistan and cultivate better relations did it tone down its support of Pakhtoonistan — and Daud's tenure as prime minister was a casualty of the changed Soviet policy. Thereafter the Shah of Iran reportedly convinced Zahir Shah, who was much less anti-Pakistan, to moderate his support of Pakhtoonistan.

The ten years that elapsed between Daud Khan's dismissal and his return to power as a result of the 1973 coup witnessed improved relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Contacts at both official and unofficial levels multiplied. Trade and tourism increased, giving rise to a feeling of open borders. While Afghanistan did not renounce its claims on Pakistani territory, it at least ceased to spread propaganda regarding Pakhtoonistan. During the 1971 war with India, Pakistan was not threatened by the opening of a second front on its Afghan border, though Kabul continued to play host to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the champion of Pakhtoonistan. The situation worsened again with Daud's return to power as Afghanistan's unchallenged ruler. Predictably, one of his first announcements as head of state renewed the claims against Pakistan and stressed that Pakistan remained the only country with which Afghanistan had a dispute.

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Two immediate effects of the Afghan coup sped the deterioration in Pakistan-Afghan relations. The first was Afghanistan's revival of the Pakhtoonistan issue at international forums such as the Algiers meeting of nonaligned nations and the Islamic summit held in Lahore.[28] Pakistani leaders were clearly angered by this development. But more serious was the exploitation of Pakistan's domestic difficulties. Encouraged by the example of Bangladesh, Afghanistan has openly supported movements in the NWFP and Baluchistan demanding autonomy. NAP leader Khan Abdul Wali Khan openly and frequently visited Kabul, at first to meet with his father, who had gone into self-imposed exile there; then, during his father's brief return to Pakistan, for treatment of an eye ailment. It is highly probable that he kept open a dialogue with Afghan leaders regarding the response of friendly governments in case of a full-fledged civil war. Ajmal Khattak, in an interview given to *Al Fatah,* is reported to have admitted that, although calls for secession and separatism are seldom made openly, the NAP objective is no less than the establishment of an independent Pakhtoonistan. This feeling was strengthened after the civil war in Pakistan and the events that created an independent Bangladesh. As cited by Professor Muzaffar Ahmad of the Bangladesh NAP in October 1971, Wali Khan was greatly disturbed at East Pakistan's separation and stated at the time that "either there should be one Pakistan or no Pakistan because without the Bengalis, the Pathans and the Baluchis would find it very difficult to cope with the Panjabis."[29]

The elite of the National Awami Party, identified in Pakistan with the pro-Moscow "left," had undoubtedly considered secession as an option. It has championed autonomy for the Pathans and at times has even stated that Pakistan itself is an "artificial" creation which must be dissolved, presumably into India. After the restoration of democratic government in Pakistan in early 1972, opposition from this elite became more open as it formed governments in NWFP and Baluchistan. Politics continued to be polarized with these NAP governments opposing the government and policies of Prime Minister Bhutto. While their real disagreements lay elsewhere, namely, with Bhutto's denial of a further breakup of Pakistan, their anger manifested itself against the government on most policy issues — primarily because it was Bhutto's government. Anyone who attended the National Assembly debate on the Simla accord — a

[28] Despite the invitation extended to Daud Khan by Bhutto's personal envoy, Aziz Ahmed, Daud did not attend.

[29] *Pakistan Forum,* September 1973.

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major debate on foreign policy — can testify to the charges of isolation and policy failure hurled at the government by Wali Khan, while the latter was excoriated for making statements that threatened the security and perhaps even the existence of Pakistan. NAP's championship of autonomy for NWFP and Baluchistan brought it into conflict with the PPP and finally led to the dismissal of the NAP government in Baluchistan, which triggered the resignation of the NWFP government.

The USSR and Pakhtoonistan

Pakistan-Afghan relations have invariably been tied to the state of Pakistan's relations with the USSR. The Soviets have exploited the Pakhtoonistan and Kashmir issues as leverage to get Pakistan to change its foreign policy. Remembering events in the early 1950s when Pakistan was poised to enter into a defense alliance with the United States, and both India and Afghanistan chose to remain outside such an alliance system, it is academic to debate now whether Pakistan made the right choice by formally aligning itself with the United States. The fact remains that the Soviet Union, in retaliation, has rendered support to Afghanistan's claims on Pakistan as it has for the Indian position on Kashmir. Afghanistan would have been less belligerent without Soviet support, which Bulganin characterized in the following way in Kabul in December 1955: "We have sympathy for Afghanistan's attitude to the Pakhtoonistan problem and think that the Pathans should be consulted on the solution of the problem."[30]

The importance of Kabul's Moscow connection was demonstrated when the Soviet Union decided for reasons of its own — foremost among them countering the influence of China — to enter into an era of improved relations with Pakistan. Starting with the Soviet oil exploration deal with Pakistan in 1961, and terminating with the civil war in East Pakistan in 1971, Moscow withdrew open support of Pakhtoonistan and thus set the tone for the dismissal of Daud Khan as premier. The decade of good relations between Moscow and Islamabad also witnessed a thaw in Pakistan-Afghan relations. Kabul got the message that Moscow was not willing to support Pakhtoonistan, at least not openly. Daud's removal from office was a necessary part of the "new look," and his absence made it easier for the Afghans to renew relations with Pakistan after a diplomatic break of nearly two years. In anticipating the restored

[30] *Dawn* (Karachi), December 18, 1955.

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relationship the new Afghan prime minister, Dr. Mohammad Yousaf, stated that the Pakhtoonistan issue was not necessarily linked with the border closure.

The current crisis in Pakistan-Afghan relations is an outgrowth of the poor state of Pakistan's relations with Moscow, and Bhutto is aware of this. Despite the military and diplomatic support rendered India by the Soviet Union in the 1971 war and the subsequent formation of Bangladesh, Bhutto has been careful in attempting to build bridges with the USSR. He has consistently refused to subscribe to the Soviet collective security schemes or to any regional economic grouping sponsored by Moscow.[31] This, no doubt, was a signal that Pakistan would not improve ties with the Soviet Union at China's expense. Soviet leaders, concerned with just such a rationale, could not have been too pleased: if Pakistan was unwilling to break, or at least dilute relations with China, the Soviet Union would continue to lend active support to Afghanistan and India.

Moscow reverted to its anti-Pakistan policy even before the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. Nixon's visit to China, Yahya Khan's role as intermediary in bringing it about, and Moscow's fears of Sino-American collusion all helped to push Moscow toward its proven friends in the area — India and Afghanistan. In India the Soviets struck a responsive chord in view of the conflict situation in East Pakistan. Afghanistan was not as receptive until the coup d'etat brought Moscow's friend, Daud Khan, back to power in 1973.

Even though the Soviets were not directly responsible for the coup, they had prior knowledge that it would take place. Furthermore, the modern Afghan army is almost entirely a product of Soviet training and is equipped with Soviet arms. Between 1955 and 1972 the USSR aided Afghanistan militarily to the tune of $455 million.[32] For the Afghan government, this military assistance has double significance: it not only strengthens the military, which is Daud Khan's strongest supporter; it makes possible a military solution to the Pakhtoonistan problem. The military's backing brought Daud back to power with the rallying cry of "Pakhtoonistan." King Zahir Shah had dropped the issue in his day-to-day dealings with Pakistan, partly in response to the Shah of Iran's request, and the Afghan military was displeased. Many of the young officers have felt that Afghanistan's mission lay in working for Pakhtoonistan; and Daud, who shares similar feelings, was their natural ally. Since the

[31] *Pravda*, March 18, 1972, in *CDSP*, vol. XXIV, no. 11.

[32] U.S. Department of State, *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1972* (Washington: August 1973).

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backbone of Daud's support remains the army, it stands to reason that even if he wanted to he could never drop his championship of Pakhtoonistan without losing the army's backing. Events since the 1973 coup have shown that his claims against Pakistan have grown *stronger, not weaker.*

The domestic situation in Pakistan has undergone some changes since February 1975, when Hyat Mohammad Khan Sherpao was assassinated in Peshawar.[33] As a result Bhutto has banned the National Awami Party and arrested 300 of its leaders including Wali Khan, who was also leader of the political opposition in the National Assembly. The government can point to public acceptance of these measures as proof of the limited base of support for "Pakhtoonistan" within Pakistan.

Sino-Soviet Rivalry Continued

At the onset of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, Huang Hwa, China's ambassador to the United Nations, said: "The aim of the Soviet leaders is to gain control over the subcontinent, encircle China and strengthen [their] position in contending . . . for world hegemony."[34] The Soviets, on the other hand, denounce "external aggressive circles" — i.e., China and "imperialism," meaning the United States — as responsible for "sowing discord and animosity" among the nations of South Asia.[35] Neither power seems prepared *at this point to tone down ideological differences, which are often* translated into their relations with other countries. South Asia is a very important arena of competition, with Moscow clearly committed to India and China backing Pakistan.

China sees the Soviet Union's scheme for economic cooperation among Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, followed by a collective security pact, as a reflection of its "hegemonistic" designs in Asia. These, coupled with growing Soviet naval strength in the Indian Ocean area, alarm Peking. Thus, the "counterweight" concept impresses China as necessary, and it supports Pakistan diplomatically and militarily to whatever extent it can. In 1972, with Pakistan serving as intermediary, it was in this spirit that Peking established relations with Iran and responded to President Nixon's offer of rapprochement. It is also for this reason that China wants no

[33] Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan: A Political Perspective," *Asian Survey*, July 1975.
[34] New China News Agency, December 8, 1971.
[35] Anwar H. Syed, *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), p. 174.

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rapid decline in American power in Asia, because it fears that if this happens the Soviet Union will be the chief beneficiary.[36]

Pakistan's refusal to be part of an anti-China scheme has no doubt annoyed Moscow. Professor Choudhury has correctly assessed that renewed Soviet support to Afghanistan on Pakhtoonistan since 1973 is "a function of Soviet browbeating to induce Pakistan to accept the Brezhnev security system."[37] The USSR would like to demonstrate that the only real guarantee of Pakistan's integrity lies in complete cooperation with Moscow.

Soviet relations with India are an integral part of any balance of power in the subcontinent, and so far Moscow has been giving India military, economic and diplomatic support. Recent Soviet promises to keep Indian industrial output in mind in formulating the USSR's own economic plans point to the importance of India in Soviet strategy. Despite Mrs. Gandhi's proud declaration in December 1971 that notwithstanding Soviet help in the war with Pakistan, "We Indians are unable to be grateful to anybody," it is difficult to see where else India could turn today for the sort of help it gets from Moscow. Were Sino-Indian relations to improve, of course — following the recent announcement of an ambassadorial exchange, and given that Pakistan no longer poses a problem for New Delhi — India could conceivably lower its dependence on Moscow by increasing its options. At present, this is still largely speculation and the Soviets probably would not permit such a move.

In fact, what is far more likely is that Japan's current pro-Chinese policy and willingness to sign a peace treaty with China to formally end World War II may make the Soviets wish to draw closer to New Delhi to counter the Tokyo-Peking friendship. Moscow warned Japan not to accept the Chinese demand that the pact include a provision for both countries to oppose all efforts of any third nation to achieve "hegemony" in Asia — aimed, say the Soviets (and the Chinese have not denied it), at the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Gromyko was unable to prevent the Japanese from reaching an agreement with China, nor did the Soviets give in to Japan's demand for the return of its four northern islands seized by the USSR at the end of World War II. Consequently, Japanese Prime Minister Miki stated that Gromyko's visit would have "no impact" on Japan's negotiations with China.[38] This attitude coupled with the fact that

[36] Robert A. Scalapino, "China and the Balance of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1974, pp. 366-367.
[37] Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh . . .*, p. 227.
[38] *New York Times*, January 14, 1976.

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Japan's trade with China now stands at $4 billion, twice the volume of its trade with the USSR, makes the Soviets nervous. Since the Japanese are close to China in culture and do not fear Peking despite China's nuclear weapons, while the Soviet Union is considered a potential adversary, Moscow cannot help but worry at Japan's "tilt" toward China in the Asian power balance. Besides reaffirming its ties with India and Afghanistan, it may again try to entice Pakistan away from China's orbit, contradictory as these aims seem.

Relations with Muslim Countries

The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the resulting oil embargo against the West led to a renaissance of Pan-Islamism. For Pakistan this development, culminating in the Islamic summit meeting held in Lahore on February 22, 1974, was the fulfillment of an old dream. That Pakistan had served as the initiator of the conference, which lasted three days and was attended by thirty-seven countries, was a source of great satisfaction. Lahore contained architectural reminders of a past when Muslim conquerors had established their rule over India. Moreover, photographs of King Faisal (Saudi Arabia), President Anwar Sadat (Egypt), President Hafiz Assad (Syria), President Houari Boumedienne (Algeria), Sheikh Sabah al Salim (Kuwait), Yasser Arafat (PLO), and of Prime Minister Bhutto and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Bangladesh) praying side by side in the Badshahi mosque — one of the most beautiful mosques in the world — served as a dramatic visual illustration of the unity of the Muslim world.

While Pakistan has gained materially (over $1 billion in the 1973-1976 period) from its close identification with the Arab world, the satisfaction felt goes beyond mere dollars and cents. It implies a sense of identity, pride and acceptance, a recognition that though the state is a young one and was made to suffer inferiority at Indian hands, it is part of an old but vital religion and culture. Pakistan's search for friends, an important element of its foreign policy, now seems closer to being satisfied.

Not until the Arab oil embargo in 1973 did Pan-Islamism again become a respectable slogan. With the acceptance of the concept of an Islamic brotherhood in interstate relations, Pakistan's relations with all the Arab countries improved. Better relations have also led to an increase in the volume of trade with the Middle East: exports to the Arab countries, which amounted to only 12 per cent of total exports in 1971, had risen to nearly 33 per cent by 1975.

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The Indian Nuclear Explosion

In May 1974 India exploded a "nuclear device" in its western region bordering on Pakistan, and the point was not lost on its neighbor. The Pakistani foreign minister embarked on a tour of Western capitals in search of a "nuclear umbrella." Although he was unsuccessful on that score, Washington and Peking renewed their pledge in support of Pakistan's territorial integrity.

Within the United Nations Pakistan championed the concept of a "nuclear-free zone" in the Indian Ocean with some success, the Indians adding that such a zone should not be imposed by outside powers. Pakistan also pledged to go ahead with its own nuclear development. The high cost, said Bhutto, would be borne "even if we have to eat grass."

While the West accepted India's pledge to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, in Islamabad this was interpreted as a move to "blackmail" Pakistan and establish Indian hegemony. In the first editorial following the Indian explosion, the *Pakistan Times* commented: "The explosion in Rajasthan spells fresh perils not only for Pakistan . . . but for other nations lying in the danger zone."[39] In a news conference on the previous day, Prime Minister Bhutto had said that nuclear weapons were used "primarily for political blackmail and coercion."[40] Unlike the major powers, India could not be expected to exercise restraint, because it did not have the maturity that comes with great-power status. Bhutto added:

> If ever there was a nation capable of using atomic weapons, it was India. If India was ever in a tight corner, it would never hesitate to use the atomic bomb. . . . The nuclear status had been acquired to brandish a nuclear sword to coerce, to impose hegemony over neighbors and to extract political concessions.[41]

India's growing nuclear capability provides another challenge for Pakistani foreign policy. It offers an opportunity for oil-rich nations such as Iran to exchange oil for Indian technology.

Relations with Iran

Iran rendered Pakistan both moral and material support in the war with India in 1965, and to a lesser extent again in 1971. The special relationship that has existed between the two countries has given Pakistan a feeling of security, especially in view of the Ameri-

[39] May 21, 1974.
[40] *Dawn*, May 20, 1974.
[41] *Pakistan Times*, June 8, 1974.

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can arms embargo imposed for ten years after 1965. During those years friendship with Iran — and China — helped to counter a feeling of despair and isolation in Pakistan. In recognition of this factor, India has intensified overtures toward Iran, and what is emerging may be a relationship that will have far-reaching consequences.

In the past Pakistan's relations with Iran were greatly influenced by both countries' dependence on the United States and their common distrust of the Soviet Union. Moscow responded by supporting India and Afghanistan against Pakistan, and Iraq against Iran. But the fluid situation of the 1960s was replaced by an even more complex set of relationships in the early 1970s; the clear delineation between friends and enemies marking the 1950s seemed gone forever. Instead, the Soviets made agreements with Iran even as they signed a friendship treaty with Iraq, and entered into a modest agreement to supply Pakistan with arms while making a major commitment to Indian military strength.

In the economic sphere they announced in 1966 that "the period of one-sided orientation has ended, and the first results are apparent": in Soviet help to Iran in the construction of two hydroelectric plants on the Amur River, which runs along the Soviet-Iranian border; in establishing a sturgeon hatchery in Resht; in developing the bay at Pahlevi; in constructing a major metallurgical plant in Isfahan and a heavy-machine-building plant in Arak. According to the Soviet press, these were the advantages accruing to Iran when it "broke the monopoly of one-sided international ties"[42] — that is, modified the exclusively Western slant of Iranian foreign policy. At the same time, the Soviets joined Iraq in "supporting the struggle of patriots in the Southern Arabian Peninsula and in Oman for national independence and freedom,"[43] here referring to the role played by Great Britain and conservative Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia's in putting down leftist uprisings.

The increase in Iranian power and prestige coincided with Pakistan's decline following its defeat at Indian hands and the separation of East Pakistan. The power balance on the subcontinent stood fundamentally altered, and with that the equation between Iran and Pakistan changed as well. From 1947 to 1971 Pakistan had been the more dynamic partner, with a larger population and (after 1955) an impressive military establishment, a growing industrial base, and tripolar relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and China, which were somehow more relevant. The withdrawal of Britain from

[42] *Pravda*, October 23, 1966, in *CDSP*, vol. XVIII, no. 43.
[43] *Izvestia*, April 28, 1967, in *CDSP*, vol XIX, no. 17.

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the Persian Gulf in 1971 and the rising importance of oil as a crucial factor in international relations shifted the importance to Iran just as Pakistan, truncated and weakened by its losses, began a period of soul-searching and reconstruction.

That the Soviet Union had recognized the importance of oil diplomacy as early as 1968 was reflected in Kosygin's remarks made during his visit to Iran in that year. "It is common knowledge," declared the Soviet premier, "that your country is rich in natural resources, oil, gas, nonferrous metals. . . . In a spirit of cooperation the Soviet Union is ready to assist Iran in the swiftest possible development of these natural resources."[44] However, it was only after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the resultant embargo that oil became an important weapon as well as a means of enriching nations fortunate enough to possess it. Iran led the OPEC fight to increase the price of oil. As a result, its revenue from oil went from approximately $5 billion in 1973 to nearly $22 billion in 1975,[45] and its power and prestige in the area increased commensurately. It was able to use some of this vast new wealth to buy arms, paying for them in cash or in oil and not having to seek military aid as Pakistan does. For example, Iran is expected to purchase $9 billion worth of arms from the United States alone over the next few years.[46] In addition, some 700 Chieftain tanks were ordered from the United Kingdom. Iran's naval force is to increase fourfold by 1978, with a fleet of destroyers, cruisers, and the world's largest fleet of hovercraft.

Meanwhile, the Pakistan position is becoming weaker despite the United States lifting the arms embargo because of increased Soviet shipments of sophisticated military hardware to India. Still, Pakistan possesses trained military personnel, and could be of some use to Iran while the latter is engaged in building up manpower;[47] the handicap for the Pakistani military might be that they have been trained on an older, less sophisticated generation of American weapons.

For the United States Iran offers what the *New York Times* editorialized as "a Nixon Doctrine ideal; a small stable state which is willing and apparently able to defend both itself and parallel American interests in a vitally strategic area."[48] With the growth in size,

[44] *Pravda*, April 3, 1968, in *CDSP*, vol. XX, no. 14.

[45] Oil comprises 80 per cent of Iran's total income.

[46] This will include thirty advanced F-14 Tomcat Fighters and fifty Air Force F-15 Eagles.

[47] However, in view of Pakistan's role in training the armed forces in Libya and in some emirates, Iran may be unwilling to accept such help.

[48] July 24, 1973. Furthermore, Iran has purchased four nuclear power plants from the West, and Indians can help in running them.

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capability and firepower of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, this area is becoming increasingly important in the competition between the USSR and the United States, and as a major power in the Gulf Iran will be vital to American interests. Now that the Suez Canal has been reopened, Soviet naval vessels will have direct passage from the Mediterranean Sea into the Persian Gulf, rather than via the longer route from Vladivostok and the Far East. For the West, Iran's naval strength could thus be a critical factor in keeping open shipping lanes from an area endowed with half of the total oil reserves of the noncommunist world.

Iran and India

Newfound wealth and power have made Iran the target of Indian overtures, to which the Shah has been receptive, the special relationship with Pakistan notwithstanding. Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Iran in May 1974, which coincided with the Indian nuclear explosion, resulted in greatly improved relations. There is a *quid pro quo* operating here. Iran has the oil and the money; India, the technology (including nuclear technology) — far superior to that of Pakistan. Increasingly, the two are likely to collaborate in an exchange of natural resources for manpower. Already India, which buys almost two-thirds of its oil from Iran, has softened the impact of rising fuel prices by winning Iranian agreement to pay only one-third of the cost now and the remainder after five years at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent. Furthermore, Iran has agreed to help expand the capacity of the Madras refinery to 6.5 million tons of oil a year, with financing and additional supplies of Iranian crude oil. This coupled with the discovery of oil off Bombay, in sufficient quantities to supply the Bombay refinery, will ease pressures concerning oil for India. Iran has also agreed to provide easy-term loans toward expanding the production of iron ore at Kudremukh to 7.5 million tons a year. In return, it is to get the first option to buy. The two countries have agreed to start a shipping line, and India will provide Iran with engineers, technicians, educators and doctors.

The Shah's visit to New Delhi in October 1974 reinforced these rapidly growing ties with an offer of nearly $1 billion in credits to India. The Indians see benefits from a close relationship in the form of further Iranian credits, an uninterrupted flow of oil and, equally important, freedom from fear of Iranian arms shipments to Pakistan. For the Shah, a better relationship with India boosts his image as an international figure and brings him raw materials and

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technical help.[49] Politically, however, he will back the territorial integrity of Pakistan, as he needs a buffer state between Iran and India. In return, Pakistan will be expected to modify its support of Qaddafi, acknowledge the Persian Gulf area as being of Iranian concern, and henceforth assume the role of junior partner vis-a-vis Iran.

Fears of any coolness in Iranian-Pakistani relations are exaggerated. Iran helped Pakistan to the tune of $850 million in 1974-1975, and the Shah's attempts to draw Afghanistan out of the Soviet orbit by offering an alternate source of economic aid are aimed equally at lessening tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, it is naive to expect a country to base relations with other countries solely on its policies toward friends. Iran cannot be expected to maintain poor relations with India over Pakistan, especially in light of the more aggressive thrust of Iranian foreign policy. The crucial factor is not that Iran helps India, but whether it also helps Pakistan. It does, and the Pakistani Foreign Office accepts the distinction.

American Presence in the Indian Ocean?

When the Shah was asked in a recent interview whether Iran would favor an increased American presence in the Persian Gulf, given the USSR's increasing activities there, he replied: "Yes. I would prefer that neither were in the Persian Gulf, because there is no need for them. But if the Soviets are there, why not the Americans?"[50] This attitude also reflects Pakistan's views regarding an American presence in the Indian Ocean, with the additional proviso that the Indian navy should be kept in check.

The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean began to increase after the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967. In the period 1967-1973 the Soviet merchant marine was much more active (850 vessels) than that of the United States (250 vessels). In terms of warships, the buildup started in 1968, reached a peak in 1970, leveled off by 1971 and again peaked in 1973. Indications are that following the reopening of the Suez Canal the Soviets have begun to increase their presence once again.[51]

The U.S. decision to upgrade the naval base at Diego Garcia was not popular with the Soviet Union, which called it an "endeavor by the Pentagon to secure for itself a military staging

[49] *Business Week*, November 17, 1975.
[50] Alexander O. Ghebhardt, "Soviet and U.S. Interests in the Indian Ocean," *Asian Survey*, August 1975, p. 675.
[51] See *Pravda*, February 27, 1974, in *CDSP*, vol. XXVI, no. 9.

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ground with far-reaching aims in this strategically important part of the world."[52] Moscow recognized the importance of the area not only because trade routes linking Asia with Europe and America run through it, but also because, as *Pravda* pointed out, "the countries of the Indian Ocean basin possess more than half of all proven oil reserves; the world's rubber and the production and the extraction of tin ore are largely concentrated there."[53] Moscow detects duplicity in Peking's role in all this, charging that while the Chinese leadership pays lip service to the idea of a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean, it in fact supports the establishment of an American base "by repeating the imperialist fabrications about the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean."[54] The Soviets are no doubt also aware that from the Indian Ocean key areas of the USSR can be brought into range for Polaris missiles.

While the U.S. Congress has been reluctant to allocate funds to improve the runways and communication facilities at Diego Garcia, saying that this would force the USSR to react, the fact remains that the Soviets already have access to naval bases at Um Qasr (Iraq), Berbera (Somalia), on the island of Socotra and at Khormaksar (Aden), along with the use of facilities in Yemen. Together with Soviet involvement in Angola on the western coast of Africa, Soviet offers to build a base in Guinea, Soviet use of Lagos in Nigeria, and Soviet military aid to all three countries, these inroads might lead to a Soviet collective security system in Africa similar to the proposed Brezhnev plan for Asia. Such a scheme could threaten the shipping of oil and other commodities around the Cape of Good Hope to Europe, a route through which NATO nations get 80 per cent of their oil and 70 per cent of their strategic materials.

NATO analysts apparently are concerned about such a possibility and point to Samuel P. Huntington's remark: "It is not who suffers from aggression but who benefits from it; the overall object is not to deter aggression but to maintain the balance of power."[55] The balance is now jeopardized by the superior position of the USSR from which its aircraft, ships and submarines can control the Indian Ocean's sea routes to Europe and America.

IV

The goals and challenges facing Pakistani foreign policy still center on issues of territorial integrity, economic development

[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] *New York Times*, January 19, 1976.
[55] *Ibid.*

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and a search for friends. The fulfillment of these objectives is made more complicated, even as it is helped, by the subcontinent acting as an arena where China, the USSR and the United States play out their rivalries. Within this framework, Pakistan has attempted to formulate policies that would assure it of certain rewards and advance it toward its goals, e.g., its alliance with Washington or, some two decades later, its role in bringing the United States and China together. At other times, it has suffered at the hands of external events, as from the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty.

Lines of friendship are never drawn permanently, and South Asian friendships are no exception. Since 1971, the main period considered here, Pakistan has improved its relations with Bangladesh, the latter's relations with India have become strained, China and India have announced the exchange of ambassadors (withdrawn in 1962), and India and Pakistan are to re-establish diplomatic relations. Where does this leave the Soviet Union and the United States? While it is probably wise not to read too much into these recent events, we may be witnessing part of an attempt, no matter how preliminary, to evolve a new set of relationships among the South Asian countries themselves. If they can control their conflicts with each other, this will enable them to fight the common problems that will in the end determine their survival — those of overpopulation, illiteracy, hunger and political instability. The superpowers should encourage, not hinder, this evolution.

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JAPAN'S PERSPECTIVES AND EXPECTATIONS REGARDING AMERICA'S ROLE IN KOREA*

by Yung H. Park

This article's primary purpose is to examine Japan's perceptions and expectations regarding the United States' role in Korea in the post-Vietnam period. More specifically it seeks to answer the following questions. How does Japan view America's policy in Korea? What role is the United States expected to play? Why such a role? How does this role fit into Japan's overall policy toward two Koreas? Do Japanese expectations differ from what the United States perceives to be her role? If so, how? In addressing these questions major attention will center on Japan's domestic politics, and especially on those elements that play key roles in the formulation of her foreign policy (i.e., the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party and the business community). First examined will be Japan's Korean policy in the 1970s, for it is in this context that Tokyo views America's policy and role in Korea.

Japan's Korean Policy

Japan's posture toward Korea in the early 1970s had an air of cautious optimism, attributable to a series of external developments affecting East Asian international relations. The 1972 Nixon-Chou meeting highlighted in dramatic fashion the fact that international politics had been undergoing major changes for several years. Although in many respects the summit meeting gave impetus to trends underway for some time, it nevertheless symbolized the beginning of a new era in Asian relations. The *volte face* in Washington's China policy precipitated a reassessment of Japan's traditional orientation toward Asian communist states, which culminated

* The original version of this article was presented at an international symposium, "A Reassessment of America's Role in Asia: Korea and Vietnam," held February 6 and 7, 1976 at Arizona State University, Tempe. The author expresses his appreciation to the Humboldt State University Foundation whose grant made possible his research trip to Japan in 1975, and to numerous individuals in Japan who provided him with valuable information on aspects of Japanese foreign policy.

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in Tokyo's recognition of Peking, Hanoi and Ulan Bator. Of particular importance to Japan's Korean policy was the historic initiation in 1972, following the thawing of tension between the two major transpacific powers, of a Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue. The de facto recognition of Pyongyang by Seoul made it possible for North Korea to launch an intensive diplomatic offensive that led to her entry into important world organizations (e.g., the World Health Organization) and to the establishment of diplomatic relations with a large number of noncommunist nations, including five Scandinavian countries in March 1973.

Japan's changing attitude toward North Korea was strongly influenced next by certain dramatic turnabouts in Seoul's traditional foreign policy. Deviating from its "Hallstein doctrine," Seoul chose not to sever relations with countries now recognizing Pyongyang. Another policy departure was its shift from eschewing all contacts with communist nations to seeking improved relations with "nonhostile" communist states including the Soviet Union and China. In June 1973 President Park further reversed his earlier position, saying that he would not oppose the simultaneous entry of two Koreas into the United Nations as a step toward eventual unification.[1]

In face of these developments the Tokyo government and its two pillars — the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) and the business community (*zaikai*) — mellowed toward North Korea. The pro-Seoul consensus within the party quickly disintegrated, and the concept of "two Koreas" gained strong momentum. LDPers belonging to the Society for the Study of Afro-Asian Problems (*Ajia afurika mondai kenkyukai,* commonly known as the AA group), long the intraparty champion of improved relations with communist states, vigorously pushed for a change in Tokyo's posture. The breakdown of the party's consensus was obvious when AA members joined with opposition parties to form a suprapartisan Dietmen's League for the Promotion of Japanese-North Korean Relations (*Nitcho yuko sokushin giin renmei*) in October 1971, and when a League mission headed by Kuno Chuji, a leading AA member, was dispatched to Pyongyang in January 1972. A major outcome of this "unofficial diplomacy" was a Japanese-North Korean communique stating pledges and hopes shared by both parties.

The League group and the North Koreans noted with optimism that "positive efforts by both peoples will lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations," and stressed the importance

[1] Saito Takashi, "Japan and Korean Unification," *Japan Interpreter,* Winter 1973, p. 31. See also *Asahi shimbun* (hereafter referred to as *Asahi*), June 23, 1973 (evening).

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of "people's diplomacy" in all areas to promote Japanese-North Korean friendship. Pledging efforts to improve trade ties, both parties proposed the use of loans from Japan's Export-Import Bank (a governmental corporation) and the reciprocal establishment of trade missions. The communique also urged that Tokyo "abandon its unfriendly policy" toward Pyongyang.[2] Further reflecting the LDP's changing mood was the decision by AA members, including Utsunomiya Tokuma, to join the opposition parties in organizing a National Council for the Normalization of Japanese-North Korean Relations (*Nitcho kokko seichoka kokumin kaigi*) in September 1973. Inaugurated with the backing of all opposition parties and major labor groups, the Council called for early recognition of North Korea and changes in Tokyo's Seoul policy as a way of contributing to the peaceful unification of two Koreas.[3]

The business community's posture was decisively affected by the changing orientation of international politics and the thawing of tension in Korea. In the wake of Nixon's China visit Tokyo's policy toward Asian communist regimes underwent a major shift from *seikei bunri* (separation of politics and trade) to the establishment of diplomatic relations and active encouragement of trade. Assured by Peking that her economic interests in Taiwan would not be disrupted, Japan quickly proceeded to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1972. The business community now argued that Japan's new policy should apply to her relations with North Korea. Formation of the Dietmen's League and the Kuno mission were largely in response to the demands of the business sector.[4]

Unlike small and medium-sized firms eager to expand trade with North Korea, industrial giants, and especially those with interests in South Korea, were initially hesitant about climbing on the North Korean bandwagon. The continued thaw in Korea, however, changed this thinking. Industries that had labored under the "Four Principles of Sino-Japanese Trade" (which China had imposed on Japanese business to steer it away from its pro-Taiwan bias) were delighted that North Korea insisted on no such restrictions vis-a-vis Japanese firms with close ties to South Korea. They were especially impressed by the strong interest North Korea — less concerned with Chinese-style "self-reliance" — had shown in purchasing some thirty prefabricated plants from Japan to meet the needs of her six-year economic plan initiated in 1971. Since the export of these plants

[2] *Asahi nenkan* (*Asahi Almanac*), 1973, p. 262.
[3] *Asahi*, September 9, 1973.
[4] *Ibid.*, January 24, 1972 (evening).

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called for the use of Export-Import Bank (EIB) loans, payable on a deferred basis, one can understand the length to which interested Japanese industries (e.g., textiles, shipbuilding, electronics, automobiles and steel) went to persuade the Tokyo government to drop its policy of denying such loans for Japanese-North Korean trade.[5]

Taking advantage of the moderating mood, New-Japan Steel, Japan's largest industrial corporation, and such ambitious auto makers as Toyota (already involved in a joint venture with a South Korean counterpart) and Isuzu quickly initiated talks with the North Korean authorities about exporting their products. In October 1972 an agreement was reached under which New-Japan Steel was to build a steel plant in North Korea. In August 1972, when Toshiba, an electronics giant, agreed to export a massive TV picture-tube manufacturing plant, the transaction was the largest ever made by a Japanese firm with North Korea and was the first electronics-related export to a communist state. It was also revealed that talks were underway for the export of other Toshiba plants manufacturing such items as refrigerators, washing machines and radios.[6]

By the end of 1972 virtually every major corporation had expressed an interest or was involved in business transactions with North Korea. While carrying on individual efforts to establish business ties, leading trading firms had joined hands in July to create a Kyoa Bussan (Kyoa Industrial Company), which would function as their "window agency" in dealing with the North Koreans and complement a North Korea-Japan Import-Export Corporation set up by pro-Pyongyang Korean residents to represent North Korean interests. Significantly, Kyoa Bussan's shareholders included "dummies" or subsidiaries of leading firms in such areas as shipbuilding, petroleum, construction equipment, textiles, steel and iron, and electronics.[7]

Zaikai's activities were not confined to immediate economic concerns. Business leaders concluded that diplomatic normalization and improved business relations with North Korea were inseparable, and that Tokyo's policy of *seikei bunri* was the chief obstacle to increased trade. For this reason they agreed to make greater efforts, comparable to those bearing on the Chinese question,[8] to facilitate a consensus within the government and the LDP in favor of recognizing North Korea. When Pyongyang approached

[5] *Ibid.* See also *Nihon keizai shimbun*, October 5, 1972. (This daily will hereafter be referred to as *NKS*.)

[6] *Asahi*, August 29, 1972.

[7] *NKS*, July 7, 1972.

[8] See my article, "The Politics of Japan's China Decision," ORBIS, Summer 1975, pp. 562-590.

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business elders (e.g., Uemura Kogoro, Nagano Shigeo, Doko Toshio and Iwasa Yoshizane) about a possible mission to North Korea, they were most enthusiastic. The proposed mission, they felt, would go a long way toward improving Japanese-North Korean relations and influencing the LDP government to establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.[9] Subsequently, a decision was made in late 1972 to approve a *zaikai* mission headed by Doko, a vice president of the Federation of Economic Organizations (*Keidanren*) and chairman of Toshiba, and composed of business leaders representing such major firms as Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo.[10]

In the words of the *Nihon keizai shimbun* (*Japan Economic Daily*), often reflecting *zaikai's* thinking, "the business community's demand [for changes in Tokyo's Pyongyang policy] is so vigorous that the government will have to respond to it."[11] The breakthrough in trade relations came in December 1973 when the Tokyo government authorized an EIB loan, payable on a deferred basis, to be used for the export of a towel manufacturing plant, thus departing from its policy of *seikei bunri* and of denying any governmental loans to North Korea. Another loan was later approved for the sale of a nuts and bolts plant. The growing governmental involvement in Japanese-North Korean trade gave further impetus to *zaikai's* rapidly rising expectations regarding North Korean market.[12]

Though relations with Seoul continued to maintain priority, Tokyo was making several cautious but significant changes in its North Korean posture. Going beyond its earlier policy of approving only "humanitarian and cultural contacts," it adopted an "incremental approach" under which all nonpolitical contacts that might lead ultimately to diplomatic normalization were encouraged. Reflecting this changing mood, in June 1972 Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi had announced that his government would now endorse "economic contacts" with North Korea.[13] The forward-looking posture gained such momentum that some Foreign Ministry (*Gaimusho*) officials even proposed a governmental mission to Pyongyang. Also, a view seriously considered within the government was that Tokyo's aid policy toward Seoul should concentrate on light industry and welfare-oriented programs rather than on heavy industry projects, to avoid irritating North Korea unnecessarily.[14]

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[9] *Asahi*, August 8, 1972; *NKS*, September 3, 1972.
[10] *NKS*, September 3, 1972.
[11] *Ibid.*, September 14, 1973.
[12] *Asahi*, December 28, 1973.
[13] *Ibid.*, September 6, 1972 (evening).
[14] *Ibid.*, January 8, 1973 (evening).

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All sectors of the government were involved in implementing the incremental policy. The Justice Ministry issued entry permits to a large variety of North Korean visitors, including a group of journalists and even a labor mission attending the 1973 convention of the anti-governmental Japan Teachers' Union.[15] The Postal Service Ministry proposed the establishment of telecommunications services between the two countries. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and *Gaimusho,* favorably responding to domestic pressures, let it be known that the government would seriously consider EIB loan requests even before the establishment of diplomatic relations.[16] MITI, supporting the proposal for trade offices in both countries, included in its 1973 budgetary requests funds for a "private" Japanese trade office in North Korea. In December 1973, as noted earlier, the government authorized its first EIB loan after obtaining Seoul's "reluctant consent."[17]

By the end of 1973 it looked as though a consensus favoring recognition of North Korea was in the making within the government and among its key domestic supporters. In 1974, however, the backing for improved relations was dealt a fatal blow by a series of dramatic Tokyo-Seoul turnabouts, demonstrating the unusually reactive and vulnerable character of Japan's North Korean policy. Tokyo-Seoul relations, which in 1973 had been strained in the wake of the Kim Dae-jung incident, experienced further setbacks in 1974. A thorny issue involved Seoul's trial of Kim on charges of alleged violations of election laws. Tokyo considered the trial and Seoul's reluctance to permit Kim to leave the country a breach of an understanding between the two governments reached in late 1973.

The Tokyo-Seoul relationship was further strained by the arrest and trial of two Japanese citizens in South Korea on charges of attempted subversion through outlawed South Korean youth organizations, and by the alleged North Korean attempt to assassinate the South Korean president in which his wife was killed. The allegation that the assassin, a Korean resident in Japan, was an agent for the Pyongyang-controlled General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (*Chosoren*), was aggressively pushed by Seoul in its demand that the organization be disbanded or at least subjected to greater governmental control. To appease the Seoul government, Premier Tanaka Kakuei attended the funeral of President Park's wife, and Shiina Etsusaburo, LDP vice president, hand-carried to Park a

[15] *Ibid.*, July 4 and 5, 1973.
[16] For Ohira's remarks, see *ibid.*, June 23, 1973 (evening).
[17] *Asahi*, September 6 (evening) and December 28, 1973.

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letter from Tanaka apologizing for Japan's "involvement" in the assassination incident and pledging his efforts to bring *Chosoren* under control.

At the peak of these strains came the controversial remarks of Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio. Challenging the pro-Seoul stance of right-wing LDPers (e.g., Kishi Nobusuke and Shiina), Kimura, advocate of a Tokyo-Pyongyang detente, stated that while Japan was not yet ready to recognize Pyongyang, North Korea did not pose a military threat to the South and hence there was no need for Seoul's fear of invasion. He also rejected the notion that Seoul was the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula. Broadening the so-called Korean clause of the 1969 Nixon-Sato communique, that the security of South Korea was essential to that of Japan, he added that Japan now considered the stability of the entire Korean peninsula essential to her security.[18] The Kimura statements pleased North Korea and her LDP supporters but aggravated Tokyo's relations with Seoul and infuriated the pro-Seoul elements in the LDP.[19]

Concurrently Seoul's relations with Pyongyang turned bad as the initial optimism and hope generated by the easing of tension between the two Koreas evaporated. In the course of a series of talks both sides quickly realized that the formidable differences separating them defied easy reconciliation. They progressively hardened their positions, and by early 1974 their relationship again became extremely hostile, producing small-scale skirmishes along the border. The Kim incident, Seoul's authoritarian measures to tighten domestic political control, the assassination attempt, and the discovery of the infamous tunnels under the DMZ, all contributed to the revival of tension. The latter two incidents, which profoundly shocked South Korea, reinforced Seoul's claim that Pyongyang had never given up its aggressive designs toward the South.

The deterioration of Tokyo-Seoul relations and the resumption of a "cold war" between the two Koreas had chilling effects on Japan's emerging North Korean policy. Within the ruling party concerted efforts were made by pro-Seoul members to reverse the downward trend in relations with South Korea, and the argument was driven home that any gestures favorable to Pyongyang would further alienate the Seoul government. An unprecedented joint meeting of LDPers belonging to three pro-Seoul organizations — the Japan-South Korea Legislators' Consultative Committee

[18] *Japan Times*, August 31, 1974.
[19] *Asahi*, October 2 and December 9, 1974.

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(*Nikkan giin konshinkai*), the Japan-South Korea Cooperative Committee (*Nikkan kyoryoku iinkai*), and the Asian Parliamentary Union (*Ajia kokkai giin rengokai*) — in September 1974 featured bitter criticisms of Kimura's "irresponsible" remarks. Also under pressure from these LDPers, the Executive Board (*Somukai*) decided to explore ways to regulate *Chosoren's* political activities more effectively.[20] The assassination attempt, the tunnels, and Kim Il Sung's apparently belligerent utterances were cited by pro-Seoul LDPers to counter pro-Pyongyang members' arguments that North Korea was not aggressive and was seeking a peaceful unification of the peninsula.[21] It was evident that Kishi, Fukuda Takeo, Funada Naka, Shiina and other elders still carried weight in LDP politics and were a major influence in the party's Korean stand. Obviously to reinforce the position that any improvement of relations with Pyongyang must come within the framework of close Tokyo-Seoul relations, Miki Takeo, the new LDP president and premier, welcomed and attended a January 1975 meeting of Japanese and South Korean legislators where a resolution was adopted calling for a prudent approach toward North Korea lest "the precarious balance of power in Asia" and Japanese-South Korean relations be impaired.[22]

Zaikai's hopes were equally dampened by the renewed tension between the Koreas and Seoul's mercurial relations with Tokyo. *Zaikai* leaders now felt that efforts to improve trade with North Korea could proceed solely on the basis of close Tokyo-Seoul cooperation and that the North Korean issue should not be allowed to aggravate already strained relations with Seoul. Business leaders also came to the conclusion that Japan's active trade policy with North Korea was inappropriate considering the Korean tension.

Even when most Japanese firms were rushing to the North Korean market, certain companies, concerned with Seoul's reactions, abided by "voluntary restraints" in dealing with North Korea. For example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries decided to shun getting involved in any transactions that Seoul would interpret to be strengthening Pyongyang's military might. Mitsubishi even turned down a North Korean offer to buy a cement plant. Several reasons accounted for this sensitivity to the Seoul government. Between Fujino Chujiro, chairman of the Mitsubishi Trading Company, and South Korea's President Park an informal understanding held that Mitsubishi would refrain from exporting any production facilities

[20] *Sekai (The World)*, November 1974, pp. 186 and 200.
[21] *Ibid.*, April 1975, p. 178.
[22] *Ibid.*

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that would add to Pyongyang's military potential.[23] The company was deeply involved in the South Korean economy, holding a major share of private Japanese investments in the country.[24] Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, under contract to provide expensive equipment needed to complete the expansion program of South Korea's largest iron and steel works in Pohang, was counting on additional orders from Seoul.

Altogether, larger gains were expected from the South Korean market than from North Korea, and for the time being greater efforts were required to develop trade ties with the South. The strategy was to wait until formal relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang had significantly improved and then embark upon an aggressive drive into the North Korean market. Mitsubishi leaders again saw wisdom in the celebrated statement by Makida Yoichiro, late president of the heavy industries branch, on his company's China policy in the pre-1972 years: "Although we are not on the [China] bandwagon, we will catch up with them by jet plane."[25]

As the Koreas reverted to hostility, and Tokyo-Seoul relations continued to deteriorate, the caution that had characterized Mitsubishi's North Korean posture came to affect other industrial giants as well. The proposed *zaikai* mission never materialized, as interested business leaders took their names out of it. Against this background the new Miki government decided in December 1974 not to authorize EIB loans even for the export of light industry plants to North Korea "for the time being." The government also announced that the sale of heavy industry plants would not be authorized as long as tension between the Koreas continued.[26] Significantly, these "retrograde" decisions came at a time when Tokyo was liberalizing trade restrictions vis-a-vis other communist nations in response to *zaikai's* demands. Only hours before the North Korean decisions it had authorized a loan for a fertilizer plant to go to North Vietnam. Moreover, *Keidanren*, the authoritative business spokesman, indicated that it would seek additional governmental loans for the export of other plants, including steel plants, to Hanoi.[27] As a result of the government's decisions, Japan's plant exports to North Korea and major transactions requiring the

[23] *NKS*, December 28, 1972 (evening).

[24] For Mitsubishi's involvement in South Korea, see Nakagawa Nobuo, "Kankoku no nakano 'nihon kabushiki kaisha'," ("Japan Incorporated" in South Korea), *Sekai*, January 1974, pp. 130-135.

[25] *NKS*, December 28, 1972 (evening).

[26] *Sekai*, March 1975, p. 207.

[27] *Asahi*, January 3, 1975.

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use of EIB loans came to a sudden halt, to the grave dismay of the business community.

On the whole Tokyo's policy toward North Korea was now noticeably cautious. While admitting that Seoul was not the only legitimate Korean government, it went out of its way to stress that it was not considering diplomatic recognition of Pyongyang.[28] By the end of 1974 the momentum for a Japanese-North Korean detente had come to a virtual standstill, and pro-Seoul positions were reasserted within the government. For example, in rebuttal to the Kimura statement that "there is no threat from the north," Defense Agency Chief Yamanaka Sadanori said that "foreign governments have no right to pass judgments" on such a matter.[29] Premier Miki, reputed to be a champion of improved relations with communist nations, quickly identified himself with pro-Seoul LDPers. In his first policy speech before the Diet in January 1975, he made clear his leaning toward Seoul when he announced that "Japan will further strengthen friendly relations with South Korea and with all countries in Asia."[30]

Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, in elaborating on Miki's statement, said:

> In the past year or so there have been several unhappy developments in Japanese-Republic of Korea relations, but the importance of close Japanese-Republic of Korea relations in our foreign policy has not diminished at all. Our government sincerely hopes that there will be peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Our government also intends to make greater efforts to improve friendly relations with the Republic of Korea.[31]

While rejecting his predecessor's (Kimura's) "no threat from the north" view, the new foreign minister nevertheless admitted that his government was "most uneasy about the situation" on the Korean peninsula.[32]

Effects of the Indochina Debacle

Seoul's charges of Pyongyang's aggressive intentions gained new emphasis after the communist takeovers in Indochina, prompting Washington to reassure the South Koreans about its commitments, including "use of tactical nuclear weapons if required."[33] The post-Vietnam developments had major impacts on

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[28] *Sekai*, November 1974, p. 183.
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Japan Report*, January 16, 1975, p. 3.
[31] *Sekai*, April 1975, p. 180.
[32] *Ibid.*, May 1975, p. 219.
[33] For discussion of this and related aspects of post-Vietnam developments in

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Japan's Korean policy. Even before the collapse of the Saigon government *Gaimusho* concluded that the National Liberation Front's victory in South Vietnam was inevitable and that Japan's foreign policy should be formulated on the basis of this eventuality.[34] One result was to strengthen Japan's traditional ties with the United States and South Korea, so that Washington's renewed pledges to Seoul and Tokyo were welcomed.

During his Washington visit in April 1975, Foreign Minister Miyazawa told President Ford and Dr. Kissinger that close American-Japanese relations and firm American commitment to Seoul were all the more important in the post-Vietnam period. In fact, just before Miyazawa left for Washington, the LDP's three committees on foreign and security affairs (the Foreign Policy Division, the Investigative Committee on Foreign Policy, and the Investigative Committee on National Security) passed a joint resolution urging him to stress the importance of the American-Japanese alliance during his talks with Washington officials. He was also urged to tell American leaders that they should not falter in their commitment to Seoul.[35] At a Washington press conference Miyazawa reaffirmed the spirit of the 1969 Nixon-Sato communique stating the importance of South Korea to Japan's security. Significantly, President Ford chose to reiterate America's Asian commitments in his April 10 speech before Congress while Miyazawa was still in Washington.[36]

When Miki met with Ford in Washington in August, Korea was again a priority item. Reflecting the LDP's dominant pro-Seoul view,[37] Miki agreed that "the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula, which in turn is necessary for peace and security in East Asia, including Japan." Urging Ford to maintain current American policy toward Seoul so that the delicate equilibrium in Korea would not be disturbed,[38] he said "We trust there will be no sudden change in this U.S. policy."[39]

South Korea and in the American-South Korean relationship, see Robert F. Rogers, "Korea: Old Equation, New Factors," ORBIS, Fall 1975, pp. 1115-1125; Kitabatake Kasumi, "Tohoku ajia ni okeru nikkanbei" (Japan, South Korea and the U.S. in East Asia), *Sekai*, June 1975, pp. 183-184; and *Asahi*, August 28, 1975.

[34] *Asahi*, April 4, 1975.

[35] "Miyazawa hobei ni miru hoshugaiko no konmei" (Conservative Diplomacy's Confusion as Revealed in Miyazawa's U.S. Visit), *Sekai*, June 1975, pp. 183-184.

[36] *Yomiuri shimbun*, April 12, 1975.

[37] Just before Miki left for Washington, Shiina Etsusaburo urged the premier to handle the Korean question most prudently lest Tokyo-Seoul relations suffer. See *Asahi*, August 1, 1975.

[38] *Sekai*, October 1975, p. 214.

[39] Hirasawa Kazushige, "Japan's Emerging Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1975, p. 169.

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The American-Japanese security talks of August 1975 in Tokyo set the stage for closer security cooperation between the two countries. Korea was again a key topic of discussion. Acting on the Self-Defense Agency's judgment that North Korea posed a threat to South Korea and that "the possibility of limited military conflicts in Korea has increased in the post-Vietnam period," Agency Director Sakata Michita, with his cabinet's understanding, formally requested Defense Secretary Schlesinger to see that "American troops in South Korea be maintained on a long-term basis."[40] Sakata also reassured the Americans of "continued use of their bases" in Japan and pledged that his government would strengthen its self-defense capabilities. With regard to "prior consultations" on military operations launched from U.S. bases in Japan, he indicated that in actual crises threatening South Korea's security Japan would not hesitate or quibble in saying yes. The Sakata-Schlesinger communique showed that an agreement had been reached on the "long-term stationing of American troops" in South Korea.[41]

The post-Indochina events also decided the Tokyo government to speed the process of restoring relations with Seoul to the level obtaining before the Kim Dae-jung affair, although the strengthening of Tokyo-Seoul ties had the effect of thwarting Japan's desire to institute a more balanced diplomacy with both Koreas. The new posture was strongly endorsed by *Gaimusho,* pro-Seoul LDP leaders and Dietmen (e.g., Deputy Premier Fukuda and LDP Vice President Shiina), and the business community. A major indication of LDP support for the Seoul government was the creation of a Japan-South Korea Legislators' League (*Nikkan giin renmei*). Organized in June 1975 to replace *Nikkan giin konshinkai,* which was composed of South Korean and pro-Seoul LDP Dietmen, the new bi-national group, chaired by none other than Shiina, included more than 170 LDP Dietmen and all Democratic-Socialist Party (DSP) legislators. The latter's participation clearly signaled the success of Seoul's effort to woo non-LDP political forces in Japan and meant a widening of Seoul's appeal in Japanese political circles. Sixty-seven LDP and DSP Dietmen took part in the organization's founding ceremony in Seoul, where congratulatory messages by leaders of both governments, including Premier Miki, were read. While the League's communique expressed support for improved

[40] *Asahi,* August 24, 1975. See also "Sakata's Scenario," an interview between Sakata Michita and Koji Nakamura, *Far Eastern Economic Review,* November 14, 1975, pp. 28-29.

[41] *Asahi,* August 30, 1975. For a summary of the communiqué, see *Japan Times,* August 30, 1975.

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Seoul-Pyongyang relations, it urged the United States to "deter communist aggression" against South Korea by "fully honoring its security commitments in East Asia." It also stressed that Japan should refrain from making "a hasty approach toward North Korea that would disrupt peace on the Korean peninsula" and "the promotion of friendly relations" between Japan and South Korea.[42]

At the same time Japanese businessmen cooperated closely with South Korea. In June Uemura Kogoro, "doyen" of the business community, headed a twenty-three-man *zaikai* group at the seventh annual meeting of the Joint Japan-Republic of Korea Committee for Private Economic Cooperation (*Nikkan minkan godo keizai iinkai*) in Seoul. Significantly, the Japanese delegation, unlike its predecessors, included few proxies. Also significant was the fact that a number of Japanese corporate giants such as New-Japan Steel, whose massive North Korean projects were thwarted by the renewed tension between Seoul and Pyongyang, took no part in the conference. The Japanese participants promised continued economic support to the South Koreans, specifically promising aid and loans for South Korea's fourth five-year plan, to commence in 1977, as well as for development of the heavy and chemical industries.[43]

Gaimusho likewise demonstrated strong support for the Seoul government. For example, speaking before a business group in June, Deputy Foreign Minister Togo Fumihiko said, in indirect criticism of Japanese firms interested in exporting plants to North Korea, that if the prevailing balance of power between the Koreas was disrupted, it would only add to the current tension on the Korean peninsula.[44] Tokyo's Seoul envoy, Nishiyama Akira, confirmed the *Gaimusho* stand in July when he said: "It is singularly important [for Japan] to deter North Korea from disrupting peace in East Asia," and "Japan should not be fooled by North Korea's propaganda."[45]

Bolstered by domestic support, and against the outcries of the opposition parties, the Miki government moved to put aside or remove major irritants in relations with Seoul. In mid-July after returning from Seoul, where an understanding was reached with South Korean leaders on the Kim affair, Miyazawa said that "Japanese-Republic of Korea relations have now returned to normalcy." Signaling the return to normalcy, a Japanese-South Korean min-

[42] For the text of the communiqué, see *Sekai*, September 1975, pp. 231-233.
[43] *Asahi*, September 28, 1975; *Sekai*, September 1975, pp. 214-215.
[44] *Tokyo shimbun*, June 6, 1975.
[45] *Asahi*, July 18, 1975; *Sekai*, September 1975, pp. 197-198.

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isterial conference was held in Seoul in September, for the first time since 1973. As Fukuda, who headed the Japanese delegation, observed, "The world is yet to see peace and stability. In this situation closer Japanese-Republic of Korea cooperation is all the more important"; "we hope that this conference will lay the foundation for such a relationship." Commenting on the strained interlude in Japanese-South Korean relations, Fukuda said, "The soil further firms up after a spell of rain."[46]

A number of key agreements were reached at the meeting, but the Japanese ministers did not endorse Seoul's positions and demands *in toto*. For example, rather than acceding to a Seoul demand that Japan reaffirm her anti-Pyongyang position as defined in the Nixon-Sato communique of 1969, the Japanese suggested the milder language used in the Ford-Miki communique. Seoul later agreed that "good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation" would contribute to the "peace and stability of East Asia."[47] In behind-the-scenes talks, however, the Japanese delegates made known their serious concern with South Korean security. In the area of economics, which was uppermost in South Korean minds, Japan promised continued cooperation and support. Reversing her earlier decision to have private organizations assume responsibility for all aid, loans and investment activities in South Korea after 1977 (when Seoul's current five-year plan is to be completed), she agreed to continue to play a major role in the economic sector. She also agreed to expand her aid and loans for the development of South Korea's heavy industry (e.g., iron and steel).[48]

In the words of the *Nihon keizai shimbun*, Japan's decision to aid the South Korean economy was based on her implicit acceptance of Seoul's position that "the only way to stop the North Korean goal of military unification is to strengthen South Korea's national power through economic means."[49] Though the communique made no specific reference to Seoul urging Tokyo to refrain from approaching Pyongyang too closely, Japan reportedly assured South Korea that her Pyongyang posture would continue to be shaped on the basis of close Tokyo-Seoul cooperation and in a manner not disruptive to Seoul's security.[50]

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[46] *Sekai*, November 1975, p. 159.

[47] For the text of the communiqué, see *Asahi*, September 16, 1975. For a discussion of differences in South Korean and Japanese views on the South Korean security question, see *Japan Times*, September 17, 1975.

[48] *Asahi*, September 10, 16 and 28, 1975

[49] *NKS*, September 16, 1975.

[50] *Asahi*, September 16, 1975.

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Japan and America's Role in Korea

Japan's current perceptions and expectations regarding America's role in Korea must be examined in the context of the preceding discussion. First of all, her domestic political considerations and economic interests have dictated that she pursue a policy of close cooperation with the Seoul government. The LDP, while divided on the Korean issue, has continued to be influenced by a pro-Seoul majority, including a variety of right-wing groups (e.g., *Seirankai* and the Fukuda faction) who have supported Seoul not only for ideological and security reasons but also out of economic considerations that have governed the business community's attitude. Significantly, these groups have had closest ties with "mainstream" *zaikai* leaders; their overriding economic concern involves Japan's large investments and loans to Seoul, totaling more than $1.5 billion, a profitable trade with South Korea, and other functions the Republic performs for the Japanese economy, such as supplying cheap labor.

Thus, at the peak of the war scare in South Korea in the wake of the Indochina debacle, the Tokyo government, backed by pro-Seoul LDPers and business sectors, quickly moved to reiterate its support of the Seoul government and urged the United States to refrain from any actions that might endanger South Korea's security or increase her sense of insecurity. Far from being "pressured" by Washington into stressing South Korea's importance to Japan,[51] Tokyo, it appears, has its own intrinsic reasons to do so; in fact, available evidence suggests that Japan pressed the United States to take an unequivocal position on the defense of South Korea while avoiding actions overtly hostile to North Korea. The continued U.S. commitment to Seoul and the latter's defense capabilities are obviously deemed to be essential guarantees of Japan's interests in South Korea.

The reactive character of Japan's foreign policy has been most conspicuous with regard to developments on the Korean peninsula as well as Seoul's attitudes. Notwithstanding her economic power, she has had little or no control over external developments and has been highly reticent about assuming initiatives in international politics, prompting one Japanese observer to remark that her postwar foreign relations have "developed as a mere repetition of passive responses to successive events rather than as a planned

[51] For a typical argument of this nature, see Jerome A. Cohen, "De-Americanizing South Korea," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 10, 1975.

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policy based on carefully selected policy decisions."[52] When her forward-looking and optimistic posture toward Pyongyang in the early 1970s was frustrated, Japanese leaders deplored this external constraint and obviously decided that efforts should be made to reduce the vulnerability and reactive nature of their North Korean policy. This meant that Japan should forsake the old way of reticence and attempt to play a larger and more active role in shaping developments involving the Korean peninsula.

Insofar as immediate Korean policy is concerned (i.e., to support a viable and independent South Korea), there is a basic convergence of Japanese and American positions. Both Tokyo and Washington support the Seoul government and do not want to see that government overrun by Pyongyang. For this reason, as some Japanese remark, the Japanese have assumed an economic role, and the Americans a military role, in their support of South Korea. Beyond this short-range policy, however, no firm unity of positions is evident between Japan and the United States. This divergence is primarily attributable to Japan's two-Korea inclination and America's one-Korea posture, which are in turn derived from their differing domestic political considerations and external perceptions.

Japan, whose foreign policy has been dictated to an extraordinary degree by economic considerations[53] (hence *zaikai's* influence), has continued to be attracted to the potentials of North Korea's market and natural resources, although this interest has been dampened by Pyongyang's failure to meet its payment obligations to Tokyo in recent months.[54] It is no coincidence that within the ruling Japanese establishment business is in the forefront of the movement to improve relations with North Korea. At the same time the business sector has been most directly and adversely affected by the renewed bellicosity on the Korean peninsula, which has dictated Japan's reversion to her pre-1971 North Korean posture. Japanese corporate leaders who had hopes of expanding their trade with

[52] Yamamoto Mitsuru, Review of F. C. Langdon's *Japan's Foreign Policy*, *Japan Quarterly*, January-March 1975, p. 74.

[53] For example, note Japan's speedy shift from a pro-Israel to a pro-Arab posture during the oil crisis.

[54] *Asahi*, April 26, 1976. For discussion of North Korea's foreign exchange problem and its implications, see Edith Lenart, "A Vicious Circle for Pyongyang," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 19, 1975, pp. 36-37; Komori Yoshihisa, "Kita-chosen shiharai chien eno nihonteki hairyo" (Japan's Special Considerations in Dealing with the Problem of North Korea's Delayed Payment), *Chuo koron (Central Review)*, June 1976, pp. 268-275.

Concerned with adverse effects that any hasty Japanese actions to "solve" the current payment problem might have on Japanese-North Korean relations, the Tokyo government has refused to follow its European counterparts' example in suspending the underwriting of exports to North Korea. See Komori, p. 275.

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North Korea prior to 1974 feel that, although Pyongyang has demanded nothing comparable to China's "Four Principles of Sino-Japanese Trade," business cannot be indifferent to politics, and improved political relations with Pyongyang are intimately related to increased economic activities.[55] Not overlooked by Japanese business is a sizable drop in trade following the deterioration of Tokyo-Pyongyang relations in 1974.[56] Business leaders are painfully aware that the political component of the Japanese-North Korean relationship is largely dependent on relations between Seoul and Pyongyang as well as upon Seoul's attitudes.

The desire to improve relations with North Korea is not confined to left-wing political circles and small business firms heavily dependent on trade with Pyongyang. It enjoys significant support in both the LDP and *zaikai,* key domestic determinants of Japan's foreign policy. Largely for this reason such industrial giants as New-Japan Steel, with an eye on the North Korean market, "judiciously" stayed out of last year's meeting of *Nikkan minkan godo keizai iinkai* in Seoul. Not only pro-Pyongyang AA members but many LDPers of centrist persuasion have strongly supported improving Tokyo's relations with the North Korean regime. Utsunomiya, the leading pro-Pyongyang AA member, has urged relaxation of tension between the Koreas as "a preliminary to eventual unification." He has further argued that to contribute to the reduction of tension Japan should move to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea and make efforts to help improve relations between Washington and Pyongyang.[57]

Tamura Hajime, chairman of AA's Korean Question Subcommittee, and Kuno Chuji, who largely share Utsunomiya's views, maintain that Japanese diplomacy should help to create an international environment making possible peaceful and stable relations between the Koreas. They see Japan's recognition of North Korea contributing immensely to promoting this environment.[58] Even "mainstream" LDPers not belonging to AA, such as Kitazawa

[55] North Korean leaders told LDP Dietman Tamura Hajime in July 1975 that economic and political relations were closely interrelated, and that "Japanese business should not expect to have profitable trade with North Korea while doing nothing to improve political relations with Pyongyang." See Komaki Teruo, "Nitcho boeki no kenkyo to kadai" (The Present State and Tasks of Japanese-North Korean Trade), *Sekai,* November 1975, p. 129.

[56] North Korea's foreign exchange problem contributed to this decrease. See Komori, pp. 268-275. For ups and downs in Japanese-North Korean trade for 1974 and 1975, see *Far Eastern Economic Review,* December 19, 1975, p. 37.

[57] Utsunomiya Tokuma, "Betonamu no kyuhen to chosen seisaku" (Sudden Turn of Events in Vietnam, and Japan's Korean Policy), *Sekai,* June 1975, pp. 44-45.

[58] *Asahi,* September 29, 1975.

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Naokichi, chairman of the party's Investigative Committee on Foreign Policy, feel that Japan has two simultaneous tasks: to improve relations with Pyongyang through increased cultural and economic contacts, and to create an international climate in cooperation with other powers that would stabilize the Korean situation and promote a friendly dialogue between North and South.[59] While there are differences among these positions, all agree that Japanese-North Korean relations are closely connected with an improvement in the climate surrounding the Korean peninsula.

The Miki government obviously feels that a favorable international environment is essential to continued improvement of Japan's relations with North Korea and to the eventual normalization of those relations. Thus, in maintaining a forward-looking posture toward Pyongyang — always within the framework of close Tokyo-Seoul cooperation[60] — it has urged the major powers and especially the United States to assume a larger and more active role in promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. As Miki's foreign policy adviser, Hirasawa Kazushige, declared, "the ultimate challenge to Japanese diplomacy is to influence events away from war and toward a stable peace on the whole of the Korean peninsula."[61] While endorsing (and urging) Washington's commitment to Seoul, the Japanese government has argued that the United States should soften its "hard-line" posture and move in the direction of reducing tension with Pyongyang as a means of stabilizing the situation in Korea. In fact, there is evidence that following the post-Vietnam war scare in East Asia Japanese leaders told Ford and Kissinger that Washington was overly concerned with the short-range objective of deterring North Korea from invading the South, at the expense of long-range concerns. Tokyo's position was that Washington's Seoul policy should not seriously interfere with the larger objective of bringing peace and stability to the Korean peninsula. The American response was that long-range considerations should not jeopardize "the immediate objectives of deterring North Korea from starting a war" and of reducing Seoul's sense of insecurity.[62]

Miki also took the position that Japan and the United States should refrain from actions and statements that would unnecessarily irritate Pyongyang. For this reason, his original language

[59] *Ibid.*, August 2, 1975.
[60] *Ibid.*, September 4, 1975 (evening).
[61] Hirasawa, p. 168.
[62] *Asahi*, August 15, 1975. Discounting the possibility of a Korean war in a television interview in the United States, Miki said that neither South nor North Korea wants war. See *Japan Tmes*, August 11, 1975.

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on the Korean question, drafted in Tokyo for inclusion in the joint Ford-Miki communique, merely stated, without mentioning Japan, that "the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula is essential to peace and stability in Asia," while Ford insisted on reiterating the 1969 Nixon-Sato statement. The final Ford-Miki communique, mentioned earlier, was based on a compromise between these differing positions.[63] But in a private meeting with LDP foreign policy specialists Miyazawa said that as far as its basic intents were concerned, the Ford-Miki statement did not differ from the 1969 Korean clause.[64] Also with an eye on Pyongyang, the Japanese delegation to the Japanese-South Korean ministerial talks, last September, opposed using strong language offensive to North Korea in the joint communique issued at the talks' close.

Assuming that a U.S.-North Korean detente is a key to solving the Korean problem, Japan has made a number of attempts to talk Washington and Pyongyang into initiating a dialogue. These actions may have been encouraged by *Gaimusho's* conclusion that some sort of "unofficial" contacts between the two had already taken place, and that Washington would not oppose meeting with the North Koreans.[65] The so-called Utsunomiya mission of July 1975 is Japan's most publicized attempt to bring about a dialogue. During his secret trip to Pyongyang, obviously taken at Miki's suggestion, the LDP Dietman had lengthy talks with Kim Il Sung. It has been disclosed that he hand-carried Kim's personal letter to Miki, and that Miki later conveyed its contents to Ford during his Washington visit in August 1975. While dismissing "any desire on his part to invade South Korea" and noting his "commitment to peaceful unification," Kim proposed direct talks with the United States that would lead to an American-North Korean bilateral peace agreement to replace the Korean armistice agreement.[66] He also reiterated his opposition to dealing with the Park government, although he said he was prepared to "negotiate with any other regime if it is democratic."[67]

Although Miki did not endorse Kim's proposals *in toto*[68] and did not expect Washington to be receptive to them, he con-

[63] Iwami Takao, "Miki seiken-ron" (A Study of the Miki Regime), *Chuo koron*, December 1975, p. 96.

[64] *Asahi*, August 15, 1975; *Japan Times*, August 8, 1975.

[65] *Asahi*, September 30, 1975.

[66] *Ibid.*, August 2, 1975; *Japan Times*, August 10, 1975.

[67] For a summary of the letter, see *Asahi*, August 10, 1975.

[68] Virtually all LDPers present at the August 2 meeting of chairmen and vice chairmen of the party's two foreign policy committees criticized Kim's proposal of an American-North Korean peace agreement for excluding South Korea. See *ibid.*, August 3, 1975.

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sidered them to be a sign of Pyongyang's flexible posture toward Washington. For this reason, he recommended that Ford make efforts to accommodate to the spirit of Kim's gesture. As for his own policy, Miki argued that improvement in Japanese-North Korean relations would have a moderating effect on Pyongyang's behavior. Indications are that he urged American leaders to follow Tokyo's suit in encouraging "people's diplomacy" with North Korea. Ford was sympathetic toward Miki's suggestions and did not argue against the need for a dialogue between his government and Pyongyang,[69] but stressed that South Korea's sense of security was his foremost concern. Moreover, since the Korean question is "something to be solved by the Koreans themselves," Ford could not agree to Kim's exclusion of the Seoul government from the proposed Washington-Pyongyang dialogue. As Kissinger put it,

> We are not opposed to North Korea as such. What we don't want to do is have bilateral talks with North Korea to the exclusion of South Korea. We don't want to have South Korea maneuvered into the position of an international pariah while we settle the future of North Korea in negotiations with other countries. We would be prepared to participate in any negotiations or in any conference whose composition was reasonably balanced that included South Korea.[70]

Ford's response did not dissipate Tokyo's interest in a Washington-Pyongyang dialogue, as indicated by Japan's diplomatic activities in the United Nations last fall. During the 1975 session she apparently made intense efforts to bring the United States and North Korea together, and Foreign Minister Miyazawa reportedly urged UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to use the prestige of his office to prevail on Washington and Pyongyang to sit in conference on the Korean question.[71] In this Miyazawa may have been prompted by Kissinger's proposal in the UN for a four-state parley by the United States, China and the two Koreas on the Korean question, as well as by his position that Peking's and Pyongyang's rejection of his proposal was not "absolutely their last word on the subject."[72]

As for the long-range future of the Koreas, a consensus is emerging in Japanese politics. Left-wing forces advocate a policy that will contribute to realization of the Korean people's ultimate objective of unification. Conservative groups also speak of Japan's

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[69] A State Department spokesman, commenting on Kim's proposal, referred to Washington's UN resolution on the Korean question, in which the United States expressed an interest in meeting with the North Koreans. See *ibid.*, August 2, 1975.

[70] *Time*, October 27, 1975, p. 37.

[71] *Asahi*, October 17, 1975; *Tong-a ilbo* (Seoul), October 22, 1975.

[72] *Asahi*, October 17, 1975; *Time*, October 27, 1975, p. 37.

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role in terms of creating an international environment conducive to eventual unification. Miki stated, in rebuttal to charges that he was really working for a two-Korea solution, that it was "not desirable to keep the status quo on the Korean peninsula since all Korean people long for reunification."[73] However, the emerging consensus favors stabilization and maintenance of the status quo in Korea "for the time being." This view is particularly strong in business, LDP and bureaucratic circles. Somewhat in contradiction of Miki's public position, *Gaimusho* officials have indicated that "for the time being" Japan's diplomacy should be more concerned with "maintaining the status quo in Korea" than with such long-range considerations as unification.[74] In the words of Ushiba Nobuhiko, a *Gaimusho* councilor and former envoy to Washington, "Of course, we endorse the grand ideal of unification, but it cannot be realized in the near future so long as the ideological confrontation exists between two Koreas. There is no alternative but to maintain the status quo for a considerably long period of time."[75] Largely for this reason, Japan has endorsed the simultaneous entry of North and South Korea into the UN as well as the "cross-recognition" formula under which Chinese and Soviet recognition of South Korea would be reciprocated by American and Japanese recognition of North Korea.

There is reason to believe that Japan's two-Korea status quo is also influenced by her perceptions of the major powers' intentions and of the Sino-Soviet conflict. While both Moscow and Peking hammer home the theme of Korea's peaceful unification, in Tokyo's thinking the two communist powers are committed to maintaining the present division. Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese place as high a priority on Korean unification as does North Korea. In fact, both powers are against seeing Korea unified for their own reasons. China does not want a unified Korea to fall under the "hegemony" of any of the three major powers and especially the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has similar fears vis-a-vis other powers and especially China. Moreover, to the Chinese and Soviets a Korea unified and controlled by Kim does not necessarily guarantee a friendly and cooperative policy. Their experience with and perceptions of Kim brand him as an unreliable ally. As far as the Chinese are concerned, this view of Kim has been reinforced by his refusal to echo Peking's warnings against the dangers of super-

[73] *Japan Times*, June 19, 1975.
[74] *Ibid.*
[75] *Asahi*, September 24, 1975.

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power (i.e., Soviet) hegemony in Asia, despite Peking's support of his recent contention that Pyongyang is the sole legal government on the Korean peninsula. That the Soviets have yet to endorse this formula implies its rejection.

Japan obviously believes Moscow's interest in maintaining the Korean status quo is serious, as demonstrated in Soviet overtures to Seoul and in USSR endorsement of a cross-recognition proposal. Inasmuch as the major powers place a premium on the status quo rather than on a unified Korea, Japan feels that this common policy should be formalized in a big-power pact as a more effective guarantee of peace and stability in the peninsula. In March 1975 Miki said that any Japanese plan for recognition of Pyongyang must be acceptable to both Koreas and that his government had no such plan at the time. Since South Korea will oppose Japanese and American recognition of Pyongyang until the two communist powers recognize Seoul, Miki was "in effect insisting on a reciprocal normalization of relations between the two Koreas and the four major powers."[76] Japan is of the opinion that neither the four-power pact nor reciprocal normalization will come into being soon. Although Moscow has hinted its endorsement of these suggestions, both China and North Korea have rejected them as perpetuating the divided status in Korea. However, Pyongyang apparently fears that at some point in the future the Soviet Union and even China might move to improve their relations with — and even to recognize — Seoul. This fear has been reinforced by growing Soviet-South Korean contacts, Japanese and American support of cross-recognition, and China's improving relations with Japan and the United States.

It was to forestall such moves on the part of the two communist powers that Pyongyang in 1975 reverted to its earlier argument that it represented the only "independent" state of the Korean people and that "the Seoul government is not an independent state but a puppet of the U.S. with no capacity for independent action."[77] For the same reason, Kim proposed direct bilateral talks with the United States in his message to Miki last summer. Moreover, North Korea bluntly warned that "socialist" states "cannot deal with puppets . . . still less recognize them."[78] Subsequently, during his trip to Peking, Kim obtained China's concurrence with his position, as noted earlier.

[76] D. S. Zagoria and Y. K. Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," *Asian Survey*, December 1975, p. 1034.
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 1025.
[78] *Ibid.*

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So long as Pyongyang remains adamant in opposing a two-Korea formula and the Sino-Soviet split continues, it is unlikely that the four powers will agree to reciprocal recognition. However, the Tokyo government appears to feel that sooner or later North Korea will come around to seeing the new political realities in East Asia and opt for a two-Korea policy that the major powers favor. Japan's hope is that the United States can do more in facilitating this change in Pyongyang's policy. If China places high priority on improving relations with Tokyo and Washington, as she appears to be doing, she may also be persuaded into adopting a milder posture toward Seoul as a gesture of good will.[79] Indications are that when pressing matters more directly affecting Sino-Japanese relations (e.g., the proposed Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and amity and the so-called anti-hegemony controversy)[80] are settled, Japan may accord the Korean question more attention in her China diplomacy. *Gaimusho* was delighted that last November China, for the first time, did not boycott an international conference where South Korea was represented. The gathering was an Asian-Pacific Shipbuilders' Conference held in Tokyo and attended by eleven nations. North Korea was absent. *Asahi* reporters covering the event noted that the conference atmosphere was most congenial, with no harsh language exchanged between the Chinese and South Korean representatives.[81] Japanese leaders now expect the United States to give greater attention to the Korean question in her dealings with China.

Tokyo has sought Seoul's understanding of its desire to improve relations with North Korea, arguing that its incremental policy will have a moderating influence on Pyongyang's behavior and thus in the long run will contribute to the thawing of tension on the Korean peninsula. Seoul, refusing to see the logic of this position, has retorted that Japan's economic relations with Pyongyang only add to its military capabilities, and that Kim is not to be trusted and has not given up his goal of armed unification. The Japanese have learned that their important economic role in South Korea cannot be readily converted into political leverage in dealing with

[79] Tokyo was pleased that during Kim's visit to Peking the Chinese "leadership advised him that he should exercise more discretion." In the words of Sakata Michita, chief of the Self-Defense Agency, "At the end of his trip to China [Kim] had greatly moderated his views. Indeed, Peking is to be credited for the change of the North Korean leader's mind." See "Sakata Scenario," p. 28. To reinforce his government's moderate stand, Chiao Kuan-hua told a visiting British leader that "there is no danger of war erupting in Korea." See *Asahi*, May 11, 1976.

[80] See my article, "The 'Anti-Hegemony' Controversy in Sino-Japanese Relations," *Pacific Affairs*, Fall 1976.

[81] *Asahi*, November 22, 1975.

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the Seoul government as far as the North Korean question is concerned. Since Seoul is sensitive to and resentful of Tokyo's pressure, they have been careful about taking actions that might be interpreted as interference with South Korean policy.[82] Because the United States is relatively free from these constraints Tokyo hopes Washington will use its influence and make greater efforts to convince the Seoul government that improvement of relations between Pyongyang and Seoul's major allies will have positive effects in reducing tension on the Korean peninsula. As Miki stated before a recent Japan-America Society meeting in Tokyo, "Japanese-American cooperation is most essential to promoting a Seoul-Pyongyang dialogue."[83]

[82] When Japan's UN activities to establish direct contacts between the United States and North Korea were known last fall, the Seoul government sharply criticized Tokyo, charging that Japan's moves were "helping the enemy." See *Tong-a ilbo*, October 22, 1975.

[83] *Sekai*. December 1975, p. 198.

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CHANGING POWER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA*

by Howard Wriggins

Recent developments in the Middle East have profoundly altered the roles Middle Eastern states can play. The 1973 war and its aftermath demonstrated to Arab states and to the oil producers in general the advantages of mutual collaboration rather than contest. The quadrupling of oil prices brings hitherto unimagined resources to the oil producers. For some, a margin of organizational and financial resources may remain, after the immediate needs of development programs have been met, to be devoted to foreign policy activities beyond the Middle East. These deserve more careful examination.

Few have ignored the effects of these changes on Western Europe. They have been thoroughly canvassed for the United States, though their consequences remain problematical. Thus far, however, too little attention has been directed toward analyzing their effects on the two principal states of South Asia — India and Pakistan.

This article explores the evolution of relationships between the Middle East and South Asia. It first recalls the changing patterns of relationship and flows of influence between the two areas in recent centuries. The sources of the Middle East states' changed capabilities are reviewed. It then considers the newer patterns of dependency that are developing and speculates on the likely direction the new influences from the Middle East will take in efforts to affect developments and relationships in South Asia.

The Historical Perspective

For many centuries the Middle East and South Asia have had substantial connections with each other. Although there were

* This article is a substantial revision of a paper originally presented at the International Studies Association in Washington, in spring 1975; it will be published in a collection of papers edited by Alexander Ghebhardt and Richard Kozicki, entitled *The Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean* (University of California Press, 1977).

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periods when the two areas were relatively isolated, periods of intimacy have been more typical. Within such periods, there has been a marked ebb and flow of influence of one region on the other, depending upon the different states' changing capacities to organize military, political or economic power from within their own territory or to obtain such resources from outside supporters or allies. In retrospect, it is clear that the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war was a watershed event; since then relationships between the two regions have changed fundamentally.

At that time, the states within the Middle East area at least temporarily composed many of their differences in the face of a common local enemy; oil-producing countries suddenly became far richer than they had ever been. Since then, Iran particularly has been using these new resources to develop a substantial local military capability while managing its new oil wealth in ways to enhance its political influence beyond its borders, not least in South Asia.

We are now witnessing a return to an earlier nexus of influences that would have been more familiar to those living in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries than it is to people imbued with nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century assumptions. In a crude analogy, the area is experiencing a return to patterns of influence more characteristic of the Moghul period than anything seen since the 1700s. Yet, paradoxically, it is in part the effort of the South Asian countries to advance industrially and to provide their people with mechanical energy as a substitute for human muscle power that draws them back to this earlier configuration.

In the thirteenth century under "Turkish" dynasties, and later, in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Persia was often the source of major cultural influences felt in the Indus and Gangetic valleys. To be sure, Babur followed the route of early invaders when he moved from Central Asia to Kabul and then to Delhi. But under him and his successors, whose military capability and administrative skills far surpassed those of their local antagonists, many practical skills and artistic sensibilities came from Persia and its western neighbors, often mediated through Central Asians. Much of the Moghul administration, for example, paralleled earlier Persian practices. The Taj Mahal is a vivid reminder of the Iranian inspiration for so many of the subcontinent's Moghul structures. Indian art in the north and west of the subcontinent was originally Persian in style and motif. Persian was the court and literary language. To this day, Muslim Punjabi and even Delhi

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families hark back with pride to Iranian ancestry if they can. And while Muslims on the subcontinent are sure they are as good as Muslims anywhere else, they look to the "west," away from the subcontinent, for the roots of their religion and for their holy places, beyond Iran to the Arabian peninsula. From the time of the first sustained Muslim influences in the eleventh century, the models for political structures and processes, as well as religious inspiration for an important segment of the subcontinental population and cultural influences, came from Iran and the Arab Middle East.[1]

However, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and until Indian independence in 1947, the tide turned and influences flowed generally in the opposite direction. Once the British consolidated their rule in key areas of the subcontinent after Plassy, India became the shining jewel in the imperial crown. Areas between Great Britain and India became significant in large part because they were on the route to India and therefore a means of sustaining imperial control. But after Napoleon's fall, the Indian Ocean became a British lake, a geopolitical fact made possible by Great Britain's control of India at the center and of the principal entry points at the Cape, Suez and Malacca. Imperial purpose and capability both derived from India, and gave the subcontinent the preponderant role in the Indian Ocean it was to hold until World War II.

Based on India, the British Indian army projected power into southern Iran, eventually going so far as to occupy parts of Iran during two world wars. British civil servants, part of the Indian service, organized a crude order in the Gulf through techniques paralleling the indirect rule developed in their Indian realm. The Indian rupee was a principal medium of exchange throughout the Gulf, and reliable commercial arrangements, loans, administrative skills and management capabilities were often sought in Bombay rather than in other centers of the Middle East (with the possible exception of the Lebanon).

Aden, at the mouth of the Red Sea, was administered as part of Bombay province. Many local disputes were moderated, if not resolved, by officials based in India. Decisions made in Calcutta, Bombay or Delhi, often on grounds of "imperial" interests, were frequently more consequential to commerce or public order in this complicated area than the aspirations of local leaders, local commercial interests or the nominal Ottoman rulers far away in Con-

[1] See Percival Spear, *India: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1961), chaps. IX-XII.

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stantinople. The British navy was far more in evidence and more influential than anything the Ottomans could put in place. India's Muslims periodically sought to affect Britain's policies toward the Middle East, as, for example, in the Khilafat movement on behalf of Turkish rights following Turkey's defeat in World War I, and later on behalf of the rights of Palestine's indigenous Muslims.

Though during World War II British power impinged directly on Egypt and Iran, and British control of Egypt and India remained critical to Allied success in the Middle East and Southeast Asia respectively, imperial order did not survive the war. The Indian independence movement, coupled with wartime exhaustion, brought an end to British rule in India, and Muslim opposition to the prospect of living as a religious minority in a majoritarian Hindu state brought the "first partition" of the country, along with independence, in 1947. In 1948, the British relinquished Palestine at the moment when Jews desperate from Nazi genocide, under Zionist inspiration with American assistance, forced the creation of Israel despite Arab opposition. Under Allied pressure, the French had already left Syria and Lebanon. Hence, within a few years after World War II, the structure of international order and familiar expectations about the locus and flow of relative power were all displaced. A new beginning now seemed possible.

Fluctuating Influences

For the next twenty years, however, relations between the states of the Middle East and South Asia remained uncertain and fluctuating, the weight of influence moving back and forth in short periods. Changes varied with the vigor and international appeal of political leaders and the internal cohesion and political effectiveness of the different regimes. Changing assessments of relative military and economic capability and the ability of states in either area to win external support from one or the other superpower also played a part.

Pakistan, as a new state explicitly founded on Islam as a defining principle, at first hoped to win the backing of fellow Muslims in the Middle East in its anxiety about India and its hopes for a change in Kashmir. But it soon found Arab and Middle Eastern Muslims far more preoccupied with dealing with the remnants of European empires and accumulated domestic problems than with mounting a common Islamic front against India.[2]

[2] See S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); G. W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968);

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Indian leaders, for their part, had long championed the cause of Arab and Iranian independence from British political control or economic predominance. Pakistan's effort to court Middle Eastern Islamic leaders only intensified Indian backing for the Arab effort to dismantle European influence.[3] After Bandung, Nasser and Nehru collaborated in promoting nonalignment, on the theory that the best way to become more independent was to multiply alternative sources of resources, markets and attentive political friends. Both sought wider political combinations to broaden the support for nonalignment; both believed their own state interests were served by gaining military and economic assistance from Moscow as well as Western governments. But their collaboration was sporadic; each found the other annoying and unpredictable.[4]

In the 1950s, the government of India under Nehru's leadership sought to speak for nonalignment in the name of the generality of newly independent states, though India's near neighbors — Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Ceylon then) — usually opposed what they considered to be Indian presumption. Pakistan, by contrast, undertook direct alliance relationships with its Middle Eastern partners Iran and Turkey, through CENTO, and linked directly with the United States in a bilateral alliance which resulted in a much modernized army and air force. Pakistan gained some international leverage through these alliances and owing to American interest in maintaining electronic surveillance of Soviet missile ranges from Peshawar (a gain Iran and Turkey also shared by providing real estate for similar purposes). As CENTO declined in importance and legitimacy, the three — Pakistan, Iran and Turkey — sought another vehicle for mutual consultations, mainly on economic matters, in RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development), with headquarters in Teheran. Meanwhile India found its nonaligned posture helpful in a special way, since the superpowers sought to compete against each other for Indian favors. But India's and Pakistan's inability to settle their differences reduced the influence the South Asian states might otherwise have had beyond the subcontinent.

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and my "The Balancing Process in Pakistan's Foreign Policy," in Lawrence Ziring, Ralph J. Braibanti and Howard Wriggins, editors, *Pakistan: The Long View* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1976).

[3] For a detailed study, see Gurcharan Singh, *The Middle East and Indian Diplomacy* (Pearl River, N.Y.: Alovar Press, 1975).

[4] Godfrey Jansen, *Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States* (New York: Praeger, 1966); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969).

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Toward the end of the 1960s, Pakistan further developed earlier transnational and interstate linkages with the Gulf sheikdoms and a few of the monarchial Arab states. Pakistani advisers and technicians were encouraged to take up high-paying and often influential positions in Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, for instance. The Sheik of Abu Dhabi found Pakistan hospitable for his costly holiday excursions. Engineers and construction workers systematically recruited in Karachi with government approval, for expanding investment construction works in a number of Gulf states, sent back to Pakistan precious foreign exchange earnings. The host countries considered them more reliable and less prone to political activity than their Palestinian or Egyptian equivalents, for they knew no Arabic and were politically uninterested. A detachment of Pakistani military personnel formed part of King Hussein's palace guard in Amman. After 1965, when the limits of American military assistance became more obvious, Pakistan released (or assigned?) air force officers and pilots to Libya, to a number of Gulf sheikdoms and Syria. Thus, a network of inconspicuous transnational connections between Pakistan and elements of the Arab world supplemented the country's more formal alliance connections with the Northern Tier states of the Middle East and the United States.

In the meantime, Nasser's agitational strategy gained him more influence than India's among newly independent countries, particularly the increasingly numerous African states. The Chinese defeat of India in 1962 hastened the decline of Nehru's influence beyond India's frontiers. Then Nasser became bogged down in Yemen and his efforts to build "Arab unity" only intensified divisions between the "socialist" Arab states and the more traditional Arab monarchies.

Iran, between the Arab world and the subcontinent, had acute problems of its own during the post-World War II period. The USSR pressed down from the north; the Shah was preoccupied with re-establishing his hold after the Mossadegh interlude and depended on the United States for economic development assistance and military aid transfers.

By 1968, roughly twenty years after India attained independence and Israel was created, it was hard to assess which region — the Middle East or South Asia — was more influential in relation to the other or within the wider international system. By the end of 1973, however, there was no longer ambiguity. In five years the historic balance of relationships had decisively turned, and seems likely to hold for the foreseeable future. The Middle Eastern-

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Iranian area had become the source of substantial influences playing on South Asia; there were virtually no influences at work in the opposite direction. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the Arab oil embargo had changed the situation in a flash.

Oil and the New Balance

There is no virtue in reviewing here in detail the multiple developments that together went to make up this historic turn. Four alone may be mentioned.

World demand for petroleum to drive industrial machines, irrigate agricultural land, keep houses warm and move people from one place to another accelerated during the 1960s, petroleum exports from the Middle East trebling in a mere ten years. As important, oil discoveries in the Western Hemisphere were declining and it became predictable that for the first time the world's largest consumer, the United States, would have to enter the Middle Eastern market in a large way to meet its expected needs in coming decades. Accordingly, *a new and favorable market situation faced Middle Eastern oil producers.*

Moreover, the *oil producers showed an unprecedented solidarity* through their organization OPEC, which threatened to withhold oil supplies from the market unless prices improved. Arab oil producers, responsible for exporting more than 54 per cent of internationally marketed oil, most of it destined for Western Europe or the northeastern United States, combined in the Arab subgroup, OAPEC. They not only confirmed marketing and pricing solidarity but showed *a growing consensus on how to deal with the "Israel problem" as they saw it.* The companies concluded that they had no choice but to accede to successive price hikes, beginning with Libya's initiative against the Occidental Oil Company in 1970, through the 1973 embargo against those countries most actively supporting Israel.[5]

At the same time, the uncertainties precipitated by the embargo led some smaller companies, lacking the supply diversification of the international majors, to bid up the price for uncommitted crude from non-Arab exporters to $16 and $17 a barrel Compared with the 1971 post-Teheran standard price of $2.23 a barrel, these new prices underlined two critical elements. (1) They

[5] For details see Zuhayr Mikdashi, *The Community of Oil Exporting Countries: A Study of Governmental Cooperation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972); and Philip Connelly and Robert Perlman, *The Politics of Scarcity* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 1975), pp. 68-82.

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dramatized how desperately the industrialized countries needed Middle Eastern oil, for some purchasers were prepared to pay nearly seven times the contemporary contract price for assured supplies in an uncertain future. (2) The fact that such a price boost had resulted from actions taken by Middle Eastern states themselves meant that effective control over marketing questions now lay in the hands of the "host" countries. Consuming governments and international "majors" had become dependent on producer governments now collaborating so closely that production cutbacks and joint decisions on posted prices, output quotas, tax shares and such would stick. In December 1973, posted prices were again raised, this time by another 130 per cent. The sellers were clearly in the driver's seat, having imposed fourfold price increases within as many months.[6]

It is estimated that because of these changes oil revenues received by Gulf states increased fivefold in 1974, on the average, compared with 1973. Iran's income, for example, jumped from $4.9 billion in 1973 to an estimated $23 billion in 1974, Saudi Arabia's from $4.9 billion to $25 billion, and Kuwait's from $2.1 to $9.3 billion.[7] The effects of supply uncertainties and the abrupt price increases were quickly felt in Western Europe, particularly in Holland, West Germany, Great Britain and Italy, and more severely in Japan.

Effects of Petroleum Price Changes on South Asia

But the consequences in South Asia were far more severe, though less noticed in the West. In the case of India, prior to these events some 22 per cent of her foreign exchange earnings were devoted to petroleum and fertilizer imports. During 1974 nearly 45 per cent had to go for these items. The problem was compounded by debt servicing (largely to Western sources) amounting to nearly 25 per cent of earnings, and the need for substantial food imports as a result of bad monsoons in 1973 at a time when foodgrain prices had also abruptly risen. In Pakistan the orders of magnitude were quite comparable. In 1973, fertilizer and petroleum imports absorbed some 17 per cent of export earnings; in 1974 the figure had jumped to 41 per cent. In Sri Lanka, costs of fertilizer and petroleum imports increased from 10 per cent of earnings to 25 per cent between 1973 and 1974. Just prior to the "oil crisis," the Colombo government had

[6] For a summary, see Robert B. Krueger, *The United States and International Oil: A Report for the Federal Energy Administration* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 61-68.

[7] As estimated by the Banque de Bruxelles and reported in the *Wall Street Journal*, December 30, 1974.

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imposed draconian measures to reduce consumption of imported foodgrains in an effort to obtain a margin of foreign exchange to devote to development investment. At a stroke, all that margin was absorbed by the increase in oil and fertilizer prices. Bangladesh's overwhelming problems were likewise made all the worse.[8] Equally as important, because the costs of imported fertilizer jumped substantially, 1974 fertilizer imports declined in all four countries, contributing to lessened food output.

Yet it would be unfair to attribute to increased petroleum prices all the additional foreign exchange difficulties experienced by South Asian economies following the Yom Kippur War. As the above data suggest, world food prices soared in 1973-1974. World foodgrain surpluses declined, America delayed expanding its own acreage and the Soviets secretly bought huge quantities of the remaining American stocks, precipitating a sharp rise in worldwide foodgrain prices. India's foodgrain imports absorbed some 25 per cent of export earnings in 1974, compared with only 15 per cent in 1973, which went mainly to Western agricultural exporters, particularly the United States, Canada and Australia. Keeping pace, Pakistan's foodgrain imports accounted for 20 per cent of earnings in 1974 compared with 10 per cent in 1973.

Then, too, the prices of industrial products had been advancing for several years, contributing to a steady decline in South Asian terms of trade quite before the dramatic price increases for petroleum in 1973-1974. But the suddenness of the changes in energy costs left no room for orderly adjustment, a liability compounded by the chronic narrow margins in South Asian economies and by the pattern of economic dependence already implied by heavy annual debt-servicing obligations. The fourfold increase in petroleum prices may make the difference between a bare and near-desperate solvency or utter bankruptcy for the peoples of South Asia.

As a result, the fortunes of the South Asian economies are far more dependent on specific pricing and supply decisions made in Middle Eastern oil-producing countries than at any time in the past. These changes have already had the following political effects:

(1) Leaders of all four countries now pay greater attention to the assumed foreign policy preferences of Arab oil producers and Iran than ever before. As pointed out, India and Pakistan have always been generally supportive of Arab aspirations for independence

[8] Data on foreign exchange costs for oil, fertilizer and food imports, from James W. Howe, *Agenda for Action* (New York: Praeger, for the ODC, 1975), pp. 238-239, are designated as "informal government estimates."

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from undue European influence. Pakistan tended to support the more moderate Arab positions when Nasser was most militant. But recently, both countries have been even more solicitous of Arab interests.

(2) Although in private conversation in South Asia there is much criticism of the abruptness and size of the petroleum price hike, of the Middle East's early inattention to South Asia's special urgencies, and of the persisting limited special assistance received, no official has dared to express his real views publicly. Too much hinges on favorable (or unfavorable) decisions still to be made in Arab capitals and in Teheran.

(3) Despite the grumbling, the added balance-of-payment burdens have not yet broken the solidarity emerging in the late 1960s between Middle Eastern and South Asian "poor" countries. Articulated first at UNCTAD meetings under Latin American inspiration and in other nonaligned confabulations including UN special sessions, an extensive consensus developed stressing the economic interests all nonindustrialized countries shared as they sought to cope with the "exploitation" imposed on them by the "rich industrialized." It stimulated broad coalitions of voting majorities at the United Nations, encompassing Africans and Latin Americans as well as Middle Eastern and South Asian delegations. By mid-1975, this voting and diplomatic solidarity had not been substantially eroded by the sharpened contrast between the newly-wealthy oil producers and the South Asian countries' deteriorating economic circumstances.

(4) Notably, prime ministers, finance ministers and central bankers of all four countries have increased the frequency and duration of their visits to the capitals of oil-producing states. They are reportedly seeking favorable financial decisions as assiduously there as they used to in Washington, London and Moscow. It therefore seems plausible that they would tailor their policies on financial and other matters to gain at least the acquiescence of Middle Eastern oil producers.

(5) Pakistan has further increased its military participation in the Gulf sheikdoms and in Libya, in part in an effort to obtain resources with which to improve its own military position, now that American military assistance has declined so sharply — and persistently — since before the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war.

(6) Domestically, Muslim minorities in India and Sri Lanka find their position improving, both governments being more solicitous of good repute in Muslim eyes than was characteristic

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before 1973. Their special interests receive greater attention; their views are listened to more sympathetically.

(7) A possibly important economic development is that oil exploration in all four states has sharply increased. India has overcome its reluctance to have foreign oil companies participate in exploration, and a number of American as well as other firms are at work, particularly in Gujarat and offshore in the Bombay High area. Sri Lanka has Soviet technicians exploring off Mannar on the northwest coast opposite India. Bangladesh is pressing further exploration in the area of the northeastern gas fields. Pakistan is pushing explorations in Baluchistan in the area adjacent to the Sui gas fields, where oil has long been suspected but never adequately sought.

A New Role for Iran in South Asia?

A significant element that could affect the relationship between the Middle Eastern and South Asian states is the changing capability and ambition of Iran. Iran's annual income from oil exports increased from $86 million in 1955 to $2 billion in 1971, and was estimated to be on the order of $20 to $25 billion in 1975. At the same time, the Shah has promoted domestic changes that have undercut open opposition to his regime. Though Savak, the Shah's secret police, remains a heavy constraint on free expression and association, and urban guerrillas occasionally burst forth, he appears able to co-opt substantial numbers of highly skilled, foreign-trained young Iranians who otherwise might be expected to form his most effective organized opposition.[9] As his political and financial fortunes have improved at home, he has become increasingly ambitious abroad.

Since the Shah's extravaganza at Persepolis in 1971, commemorating the 2,500th anniversary of the ancient Iranian empire, he has been shaping a progressively more active role for his country in the region, with two main strings to his bow — oil revenues and a growing military capability.

With regard to South Asia, his increased oil income has given him a capacity to exert influence in the following ways:

(a) He can grant (or withhold) price concessions on the export of oil.

(b) He can grant (or withhold) long-term, low-interest foreign exchange loans which, if issued, will reduce the short-term burden of increased oil and fertilizer import costs.

(c) He can grant (or withhold) long-term, low-interest loans for

[9] See Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).

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development investment which, if authorized, can add momentum to development programs while easing foreign exchange deficits in the short run.

(d) He can grant (or withhold) foreign exchange resources that the recipient might want to use to purchase additional military equipment anywhere in the international arms market, which would add to the recipient's buying power and free him from possible supplier efforts to restrict or shape his defense policies.

(e) He can encourage (or reject) joint development projects, such as have been negotiated with India. For example, a $300 million loan is making possible the start of a huge iron ore pelleting plant near Mysore, one-half of the output being committed to Iran.

In each such possibility, resource transfers can be made contingent on the prospective recipient's appropriate foreign or other policies. For instance, in 1972, in an effort to gain foreign exchange to offset some of the costs of losing Bangladesh and to associate himself with the more active elements of the Third World, Pakistan's Prime Minister Bhutto developed friendly relations with the unpredictable Qadaffi of Libya. The Shah disapproved and refused to attend the Islamic summit organized by Bhutto. He was reportedly not prepared to provide substantial assistance to Pakistan until relations with Libya became considerably cooler — which then became apparent. The upshot was that Pakistan received a substantially larger long-term loan than had been expected.

More precisely, South Asia has been a principal recipient of concessional assistance from Iran. Some $750 million went to India in 1974 in the form of deferred oil payments, with 20 per cent of oil imports moving at pre-embargo prices. Pakistan received $580 million in credits and another $250 million in cash transfers.[10] Only Britain, which was granted a $1 billion loan, and Egypt have received more from Iran.

Yet, the importance of such figures for gauging Iran's long-term political influence should not be exaggerated. Already 1975 earnings were less dramatic as world demand temporarily slackened. Unlike his Saudi neighbor, the Shah's oil stocks are being seriously depleted and are not likely to provide reliable income beyond the next thirty years. By then his country must be sufficiently diversified to be viable without a large oil income. In order to diversify that rapidly, he needs to maintain as high a price for his petroleum sales as possible. But a number of Arab oil producers have larger reserves and far less urgent need to sustain the highest

[10] OECD, "Flow of Resources from OPEC Members to Developing Countries" (Paris, working document, April 23, 1975), pp. 14-15; also, interviews in Washington, fall 1975.

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possible price in the short run. Indeed, some — like Saudi Arabia — have an interest in lowering the price to deter the development of substitutes and to gain a larger share of the market more commensurate with their current productive capacity. Accordingly, the Shah will have to devote considerable diplomatic energy to maintaining solidarity with fellow oil producers to hold the oligopolist's advantage at its short-run optimum. Finally, his commitment to enormous defense expenditures and his ambitious development plans will set limits on his ability to use economic levers to gain his ends in South Asia. Some observers expect him to need outside financing again by 1980, and by 1975 he was already undertaking fresh borrowing.

Nevertheless, since his settlement with Iraq in 1975 at the expense of the Kurdish movement, and so long as Moscow follows a policy of détente toward Iran as well as elsewhere, his fears of surprise from the west or north are minimized. This gives him a freer hand for initiatives vis-à-vis Afghanistan, Pakistan and India than has been possible for many decades. It was therefore not surprising that in 1974 he and his queen undertook a major progress through South and Southeast Asia. Pakistan and India received him with all the attention and respect traditionally due a rising power in that part of the world.

In South Asia, one can assume that the Shah hopes to discourage India from acting on any temptation it might have to move against Pakistan. He seeks to induce Afghanistan to forgo stimulating tribal unrest in Pakistan. He appears to want to encourage the Pakistanis to find moderate solutions to differences with India and to gain effective mastery over their domestic opposition in the frontier areas, perhaps by harsh measures if necessary.

What have the South Asian countries to offer the Shah in return for his economic assistance and apparently benevolent readiness to assist them? India, as the largest, is likely to be more consequential to the wider region in the longer run. The USSR remains the Shah's most persistent source of international worry. Closer Iranian links with New Delhi might help to reduce India's growing political, economic and military dependence on Moscow, and thus block a possible Soviet "pincer movement" designed, as the Shah sees it, to surround Iran. India also is a storehouse of hitherto unexploited industrial minerals.

Developments in Pakistan, however, could affect the Shah more directly. Should the tribal areas of Baluchistan revert to disorder and, in the worst case, lead to a successful breakaway

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movement, the Baluch tribes in southwestern Iran would be tempted to join it. Moreover, if Bhutto does not find a way of improving relations with his Pukhtun-speaking tribals in the Northwest Frontier Province, Afghanistan might stand to gain from Islamabad's difficulties — a development likely to strengthen an Afghan regime the Shah may believe to be already unduly influenced by Moscow.[11] A breakup of Pakistan could activate tribal unrest in Iran and might bring India to the Iranian frontier, creating a contingency Teheran would strive to avoid if it could. Accordingly, Pakistan, too, is an important consideration.

The Shah's second source of possible influence is his growing military capability. He has under arms some 230,000 men, who will have approximately 800 Chieftain tanks at their disposal when orders presently committed have been filled. His defense budget is reported to be in the neighborhood of $10.5 billion (compared with India's reported $2.6 billion). His air force is well equipped with F-5A's, while some eighty F-14 Tomcat fighters are on order. His helicopter park has been growing rapidly, and with some 640 aircraft will comprise the largest such unit outside superpower inventories. His navy is expanding. He has laid claim to protect the security of the Gulf and the sea lanes fanning out from the choke point at the Gulf of Oman. His men are presently active in Dhofar; he could quickly intervene across the Gulf should the United Arab Emirate arrangements come under threat.

The United States appears to support the Shah's buildup, for it sold him an estimated $2.5 billion worth of military equipment in FY 1975 alone, on top of substantial sales in the two previous years.[12] To be sure, these massive deliveries may reflect the Treasury's concern for America's balance of payments and the recycling of petrodollars as much as a positive view that a more militarily effective Iran is desirable. A militarily preponderant Iran in the Gulf might intensify long-standing Saudi anxieties and those of the small Gulf sheikdoms; Afghanistan and Iraq might turn to Moscow for countervailing support; also, expenditures for arms could divert Teheran from more constructive investments at home. On the other hand, it would appear that by such investments the Shah hopes to dissuade the Soviet Union from an adventure southward, while at the same time demonstrating a military capability

[11] "Out of the Fire," *The Economist* (London), May 17, 1975, p. 74.

[12] *New York Times*, August 10, 1975; *Jerusalem Post*, July 2, 1975; interviews in Washington; *The Military Balance, 1975-1976* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), pp. 33, 54.

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throughout the Gulf to discourage outsiders' possible temptations.[13]

There are important limitations to what he can accomplish on the military side. While his equipment is modern and he has some expertly trained officers and technicians, not all his men may be competent at handling highly sophisticated equipment. His numerical strength of 230,000 compares well with Pakistan's 250,000, but beside India's nearly one million men it is not impressive. At the same time, the Soviet contingency cannot be set aside: the Gulf emirates are divided and weak and might tempt ambitious outsiders, while developments in the Arab world are volatile and fundamentally unstable.

Nevertheless, the Shah has ambitions to influence events in South Asia. He has undertaken a military contingency commitment, in addition to the economic commitments made after he visited the subcontinent, and has publicly declared Iran's intention of intervening militarily if necessary, should Pakistan's integrity be threatened.[14] This, of course, has delighted Bhutto. Although earlier such a declaration would have provoked Indian anger — as did Iran's rapid military buildup — more recently the New Delhi government seems to have been reassured about the Shah's intentions. In any event, it has not reacted publicly to any apparent Iranian preference for Pakistan it may have noticed.

The Shah's economic and military capabilities are of a different order of magnitude than they were five years ago, even though there are still rather stringent resource and organizational limits to his position. That his government is now in a position to exert significant influence in South Asia if he so desires creates a new element in the power equation of the area.

Conceivably, in trying to develop closer relations with both India and Pakistan, Teheran might succeed in improving relations with Delhi and Islamabad simultaneously. Moreover, Teheran's favors, so badly needed by both countries, might be so measured out to each as to induce closer cooperation between them. Because Washington and Moscow tried and failed is no guarantee that the Shah cannot be successful. Granted, the chances are not good. But so long as the Shah remains in power and retains a margin of financial resources and diplomatic energy to spare from his Middle Eastern and Soviet concerns, one can expect his regime to continue attempting to affect events in South Asia.

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[13] For a sympathetic view, see R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Iran, the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1972).
[14] R. Critchfield, *Christian Science Monitor*, July 29, 1974.

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In return, both India and Pakistan can be expected to compete for his favor in regard to such mundane matters as low interest loans, assured supplies, price concessions on petroleum imports and development investment. Pakistan seeks resources for military purchases and a reassuring geopolitical balancer at its back. Since the United States seems reluctant to grant any more military assistance, Pakistan must find the cash to purchase modern planes on the world market wherever they can be bought. Both India and Pakistan try to persuade Teheran that Iran's long-run interests will be better served by closer relations with its government. It is safe to guess that each warns the Shah of the domestic instability or international unreliability of the other.

At the same time, the Shah is not likely to have it all his way. Despite the nexus of economic interdependency these developments imply, local South Asian interests have a powerful life of their own. In the first place, in the eyes of her policymakers India's relations with the Soviet Union and China are still strategically more consequential than relations with the Middle East, even though the oil price hike is of grave economic importance. Arms flows from the Soviet Union are crucial; yet if relations with China could be improved, India could become somewhat less dependent on Moscow.

Moreover, India's attention to the American buildup in Diego Garcia has shown the country's interest in naval developments in the Indian Ocean quite apart from its relations with Iran. Until recently it has been publicly more concerned with the American facility in the Chagos Islands than with the more substantial Soviet facilities in Berbera, Somalia, and the associated emplacement in Aden. As the "Persian" Gulf suggests Iran's special responsibilities in that area, the "Indian" Ocean carries with it implications of wider responsibilities for India. The recollection of what the British were able to do from their subcontinental base must have some effect on the vision of India's naval planners. Before the rise in oil prices and the conversations between Delhi and Teheran that followed, there were contentious exchanges between the two capitals about the naval future of each country. Should either begin to exert its naval muscle on the margin of the other's seaward "territory," these issues would be likely to surface again.

Earlier, India pressed for a nuclear-free zone in the Indian Ocean, in the hope of dissuading all nuclear powers from threatening nuclear weapons from the sea. But since the Indian nuclear explosion Delhi has been far less enthusiastic about that idea. Now it is the Pakistanis who call for a nuclear-free zone. (It also seems

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likely that they prefer to have an American presence in Diego Garcia as a possible source of support should Pakistan find itself again in difficulties with India, as in 1971.) For its part, until 1971 Sri Lanka repeatedly called for a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean, from which superpower naval forces would be excluded, but Colombo's enthusiasm seems to have waned since the dismemberment of Pakistan.

All three countries, however, share a high degree of ambivalence toward their oil-producing neighbors to the west. Delhi, Islamabad and Colombo would all welcome more generous demonstrations of Third World solidarity in the form of greater concessions from their oil-exporting associates. In India's case there is some doubt about how long the universalistic principle of solidarity will retain priority over her more particular national interest in attempting to bring some moral or political pressure to bear on oil exporters to ease her critical situation.

Pakistan's leaders, too, are ambivalent. Yet Iran's more direct interest in Pakistan and Islamabad's more favorable connections with fellow Islamic states in the Gulf and with Iran suggest that Pakistan is more likely to evolve satisfactory concessional arrangements with the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East. Of course, should the Shah's imperial dreams lead to Iranian actions that ran counter to Islamabad's interests — perhaps in coastal Baluchistan, or in the Gulf emirates where Pakistan might have particularly close connections — relations with Iran could sour. Moreover, should the Shah show manifest preference for India as a more substantial makeweight in the overall Asian balance, Islamabad would be rendered anxious and angered. But there would be little Pakistan could do about such a development, unless the configuration of relationships changed sharply and Islamabad could count on strong Soviet support. Chances are that, in the longer run, rivalry between the two regional giants — Iran and India — might deepen. In this event Pakistan might be given an opportunity to profit from a nonaligned posture between the two if it found Teheran unwilling to be as helpful as it hoped. Unless both India and Pakistan discover substantial sources of petroleum, however, each will have difficulty in standing up to the economic leverage possessed by the Middle Eastern oil exporters.

What of Saudi Arabia and South Asia?

The Saudis are accumulating resources much more rapidly than Iran and could conceivably be more influential in regional

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affairs to the east than they show signs of seeking to be at this writing. Thus far the Saudi clan has shown no ambition to play a role outside the Arab world; it has remained preoccupied with religious concerns, internal development of its backward realm and the problem posed to the Arab world by Israel, particularly the Israeli presence in Muslim parts of Jerusalem. The small Saudi population would seem to preclude forms of influence other than financial and political. Moreover, risks to the Saudi regime come not from non-Arab states to the east but from impatient radicals within the country or from neighboring Arab states.

The Outlook

In conclusion, one can confirm that substantial changes in power relations between the Middle East and South Asia are taking place because of dramatic changes in level and direction regarding the demand for petroleum, new political coalitions among the Arab oil-producing states, and the rising capability of Iran. As a result, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are becoming more dependent on decisions made in Arab capitals and in Teheran than ever before.

Unless equally dramatic changes take place in petroleum discoveries in South Asia, in energy technology which makes substitutes easy and reliable, in Iran's political coherence or the international environment of Iran and the subcontinent, the new dispensation can be expected to last for the foreseeable future. However, Iran's margins of influence will fluctuate with demands for oil, successive price adjustments, the pace of its development expenditure and the continued political vigor of the Shah's regime.

The dependence of both India and Pakistan on Teheran and the latter's ambitions to play a role in this area of historic Iranian influence suggest that Iran will place more emphasis on its South Asian policy than it has over past decades. These developments may contribute to an easing of Indo-Pakistan tensions, though the chances of success in this respect seem remote.

While India and Pakistan are not likely to become reliable collaborators in the Asian system, it is quite possible that their long-standing and intense differences are moderating, as Pakistan accepts the hard fact that India is clearly pre-eminent on the subcontinent and the Indians recognize that Pakistan no longer represents the threat to its security Delhi once believed. Perhaps of more concern will be relations between the South Asian-Middle Eastern giants —

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India and Iran. Collaboration would serve the interests of both in dealing with their differing security problems, but contrasting policies toward the Soviet Union and the United States and possible naval competition could provide sources of difficulty in the future.

Although the Saudis will have far more resources for foreign policy (or other purposes) than Iran, it seems highly unlikely that they will seek to play the influential role that Iran now appears to seek.

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reviews

The Future of the Multinational Enterprise. By Peter J. Buckley and Mark Casson. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976. 116 pp. $16.50.

Controlling Multinational Enterprises: Problems, Strategies, Counterstrategies. Edited by Karl P. Sauvant and Farid G. Lavipour. Boulder: Westview Press, 1976. 335 pp. $25.00.

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Over the past few years, scholar and nonscholar alike have exhibited great fascination with the power and transnational reach of the multinational enterprise (MNE), and the stream of literature on this subject continues to flow at a rapid rate. Most of the writers are economists and business-administration specialists, but political scientists venture increasingly into this exciting field. Underlying most of the literature is an implicit and sometimes explicit assumption of persistent growth by MNEs, especially the large ones, and of constant expansion through proliferating subsidiaries. This assumption also plays a major role in current UN efforts to develop a code of conduct for MNEs and perhaps for the home and host states as well. Does this assumption remain valid for the future, or are economic and political realities changing in such a way as to cast doubts on the continued growth and expansion of these powerful entities?

Of the two books under review, it is Buckley and Casson's that touches directly on the question of the MNE's future development, offering long-term projections based on a comprehensive economic theory of the multinational enterprise. In Sauvant and Lavipour's collection, the major emphasis is on current economic and political problems involving MNEs; their likely behavior in the years to come is treated only peripherally.

It is a hazardous task to summarize any comprehensive economic theory, but in order to make a proper judgment on Buckley and Casson's projections, the essentials of their theory, at least, must be sketched. The theory is based on the concept of "internalization,"

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which seeks to link market theory with theories of managerial organization and control. The authors begin with three assumptions:

(1) Firms maximise profit in a world of imperfect markets.
(2) When markets in intermediate products are imperfect, there is an incentive to bypass them by creating internal markets. This involves bringing under common ownership and control the activities which are linked by the market.
(3) Internalisation of markets across national boundaries generates MNEs. [p. 33.]

Among the market imperfections listed by the authors are the following: concentrations of market power that lead to indeterminate bargaining situations; inequality between buyer and seller with respect to their knowledge of the nature and value of the product; and government interventions in international markets, through tariffs, restrictions on capital movement, and various national taxation systems. The authors stress the importance of knowledge as a particularly "strong incentive for the seller to assume the buyer's risk by internalising the knowledge and integrating forward into the buyer's industry." (pp. 39-40.) This incentive is reinforced by the fact that knowledge is a "public good"; therefore, if the seller wants to maximize his advantage from knowledge, it is essential to preserve the element of natural monopoly.

The main benefits accruing to the MNE from internalization are "the creation of internal futures markets, imposition of a discriminatory pricing system, avoidance of the costs of bilateral bargaining . . . elimination of buyer uncertainty . . . and the ability to minimize the impact of government interventions through transfer pricing." (p. 44.) But there are also several costs. One of these is the "resource cost" of fragmentation, which depends on the relation among the optimal scales of the activities linked by the market. Probably of greater importance is the "communications cost," which rises with the increasing geographic distance between the regions linked by the market and with the increasing "social distance," i.e., the dissimilarities in language and socio-business environments. Another important cost factor is political discrimination against foreign-owned firms, which may lead to unstable political relations. As all these costs rise, multinationality may lose its attraction, and the expansion of MNEs may slow down or stop altogether.

In the equation between benefits and costs, the R&D factor obviously plays a crucial role. The notion of R&D advanced by Buckley and Casson is very broad: it includes not only technically oriented but also market-oriented R&D. Research and development yields

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new, improved products and new, more efficient production processes. But the knowledge gained through R&D must be protected, and the risk of imitation needs to be minimized — which means that the prevailing patent-protection system, currently under severe attack by the less developed countries (LDCs), must be preserved.

The authors contend correctly that

> in the first stage of aggressive growth the more research-intensive is the firm the more likely it is to be multinational and the faster it is likely to grow; thus MNEs will tend to grow faster than average, not because of the advantages of multinationality *per se*, but because both multinationality and growth are linked to R and D through the internalisation of knowledge. [pp. 61-62.]

At the same time, as the authors point out, the cost of adapting knowledge to new markets and to new production environments tends to encourage these firms to invest in countries at a parallel stage of development. In other words, they tend to invest in other developed economies rather than in LDCs, except in extractive industries, which of course are restricted by the location of the raw materials, and in manufacturing enterprises where low labor cost is a decisive factor. Investment data bear this out.

While the explosive growth of MNEs after World War II, especially in fields having to do with advanced technology, has led to widespread concern about the threat posed by continued expansion of MNE activities, the authors believe on the basis of recent trends that

> many MNEs may be entering on a second, more defensive, phase in their life. Depending on the nature of the firm's skills, this phase involves either the progressive decline of the firm, its takeover by another (usually larger) firm, or the redeployment of the research team on other projects. The first two possibilities raise awkward political issues in connection with the rationalisation of internationally owned firms, and the probability of widespread redundancies in their branch plants. On the other hand, the final possibility suggests that the growth of MNEs may continue, though at a reduced pace, and with their influence diversified over a wider range of industries. [p. 62.]

Indeed, when the costs of internalization of markets and knowledge outweigh the benefits to the MNE, the basis for multinationality is undermined. Factors contributing to such a development, not mentioned by the authors, might include a reduction in tariff barriers because of new trade negotiations like the impending Tokyo Round, changes in the wage and productivity levels of different countries, or a more highly scrutinized allocation of capital for investment because of the reduced rate of capital formation. As a consequence, it

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may become economical to sell off foreign plants to indigenous producers (as a number of American MNEs have done recently) and to license technology to the new owners as needed, rather than maintain a worldwide organization for the diffusion of technology.

Buckley and Casson document their work thoroughly and provide supporting data for their mathematical model, and without sacrificing sophistication, their theoretical tenets are presented in language that is understandable to most nonprofessional readers. *The Future of the Multinational Enterprise,* which contains a useful critical survey of alternative theories pertaining to the MNE, is clearly a significant contribution to our knowledge of transnational commerce.

Controlling Multinational Enterprises, edited by Sauvant and Lavipour, is a collection of specially commissioned essays, previously published articles, and excerpts from government documents and UN studies and documents. It contains valuable statistical data, furnished by the UN, and a comprehensive bibliography. As is common with multiauthor volumes, there are shortcomings: duplication of effort, occasionally divergent data on the size of MNEs (see pp. 8-23, 44-45), and a lack of up-to-date information on some issues dealt with in the reprinted materials (e.g., recent experiences with the Andean Pact investment scheme).

The book's main purpose is to explore the interface between multinationals and the nation-states in which they operate. Part I examines the extent to which MNEs contribute to the maintenance or modification of structures in the international system, and analyzes the MNE's impact on the diffusion of culture. Part II deals with some of the power-related characteristics of the MNE that impose constraints on the ability of home and especially host countries to circumscribe its activities. Finally, Part III reviews strategies that have been devised by national governments, groups of governments and the UN to eliminate "undesirable" MNE practices, and evaluates the effectiveness of these programs.

In terms of the future of the multinational, its potential for carrying sociocultural patterns to host countries may be significant inasmuch as successful transmission on a broad scale may reduce hostility on the part of the host state and thus lessen or prevent social and political friction. Sauvant, who is a contributor as well as coeditor, argues that the foreign affiliates of an MNE are able to influence and shape not only a host country's business culture but, through it, the entire cultural and social system as well. Sauvant lists several channels for this transfer of culture: the use of home-

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country management methods in MNE affiliates; the employment of expatriates to fill top managerial posts in these affiliates; the use of parent-company language in intra-MNE communications; the utilization of indigenous labor; the creation of a local infrastructure in support of the foreign affiliate, including business organizations to supply trained personnel and provide advertising services; and the "internationalization of advertising."

I agree with Sauvant that certain aspects of business culture — management methods, in particular, and these mostly from the United States — have been transmitted by MNEs to host countries. This transfer has been bolstered by the establishment of management institutes (such as INSEAD, in France) that have been patterned after prestigious American business schools. But despite the various linkages noted above, I doubt that the sociocultural patterns of host countries have been broadly affected through MNEs. While advertising agencies, as Sauvant points out, have become increasingly transnational, and while most of the largest ones are American-owned, the advertising output, in order to be effective, must appeal to national and even subnational tastes. Even within the European Common Market, the tastes and habits of consumers continue to differ along national and traditional lines, and advertising copy and packaging methods must be closely attuned to these differences if the goods produced by MNEs are to be sold.[1] Conversations in 1973, with Unilever marketing executives in charge of advertising in Belgium and the Netherlands, confirmed this situation. It seems doubtful, then, that MNE advertising can transmit home-country sociocultural patterns sufficient to make a significant impact on the culture of the host country.

Nor is it obvious that employing an indigenous worker for an MNE affiliate will serve as a mechanism to transmit sociocultural patterns. The worker may share the same economic goals as the MNE and might even accept the business philosophy of the firm as practiced in the home country, but this is a far cry from influencing the cultural values and beliefs of his countrymen. Of course, there are other very effective vehicles for the transfer of sociocultural patterns. For better or worse, American films (including TV features) and music have had a considerable impact on societies all over the globe, and have materially contributed to shaping values and behavior.

[1] See the testimony of Professor H. W. deJong, in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Economic Concentration, Hearings* before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 1969, part 7A, pp. 3608-3636.

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East-West economic relations and the multinational are examined by Thomas A. Wolf. His contribution is a reprint of a study first published in 1973, and while the subject is covered competently, the information is at times outdated. It would have been interesting, for example, to learn of General Electric's experience in its cooperative venture with Soviet plants, since American MNE executives have expressed disappointment with such U.S.-Soviet arrangements. As for future MNE activities in this area, lower rates of capital accumulation, and the more careful scrutiny of capital allocation that results, may place constraints on large-scale credits for joint operations with East European plants. Moreover, other cost factors, mentioned above as brakes on MNE expansion, may also diminish the attractiveness of East-West ventures and reduce the extent of East-West economic relations, at least so far as the participation of MNEs is concerned.

In his discussion of strategies and counterstrategies available to national governments and multinationals — which, of course, pursue conflicting economic and political objectives — Franklin Root offers an excellent exposition of how MNEs can obviate restrictive national policies. Root argues that the greater the enterprise's multinational involvement, the higher is the autonomy of corporate decision-making relative to public policies. He also believes, in contrast to the views of many LDC governments, that MNEs are hostage more to the home country than to the host countries. (pp. 104-108.) But whatever the ability of the MNE to place constraints on the home and host countries, such political instruments as expropriation may carry the day if host-country governments are determined, for political reasons, to accept the economic costs of such an action. This is well demonstrated by Michael Morris, Lavipour and Sauvant in their absorbing analysis of the nationalization of Alcan's bauxite facilities in Guyana.

Andrew Hilton presents the results of a 1972 survey of 680 adult-male respondents in Nigeria which was designed to determine (1) the level of awareness of foreign investment, (2) differences in attitude toward investors of different nationalities, and (3) "the possibility that hostility toward certain foreign groups might serve as a positive function both as a means of securing in-group cohesiveness and as a way of diverting hostility from other potentially more vulnerable expatriate [alien] communities." (p. 146.) Perhaps the most surprising of Hilton's findings is that there was little animosity directed toward most foreign investors, but often deep hostility toward indigenous enterprises; where antiforeign sentiment did exist, it was directed primarily against those aliens whose economic

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capacity and culture were closest to the Nigerians', rather than against the more economically powerful and culturally distant investors. (p. 149.) In view of Nigeria's ethnically fragmented society, it might be dangerous to apply these findings to other LDC societies, but they suggest that there may be little popular support for anti-MNE policies in many LDCs. For some LDC governments, of course, such support may be largely irrelevant to decision-making.

Popular attitudes toward foreign investment, nationalization of MNE facilities, MNE strategies and counterstrategies aimed at constraining home and host countries — all these may lose much of their significance if Buckley and Casson's prediction of the decline of the multinational comes true. I tend to agree with their prediction: changing economic, financial and political conditions will probably lessen the attractiveness of expansion to MNE management, especially in the Third World.

The Executive, Congress, and Foreign Policy: Studies of the Nixon Administration. By John F. Lehman. New York: Praeger, 1976. 270 pp. $18.50.

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One consequence of Watergate has been the tendency to believe that Richard Nixon's abuse of power extended to foreign affairs and that the balance between the executive branch and Congress was a victim, like the presidency, of secret and tyrannical extensions. In fact, things were not so simple. According to John Lehman, who as a National Security Council staffer had firsthand experience, the lack of congressional consensus on foreign policy together with resentment over Vietnam forced Nixon to proceed on two tracks. He fought to retain the prerogatives of his predecessors, but simultaneously, through the intellectual schemes of Dr. Kissinger, he also sought to create a fresh consensus. *The Executive, Congress, and Foreign Policy* is an account of foreign-policymaking in the atmosphere of the first Nixon term.

Lehman explores the theoretical and practical aspects of his subject, drawing on an extensive literature and his own memories

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of the 1969-1972 period. He demonstrates that an "ideal" or precise balance between Executive and Congress in the making of foreign policy is not to be found in the historical record or the Constitution itself. Both branches participate, and the apparent dominance of one over the other is a product of circumstance, not of law or tradition. Lehman argues that instead of this sterile debate over "balance," it would be more productive to examine the attributes of each branch and how they could be applied most efficiently to the pursuit of our interests abroad.

The heart of the book is a detailed study of four "processes" of foreign policy creation, each illustrated by a case history through which Congress and the Executive defined their working relationship during the first Nixon term. The war power is exemplified by the Cooper-Church Amendment of May 1970, which sought sharp restrictions on the president's freedom of action in Cambodia. Treaty-making is to be seen in the renewal of Spanish base rights, a controversy over the powers of the Senate and the president as commander-in-chief. That most popular of congressional undertakings, the investigation, is examined through the Symington Subcommittee on Commitments Abroad, which tested executive privilege and secrecy. Finally, the authorization/appropriations process is reviewed through the Cambodian Supplemental.

Perhaps the best word to describe these transactions is "surprising." There emerges a pattern of congressional assertion where the administration's every tactical advance is purchased by a strategic concession, either through congressional participation in foreign-policymaking or in the policy itself. The Cooper-Church Amendment was defeated in its original form after an all-out battle. But the president's unyielding opposition to Cooper-Church in Washington was not accompanied by equal firmness in the conduct of the Cambodian operations themselves. Nixon behaved erratically under pressure, and his restrictions on the scope and duration of the Cambodian "incursion" vitiated much of its military value.

The same pattern of congressional assertion prevails in the other cases. Executive agreements on the Spanish bases are upheld in 1970, but the lesson is learned; as the author notes, renegotiation of the agreement in 1975 takes treaty form, requiring congressional consent. Nixon, pledged to an "open administration," allows the Symington subcommittee access to information; after an embarrassing series of leaks, judged by the president to originate with the subcommittee, he reverses course. Lehman provides a bizarre note

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on executive prejudice: "No investigation was ever undertaken, nor any measures to prove the source of the leaks." The difficulty of conducting foreign policy without "the support of informed consensus" is amply illustrated by the Symington subcommittee case. Lehman clearly condemns the "secrecy and dispatch" that seem to have characterized the activities of his superiors. Congress and the public must be trusted to make policy judgments, and "a price in confidentiality and in time required to articulate positions publicly must be paid."

The Cambodian Supplemental, whose success exceeded administration hopes, also had its price. It is indeed surprising to read today, when Cambodia seems a minor episode in the Indochinese tragedy, that the supplemental involved more foreign policy debate and consultation between the two branches than was occasioned by any executive proposal since the Marshall Plan! But the price — a revised version of Cooper-Church and the prohibition of U.S. advisers in Cambodia — proved to be a "crippling obstacle," in official judgment, to successful Cambodian defense. Lehman's description of the debate is as exhaustive as the debate was exhausting. One concludes that all parties to the episode — Congress, president and Mr. Lehman — succumbed under the weight of their own machinations.

The book concludes with some trenchant observations on the workings of the Executive and Congress, and with an assessment of suggested reforms. It is quite clear that the foreign policy operation of the twenty-five years preceding 1969 — a strong Executive working through a few strong committee chairmen — was the product of an equally strong consensus-of-outlook on foreign affairs. After the "cold war" concept ceased to be accurate or convincing, the essential lubricant between Executive and Congress thinned and friction increased. The author contends that the restoration of consensus through Kissinger's conceptual framework was just about to emerge when "it was obliterated by the devastation of the Executive as a result of Watergate."

The evidence produced in *The Executive, Congress, and Foreign Policy* suggests that the Nixon administration fell short of both its major objectives in dealing with Congress on foreign policy. Executive prerogative diminished slowly but surely, less in law than in practice. Executive-congressional consensus was not created during Nixon's first term. Unfortunately, Lehman's treatment of the administration's strategy for establishing such a consensus does not possess either the lavish detail or massive evidence that was devoted to the battle over respective roles for the branches. The four "proc-

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esses" reveal the growth of certain perspectives on international affairs, but it is difficult to trace from these the progress of Dr. Kissinger's conceptual scheme as a shaper of congressional attitudes. Yet such attitudes, like their "cold war" predecessors, will determine the continuity of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy.

Mr. Lehman has produced a remarkable book. The prose is splendid, give or take an adverb, and it has already had public impact. Lehman, master of the sometimes idiosyncratic ways of Congress, was by sublime irony nearly a victim of the confirmation power. His manuscript was used by a highly offended senator to harry him when he was nominated to his current post as Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. But the senator's literary and evidential criteria were not the best standards — at least in the view of the majority of his colleagues. The book is a solid piece of research and is essential to our understanding of how American foreign policy is made.

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publications received

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Japan, America, and the Future World Order. Edited by Morton A. Kaplan and Kinhide Mushakoji. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, for the Center for Policy Study, University of Chicago, 1976. 369 pp., $12.95. Well-informed report on a pair of conferences held in Tokyo and Chicago, with unusually good input from Japanese side.

Mathematical Models in International Relations. Edited by Dina A. Zinnes and John V. Gillespie. New York: Praeger, 1976. 397 pp. $29.50. The new frontier in quantitative international relations.

The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics: Essays on International Politics in the Twentieth Century. By John H. Herz. New York: McKay, 1976. 307 pp. $4.95 (paper). The full impact of Herz's theoretical realism is conveyed by this collection of essays, most of which have been published previously.

On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation. By J. Bowyer Bell. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976. 272 pp. n.p. A study of rebellions against the British Crown; replete with impressionistic conclusions and delightful prose.

On War. By Carl von Clausewitz; edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. 717 pp. $18.50. The new English rendition of Clausewitz's tome, accompanied by useful commentaries.

The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies: A Study of Self-Determination, Concord Among the Major Powers, and Political Arbitration. By István Bibó. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Halsted Press, 1976. 152 pp. $17.50. Rather unfocused study of the rise of the modern nation-state in the international system.

Perception and Misperception in International Politics. By Robert Jervis. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. 445 pp.

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$22.50 ($11.50, paper). Important, critical look at studies of unconscious behavior in foreign-policymaking elites.

Small States and Segmented Societies: National Political Integration in a Global Environment. Edited by Stephanie G. Neuman. New York: Praeger, 1976. 238 pp. $16.50. Case studies of divided or heterogeneous societies, with occasional comment on their tendency to remain viable and governable political units.

The Soviet-American Arms Race. By Colin S. Gray. Westmead, England: Saxon House/Lexington Books, 1976. 196 pp. n.p. Revision of a Rand study that attempts to break down the range of possible strategic postures into discrete policy categories.

Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites. Edited by Robert Axelrod. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. 404 pp. $25.00 ($9.95, paper). The best collection to date on the methodology of cognitive mapping; includes a number of case studies.

Peace and World Order Systems: Teaching and Research. By Paul Wehr and Michael Washburn. Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, Library of Social Research no. 25, 1976. 255 pp. $12.00 ($7.00, paper).

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The Problem of International Consultations: A Report of the Trilateral Task Force on Consultative Procedures to the Trilateral Commission. *Rapporteurs:* Egidio Ortona, J. Robert Schaetzel and Nobuhiko Ushiba. New York: The Trilateral Commission, Triangle Paper no. 12, 1976. 21 pp. Free.

The Year Book of World Affairs: 1976. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. Boulder: Westview Press, for The London Institute of World Affairs, 1976. 347 pp. $27.50.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY

Alternative Energy Strategies: Constraints and Opportunities. By John Hagel III. New York: Praeger, 1976. 185 pp. $17.50. Supported by the Petroleum Information Foundation, this study makes the case for increased petroleum flows, greater incentives for private industry, and limits on consideration of the ecological consequences of energy development.

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Energy Supply and Government Policy. Edited by Robert J. Kalter and William A. Vogely. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. 356 pp. $5.95 (paper). Oriented toward domestic energy policies; provides a useful exploration of the possible impact of international energy developments.

Foreign Trade and International Development. By Anindya K. Bhattacharya. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1976. 107 pp. n.p. A catalogue of the pressures on present and future trade negotiations that make a successful outcome so unlikely.

The Future of World Oil. By Paul Leo Eckbo. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1976. 142 pp. n.p. Applies cartel theory and several mathematical models to the behavior of the international petroleum market.

The Law of the Sea: U.S. Interests and Alternatives. Edited by Ryan C. Amacher and Richard James Sweeney. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976. 196 pp. $9.00 ($4.00, paper). Proceedings of a conference in February 1975 sponsored by the U.S. Treasury Department and the American Enterprise Institute.

The Politics of International Monetary Reform — The Exchange Crisis. By Michael J. Brenner. Cambridge: Ballinger, for the Center for International Affairs, Harvard, 1976. 144 pp. n.p. Highly literate explanation of the various attempts to rebuild the international monetary system since its breakdown in 1973.

Potential Energy: An Analysis of World Energy Technology. By Michael Kenward. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 227 pp. $14.95 ($5.95, paper). A valuable, illustrated survey of the energy sources available to meet the challenge of the next few decades.

The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World. By Mahbub ul Haq. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. 247 pp. $12.50 ($5.95, paper). The agenda for international action on Third World poverty is set down in general fashion.

Seabed Politics. By Barry Buzan. New York: Praeger, 1976. 311 pp. $20.00. Historical study of the course of negotiations on regulating the seabed and the oceans; emphasis is on the UN conferences and their political environment.

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Technology Transfer and U.S. Foreign Policy. By Henry R. Nau. New York: Praeger, 1976. 325 pp. $22.50. A collection of generally helpful papers, albeit uneven in quality, on technology and its emerging importance in international affairs.

Women and World Development. Edited by Irene Tinker and Michèle Bo Bramsen. Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1976. 224 pp. $3.50 (paper). The combined contribution of the ODC and the American Association for the Advancement of Science to International Women's Year (1975).

Nuclear Energy and National Security. By the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development. New York: CED, September 1976. 80 pp. $4.00 ($2.50, paper).

Social Policy in a Changing World: The ILO Response. Selected Speeches by Wilfred Jenks, Director-General of the International Labour Office, 1970-1973. Geneva: ILO, 1976. 265 pp. Sw.Fr. 20.00.

United States Strategies for World Hunger. By Carl J Schramm. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1976. 20 pp. $0.75.

MILITARY AND ARMS CONTROL

The Dynamics of Détente: How to End the Arms Race. By Arthur Macy Cox. New York: W. W. Norton, 1976. 256 pp. $8.95. An indictment of those high-level officials in the U.S. government who are skeptical of detente and who press for higher defense budgets.

The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control. By William Epstein. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1976. 341 pp. $14.95. Explores strategies for reducing and possibly ending the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

The Raid. By Benjamin F. Schemmer. New York: Harper & Row, 1976. 326 pp. $10.95. A fascinating, behind-the-scenes look into Pentagon operations, specifically the abortive effort to rescue American POWs from the Vietnamese prison camp at Son Tay.

Documents on Disarmament: 1974. By the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington: GPO, 1976. 918 pp. $8.60 (paper).

The International Countermeasures Handbook: 1976-1977. (Second edition.) Edited by Harry F. Eustace. Palo Alto, Calif.: EW Communications, 1976. 666 pp. $35.00 (paper).

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THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

America as an Ordinary Country: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future. Edited by Richard Rosecrance. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. 276 pp. $9.75. Papers originally delivered at a 1975 Cornell University conference; includes contributions from Buchan, Hassner, Duchêne, Gilpin, Bergsten and others.

America in an Interdependent World: Problems of United States Foreign Policy. Edited by David A. Baldwin. Hanover: The University Press of New Hampshire, 1976. 352 pp. $12.50 ($6.50, paper). Essays produced by the faculty study group at Dartmouth College's Public Affairs Center. The result is both elegant and thought-provoking, touching on a wide range of foreign policy questions.

Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power. By John G. Stoessinger. New York: W. W. Norton, 1976. 234 pp. $8.95. A sympathetic portrait of a U.S. secretary of state; the underlying purpose is to convey Stoessinger's normative view of the American world role in the 1970s.

Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War. By Richard J. Walton. New York: The Viking Press, 1976. 388 pp. $12.95. Insightful discussion of the interaction between domestic electoral politics and foreign policy, and of the damage to each that results.

Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems. Edited by Klaus Knorr. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, for the National Security Education Program, 1976. 387 pp. $6.95 (paper). A valuable set of essays that places national security arguments in a temporal framework, thus suggesting some value in the study of history as an approach to understanding international relations.

The Minutemen and Their World. By Robert A. Gross. New York: Hill & Wang, 1976. 242 pp. $8.95 ($3.95, paper). The best tools of social history are applied to an early guerrilla war, resulting in an incisive portrayal of what makes some men revolt and others stay at home.

The New Internationalism: Strategy and Initiatives for U.S. Foreign Economic Policy. By Wilbur F. Monroe. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1976. 238 pp. n.p. *Tour d'horizon,* without in-depth examination of any given problem, by a member of the President's Council on International Economic Policy.

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